VI. 1811. 46. parations, of the ene convoy, is thus described by Sir Charles Stewart: "Wel- CHAP. lington early determined to make his retreat by the great road which leads from Ciudad Rodrigo to Fuente Guinaldo. The divisions upon the more advanced chain Wellingaccordingly received orders, in case of an attack, to retire, ton's preafter having well disputed their ground, towards Fuente and advance Guinaldo. Here it was expected that a more resolute my, who relieve stand would be made under cover of the redoubts and Ciudad Rodother works which had of late been thrown up; whilst, rigo. in the event of further falling back, everything was so settled that the movement could be executed at any moment, and with comparative security. Such was the order of the Allied army when, on the 24th of September, a considerable body of the enemy showed themselves in the plain before Ciudad Rodrigo. They came from the Salamanca and Tamames roads, and were accompanied by a countless number of waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their progress was slow and apparently cautious; but towards evening the convoy began to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which passed the Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which halted upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything further than the object which was thus attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked that night near the town. In the morning, however, as soon as objects became discernible, one corps of cavalry, amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in motion along the great road which, leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Bodon on the left; whilst another, less numerous, perhaps, but, like the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched direct upon Espeja. They both moved with admirable steadiness and great regularity; and as the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear and beautiful, their appearance 208, 209. was altogether very warlike and extremely imposing.1 1 Lond. ii. 221. VI. 66 CHAP. Covering both flanks, and a retiring angle of the river forming its point d'appui. The approaches were difficult and 1811. exposed, and the natural defences shielded it much more effectually than the one at Guinaldo had done. Yet was the position in one respect full of danger: there was no secure retreat in case of disaster. With a river," says Sir Charles Stewart, "like the Coa in our rear, it would have been absolutely necessary either to repel at all points the enemy's attacks, however formidable, or to perish; for the line once broken could not be withdrawn without suffering a loss which in our case must have 1 Lond. ii. proved fatal." The selection of such a position for a pitched battle, which in other circumstances would have been a grave military error, was vindicated in Wellington's case by the well-grounded confidence which he felt in the quality of his troops, and the fact that the whole force to the north of the Tagus were here, for the first time since the attack on Badajos, assembled. The 5th division passed the Agueda at Navas Freas, and formed the right of the line; to its left was drawn up the 4th ; the light stood above Soito; the 3d in front of Pouca Tarenha; the 1st and 6th at Rendoa, where the ground was peculiarly strong; the 7th, with the cavalry in a second line, in the rear-in all, 30,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 46 guns and with such a force, Wellington 416, 417; might well be excused by feeling confident against the iv. 66, 67. army, fully a half greater, by which he expected to be assailed.2 2 Brial. i. Marmont, 55. decline the Every one in both armies now expected that a pitched The French battle was at hand, the more especially as the retreat of conflict. the retiring columns had been severely pressed by Marmont's advanced-guard, with whom a sharp action had taken place at Aldea del Ponte, in which, although the British at first had the advantage, they were ultimately worsted in consequence of the gallant rearguard pursuing their advantages too far, and being driven back by a much superior body of the enemy. But it fell out otherwise : ately at hand to support them, they were at length compelled to retire, and the guns fell for a moment into the hands of the assailants. But it was only for a moment; for the 5th Regiment was ordered instantly to recover them. They marched up in line, and firing with great coolness; when at the distance of only a few paces from their adversaries, they brought their bayonets to the charging position, and rushed forward. I believe this is the first instance on record of a charge with the bayonet. being made upon cavalry by an infantry battalion in line; nor, perhaps, would it be prudent to introduce the practice into general use; but never was charge more successful. Possessing the advantage of ground, and keeping in close and compact array, the 5th literally pushed their adversaries down the hill; they then retook the guns, and, limbering them to the horses, which had followed their advance, drew them off in safety." CHAP. VI. 1811. 49. tion under Alten and While this was going on in one part of the field, repeated attacks were made in another upon the handful Glorious of cavalry under General Alten's orders, who, assisted cavalry acwith his usual gallantry by Sir Charles Stewart, manfully Sir Charles stood their ground against the squadrons, four times more Stewart. numerous, of Montbrun's dragoons. "On all such occasions," says Sir Charles Stewart, "the assailants outnumbered the defenders by at least four to one, and they came on with the reckless bravery which is exhibited only by men accustomed to conquer; but nothing could exceed the steadiness of our cavalry, and their excellence became only the more apparent on account of the great odds to which they were opposed. There were present in this rencontre two squadrons of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, with a similar number of the 11th Light Dragoons, between whom it was impossible to determine which performed feats of the greater gallantry. Indeed, I can personally attest that the single source of anxiety experienced by the officers in command, arose from an apprehension lest these brave fellows should follow the CHAP. VI. 1811. 57. Welling ton's pro time. an alarming degree. Fevers and agues were very general; scarce a regiment could show two-thirds of its numbers on parade; and the sick in the hospitals of the British alone swelled to the enormous number of sixteen thousand. During the period of apparent rest which followed, the active mind of the British chief enjoyed no relaxation, jects at this and he was incessantly engaged in projects to turn to the best account the favourable aspect which affairs were assuming from the events in progress in the north of Europe. During the autumn, Napoleon withdrew 60,000 of his best troops, including the whole Imperial Guard, from the Peninsula, to take a part in the war in Russia. Wellington, feeling the pressure upon him thus relieved, revolved in his mind various plans for offensive operations. Among the rest, he entertained a design of making an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters in the rivers which required to be crossed rendered this design impracticable. So closely, however, was that fortress watched, that Don Julian Sanchez, a guerilla chief, who had thrown himself into it when it was besieged by Massena, and cut his way out when its surrender was approaching, made prisoner of the governor-general, Regnaud, by a well-devised ambuscade, when riding unguardedly outside the walls. He became a frequent and acceptable guest at Lord Wellington's table, who received him with the courteous hospitality with which Marmont had entertained Colonel Gordon, and which brave and chivalrous nations owe to each other.1 1 Lond. ii. 227-230. 58. Brilliant success of General But these projects ere long were succeeded by another which was conducted with the greatest ability by General Hill. When Marmont withdrew with the bulk of his army to the neighbourhood of Placencia, he left a corps los Molinos. of his army at Merida, which first moved to the neighbourhood of Zafra, but afterwards to that of Caceres, for the purpose of levying contributions. Deeming that Hill at Aroyo de Oct. 27. VI. 1811. success, that the retreat of this part of the line to the CHAP. fortified positions in the rear was effected without a gun. being taken, a square broken, or squadron dispersed. Before midnight on the 25th the three central divisions were safely collected in the position of Fuente Guinaldo. But they were only 14,000 men, the wings being not yet come up, and they had the prospect of being assailed at daybreak by 50,000, including 13,000 of the Imperial Guard. 66 51. appearance French ar my here Sept. 26. "The night of the 25th," says Sir Charles Stewart, was spent by us, as it is customary for soldiers to spend Splendid a night upon which they have reason to expect that a day of the of battle will rise that is to say, the superior officers lay down in their cloaks upon the floors of the houses, whilst collected. the men slept on their arms round large fires, which blazed along the range of the position. Long before dawn, however, all were astir and in their places, and the different regiments looked anxiously for the moment which should behold the commencement of a game as desperate as any which they had been yet called upon to play. But instead of indulging our troops as they expected, Marmont contented himself with making an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute a variety of manœuvres in our presence; and it must be confessed that a spectacle more striking has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry which followed us to our position, and had bivouacked during the night in the woods adjoining, were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting for the signal to push on. By-and-by nine battalions of infantry, attended by a proportionate quantity of artillery, made their appearance, and formed into columns, lines, echelons, and squares. Towards noon twelve battalions of the Imperial Guard came upon the ground in one solid mass; and as each soldier was decked out with feathers and shoulderknots of a bloody hue, their appearance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree. The solid column, however, soon deployed into columns of battalions-a move |