CHAP. VI. 1811. ment which was executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy quite admirable; and then, after having performed several other evolutions with equal precision, the Guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. Next came another division of infantry in rear of the Guards, and then a fresh column of cavalry, till it was computed that the enemy had collected on this single point a force of not less than 25,000 men. Nor did the muster cease to go on as long as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment we could observe men, horses, guns, carriages, tumbrils, and ammunition-waggons, flocking into the en1 Lond. ii. campment, as if it were the design of the French general to bring his whole disposable force to bear against the position of Fuente Guinaldo."1 215-217. 52. declines battle. The fate of the Peninsula was now in Marshal MarMarmont mont's hands. By his own admission he had 40,000 men, including 13,000 of the Imperial Guard, in one battle-field, within cannon-shot of the English army. Wellington stated the French army at 60,000 men, with 125 guns, including 22 battalions of the Imperial Guard ; and if the enemy's force be stated at a medium of 50,000 men and 100 guns, it will probably be near the truth. Wellington had at the very utmost 15,000 men, in a position only strengthened by a few field-works. But the French generals, despite their immense superiority of force, were afraid to engage the British in a pitched battle in a favourable position; and Marmont, accordingly, spent the day in making a parade of this force, as in a review, before their enemies, while he himself was studying the English position. To the latest hour of his life he never ceased regretting that he had not fought instead of reconnoitring only on that occasion, for so favourable an opportunity never again occurred. The Imperial Guard, and a considerable part of the forces in the Peninsula, were soon after withdrawn to take part in the war against Russia.2 2 Marmont, iv. 66; Gurw. viii. 305, 306. The English general had his own reasons for stand Ciudad Rodrigo in form, now that it was left to its own CHAP. resources. VI. 1812. 61. Investment of Ciudad ties. How great soever might be the advantages which Wellington enjoyed in the dispersion of the French troops, he had his full share of difficulties in preparing for the siege. Rodrigo and The fortress to be attacked stood on the brink of a rapid its difficulriver, surrounded by a vast plain without any defensible position, water, or even cover for the troops. It was impossible to place an army there for any considerable time without exposing it to hardships which must soon prove fatal to its health. The town is situated upon one of three eminences which stand upon the right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly from the plain, which is in a high state of cultivation. "This plain is bordered," "This plain is bordered," says Sir Charles Stewart, "on the north and west by a range of rugged mountains, and on the south-east by a similar range still more rugged and impervious. The former of these ranges consists of cliffs and crags, separated from one another here and there by wide passes, through which several excellent roads conduct to Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast only of the Pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous as to be perfectly useless in a military point of view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at the distance of several miles from the walls, and hence both are equally unavailing for the purposes of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a position at all favourable or commodious to an army intended to cover the progress of a siege." The whole country is "deficient in springs and pools, and the only source from which water can be procured by the inhabitants is the Agueda." This circumstance alone imposed a very serious difficulty upon the besieging army, for the mass of the troops required to be established at a distance from the river, from whence water could only be brought at great difficulty and expense. In addition to this, should the siege be once seriously undertaken, it must either be brought to a successful issue, or, in the event of its being raised, the CHAP. VI. 1812. 1 Lond. ii. 193-196. 62. of the for tress. whole artillery and stores would be lost for the nature of the country, and the badness of the roads, rendered any attempt to withdraw them in presence of a superior enemy hopeless; and the banks of the Agueda and Coa are not only extremely rugged and difficult, but these rivers are liable to sudden floods, which sweep away bridges and render fords impassable.1 "Ciudad Rodrigo," says Colonel Jones, "is built on a Description rising ground, on the right bank of the Agueda, and has a double enceinte all round it. The interior wall is of an old construction, thirty-two feet high, and generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and with weak parapets and narrow ramparts. The exterior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie of a low profile, and is constructed so far down the slope of the hill as to afford but little cover to the interior wall; and from the same cause of the rapid descent of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imperfectly covered by its glacis. On the east and south sides there are ravelins to the fausse-braie; but in no part are there any countermines nor a covered way. Without the town, at the distance of 300 yards, are the suburbs, which are enclosed by a bad earthen retrenchment hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during the siege of 1810. The French, too, since they had been in possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, had made strong posts of three convents, one on either side of the suburbs, and one in the centre; and they had also converted into an infantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated just beyond the glacis on the north-western angle of the place. The works of the suburbs, though slight, were sufficient to resist a coup-de-main. The ground outside the place is dry and rocky, except on the northern side, where there are two hills called the lesser and larger Teson. The one, at 180 yards from the works, rises nearly to the level of the ramparts, and the other, at 600 yards' distance, considerably above them. The French had erected a redoubt upon the highest of these hills, which required to be VI. 1811. Marmont, who had declined to attack fifteen thousand CHAP. at Guinaldo, had not resolution to hazard this attack on double the number in the stronger position of Soito. He withdrew his troops accordingly during the night of the 27th; and on the morning of the 28th, Sir Charles Stewart, who went forward to reconnoitre, found only a rearguard of cavalry in possession of Aldea del Ponte, which they had won the evening before. 56. go into Though Marmont committed a great and irreparable mistake in not attacking the English at Fuente Guinaldo The French on the 26th, yet he was not to be blamed for not pro-wintersecuting his advantages or advancing into Portugal at quarters. that time. He had neither provisions nor stores necessary for such a forward movement. His object was in the first instance merely to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, and after that was done to make such a reconnoissance as would enable him to see whether any preparations had been made for a regular siege of that fortress. It was only from finding the Allied army so scattered that he was tempted to bring up his whole force at Fuente Guinaldo, and had so fair an opportunity, which he let slip, of striking a decisive blow there. Finding the enemy all concentrated at Soito on the 27th, he gave up all thoughts of any further offensive movement at that time, and, retiring into Spain, distributed his great army into winterquarters. Dorsenne with the Imperial Guard moved back to Salamanca and Valladolid; while Marmont, with the army of Portugal, went into cantonments around Placencia, and in the valley of the Tagus. On his side the English general, finding the enemy withdrawn, passed the Coa with the bulk of his troops, leaving only the 4th Marmont, and light divisions to observe Ciudad Rodrigo and dis- iv. 67, 68; charge the duty of light posts. The remainder of the army 226, 227; was put into cantonments, headquarters being established to Lord Livat Frenada.1 But the billets were exceedingly small and 9, 1811; incommodious, the rain fell in torrents, and the unhealthy 326. autumnal months having now set in, the sick increased in Lond. ii. Wellington erpool, Oct. Gurw. viii. CHAP. VI. 1811. 57. Welling ton's pro time. an alarming degree. Fevers and agues were very general; scarce a regiment could show two-thirds of its numbers on parade; and the sick in the hospitals of the British alone swelled to the enormous number of sixteen thousand. During the period of apparent rest which followed, the active mind of the British chief enjoyed no relaxation, jects at this and he was incessantly engaged in projects to turn to the best account the favourable aspect which affairs were assuming from the events in progress in the north of Europe. During the autumn, Napoleon withdrew 60,000 of his best troops, including the whole Imperial Guard, from the Peninsula, to take a part in the war in Russia. Wellington, feeling the pressure upon him thus relieved, revolved in his mind various plans for offensive operations. Among the rest, he entertained a design of making an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo by escalade; but the rising of the waters in the rivers which required to be crossed rendered this design impracticable. So closely, however, was that fortress watched, that Don Julian Sanchez, a guerilla chief, who had thrown himself into it when it was besieged by Massena, and cut his way out when its surrender was approaching, made prisoner of the governor-general, Regnaud, by a well-devised ambuscade, when riding unguardedly outside the walls. He became a frequent and acceptable guest at Lord Wellington's table, who received him with the courteous hospitality with which Marmont had entertained Colonel Gordon, and which brave and chivalrous nations owe to each other.1 1 Lond. ii. 227-230. 58. Brilliant success of General But these projects ere long were succeeded by another which was conducted with the greatest ability by General Hill. When Marmont withdrew with the bulk of his army to the neighbourhood of Placencia, he left a corps los Molinos. of his army at Merida, which first moved to the neighbourhood of Zafra, but afterwards to that of Caceres, for the purpose of levying contributions. Deeming that Hill at Oct. 27. |