CHAP. VI. 1812. lost; but the soldiers worked with such vigour that before The first parallel sunrise they were entirely under cover. was immediately laid out, and before sunrise on the 10th the workmen there too were completely sheltered. By the 13th, at noon, not only was the first parallel completed, but three batteries, capable of containing thirtytwo heavy guns, were erected. The guns were all brought up, and the ammunition lodged in the magazines. Matters were in this state, and the troops were already beginning to talk of opening their fire, when information was received that Marmont, who it was thought had gone with the divisions towards Valencia, but who in reality was in person in the north near Valladolid, was returning in haste with four divisions to raise the siege. This information was erroneous; for, so far from having stopped the march of his divisions towards Valencia, Marmont did not even hear of the investment of the place until the 15th. Then, however, calculating that it could hold out for three weeks, he gave orders for his nearest divisions to concentrate on Salamanca; summoned Dorsenne to his aid with part of the army of the north; recalled Bonnet from the Asturias; ordered Foy's division, which Montbrun had left to cover his rear, to join him; and directed that general himself to return by forced marches from Valencia. These measures, he calculated, would produce 32,000 men on the Agueda to raise the siege, by the 27th inst., and 40,000 by the 1st February. But this information, though premature, led to the most important results. Fearful of the approach of a large army, which might compel him to raise the siege, Wellington, contrary to all the ordinary rules of scientific Lond ii. attack, ordered the batteries already constructed in the first Brial.i. parallel to be armed, and the gunners to fire alone upon Wellington the body of the place, without attempting to silence the to Lord Livenemy's flanking fire, or ruin his defences. By adopting 15, 1812; this unusual course, he hoped in a few days to breach the 525. rampart, and by a rapid attack carry the place in a third 250, 251; 426, 42; erpool, Jan. Gurw. viii. CHAP. VI. 59. Wellington Ciudad main design, which was to attempt, in the depth of winter, the reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo by main force. 1811. Notwithstanding all the vigilance exerted in the distant. blockade, supplies had been frequently thrown into that approaches fortress; and it was evident that all hopes of reducing it Rodrigo. were at an end, unless it could be done by a rapid siege before the distant armies of France could assemble for its relief. He was not without hopes of achieving this object, as the difficulty of procuring supplies had obliged Marmont to quarter his army at a considerable distance from the Portuguese frontier, and in situations far apart from each other and the badness of the roads rendered the transport of carriages and artillery in winter a matter of great difficulty. To this was to be added another consideration of not less moment. Not only had the finest part of the army which had recently threatened the British at Fuente Guinaldo been recalled into France, but the Emperor had detached two strong divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, containing 15,000 combatants, from Marmont's army, to take part in Marshal Suchet's expedition against Valencia, and at the same time dislocated the whole army of the north, and of Portugal, by ordering the latter to Old Castile.1 1 Marm. iv. 78-80. 60. of the mies in Spain. Jan. 1812. Marshal Marmont set out in person in obedience to Dislocation these orders on the 5th January 1812 for Old Castile, French ar leaving only Brennier's division in the valley of the Tagus, to keep an eye on Estremadura, and General Clausel with the 2d division at Avila. An attentive observer of all that was passing, Wellington built upon this auspicious state of things his expectation, by a sudden movement, of gaining a great advantage over the enemy, and wresting from him the great frontier fortress of Spain, which was all that remained to him of the conquests of the army of Portugal. Directing General Hill, there1 Lond. ii. fore, to advance upon Merida, as well to alarm Drouet and Soult as to draw off part of the enemy's force from Ballasteros in Andalusia,1 he made himself ready to invest 241; Marm. iv. 81. Ciudad Rodrigo in form, now that it was left to its own. resources. CHAP. VI. 1812. 61. of Ciudad ties. How great soever might be the advantages which Wellington enjoyed in the dispersion of the French troops, he Investment had his full share of difficulties in preparing for the siege. Rodrigo and The fortress to be attacked stood on the brink of a rapid its difficulriver, surrounded by a vast plain without any defensible position, water, or even cover for the troops. It was impossible to place an army there for any considerable time without exposing it to hardships which must soon prove fatal to its health. The town is situated upon one of three eminences which stand upon the right bank of the Agueda, and rise abruptly from the plain, which is in a high state of cultivation. "This plain is bordered," says Sir Charles Stewart, "on the north and west by a range of rugged mountains, and on the south-east by a similar range still more rugged and impervious. The former of these ranges consists of cliffs and crags, separated from one another here and there by wide passes, through which several excellent roads conduct to Salamanca and into Castile; the latter can boast only of the Pass of Perales, a defile so precipitous as to be perfectly useless in a military point of view, because perfectly impassable. Both are at the distance of several miles from the walls, and hence both are equally unavailing for the purposes of a blockading force; whilst neither offers a position at all favourable or commodious to an army intended to cover the progress of a siege." The whole country is "deficient in springs and pools, and the only source from which water can be procured by the inhabitants is the Agueda." This circumstance alone imposed a very serious difficulty upon the besieging army, for the mass of the troops required to be established at a distance from the river, from whence water could only be brought at great difficulty and expense. In addition to this, should the siege be once seriously undertaken, it must either be brought to a successful issue, or, in the event of its being raised, the CHAP. VI. were so effectually covered by the fausse-braie that little or no injury was experienced by it; and serious doubts began to be entertained by the engineers whether it would be possible to make a practicable breach till that covering had been blown in. Preparations, accordingly, were made for pushing the approaches nearer; and, preparatory to this, a heavy fire was directed on the San Francisco convent, which in a few hours was reduced to a heap of ruins, and, along with the adjoining suburb, taken possession of shortly after dusk by a party of the 40th. No sooner was the enemy dislodged from this fort than the approaches were pushed forward with the utmost vigour; and on the evening of the 17th, they were advanced to within a hundred and eighty yards of the rampart. From the new parallel so heavy a fire was kept up, both on the old breach and an old tower which was near it on our left, that the former was deemed practicable, while the latter fell with a tremendous crash, and opened a large aperture. Pits were then dug along the glacis, in which riflemen were placed, as was afterwards so much done at Sebastopol, with orders to keep up an active fire on the embrasures, while an incessant shower of grape and canister was thrown on the breaches, so as to render any repairing of them impossible. By mid-day of the 18th, the town was reconnoitred by Major Sturgeon of the engineers, who reported that the greater and lesser breaches were were both practicable. Wellington upon this directed the place to be summoned; and the governor having returned a gallant answer, declaring his resolution to hold out, he determined on an assault on the Brial. i. 427; evening of the 19th, which he announced to the army in the laconic order, "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by assault this evening at seven o'clock."1 1 Lond. ii. 258-263; Marmont, iv. 84. 69. The plan of attack, which was drawn up by Lord Plan of the Wellington and his staff in the trenches, in the midst of a terrific cannonade, was as follows: The attack was to be made by the divisions which happened to be in the assault. VI. trenches at the time, and as they were the light and CHAP. third division, the honour devolved on them. The third division, consisting of the 45th, 74th, and 88th, forming 1812. M'Kinnon's brigade, on the one hand, and of the 5th 77th, 83d, and 94th, forming Campbell's brigade, on the other, were to attack the main breach. They were to be preceded by the light companies, under Major Manners, as a storming party; and they were to be headed by parties carrying woolpacks and scaling-ladders, to enable the soldiers to cross the ditch and mount the walls. These troops were regularly formed in the second parallel, General M'Kinnon leading, and Colonel Campbell in support, with a Portuguese brigade in reserve. To aid this main attack a feint was to be made on the right by Major O'Toole, with five companies of the 95th rifles, and the light companies of the 83d and 94th, the whole guided by Major Sturgeon. The smaller breach on the left was to be stormed by the light division, consisting of two battalions of the 52d, one of the 43d, two of the 95th, and two of Caçadores. This attack was to be led by Vandeleur's brigade, which, issuing from the left of the convent of San Francisco, was to advance first against the breach in the fausse-braie, and then upon that in the ramparts. As soon as they reached the summit of the fausse-braie, they were to detach to their right, in order to communicate with M'Kinnon's brigade, and flank the attack on the principal wall; and as soon as they had reached its summit, they were to turn to the right and join in the main assault. As soon as this was done they were to endeavour to burst open the Salamanca Gate, near which the rest of the division was placed, which was to rush in and secure the place. Three hundred volunteers, under Major Napier, were to head this assaulting column; and they were preceded by the bearers of bags and ladders, Wellingwho were not to carry their arms. Positive orders were given in issued that not a shot was to be fired by the stormers 261, 262. during the assault. To aid the main attack, others ton's orders, Lond. ii. |