Mortier in the north-west of Spain, who advanced to Placencia with 34,000 men to threaten Lord Wellington's rear, of which the remnant of Soult's corps, which had advanced to Oporto, formed only 4000. The remainder was composed of Ney's corps, drawn from the Asturias, and Mortier's, from the neighbourhood of Burgos, all of which districts were entirely stripped of troops from the effect of Lord Wellington's advance. Had the Spaniards done their duty, this united force could not have been brought to bear upon the British army. Its advance had been foreseen and guarded against by Lord Wellington. His army could only be reached by an enemy approaching from the north-west, either by the Puerto Pico or the Puerto de Banos. Marshal Beresford, with 13,000, was stationed at the former, and the Spaniards undertook to hold the latter; but, unfortunately, instead of doing so, they abandoned it, and thus let in the united forces of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, into the theatre of operations on the Tagus. But though this unfortunate circumstance rendered the retreat to Estremadura necessary, yet still the advance to Talavera had been attended with two great and durable results. It had stayed the invasion of the south, and liberated all the north of Spain from the enemy. The French were now confined to the centre of Spain, where the resources of the country were nearly exhausted, and they would find it impossible to carry on the system of making war maintain war, which they had hitherto so successfully pursued. CHAP. VII. 1810. 10. "A battle more glorious or distinguished than that of Talavera itself, was not to be found in the annals, not Continued. merely of England, but of modern Europe. Unlike many other actions which are gained by a lucky accident or fault on the part of the enemy, it was a fairly fought field, in which the prize was at length won by persevering firmness and indomitable courage against vastly superior numbers. By the same unfortunate fatality, however, which had attended all the operations of the Spanish CHAP. VII. 1810. 5. Continued. a year, which will not materially weaken the royal the admiration of the House, is to attempt to introduce a feeling which I trust will never find a place in the British House of Commons. CHAP. VII. 1810. 11. "The loss on that day has been much dwelt on, and none can lament the brave men who perished on that Concluded. occasion more sincerely than I do. But, sharing as I do to the very utmost that feeling, I must at the same time deprecate that careful searching into the details of loss, which is calculated to unnerve the military energy of the country. If such feelings become general, how shall we be able to resist the French or maintain the national independence, hitherto upheld by the strenuous efforts of our soldiers! But in truth, the loss, heavy as it is, has been greatly exaggerated. The returns, which I shall move for on a future day, will demonstrate this. In the mean time, I may observe that our whole loss in Portugal and Spain during the campaign, including the 1500 wounded who fell into the enemy's hands at Talavera, fell short of 8000 men. Of these 5000 were the killed and wounded at the battle there; while the loss of the French in that battle alone did not amount to less than 10,000 men. Soult, notwithstanding all the eulogiums on his military conduct pronounced by the gentlemen opposite, did not carry off a single piece of cannon, and but a third of his army, from the north of Portugal. The gallant chief who commanded the army has indeed fought for his title at Talavera; but he fought for it also in Asia and Europe, in all of which quarters he had been victorious. While all must lament the loss with which his last and crowning victory has been attended, let it be remembered what advantages that loss has produced. Compare the estimation in which the Britisharmy is now held, and the character it has won, with what they were when the Peninsular war began, and the mighty step in national renown which has been made will be at once apparent. We now appeared in the eyes of Europe, not merely, as heretofore, as a great naval, but VII. 1810. CHAP. attempt to contend with him on land, were in every mouth, and loudly re-echoed by a great majority of the press, ever disposed to inflame, rather than moderate, the passions of the moment; and to such a length did the general ferment go, that it was even taken up by the public bodies in the country, and the Common Council of London presented a petition to the King on the subject, which is one of the most curious instances of popular error on record in the whole annals of history. The Opposition, as well they might, made the most of this, to them, auspicious state of things; the powerful eloquence of Mr Canning, in consequence of his absence from England after his duel with Lord Castlereagh, was no longer at hand to support the Government; and it required all the firmness of the latter to make head against the torrent, and prevent the Peninsular contest being at once abandoned, during the first moments of despair consequent on the retreat from Talavera. Lord Castlereagh acted a noble and truly patriotic part on this occasion. Though out of office, and having been undermined in the Cabinet by a secret and unworthy intrigue, he did not attempt to avenge his wrongs upon his former colleagues; he did not join the ranks of Opposition, or change his public conduct to gratify private feelings. He gave Government a generous and effective aid, and, supported by Wellington in the field, maintained the contest against the surging multitude at home and abroad, who were striving to bring it to a termination. 7. reagh's speech on War of 1809. The debate came on on February 1, 1810, on occasion Lord Castle of the Chancellor of the Exchequer moving a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington and the army which fought at the Spanish Talavera. General Tarleton had then opposed the vote, and even condemned in no measured terms the conduct of Lord Wellington on this occasion. Upon this Lord Castlereagh rose and said,-" The gallant general has felt himself called on, in the discharge of a public duty, not only to refuse a vote of thanks to Lord Wellington, but even to lend his countenance to the attempt to convert a vote of thanks into the heaviest censure which could be passed on a most meritorious officer. I must protest, in the outset, against the practice of referring to the whole operations of a campaign on a question confined to the merits of a single but glorious and memorable action. But while I protest against such a principle, I feel I should be doing great injustice to Lord Wellington if I declined to enter on the merits of the campaign as a whole, which were such as to confer the highest lustre on that noble officer. In April 1809 Lord Wellington found himself at the head of 25,000 men in Portugal. His instructions directed him to rescue and defend that country, but with liberty to combine and co-operate in the execution of a plan for joint operations with any of the Spanish armies on the frontier, looking, however, to the defence of Portugal as the grand object of the expedition, and the most important duty he had to perform. Soult at that period occupied the northern provinces of Portugal, while Victor, after having beaten Cuesta at Medellin, menaced the south of that kingdom. The wish to drive the enemy out of Portugal attracted his attention to the North; the entreaties of Cuesta were for combined operations against Victor: and his anxiety to carry into full effect the spirit of his instructions rendered the option difficult. He decided for the North, in the first instance, leaving General Mackenzie, with 12,000 men, to watch Victor on the Abrantes frontier. It is unnecessary to dwell on the brilliant manner in which the exploit of crossing the Douro, and expelling the French from Portugal, was performed, because, however it might be cavilled at by some in this country, ample justice has been rendered to it by the general voice of Europe, and even that of his enemy. CHAP. VII. 1810. 8. "The principle upon which Lord Wellington acted, and was instructed to act, in the campaign, was, in the first continued. instance, to provide for the defence of Portugal by the expulsion of the French from that country, and, having |