1810. Duke of Wellington's despatches, that these apprehen- CHAP. sions were largely shared by the Government, and that, though they did not resolve on abandoning Portugal and withdrawing altogether from the contest, they threw upon him the responsibility of continuing it. Nor is it surprising that they did so. Judging from the past and the lessons of experience, there were no solid grounds for the belief that the struggle in the Peninsula could come to any other termination but that which had already attended similar efforts in Flanders, and under Sir John Moore in the north of Spain. Before we blame them for hesitating sorely on this point, we are bound to look, not merely to the result, but to the grounds which then existed for anticipating a different result from what in similar circumstances had too often before taken place. 13. reagh and ton's con the war in sula. The grounds on which Lord Castlereagh and Lord Wellington believed the contrary, and on the strength of Grounds of which the one maintained the contest in the field, and the Lord Castleother in the senate at home, were those contained in the Wellingmemorable minute of 7th March 1809, on which the sub-fidence in sequent conviction and conduct of both had been founded, the PeninLord Castlereagh, whose official position for several years at the head of the War Office had made him thoroughly acquainted with the military strength and resources of the country and of its enemy, was too well informed not to know that it was in vain for Great Britain, with its limited population, and vast colonies to defend, to think of coping alone with France on the continent of Europe. But he was not the less resolute to maintain the contest. He was well acquainted with the strength of the positions for defence which the mountain ridges of Portugal afforded, and the extreme difficulty of finding supplies for a large army in the interior of the Peninsula, for any length of time, from the resources of the country itself. He had authorised, as War Minister, the erection of the stupendous field-works at Torres Vedras, which afterwards proved an impassable barrier to French ambition. From these cir CHAP. VII. 1810. cumstances he was led to expect that, if not permanently maintained, the war might at least be prolonged for a considerable time in Portugal. Much was to be anticipated from simply gaining time in the conflict. He was well aware of the oppressive manner in which the Continent, and Germany in particular, had been treated by the French ruler, and the immensity of the exactions, both in money and supplies, which had for years been extorted from its suffering inhabitants; and he entertained a sanguine hope that this arbitrary and ruinous system would in the end work out its natural result, and produce a general insurrection of the Continent against French domination. Everything depended on prolonging the contest in the Peninsula till this auspicious change took place; and the very desolation and ruin of the country, by rendering supplies difficult, if not impossible, for a large army, afforded the fairest prospect of being able to do so with ultimate success. Great Britain, resting on the sea as its base of operations, could experience none of the difficulty in obtaining supplies which might be anticipated for the French. Even in the most unfavourable point of view, and supposing Lord Wellington to be ultimately driven from Portugal, it would be no small matter to avert such a calamity for any considerable time, and postpone, if we could not entirely prevent, the imminent danger to the independence of Great Britain which would necessarily arise from the whole navy of Spain again falling under the power of France, and Napoleon acquiring the vast naval resources which that country derived from the immense trade which it carried on with its transatlantic possessions.* * In the course of the debate on Lord Palmerston's motion respecting the army estimates, on March 4, 1811, Lord Castlereagh gave the following details on the measures he had adopted for the increase of the army during the time he had held the seals of the War Office: "It having fallen to my lot," said he, "officially to propose all the onerous measures which have been adopted since the year 1805 for levying men, it is gratifying to find that these efforts have achieved the great object to which they were progressively directed; that the zeal and perseverance of the nation, in cheerfully submitting to these burdens, VII. 1810. 14. getting the British The difficulty of carrying on the war in the Peninsula, CHAP. and the embarrassment of Government in conducting it, was immensely augmented by another circumstance. This was the combined effect of the British system of paying Immense for everything they required, while the French paid for difficulty of nothing, and the enormous and ruinous cost at which specie for specie, which alone would pass on the Continent, had to army. be bought by the British Government. Such was the effect of the drain of gold and silver to the Continent, that the whole specie in Great Britain was bought up and sent there, where it could be sold at a great profit. So large and overpowering was this demand, that a guinea in London was selling for twenty-eight or thirty shillings, and even at more extravagant prices. It was with the utmost difficulty that specie could be got at all in the British Islands, and never in anything like sufficient quantities to meet the wants of the army abroad. The letters of Wellington, accordingly, to Government at this period are full of the most energetic complaints of the want of specie, and the absolute impossibility of maintaining the contest if it was not sent out in larger quantities than all the efforts of the British Government had hitherto rendered practicable. Nevertheless, the expenditure in the Peninsula had gone on rapidly increasing, until, in the close of 1810, it had reached the enormous amount of £420,000 a-month, or £5,040,000 a-year. This vast expenditure excited, as well it might, the most serious1 Gurw. vi. apprehensions in Ministers. Their private letters to 168. Wellington were in the most desponding tone.1 This state of matters was so unprecedented and alarm has been rewarded by the powerful army which it now possesses, unexampled 37, 116, VII. 1810. 15. Appointment of the Bullion CHAP. ing that it awakened the most gloomy presentiments in the minds of the Cabinet; and so doubtful were they of the result, that they were often on the point of abandoning the Peninsula, and ordering Wellington, with his whole home. In order to allay the public apprehension, army, Committee. and get to the bottom, if possible, of this mysterious affair, then very little understood, and even now, after half a century's additional experience, not nearly so generally appreciated as its vital importance deserves, Government consented to the appointment of a select committee to inquire into the subject, take evidence, and report. The committee was chosen with the utmost impartiality, and comprehended the leading men on both sides of the House; in particular Mr Horner, Mr Ricardo, Mr Tierney, Mr Ponsonby, Mr Canning, Mr Vansittart, Lord Castlereagh, Mr Lushington, and many others. They examined the Governor and Deputy-Governor of the Bank of England, and all the leading bankers and merchants in London, as to the facts of the case, and their opinion on the causes to which the present anomalous and alarming condition of the currency was owing. Mr Horner was the chairman, who drew up the report, which was a very able and closely argued pleading on the side of the majority. They spared no pains in the obtaining and sifting of evidence; and much was expected from the verdict of a body composed of men of such distinction, and whose judgment was based on so extensive and valuable a mass of evidence. Yet, strange to say, the committee thus constituted and enlightened, concluded with a report not only directly contrary to the most elementary principles of political economy, but recommending measures which, if carried into execution, would beyond all doubt have, at the most critical period of the contest, at once destroyed the power of Great Britain, and terminated the struggle in favour of France. Lord Castlereagh was in the minority, and strongly comxvii. ccii. bated the resolutions; and never did he render a more Appendix. decisive service to his country than by successfully resisting their adoption by Parliament.' June 8, 1810. 1 Parl. Deb. 1, 4, lxxxiii. port. 16. The committee began by stating what was undoubtedly CHAP. true, that during the whole of 1809 and the months VII. which had elapsed of 1810, the price of gold had been 1810. £4, 9s. to £4, 12s. per ounce, instead of the standard Bullion ReMint price of £3, 17s. 104d., which corresponded to a guinea being worth 25s. or 26s. During the same period the exchanges with Hamburg and Amsterdam were depressed as low as from 16 to 20 per cent below par, and that on Paris still lower. "So extraordinary a rise," they added, "in the market price of gold in this country, coupled with so remarkable a depression of the exchanges with the Continent, very early, in the judgment of the committee, pointed to something in the domestic currency as the cause of both appearances. It will be found from the evidence that the high price of gold is ascribed by most of the witnesses entirely to an alleged scarcity of that article, arising out of the unusual demand for it on the Continent of Europe. This unusual demand for gold upon the Continent is described by some of them as being chiefly for the use of the French armies, though increased also by that state of alarm and failure of confidence which leads to the practice of hoarding. Your committee think that in the sound and natural state of the British currency, the foundation of which is gold, an increased demand for gold from other parts of the world, however great, and from whatever cause arising, can have no effect in producing here, for a considerable period of time, a material rise in the market price of gold. But before they proceed to explain the ground of that general opinion, they wish to state some other reasons which alone would have led them to doubt whether, in point of fact, such a demand for gold as is alleged has operated in the manner supposed. Mr Whitmore, indeed, the Governor of the Bank of England, stated that, in his opinion, it was the high price of gold abroad which had carried our gold coin out of the country, but he did not offer to your committee any proof of the high prices. The committee are of |