VIII. 26. Stewart CHAP. this occasion his Majesty dwelt with earnestness on the immense efforts which Prussia had already made, and 1813. was preparing to make, for the prosecution of the war, Interview of adding, that the forces which she as yet had on foot were not a half of those which she was prepared ultimately to bring into the field. The following morning brought the agreeable intelligence of the fall of Spandau-a success of no small importance, both as letting loose the blockading force and quieting the apprehensions of the inhabitants of Berlin. But grave events were on the wing; and intelligence arrived on the same day which rendered an immediate concentration of the Allied forces necessary, and gave unmistakable tokens of a great battle approaching. An officer arrived from Sir Robert Wilson, who was with the advance at Chemnitz, announcing that the enemy, in great strength, were moving upon the Allied left, and that their advanced-guard had reached Jena, while the Emperor himself was at Erfurth.* It was known that the entire force of the enemy was 170,000, 1 Sir Chas. while the Allies could not, at the very utmost, collect Stewart to 28, 1813, reagh, April more than 80,000 at any one point; while the French force, being all drawn from Mayence and the Rhine, was comparatively concentrated in one line of advance.1 But notwithstanding this great disparity of force, no fears were entertained, either at the Allied headquarters or in MS.; Lond. 13-15; Cathcart, 119-122. "An officer is just arrived from Wilson at Chemnitz. The enemy are moving on our left: their advance has reached Jena. In consequence of their approach, the Allied army are more closely concentrating on the Saale between Merseburg on the right and Altenburg on the left. Wittgenstein has removed from Dessau to the former place. Milaradowitch is thrown for ward towards Plauen to strengthen the left; and the movements are indicative of a serious event, of which, from the enthusiasm prevailing, there can be no doubt, although, as you will see by Buonaparte's document, be reckons his forces at 200,000 men, and he states himself 170,000 collected here. I hope the Allies will force him to fight in the plain; but the misfor tune is, the country near the Thuringian Forest is exactly what will enable him, if he is beat, to get off well without being annihilated by the Cossack cavalry; and having his fortresses on the Rhine, he does not risk so much as the Allies in a battle, who, if worsted, would have difficulty, with only one good bridge here over the Elbe, and Magdeburg, &c., in the hands of the enemy. However, there is nothing to fear."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to Lord CASTLEREAGH, April 29, 1813; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 387, 388. VIII. 1813. their armies, of the result; for not only was their self- CHAP. confidence at the very highest point, from the successes of the preceding campaign, but they were aware that more than half the French army was composed of raw young conscripts, little calculated either to brave the fatigues of long marches and wet bivouacs, or to withstand in regular battle the veterans of the Moscow campaign. 27. Kutusoff, movement towards. Old Marshal Kutusoff had been taken ill, and died in his progress through Silesia; but the loss of this Death of veteran abated nothing of the confidence of the Allies. and forward After much deliberation, the command-in-chief was of the Allies bestowed on Count Wittgenstein, whose successful cam- Leipsic. paign on the Dwina, and great services at the passage of the Beresina, had procured for him a high military reputation. As the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, however, were at headquarters, his command was little more than nominal, and he stood in the unpleasant predicament of bearing the responsibility of operations of which he had by no means the uncontrolled direction. He was, though by no means a consummate general, of a daring intrepid disposition; and he readily went into the project, then the favourite one at headquarters, to advance before the enemy had recovered the consternation produced by the catastrophe of the last campaign, and give them battle, however superior they might be in number, with whatever forces could be assembled for the purpose. Though this was the general opinion, however, and the one which was immediately acted upon, yet there were not wanting others, among whom was Sir Charles Stewart, who viewed the matter in a different light. They pointed out that the enemy were greatly superior in guns and foot-soldiers, but proportionally inferior in cavalry: that this advantage would be lost if they advanced to the Saale to meet them, because the Thuringian Mountains in the rear would afford the enemy a secure place of retreat, where VIII. the Allied horse could not follow them; whereas the Allies themselves, if worsted, would have no line of retreat but 1813. by the bridge of Dresden, as the others, especially that at Magdeburg, were in the hands of the enemy. Wittgenstein and the Allied generals were not insensible to 1 Lond. 14. these considerations, but they deemed them overbalanced cari, 120 by the importance of striking a decisive blow in the 122; Wil- outset of the campaign; and as they were confident of victory, they felt little solicitude about the line of retreat in case of disaster.1 16; Cath son, i. 217, 341. 28. mercial conclusion Sir Charles Stewart's first acts on the great theatre of New com- German affairs were of a diplomatic, not a military chatariff, and racter. An edict had already appeared before his arrival of a treaty on the 20th April, which declared the abolition of all the of alliance restraints under which the commerce of the north of Euand Prussia. rope had so long laboured, from the rigorous application with Russia 1 Sir Chas. of the Continental System; but the tariff of duties which had been substituted in its room, drawn up from interested motives or in ignorance, was so high as to amount to a total prohibition of British manufactures, as well as of the export of Prussian corn. Sir Charles, immediately after his arrival, made representations to Baron Hardenberg on the subject, which were promptly attended to. Assurances were given, which were immediately carried into effect, that the tariff should be provisionally susStewart to pended till an arrangement, conjointly with Russia, could reagh, April be agreed upon. Shortly after, he had the satisfaction MS.; Lond. of signing the formal treaty of alliance between Great 13, and Ap- Britain, Russia, and Prussia, the preliminaries of which pendix, No. 2. See the had already been signed by Lord Cathcart with the Emperor Alexander, by which Russia engaged to keep 234; and 200,000 men in the field, exclusive of garrisons, Prussia half as many, in consideration of £2,000,000 instantly advanced by Great Britain.1* Lord Castle 30, 1813, Treaty in Martens, Sup. iii. Schoell, xii. 543. * Lord Castlereagh's general views of the principles on which the alliance should be conducted were well explained by him in a letter to Lord Cathcart on April 8. "On the political part of the arrangement," said he, "I foresee But the sovereigns and their ministers were soon called CHAP. by the loud trumpet of war from these diplomatic labours VIII. 1813. opposite to the dangers and the glories of the field. The French 29. demonstrations of offensive operations were not confined Mutual adto the main army in front of Dresden. On the Lower vance of the Elbe, General Puthod advanced to the margin of that armies. river with 8000 infantry and 3000 horse, while Davoust moved forward on the same quarter from Bremen, in the direction of Rottenburg on Harburg. But this was a diversion merely intended to deceive the Allies as to the real points of attack. The main effort was to be made by the Emperor Napoleon himself in the great plain which stretches from the Saale to the Elbe, and comprises the finest part of Saxony. The force with which he made this advance in all amounted, according to Thiers, whose estimate is founded on the returns in little difficulty. To make war and to treat together is so obviously the policy of all parties, that I apprehend no hesitation on the part of either power; neither can I suppose you will experience any great reluctance, even on the part of Prussia, to gratify the Prince Regent by abating the nuisance of which those small territories enclavés in Hanover amount to. The larger arrangements, at least in the north, are in principle understood. The reintegration of Prussia in extent of power is not, of course, intended to supersede the indemnities for Denmark in case she joins; and in the application of these principles hereafter, we may hope that Great Britain and Russia will see justice done. "The political arrangement of Europe in a larger sense is more difficult at this early moment to decide on. So much depends on events that it is perhaps better not to be too prompt in encountering litigated questions. The main features we are agreed upon: that, to keep France in order, we require great masses; that Prussia, Austria, and Russia ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been; and that the inferior states must be summoned to assist or pay the forfeit of resistance. I see many inconveniences in premature conclusions, but we ought not to be unprepared. "As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a despatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of Russia probably has not this interesting document at headquarters (interesting it is to my recollection, as I well remember having more than one conversation with Mr Pitt on its details before he wrote it): some of the suggestions may now be inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for the restoration of Europe, that I should be glad your Lordship would reduce it into distinct propositions, and to learn the bearings of his Imperial Majesty's mind upon its contents." An unofficial communication of this nature, between two powers that have no partialities to indulge, may prepare them the better to fulfil their duties at a future moment."-LORD CASTLEREAGH to LORD CATHCART, Foreign Office, April 8, 1813; Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 355, 356. * This important state paper will be found in History of Europe, c. xxxix. § 50, note. VIII the French Depôt de la Guerre, to nearly 200,000 men, but of these not more than two-thirds could by possibility be collected in one field. This immense bodyformed by the junction, behind the Saale, of Napoleon descending from the Thuringian Forest, and Eugene ascending from Magdeburg-could not advance along one road without being spun out to an inordinate length, and accordingly it pressed on in two columns towards the Elbe. Ney, Marmont, and the Imperial Guard, moved on the great road from LÜTZEN towards Leipsic ; while, on their right, Bertrand and Oudinot remained in reserve on the Upper Saale, with orders to move from Naumburg on Stossen; and on the left Eugene, with the corps of Lauriston and Macdonald, was to debouch from Merseburg, and move direct by the road of Mackranstadt on Leipsic. On their side the Allies made corresponding movements, and instead of awaiting the enemy behind the Elbe, they advanced to meet him in the Saxon plains. Their forces were spread over the whole country from the Elbe to the Saale, the grand headquarters being at Altenburg. Wittgenstein, with the Russians, was at Zwickau; Kutusoff's corps some miles in advance of Dresden; Milaradowitch, with his advance, at Chemnitz. The Prussians, again under Blucher, formed the extreme 1 Lond. 18; left of the Allied line, which leaned on the broken ridges 122, 123; which formed the Thuringian Forest, with their headquarters at Altenburg; D'York was farther to the right towards Dessau; while on the extreme right Bulow observed Magdeburg.' Cathcart, Thiers, xv. 453, 464; Marmont, v. 14, 15. 30. Weissen fels, and death of Bessières. May 1. When the hostile arrays were in this manner advancing Combat of by common consent against each other, they necessarily soon came into collision. It took place for the first time at Weissenfels, and was attended by a melancholy event, which overspread the French army with mourning. On the evening of the 30th April, some battalions of Ney's corps had gallantly borne the charges of Winzingerode's cavalry, which was making a reconnoissance towards Weis |