CHAP. 49. Which are with scorn leon. in the mean time to transmit them to the Emperor, in return for which concession Metternich agreed to allow the King of Saxony to return to Dresden, which he 1813. accordingly did two days after, having previously asked and obtained from Austria a promise of the most absolute repudiated secrecy as to his promise of adhesion to her projects of by Napo armed mediation. On receiving the proposals of Austria, Napoleon perceived at once the error he had committed in winking at the armaments of that power, excused on the ground of giving weight to her mediation, and saw at length that she was going to turn this armed mediation. against his interests. He felt accordingly, and expressed in his private correspondence with Narbonne, the most profound indignation against the Cabinet of Vienna, for thinking for a moment of such terms, or venturing to propose them to him. In his official answer to them, however, he was more moderate; and, without expressly acceding to the terms proposed, he received them in such a way as did not preclude the hope of future accommodation. His mind, however, was in reality made up; he would not submit to anything which he deemed, however unreasonably, humiliation. Yet was it not humiliation to France which was proposed, for she had no interest in the possessions in the north of Germany, and was rather Sir Chas. weakened than strengthened by their being tacked to her Stewart to empire. It was Napoleon alone who was thwarted by reagh, June the cession of the Hanse towns, and abandonment of the MS.; Fain, Confederation of the Rhine; but, rather than submit to 1813, 184; such a slight, he was willing to imperil the French em- 519, 520. pire.1 Lord Castle 4, 1813, Guerre de Thiers, xv. 50. Stackelberg An accidental circumstance at this time contributed still further to sow the seeds of distrust between Napo- Secret deleon and the Cabinet of Vienna. A courier was arrested spatch of at Dresden, the bearer of despatches from M. de Stackel- to Nesselberg, the Russian minister at Vienna since Austria had cepted. assumed the part of a mediator, to M. de Nesselrode, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which proved that rode inter .1813. CHAP. Metternich, while holding out the olive branch to NapoVIII. leon, was in reality doing the same, in perhaps warmer terms, and with more sincerity, to Russia. He there said that Austria could not take any decided step as yet, from being fettered by the treaty of 14th March 1812, the danger of a war with France, and the incompleteness of their preparations; but implied that, in the event of the Allies acceding to the terms proposed, Austria would, if they were refused by France, join her forces to those of the Coalition. This was accompanied by a letter from the King of Saxony to Thielman, desiring him to keep the gates of Torgau shut against both the contending parties. In reality there was nothing in this despatch of Stackelberg which revealed anything more than a desire on the part of Metternich to act to Russia, equally as France, in the real character of a mediator; but Napoleon had never thought they would really act up to that character. He had hitherto clung to the idea that, when matters came to a crisis, the Emperor of Austria would remain faithful to the family alliance. He expressed himself accordingly to those around him in terms of such extreme indignation against the "traitors," as he styled them, who had betrayed him, that the universal belief was that no pacific relations with the Cabinet of Vienna would long be practicable. So strongly was he impressed with the idea that Austria was no longer to be trusted, that he resolved to adopt what had all along been the advice of Talleyrand and Cambacères, 1 Thiers, xv. and address himself on the subject of a pacification diFain, i. 178. rectly to the Emperor of Russia, putting Austria entirely 521-524; 51. aside.1 Full of this project, he adopted a plan which was the Napoleon's basis of all his operations for the remainder of this eventchange of plan in con- ful year. This was, by one means or another, to prolong sequence of the war or the negotiation till his reserve armaments covery. were in readiness and had come up into line, which he estimated at 200,000 men, and who, in addition to the this dis VIII. 1813. 300,000 which he had already in the field or soon to CHAP. join, would form a mass of half-a-million of combatants, at the head of whom, from Dresden as a central point, he would be in a situation to dictate the terms of peace at once to Vienna, Berlin, and St Petersburg. Having adopted this plan, he commenced a series of despatches to M. de Narbonne, at Vienna, prescribing an entirely different course of conduct from that which he had hitherto pursued. The tenor of all these despatches was to use the most conciliatory language to Austria, to feign entire satisfaction at her professions, to admit, in Metternich's words, that the treaty of 1812 was no longer applicable to existing circumstances, and, so far to Narfrom denying the extent of the armaments of France, to 12, 1813; admit them to their full extent, and give, if desired, their 526, 527. exact amount.1 1 Napoleon bonne, May Thiers, xv. immense preparations for the pro the war. Having thus taken his resolution to throw off Austria, 52. and, if he could not come to a direct understanding with Napoleon's Russia, to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour, Napoleon, in every quarter, commenced the most gigantic fecution of preparations. His first step was to send for his step-son, Eugene Beauharnais, whom he thanked for his fidelity and fortitude in the command of the army during the last stages of the Russian retreat, and announced that he was about to prove his gratitude by a splendid settlement, that of the Duchy of Galicia, on his daughter, the publication of which would immediately appear in the Moniteur. After this preface, he stated that he was about to send him on a special mission to Italy, the object of which was that he should immediately take the command, not only of his own viceroyalty of Lombardy, but of Piedmont and Tuscany, and from the whole united raise a powerful army, the elements or skeletons of which already existed in those provinces. With regard to Murat, he had more difficulty, for that brave and chivalrous, but weak and vacillating prince, had had his vanity profoundly mortified by some lines inserted in the Moniteur in regard to VOL. I. 2 P CHAP. VIII. 1813. his incapacity to command the army after the Russian retreat, and he had fallen into a state of depression and despair which incapacitated him for any active exertion in a separate command. He therefore recalled him from Naples, whither he had retired, to command the cavalry 1 Napoleon of the army, and ordered him to put 20,000 of his troops at the disposition of Prince Eugene. "When Austria," 19, 1813; said he to Eugene, "shall see 100,000 combatants on 530,531. the Adige, she will feel that it is for her to make up to us, not us to her."1 to Eugene, May 13, and May Thiers, xv. 53. His mea sures to aug. ment the reserve on To augment the main central army, on which he had to depend for operations in the field, the French Emperor took equally decisive measures, which were attended with the Rhine. extraordinary success. He recalled sixty skeleton battalions, and as many skeleton squadrons from Spain, which were to be filled up to their full complement by conscripts from the interior, made to converge from all parts of France to the frontier fortress of Mayence. From this source he calculated on getting in two months 70,000 troops. In Westphalia and at Hamburg, from the exertions of Jerome Napoleon and Marshal Davoust, he reckoned on 112 battalions, mustering 90,000 combatants. These, with 28 second battalions, organised at Erfurth by Victor, as many coming up from Bremen under Vandamme, and 10,000 Danes, would form a mass of at least 130,000 sabres and bayonets, of which the command was to be given to Marshal Davoust, and which were intended to operate on the Lower Elbe. Thus he reckoned, in addition to the 300,000 already under his orders in Saxony or on the road to it, on 100,000 in Italy, 70,000 at Mayence, and 130,000 between Magdeburg and Hamburg-in all, 600,000 men. It was with this enormous force that he prepared to avenge the disasters of the Russian campaign, and restore his prestige and ascendancy in Germany, and over Europe. Extraordinary as it may appear, the result proved that these calculations of the French Emperor were by no means overcharged, and 2 See the Etats de l'Armée, given in Thiers, xv. 331-333. that the number of men whom, from first to last, he brought up around his standards, rather exceeded than fell short of what he had anticipated. CHAP. VIII. 1813. 54. measures for and streng Elbe. Not content with these immense preparations, Napoleon gave the most extensive orders, and set on foot the His vast most gigantic works, for the defence of the line of the fortifying Elbe. He directed the construction of two additional thening the bridges, one at Dresden itself, and one at Priesnitz, to facilitate the passage of troops; commenced the restoration of the fortifications of Dresden, which had been in a great degree dismantled; directed the construction of têtes-de-pont on both banks, and ordered additional works at Torgau, Wittenberg, Dessau, and Hamburg. At the same time he set on foot such vigorous measures for the restoration of his cavalry, in which arm he had as yet been so inferior to the enemy, that he reckoned, within six weeks, on having 16,000 horsemen fully equipped, of which 4000 were those of the Guard, and 3000 those of the King of Saxony, now, by his reconciliation with that 535, 536. monarch, again put at his disposal.1 1 Thiers, xv. the Allies. Meantime the Allies were slowly retiring, and in good 55. order, to their chosen battle-field at Bautzen on the Spree, Forces of on the Bohemian frontier. The entire force at their disposal on this occasion amounted to only 88,000 men ; and of these not more, at the very utmost, than 80,000 could be collected on one field; while, inclusive of the large force of fully 80,000 under Ney at Torgau and Wittenberg, threatening Berlin, Napoleon had 160,000, whom he could assemble on one field of battle. This great disproportion of force was owing to the immense losses which the Russian army had undergone, by fatigue, sickness, and the sword, during a campaign of unexampled activity, which had now continued with scarce any intermission for ten months, which had so reduced their ranks, that few of the battalions mustered more than 250 or 2 Lond. 30, 31; Cath 2 300 bayonets. The French had greater losses; but the difference sustained equal or cart, 144. and it was a most. |