VIII. speech: "Sir Robert Wilson, I have duly appreciated CHAP. the services, gallantry, and zeal, which have distinguished you throughout the war; in testimony of which I have 1813. determined to confer upon you the third class of the order of St George." So saying, as if desirous of doing it in the most gratifying manner, the Emperor directed General Augerausky to take his cross from his neck, and delivered it to Sir Robert Wilson. Then turning to Sir Charles Stewart, while General Augerausky gave him the cross and ribbon, he said: "General, I give this to Sir Robert Wilson, for a long series of distinguished services through the campaign, through the war." The Emperor continued some time to speak in the same strain, with his hand on Sir Robert's shoulder. "Sir Charles Stewart," says Sir Robert Wilson, "behaved most generously and kindly on this occasion, saying all that could be said, and perhaps exaggerating my merits." He lost no time in transmitting to the Foreign Office a full account of this interesting scene, in duplicate of a letter addressed to Lord Cathcart.* The gracious mode, the well-chosen moment, and the pride experienced by a British officer, in seeing one of his companions in arms thus decorated in front of the Imperial army, justify me in recording this incident in detail." If it was a grateful task to Sir1 Lond. 52. Charles Stewart to witness the honour bestowed on a R. Wilson's noble fellow-soldier, it is not less pleasing to his biogra- 33, 34. pher to record the generous enthusiasm which led him to speak in such terms of a worthy companion in arms, but a most determined political opponent. 66 * See SIR C. STEWART to LORD CATHCART, May 27, 1813; WILSON'S Diary, i. 458. 53; Sir Diary, ii. CHAPTER IX. ARMISTICE OF PLESWITZ. JUNE 4-AUGUST 18, 1813. CHAP. IX. 1813. ]. Vast im the matters treated at the Congress of Prague. REMARKABLE beyond any other in European history, from the magnitude of the interests which came under its discussion, and the vast consequences which followed from its determinations, the Congress which met at Prague, portance of after the armistice signed on the 4th June at Pleswitz, was distinguished by the great military and diplomatic ability to which the management of these vast concerns was intrusted. The genius and profound dissimulation of Napoleon was there met by the cautious prudence of Metternich and the indomitable resolution of Castlereagh; the moral firmness of Caulaincourt and diplomatic skill of Maret, were matched against the ardent patriotism of Hardenberg and the disguised ambition of Nesselrode. The British minister was not personally present at the deliberations, but he was admirably represented by Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, who were fully in his confidence, and communicated to the Allied Plenipotentiaries the impress of his resolution. The interests at stake were nothing less than these-the permanent enslaving, or the immediate emancipation of Europe; and in the decision of that all-important question, Austria possessed a preponderating, it may be said a decisive, influence. For, if her forces were added to those of Napoleon, and the great central bastion of Bohemia put into his hands, no one could doubt that his military means, already victorious in two great battles, would prevail in the strife; and, on the other hand, if the Cabinet of Vienna joined their armies to those of the Allies, there was a fair prospect of reducing the formidable numerical superiority to which his recent successes had been owing, and at length driving his legions across the Rhine. CHAP. IX. 1813. Austria, and Austria was perfectly sincere in this great debate; for 2. she was actuated by the most pressing and imperious of Sincerity of all passions that of fear. She had suffered so much her views. from France in preceding wars that she was naturally desirous of turning the present crisis as much as could be to her own advantage, and, if possible, regaining some part of the territory which she had lost in these disastrous contests. But she was anxious to do this without drawing the sword. She wished to take advantage of her situation as armed mediator, and in a manner umpire, between the contending parties; but she was by no means prepared to take an active part in hostilities. She had still an undefined dread of the awful power from whom she had suffered so much, and of the conqueror whose victorious sword had struck so deep into her vitals. Add to this that her preparations for war were in so incomplete a state that a war with Napoleon i. 177. would be attended with very great hazard.1 1 Cathcart, Russia aud The forces which Russia and Prussia could bring into 3. the field did not exceed 80,000 men; and although as Forces of many more were engaged in the blockade of fortresses Prussia. on the Elbe and the Oder, yet they were fully engaged where they were, and were for the most part landwehr, who could not be relied on for operations in the open field. Bernadotte had 20,000 on the Lower Elbe but they would be quite occupied with the troops of Davoust in Hamburg, while Bulow's 12,000 Prussians in the neighbourhood of Berlin were absolutely required for the defence of that capital against the threatened attack of Marshal Oudinot from the side of Luckau. Thus the Allies, even including the whole disposable forces of CHAP. IX. 1813. 4. Great advantages fairs gave to Austria, could not, at the very utmost, bring more than 170,000 men at once into the field to oppose 300,000 whom Napoleon would shortly have under his banner, and as many more on whom he could rely if his much-wishedfor delay of two months were obtained. It was hazardous in such circumstances to precipitate immediate hostilities, for the Allies would in that case be at once met by a superiority of nearly two to one; but it became still more so to delay them for a considerable period, for in that time the superiority might be expected to be not less than three to one. This state of affairs presented singular advantages to a chief possessed of the sagacity and decision which which this characterised Napoleon. In addition to the ordinary and state of af- well-known superiority which a single powerful sovereign Napoleon. has in negotiating with a coalition of separate cabinets, actuated by individual and often discordant interests, he enjoyed this peculiar and decisive advantage, that he was not only superior in force to all united, but immeasurably so to any one when taken separately. It was universally felt that the Coalition could only make head against the French Emperor by holding together; but it was by no means equally clear that they would hold together, or all remain proof against the powerful means of seduction which he had it in his power to apply to each. It was already known that he had made offer to Austria of the whole province of Silesia as the price of her co-operation, and it was by no means certain that her Cabinet would resist the temptation of regaining that ancient and valuable province, the more especially when the family alliance of the two imperial houses, and the backward state of her present military armaments, was taken into consideration. To Russia he had likewise made overtures for a separate peace; and it lay with the Emperor Alexander at once to terminate a bloody and exhausting war, in which he had no longer a direct interest, by a glorious and lasting peace. The sincerity and ardour of Prussia in the cause could not for a moment be doubted, and everything which heroism and patriotic ardour could effect might confidently be anticipated from its loyal and suffering inhabitants; but its military resources, drawn now from not more than five millions of inhabitants, were evidently unequal to a contest, single-handed, with a power wielding those of eighty millions, if the Confederation of the Rhine and Italy is taken into consideration. Bernadotte could, as a matter of course, draw off his forces, and take shelter in his remote peninsula the moment the Coalition was dissolved; and the army of England was too deeply engaged in the Peninsular contest to be in a situation to offer any but an indirect aid to any contest in Northern Europe.* CHAP. IX. 1813. reagh's Deeply impressed with these considerations, and well 5. aware that none of the powers in Europe were capable of Lord Castlemaking head against France in its present powerful mili- view of the tary state of organisation singly, Lord Castlereagh directed alliance. his main attention to holding together the often disunited members of the Coalition. Prussia had for ten years looked on with indifference while Austria maintained the contest. Austria did the same when she was engaged; and both those powers joined their forces to those of Napoleon Lord Castlereagh's anxiety on the subject of the Alliance holding together, and on the line Austria was to take, had by the end of June become extreme. On the 22d June he wrote to Sir Charles Stewart-" We are in great anxiety to hear from you upon the armistice. Its extension to the 20th July puzzles and alarms us for the temper of Austria. We have done everything to prevail upon the Prince Royal to manage matters with your parties, and I trust all may be arranged before the resumption of hostilities." And again, on the 30th June, he wrote to Lord Cathcart-" In the present wavering state of Austrian politics, I have deemed it advisable to direct your Lordship to endeavour to bring the Court of Vienna to a private explanation of its views. It is not for Great Britain to goad other powers into exertions which they deem inconsistent with their own safety; but it is material we should know on what we have to reckon, as well as to evince the disposition we feel, as far as our means will permit, to sustain the Continental powers in accomplishing their own, as well as the general safety; and as a proof that such is our disposition towards Austria, your Lordship is authorised to make them an advance, if actually en lutte against France. The rapid progress of the British arms in Spain will, I trust, prove that we are not disposed to be inactive, and that it is not by pecuniary efforts alone that we are ready to contend for a better order of things.”—Castlereagh Correspondence, viii. 408, 411. VOL. I. 2 R |