CHAP. resumption of hostilities was to be given. IX. 1813. Metternich engaged to obtain the consent of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia to the extension, though he was well aware that it was decidedly contrary to their wishes. Napoleon held out for the 16th August, independent of Stewart to the six days, and made a great merit with Metternich Lord Castle with agreeing to the 10th instead. But in truth he was 1 Sir Chas. reagh, July 4, 1813, Fain, ii. 43 MS. Thiers, overjoyed at the prolongation which he got, and, instantly xvi. 78, 79; changing his tone, loaded M. de Metternich with caresses, and dismissed him to his imperial master at Gitschin with the warmest assurances of affection and regard.1 46. 30. battle of its great effect. June 30. The intelligence of this prolongation of the armistice News of the gave the greatest satisfaction at the French headquarters, Vitoria, and where it was universally regarded as a harbinger of peace, and an immense advantage to their arms if war was renewed. Proportionally great was the displeasure with which it was regarded by the Allied sovereigns, who had less to gain than either Napoleon or Francis by delay, and who looked upon it, not without reason, as a concession to the declared wishes of the French Emperor of the most sinister augury. The dissatisfaction thence arising was very great, and might have been attended by the most serious consequences, had not news arrived on the very next day of such importance as gave an entirely new turn to men's thoughts, and completely dispelled any feelings of irritation with which the news of the extension of the armistice had been attended. This was the news of the Battle of VitorIA, gained in Spain by Lord Wellington on the 21st June, the intelligence of which was, by great exertion, forwarded to Germany, and received in both camps on the afternoon of the 29th of that month. The impression in both was extreme. In the Allied camp," says Sir Charles Stewart, "the impression was strong and universal, and produced, in my opinion, the resumption of hostilities." "Metternich," says Baron Fain, "could not fail, on his return to Gitschin, to learn the details of this victory from the mouths of the English themselves; IX. and we shall soon see the fatal influence which it exer- CHAP. cised on the progress of the negotiations." Nor is it surprising that the French and English diplomatists on the 1813. spot should thus concur as to the influence of this great victory on the progress of the negotiations. The Peninsular contest was now decided. It was no longer a consummate general maintaining with inferior means a painful defensive contest, but a victorious chief at the head of the military force of three nations, who, after expelling the enemy from the soil which they had polluted, was preparing to cross the frontier, and carry his triumphant standards into the heart of France. A hundred thousand men, collected round the standards of Wellington, only awaited the fall of the frontier fortresses to descend like a torrent from the Pyrenees, and inundate the valley of the Garonne. The charm of Napoleon's invincibility was at an end. Disaster had overtaken his arms alike in the south and the north of Europe; and the only question 1 Lond. 88; Austria had now to consider was, whether she should vo- Fain, ii. 80; Bignon, xii. luntarily link herself to a sinking empire and a falling 171. cause.1 31. reasons for line of de No sooner was Napoleon assured of the extension of the armistice, and thereby secure of sufficient time to get Napoleon's up his great reinforcements from the rear, than he set fixing on the with his wonted vigour to organise the means of defence Elbe as his against the Allies. He had no choice but between the fence. line of the Elbe and that of the Rhine; for the intermediate "position of the Saale," of which so much was said in Germany, was as liable to be turned by Bavaria as that of the Elbe by Bohemia, and though a very strong line of defence, supported by the Thuringian Forest on one flank and the Hartz Mountains on the other, against an army of eighty or a hundred thousand men, yet it presented no adequate means of resistance to an assailant who had the command of two hundred and fifty thousand. The Rhine, it is true, was his real base of operations; but to retire to it was to abandon at once VOL. I. 2 T CHAP. IX. 1813. all for which he was contending. If his eagles recrossed the great frontier stream of France, the whole Confederation of the Rhine was given up, the hostility of Austria rendered certain, and the war, with all its horrors and sufferings, brought home to the soil of France. For these reasons he judged, and, in the circumstances, wisely, to adopt the Elbe as his defensive position, and strain every nerve to maintain it against the utmost efforts of the Allies. This great river, issuing from the Bohemian Mountains between the fortified rocks of Koenigstein and Lilienstein, supported in its course by the bastions of Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeburg, and resting at its northern extremity on the fortified position of Hamburg, all of which were in the hands of the French, presented a position eminently capable of defence, and affording peculiar facilities to a commander like Napoleon, issuing from a fortified central stronghold, and prexvi. 30, 31. pared to strike redoubtable blows on the right hand and the left.1 1 Thiers, 32. fortifying Koenigstein and Dres den. Having thus resolved on maintaining himself on the Napoleon's line of the Elbe, Napoleon set to work with more even measure for than his wonted vigour to strengthen his position upon the Elbe at it. After his return to Dresden, on the 10th June, he commenced a series of journeys in different directions, to inspect with his own eyes the state of the fortifications, and put them all in the most formidable state of defence. The fortresses of Koenigstein and Lilienstein, situated on precipitous rocks on either side of the Elbe, first attracted his attention, and he provisioned the former with victuals sufficient to maintain an army of a hundred thousand men for ten days. Lilienstein was almost an entire creation, and he soon put it in a formidable posture of defence, and committed its defence to General Rogniat with two thousand men. His plan was to use these two fortresses as points d'appui, to cross the river, and debouch in the rear of the Allied armies, if they ventured to descend from Bohemia on the rear of the French army 1 CHAP. IX. 1813. at Dresden. To facilitate such a movement, and secure the Saxon capital from insult during its operation, he added greatly to its fortifications, which had been nearly completely dismantled, at the earnest request of the citizens. Of the old rampart there remained only the bastions, which he strengthened and armed with artillery. The place of the curtains was supplied by wet ditches and strong palisades; and in front of the faubourgs he erected strong palisades, with large redoubts in front armed with heavy artillery. On the right bank, where the Neustadt, or new town, was situated, fortifications of a similar kind were erected, connected with the other side, in addition to the old bridge, by two new ones erected for the occasion. To these means of defence were added immense magazines of provisions capable of supporting 30,000 men for several months, in addition to the 16,000 sick and wounded who already encumbered the hospitals. He designed to make this fortress, thus strengthened, the pivot of his offensive operations, from whence he could direct his blows at pleasure against the enemy, either on the right or left bank of the river; and he Odel. i. calculated that 30,000 men could maintain themselves ii. 24; there for fifteen days, against any force the Allies could 35-38. bring against. it.1 256; Fain, Thiers, xvi. 33. at Torgau, burg. Torgau and Wittenberg were the next of the fortresses on the Elbe which attracted the Emperor's attention. His works Several thousand Saxon peasants were immediately em- Wittenberg, ployed night and day in strengthening the fortifications and Magdeof these places, which it was calculated would be in a complete posture of defence in seven or eight weeks. Vast hospitals were at the same time formed in both towns, especially the former, for the reception of the sick and wounded of the immense host which would be assembled around them. Magdeburg was in so perfect a state of defence, that nothing was awanting to add to its strength. The whole care of the Emperor was, therefore, directed to forming in it a double set of establishments CHAP. IX. 1813. 1 Fain, ii. 23-27; Odel. i. 256; Thiers, xvi. 37-39. 34. alike indispensable to the success and health of the troops. The first of these was to provide buildings for the remounting and equipping of great part of the cavalry of the army, in particular the division of General Bourcier; and the second to render it the grand depot for the hospitals of the army. Napoleon expressed his intention, in his usual vigorous way, by saying that "he meant to convert Magdeburg entirely into stables and hospitals;” and he was very nearly as good as his word. The numerous convents, hospitals, and other public edifices of that town afforded every facility for carrying this design into execution. In addition to this, he proposed to station twenty thousand men in this central fortress, of whom five or six thousand were to form its garrison, and fourteen or fifteen thousand were to compose a movable column, intended as long as possible to keep the field in its vicinity, and preserve the communication between the fortresses on the Upper and the Lower Elbe.1 The principal fortress on the lower part of the river was Hamburg, which had been immensely strengthened regard by Marshal Davoust, who had extracted enormous con His mea sures burg and Werben. tributions from its suffering inhabitants-the means of compelling them to forge their own chains. It was not a regular fortress like Magdeburg, but formed part of a vast intrenched camp, which, in the hands of Marshal Davoust, who had (including the Danish contingent) 40,000 men at his command, formed a very formidable position. But between Madgeburg and Hamburg there was a long interval, undefended by any strong place, which gave the Emperor much uneasiness. After repeated surveys and consultations with General Haxo, he made choice of Werben, a town on the Elbe, nearer Magdeburg than Hamburg, at the corner of the elbow which the Elbe makes when turning from the north to the west, and at the point of its course nearest to Berlin. He ordered there the immediate construction of a citadel, composed of earthworks and palisades, where 3000 men might be lodged, |