IX. 1813. and maintain themselves for a long time. These plans CHAP. were meant to put in practice the maxim of Napoleon, that the line of a river was never to be defended but offensively; that is, by taking possession of all its passages, and taking advantage of them to threaten the enemy alike on his own bank, and, if a crossing was xvi. 40, 41. effected, on the side to which his troops had passed.1 1 Thiers, Napoleon had ordered Marshal Davoust "to take a 35. exactions of See orders in Thiers, xvi. 41, 42. cruel vengeance for the revolt of the inhabitants of Ham- Immense burg, Lubeck, and Bremen, to shoot immediately all the Daoust at old senators, the officers and soldiers of the Hanseatic Hamburg. Legion, the functionaries who had not contrived to escape, and then to make out a list of five hundred of the chief merchants, and to 'displace property,' in his own words, by confiscating their whole effects." These barbarous orders, which, if literally executed, and followed as they of course would have been by reprisals, would have substituted for the humanity of European the barbarity of Eastern war, fortunately proved in great part incapable of execution. The most part of the delinquents who had been designed for execution had escaped into the Danish territory before the French had regained possession of the city; and after the first ebullition of the imperial wrath, Napoleon was not sorry of a pretext for substituting for the shedding of blood enormous contributions in money from the unfortunate inhabitants. The humanity or prudence of Marshal Davoust retarded the commencement of the bloody execution till the dark fit had passed away from the Emperor's mind; and it was well it did so, for a few days after the capture of the town he wrote to the Marshal: "If the day following your entry you had shot several, it would have been well; but now it is too late. Pecuniary exactions are much more worth." 33 Napoleon Accordingly, by his directions, the Marshal levied a con- Davoust, tribution of 50,000,000 francs (£2,000,000) on the city 1813; of Hamburg, which at that period contained less than 43. 80,000 inhabitants! an exaction equivalent to what to Marshal June 6, Thiers, xvi. CHAP. IX. 1813. £10,000,000 sterling would be on Manchester, or Glasgow, or Liverpool. As it was evidently impossible for such an enormous sum to be paid, even by the most distant instalments, in specie or paper, its contribution was thus allocated 10,000,000 francs (£400,000) instantly in specie; 20,000,000 francs (£800,000) in bills; and the balance in articles of food, clothing, and military furnishings. The inhabitants of Hamburg, struck with consternation with these enormous exactions, made the most vehement remonstrances against them, and earnestly besought a remission of a large part; but the Marshal Brun; Lab. 114; Cape- was inexorable, and the disconsolate citizens had to subfigue, x. 271; Fain, ii. 47 mit in silence to their hard fate, which for ten years xvi. 43, 44. after blasted the prosperity of their once flourishing 1 Malte 49; Thiers, 36. Forces which Na community.1 It appears from the official returns in the War Office of Paris, given by M. Thiers, that the forces which Napopoleon had leon had collected for the campaign were enormous; collected by much beyond what at the time was either suspected or of August. deemed possible by the Allied powers. They amounted the middle 2 Theirs, xvi. 55. to the immense number of 400,000 combatants on the Elbe, of whom 60,000 were horse, with 1000 guns, besides 20,000 in Bavaria, and 80,000 in Italy; all in the field, and irrespective of the blockaded garrisons on the Oder and the Vistula, who were 100,000 men. In addition to this, the non-effectives in the rear, who, though not ready for the field at the moment, might be expected to become so in the course of the campaign, so as to fill up chasms and supply casualties, were 200,000 more. In all, 700,000 combatants; of whom, making the largest allowance for non-effectives, 500,000 might be reckoned on as available for the purpose of an active campaign. The plans of the Allies were fully arranged at Trachenberg by the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia in person, together with the Crown Prince of Sweden, who hastened thither, and took an active part in the deliberations. The operations agreed on were as follows, and calculated IX. 1813. 37. agreed on by and the Allies at Trachen to berg. June 12. with no small ability to meet the circumstances under CHAP. which they were placed. Immediately upon the declaration of war by Austria against Napoleon, which, after the result of the conference of Metternich with Napoleon, Plan of opeon 28th June, was reckoned upon as certain, a force rations reckoned at 100,000 men, composed of Russians Prussians, the elite of their respective armies, was march out of Silesia through the chain of mountains which forms the northern boundary of Bohemia, and to proceed secretly and suddenly westward along their southern base, through the dominions of the Emperor Francis, towards the left bank of the Moldau, there to join the Austrian army, and from that new base to act upon Napoleon's communications in Saxony, and in rear of the line of the Elbe. Meanwhile a force of 80,000 Russians and Prussians, partly composed of landwehr, was to remain in Silesia, under the command of General Blucher, to keep possession of that province, and cover the great line of communication through Poland with Russia. On this road large but still distant reserves were coming up from Russia to support that commander, whose instructions were to avoid a general action in the mean time, especially against superior numbers. The Army of the North, which was 80,000 strong, composed of some regular Russians and Cossacks, large bodies of Prussians, chiefly landwehr, and Hanoverian levies, was intrusted in the first instance with the defence of Berlin; and if the operations of the Grand Army should transfer the seat of war to the left bank of the Elbe, they were then to cross that river, and co-operate in a general attack on the enemy. In the mean time his Cossacks and light troops, about 10,000 in number, were to cross the river and threaten the enemy's communications, at the same time endeavouring to excite insurrections in Hesse, West-1 Cathcart, phalia, and all the German provinces between the Elbe Lond. 372. and the Rhine.1 The Allied army, which was in a condition to take the 198-200; CHAP. IX. 1813. 38. Forces of at the re hostilities. field in July 1813, was 50,000 short of the French; it amounted at the very utmost to 340,000 or 350,000 men; while the latter had 390,000 combatants arrayed around their eagles. This deficiency, which was by no means exthe Allies pected, and threatened the Allied cause with the most sumption of serious danger, arose chiefly from the Austrian troops ready for the field being somewhat less than had been represented to the Allied sovereigns; those in Bohemia ready for action, instead of 150,000, which Metternich held out, were only 90,000.* This arose from the prostration of the military strength of Austria after the battle of Wagram, which the embarrassed state of its finances had prevented its Government from restoring before the Russian catastrophe, and the great distance of the most warlike province of the empire, which long retarded the formation and concentration of its military force when war was determined on in July 1813. Great part of the troops also which were brought up were raw levies, little qualified to withstand the shock of Napoleon's corps d'elite. The cavalry alone was in excellent condition, and presented a magnificent body of men, which did good service in the campaign which followed. The Prussian troops, great part of whom were landwehr, recently called from the plough, were full of enthusiasm, and universally animated by the most determined spirit; but although these heroic resolves might carry them through the dangers of * Cathcart estimates the Austrian force which was ready for the field, as low as 45,000 men; but Sir Robert Wilson, the British Commissioner at the Austrian headquarters, states that he saw 60,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry (ii. 83) reviewed on the 19th August at Prague; whilst Kleinau's corps, and three divisions of light troops along the frontier, were absent. He estimates the Austrian army in Bohemia at this time at 115,000 men (ii. 86). His experience as a practical soldier, and his intimate acquaintance with the staff of the Austrian army during this campaign, which gave him constant access to the real working field-states (as contradistinguished from the official bulletins) of that force, render his authority upon this point decisive. Sir Charles Stewart, whose long experience as Wellington's Adjutant-General rendered him peculiarly qualified to judge as to numbers, entirely confirms Wilson's estimate. See LOND. 106. This would make the disposable Austrian field force 90,000 at least. Even after all the loss at Leipsic, Austria had (on the 29th October 1813) 106,000 men in the field.-WILSON, ii. 206. CHAP. IX. 1813. the field, it was much to be feared they would not be equally efficacious in enabling them to undergo the fatigues of a campaign, or withstand the contagion of the hospital or the bivouac. The main strength of the Allied force was to be found in the Russians, who were 120,000 strong, of whom 15,000 were cavalry, with 300 guns. A considerable part of their force was com-Wilson, ii. posed of iron veterans, who had gone through the cam- cart, 191paign of 1812, and might be confidently relied on in any 96. emergency.1 86; Cath 193; Loud. 39. paign. Relying on his great numerical superiority, Napoleon's plan of operation was framed, as already noticed, on the Napoleon's following principles. Resting on the fortresses of Lilien- plan of operations for stein, Koenigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg, and the cam. Magdeburg, which gave him the entire command of the river, and enabled him to debouch at pleasure with an overwhelming force on either bank, he was resolved to await calmly in his central, and in great part impregnable, position, the time when the Allies, occupying the exterior circle, would "commit some fault of which he would instantly take advantage to fall on and destroy them." Master of all the passages over the river, and with a disposable force greater than that to which he was opposed, he had it in his power at any time to direct a greatly superior body of troops against any of the three armies which menaced him; and they had no point d'appui in case of disaster, while he, in case of reverse, had a secure refuge under the guns of the fortress from which his troops had issued. 40. campaign of Perfectly aware of Napoleon's system of military tactics, and the important use he would not fail to make Plan of the of the central fortresses and interior line of communica- the Allies. tion which he had at his command, the plan of the campaign adopted by the Allies at Trachenberg was the best that could possibly have been adopted to meet his designs, and was of the following import. All the three armies were simultaneously to assume the offensive the |