CHAP.

IX.

1813.

Grand Army in Bohemia, 180,000 strong, taking the lead, and threatening the enemy's communications by a descent into Saxony, on the direct line from Dresden to Mayence. But to avoid the obvious danger of an attack on one of them by Napoleon in person at the head of an overwhelming force, their commanders received orders, whenever they became aware, from the activity of the operations, and the presence of the Imperial Guard and reserve cavalry in any quarter, that the Emperor himself was present, immediately to retire, and continue falling back so long as the pursuit was vigorously continued. Meanwhile, the other armies, relieved of the Emperor's attack in person, were to press on, and use the utmost endeavour to intercept his communications. In this way it was hoped the advantage to be derived from his command of the river and central fortresses would be in a great degree neutralised, or rather turned to his detriment because the elite of his army, obliged in this manner to cross and recross the river, and fly from one menaced point to another, would become worn out by constant marches and counter-marches; and their supplies, how great soever in the outset, would be exhausted ere long, from their foraging being necessarily confined 1 Sir Chas. to a comparatively limited sphere within the exterior Stewart to circle. On the other hand, these dangers were to be reagh, Aug. apprehended in a much inferior degree by the Allies, as MS.; Lond. their communications with the rear were all open, and Cyr, iv. 348. supplies to any amount might be obtained from the fertile fields of Silesia, Poland, Bohemia, and Bavaria.1

Lord Castle

14, 1813,

372; St

tria.

41.

When such military preparations were going on on State of the both sides, it is evident that it was more a work of disnegotiations with Aus simulation than anything else to carry on negotiations June 1813. either at Reichenbach or Prague, and that both France and Austria, under colour of pacific intentions, were in reality only striving to gain time for their warlike preparations. Yet was the negotiation between the Allies and Austria for long by no means on the amicable foot

IX.

ing which was desirable; on the contrary, it was at one CHAP. period on the point of miscarrying, on account of the refusal of England to give any subsidy to the Court of 1813. Vienna, and the doubts entertained of the good faith of Bernadotte in consequence of his allowing Hamburg to fall into the hands of the French without striking a blow. The truth was, the British Government entertained at this period serious doubts as to the intentions of Metternich, chiefly from the part he had taken in promoting the family alliance between the imperial families of France and Austria, and the adherence of the Cabinet of Vienna to that of the Tuileries during the eventful crisis of the Russian war. For these reasons, the British Government, in the first instance, refused to give any subsidy to Austria, even if she took a part in the war; and this refusal gave great umbrage to the Cabinet of Vienna, especially considering the large sum Great Britain was at the same time advancing to Russia, Prussia, and Sweden. Fortunately, Sir Charles Stewart had by this time come to the Allied headquarters at Reichenbach, and he made Lord Castlereagh fully aware of the mischievous effects which their declinature was producing on the prospects of the alliance, and the necessity of an immediate advance to enable Austria to take the field. The letter which he wrote to his brother at this crisis is highly valuable, and throws an important light both on the critical state of the European alliance at this period, and the great share which both brothers had in cementings its fortunes.*

"DEAREST CASTLEREAGE,-Count Hardenberg has arrived from Vienna, and Mr Humboldt. I have had many conversations with both. Both have hopes; but I will not vouch for the solidity of the basis on which they are rested. It seems now that Metternich is valiant, and that the Emperor Francis is the timid person. To wind him up to a proper key-to pat him on the back and to commit him, decidedly is the present aim. To accomplish this, it is necessary to hold the stoutest language: to declare that even without him the war will be carried on; to clench treaties for succour more binding with England; and, in short, to look only to war. Upon this policy they are now acting. How it will answer is in the womb of time. His Imperial Majesty, Francis, does not see things so advantageously as is desirable; and when it is pointed out to him that a movement in Buonaparte's rear with the

CHAP.

IX.

1813.

42.

Intrepid

But although both Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart, who were on the spot, were agreed as to the absolute necessity of an immediate advance of money to enable Austria to take the field, yet that necessity was Conduct of not equally apparent to the British Cabinet at home, who, cart and Sir already embarrassed by the enormous expense of the Penart in re- insular war, found their resources seriously diminished Austrian by the monetary and commercial crisis in which, from the

Lord

Chas. Stew

gard to an

subsidy.

universal hostility on the Continent, the British commerce

Austrian force would annihilate his son-in-law, he rather looks to his reigning in those limits which peaceable arrangements may bring about.

"Count Stadion declared yesterday that the Emperor Francis had positively refused a meeting with Buonaparte, which the latter had urged. If this is the case, the visits of the Russian Emperor and the King of Prussia will be equally declined. The arrival of the news of the armistice at Leipsic was very mal apropos. A great victory would have been gained then by Woronzoff. When it was received, the Prussian officers were so indignant that they tore off their pelisses and trampled them under foot. Count Stadion received reports yesterday from Count Bubna at Dresden, which positively assert that the loss of the French army since the opening of the campaign amounts at least to 60,000 men. Buonaparte is anxious to have it believed that it only depends on him to negotiate separately with Russia. In my official despatches, you will see the progress and conclusion of our treaties. I shall always lament the dilatory proceedings attending their completion. They should have been finished at Dresden or Grossberg, and we could then have done it without difficulty, and should have been then free from the accompanying explanations. But this I could not rectify. Although you may not now carry us through our signatures, still if we had not concluded, the alternative would have been an incapacity in Prussia to continue her preparations, the direct loss of Austria, and Russia looking to her own frontier. As it is, we have the hope Buonaparte will spurn the propositions made. We could not wait for orders from home. We give our game the last chance, and if the worst happen we need never be a party to the pacific negotiation; and if we are left in the lurch, it is not without having done our utmost. The loss of a part of our subsidy need not signify.

"With regard to the numbers to be kept up by the Allies, Prussia to the last would have inserted 100,000 men, and Russia alone prevented this. It may be said Prussia was engaged by her former treaty with Russia to furnish 80,000 men, and that we get no more by our subsidy. But the fact is, that it would be quite impossible for Prussia to make good the losses she has sustained since the commencement of hostilities, and to bring up her effective in the field to 80,000 men without England's aid. But with what has been given I am sure she will be brought up to the very utmost mark. I cannot conceal from you that Lord C.'s [Cathcart] extraordinary partiality to Russia will never let him see a greater exertion in another quarter than he can accom plish; therefore, the lower number was inserted in the treaty even after the higher had been three times inserted. I was obliged to be obedient as to 80,000, as Russia would not go higher. I fear you will be much disappointed; but I act under orders. I hope my hussar proceedings as to an advance will not

IX.

had come to be involved. The strenuous representations, CHAP. in consequence, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had compelled Lord Castlereagh, much against his will, to 1813. refuse, in the most positive manner, any, even the most inconsiderable, advance to Austria; and even in regard to the payments to Prussia, they were directed to be made in the most cautious manner. The necessities of Austria, however, were still more pressing, and a certain advance of money was indispensable to enable her to put her troops in motion. Matters were thus very near coming to a fix; and the danger was imminent that, at the decisive moment, Austria, needy and sullen at the refusal of aid she had experienced, would draw off, or even unite her forces to those of the enemy. In this extremity, the moral courage of Lord Cathcart and Sir Charles Stewart was put to the test, and fortunately it proved equal to the crisis. On the 16th June they signed a secret article to the treaty of June 16. Reichenbach, without any direct authority from the British Cabinet, but which they felt assured would not be disavowed, by which it was stipulated that, in the event of Napoleon declining the terms of accommodation proposed by Austria, 'she [Austria] should, in the event of her taking a part in the war, receive £500,000 in bills upon London, and the like sum in military stores and accoutrements; that she should bring 200,000 men into the field, and be restored to the condition in which she was in 1803, or, at any rate, at the Peace of Presburg; and that the Pope

66

electrify you. The fact is, Prussia cannot go on just now without a lift; the machine is really at a stand for want of oil.

"It may be right to put you in possession of the arguments that are used by those who do not press Austria so much forward as we would desire. It is said the positive refusal of England to give any subsidy has created in Metternich great dissatisfaction; that even the name of a small subsidy, in the event of their acting, would be of immense importance. The non-interference also of Sweden, up to the present time, upon whom they say we have expended our millions, and her suffering Hamburg to fall, is urged as a reason for Austria keeping back; she having originally stipulated, as one of the conditions that would induce her to take a part, the employment of a large Swedish army on the Lower Elbe."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Reichenbach, June 16, 1813 (Most private and secret), MS.

IX.

1813.

should be reinstated in his dominions." This clause had been drawn up under Count Stadion's eyes, in the treaty between Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, but without the signature of any one on the part of Austria. The Emperor Francis declined to sign it, as long as any hope remained of Napoleon's acceding to the terms proposed 1 Hard. xii. by him for a general pacification. But at length, when 184 Schoell, these hopes had entirely vanished from the determined Lond. 368, resolution of the French Emperor, he gave his consent to No. III. the secret article on 27th July, and thereby conditionally incorporated Austria with the Grand Alliance."

July 27.

x. 257;

Appendix,

43.

nadotte.

Fortunately about this time a ray of light broke in from Change of the quarter where it was least expected, and which conpolicy on the tof Ber- tributed to remove the indecision of Austria, and cement the union of the Allied powers. Bernadotte, whose backwardness in the general cause, especially in regard to Hamburg, had given rise to serious suspicions, not only in the breast of Sir Charles Stewart, but of the Allied sovereigns, suddenly changed his policy, and professed his willingness, not merely to repair to Trachenberg to concert measures with them, but to act with his whole force upon the lines most important to the Allied cause.* The cause of this sudden and auspicious change was, that secret information was received at this period that, in the event of the resumption of hostilities, one of Napoleon's first measures would be directed against Berlin and the Prince Royal of Sweden. For this purpose, the corps of Bertrand, Oudinot, and Reynier, with one of cavalry, mustering

* "MY DEAR STEWART,- The Prince Royal having entered into the most extended plan of co-operation which could be desired by the Emperor and King of Prussia, and having offered to act with the means within his reach upon the line of operations most interesting to them, I trust, my good friend, you will do everything in your power to cause every man of new or old troops to be placed at his absolute disposal, which are on this side of the line of demarcation. Whatever the quality of the troops may be, one advantage at least will arisethat of the whole being made to act with decision upon one system, and under the direction of one general. If, during the armistice, you can see the Prince Royal, I shall be glad of it. He looks upon you as a real soldier, which with him is a high degree of estimation."-GENERAL ALEXANDER HOPE, Envoy to Sweden, to SIR CHARLES STEWART, Stralsund, June 11, 1813, MS.