IX. 1813. 70,000 combatants, was to be advanced against Berlin, CHAP. supported by Girard from Madgeburg, and Davoust from Hamburg, forming a force in all of little less than 100,000. Against this force Bernadotte could not oppose more than 70,000; so that he had much need to conciliate the Allied sovereigns to avoid destruction. Upon receipt of this intelligence, he entered warmly into the views of the Allied sovereigns, and repaired forthwith to Trachenberg in person to concert with them the plan of operations. He was there received with the utmost distinction by the Allied sovereigns, and a stronger head than his might have been carried away by the incense bestowed upon him. From hence, however, arose a fresh set of difficulties; for he openly aspired to the command-in-chief of the Allied armies, or at least of that portion of them which acted in Prussia and on the Lower Elbe. It was no easy matter to reconcile these pretensions with the preponderance of Russia in the councils of the Coalition, and the just demands of Prussia for the lead in defence of her own country; but at length the matter was adjusted, though not without difficulty, by giving the Prince Royal the command of the Army of the North, charged with the defence of Berlin, with Prince William and Prince Henry of Prussia serving under him to be a check upon his actions.* But though Bernadotte was treated with such distinc "Prince William and Prince Henry of Prussia are to serve in the army which is to be placed under the Prince Royal. This is the policy of Prussia, lest the Prince Royal, once he has the army, should made himself too powerful. My friend Hardenberg is strong in power and favour, although he has collected in his person the management of every office in the state, and although he is nearly seventy years of age, and very deaf. Still he brings the affairs of the country forward; and, from what I hear, the interests of Great Britain in the alliance could not be intrusted to better hands. The loss of Scharnhorst has been a great misfortune; his principles, as well as his abilities, are so striking, that I wish all military arrangements were solely under his control. Kniesebeck has considerable military ability, but he is supposed to be favourable to peace, and hostile to Russia. The game evidently playing now is to unite Prussia with Austria, and to separate her as much as possible from Russia."-SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, June 26, 1813, MS. CHAP. IX. 1813. tion, and invested with so important a command, the plan of the campaign adopted was not his, but that of the Russian and Prussian generals, who, long opposed to xvi. 186; Napoleon, had come to learn the proper mode of combating his system of warfare.1 1 Thiers, Lond. 87 91. 44. attack on the free corps of the poet Körner. June 16. A barbarous piece of treacherous cruelty practised by Treacherous the French at this period powerfully contributed to inflame the already ardent feelings of the Prussians at this time. Lutzow and It is thus narrated by Sir Charles Stewart: “A circumstance which has occurred to the free corps of Lutzow has excited the greatest possible indignation here. This corps was acting in the enemy's rear, when, hearing of the armistice, they desired to have a free passage from the neighbourhood of Hoff to the right bank of the Elbe. The French general received them, and promised them a safe conduct. He treacherously, however, on their march, fell upon them with superior forces, and with difficulty twothirds of the corps escaped. The general gave as his excuse that he had received particular orders from Buonaparte that the armistice excluded those who carried on war like marauders in the rear of their opponents, and that the free corps should be everywhere treated with the greatest severity. This scandalous proceeding is a fair ground for immediately breaking the armistice, but it is hard to say how it will be viewed at the seat of judgment. The people of Leipsic are so exasperated against the French that 2 Sir Chas. they have declared the city in a state of siege." So far Lord Castle- Sir Charles Stewart: but, unknown to him, the event was reagh e destined to acquire enduring celebrity from what there Stewart to June 26, 1813, MS. befell a man of immortal fame. Among those wounded on this occasion, was the poet Körner, whose patriotic strains had rung like a trumpet to the heart of Germany, and who had advanced to parley with the French general, whom he assured of the armistice. But the perfidious barbarian, exclaiming, "The armistice is for all the world except you," cut him down before he had time even to draw his sword. Körner fell back in his saddle on receiv IX. ing the blow, which severely wounded him on the head, CHAP. and was quickly followed by a second, by which he was wellnigh stunned. His horse, which was a very powerful 1813. courageous animal, however, carried him in an almost senseless state into a neighbouring wood, where one of his companions overtook him, and was proceeding to bind up his wound, when a party of the enemy rode up. Without losing his presence of mind, Körner immediately called out in a loud voice, "Let the four squadrons advance." The enemy were deceived by the stratagem and retired, upon which Körner withdrew into the recesses of the wood and escaped. He was from thence conveyed during the night to the house of a peasant in the neighbourhood, by whom he was kindly treated; and he was afterwards taken secretly to the house of Dr Wingfield, in Leipsic, who, with generous devotion, put in hazard his own life to save that of his friend. He recovered so far as to be able to resume his military duties, and take a part in the battle Werke, i. of Dresden, where he was shot through the heart. A few Deutsche days before his death, he composed his immortal ode to Fred. Kolle, his Lyre and Sword-the noblest of all the noble lyrical Univ. Sup. pieces which his genius at that crisis created to aid in the ner. liberation of the Fatherland.1 1 40, 41; Pandora von 413; Biog. voce Kör 45. Stewart's negotia tions. There can be no doubt that Sir Charles Stewart was right in saying that this treacherous act afforded a good Sir Charles ground for breaking the armistice, but that it was very gloomy doubtful how it would be taken at headquarters. In view of the truth, at this period it was more than doubtful whether a general pacification was not at hand; or, at least, whether Austria would not immediately come to pacific terms with Napoleon. The anxiety which prevailed at the Allied headquarters at this time on this subject was extreme. They knew that a secret negotiation was going on between the Cabinet of Vienna and the French Emperor, and that Metternich had come to Dresden to conduct it in person with him; and they were ignorant of what had passed at the private interview between them, which rendered all VOL. I. 2 U CHAP. IX. prospect of a good understanding hopeless. Sir Charles Stewart, accordingly, at this period wrote from the Allied 1813. headquarters to Lord Castlereagh that a mystery hung over the negotiations which he could not penetrate; that a secret understanding existed between France and Austria; and that the independence of Europe was about to be sacrificed to "some miserable expedient for temporary tranquillity. In truth, Sir Charles Stewart's penetra tion was by no means at fault on this occasion; the danger which he divined and dreaded existed in its fullest extent, and to a degree greater than he suspected. It lay with Napoleon at this period by a word, and at a trifling sacrifice, not only to disarm the hostility of Austria, but convert her into a firm ally. Nothing hindered this from taking place but his indomitable pride and firmness, which could not brook even the semblance of defeat. 46. delay in Though secretly determined, however, not to accept Napoleon's the proposals of Austria, Napoleon had no pretext, after sending Russia and Prussia had accepted the mediation of that power, for delaying to send plenipotentiaries to Prague, the agreed-on place of assembly. He nominated, accordingly, M. de Narbonne and M. de Caulaincourt to represent France at the approaching congress. M. d'Anstett plenipotentiaries to Prague. "I was much besieged by Chancellor Hardenberg to increase the issue of £100,000, as you will see by the enclosed note. I have, however, more per emptorily resisted this, since I find there is still some mystery as to the neg tiations which I cannot entirely develop. I know not what Sweden may say to these proceedings, but I understand she has accepted the Austrian me diation; but she is kept very much in the dark. And when I review all I have seen and heard, it is my firm belief some pacific arrangement will be made, it is so evident that Austria, who has the chief power, is forming this. It is clear that, though she approves of the principle of resistance to a certain extent against France, she by no means goes along with England in her views as to Buonaparte's power being more confined. It is incontrovertible that a secret understanding exists between the French and Austrian Cabinets, and out of all this I think one must be blind not to foretell that some miserable expe dient for temporary tranquillity will be resorted to. I have good reason since I began this letter to believe what I have mentioned as to the Prince Royal's communications is correct. We must judge him from the future, not the past."SIR CHARLES STEWART to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Berlin, June 26, 1813, MS. CHAP. represented Russia, and M. de Humboldt, Prussia, at the congress; and from the high character of all these diplomatists, it was confidently expected that the negotiations 1813. would make rapid progress, and possibly terminate in a fortunate result. But this illusion was not of long duration. The Russian, Prussian, and Austrian plenipotentiaries arrived at Prague on the 12th July, the time appointed, and M. de Narbonne also made his appearance. But M. de Caulaincourt, to their astonishment, did not arrive, and his absence prevented anything being done. After waiting in vain till the 18th, they were surprised, instead of the absent plenipotentiary, at receiving a despatch from Napoleon, dated Dresden, 17th July, in which he complained that at Neumarkt General Barclay de Tolly had declared that he considered the armistice as lasting only till the 10th August instead of the 17th, the expiry of the period allowed for denouncing the armistice, and that he must receive satisfaction on so important a point before he sent M. de Caulaincourt to commence the negotiations. He complained also that M. d'Anstett and M. de Humboldt were not of the rank which was required for those who were to meet M. de Narbonne and the Duke of Vicenza (Caulaincourt). Both objections were obviously unfounded. Barclay de Tolly was merely a military commander, who had no authority to say anything as to the duration of the armistice, which it would be time enough to discuss when the period of its expiry drew near. And as to the rank of the diplomatists an objection which sounded strange from the child of the Revolution-M. de Humboldt, of ancient family, and brother of the illustrious naturalist, famed over the whole world, was at least on a level with either Maret or Caulaincourt, neither of whom had any pretensions to aristocratic descent. As it was, however, these objections gave rise to an angry correspondence, which was not terminated till the 28th, when Caulaincourt, who had only been permitted to quit Dresden on the 26th, having arrived, the |