CHAP. IX. 1813. conferences were allowed to go on. This factious resistance upon trifling points strengthened greatly the arguments of those who contended that Napoleon was al1 Fain, ii. together insincere in the conference, and that he was 209; Thiers, laying hold of every pretext to prolong the armistice, in order to gain time for his military preparations being completed.1 xvi. 147, 148. 47. culty raised by Napo leon as to the form of the confe rences. July 28. In the meanwhile, previous to M. de Caulaincourt's arFresh diffi- rival, Napoleon started another difficulty, which, though of form only, was of such a kind as stopped altogether, in the mean time, the commencement of the negotiations. Metternich proposed that, when the conferences were opened, the mode adopted in the negotiations of Tetschen in 1779 should be followed-viz., by written notes, addressed not by the belligerent parties to each other, but by both to the mediating power, and by it transmitted to the plenipotentiary of the power for whom it was really intended. To this proposition the Allied plenipotentiaries, anxious to conciliate Austria, at once agreed; but M. de Narbonne contended for that pursued at the conferences of Utrecht, where the plenipotentiaries sent their notes directly to each other, and the communications were carried on partly verbally, partly in writing. It was obviously a matter of little consequence which form was adopted, as the notes to be exchanged were the same whether they were to be addressed by the belligerents to each other or to the mediating power; but Napoleon was firm in insisting for his side of the question; and as the fatal term of the 16th August was approaching, M. de Metternich, who See official had become seriously alarmed that the negotiations would ence in come to nothing, requested and obtained a secret confer200; Thiers, ence with M. de Narbonne, the particulars of which, hap correspond Fain, ii. xvi. 156, 157. pily preserved in the archives of the Austrian statesman, are of the highest interest and importance.2 "The difficulty now raised," said M. de Metternich, “is not more serious than that which has been discussed. We have announced to you officially that the convention is CHAP. 1813. 48. ference of and Nar ratified, in virtue of which the armistice is prolonged to the 16th August; this, therefore, could never give you a ■reason for withholding the nominating of your plenipotentiaries when ours arrived on the evening of the 11th July. Secret conNow the commissioners at Neumarkt, who know nothing Metternich of the matter, and have all the passions of military staffs, pretend to interpret the clause differently, and you pretend to be alarmed at it. I say 'pretend,' for you cannot seriously believe what you advance. You rest on an insignificant difficulty, which is entirely without foundation, as not only the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries, but the mediating power, are on your side of that question. In these circumstances we can see nothing in such conduct, when time is so precious, but a desire on the part of the Emperor Napoleon to keep us here without doing anything till the conclusion of the armistice. But do not deceive yourselves; you will not by so doing prolong the suspension of arms by one hour. By the difficulties which you say you have encountered at Neumarkt, you may judge of the difficulty which we have had in getting the armistice prolonged even to the 10th August. Rely upon it you will obtain no second suspension; let not the Emperor Napoleon deceive himself on so important a point. In such an event we shall not remain neutral; ; rest assured of that. After having from the very first employed every possible means to bring him to reasonable conditions-which he well knows we have communicated to him from the first moment, and on which we have never for an instant varied, for they constitute the only possible basis for the peace of Europe-we have no alternative if he refuses but to become belligerents ourselves. If we remain neutral, as he in reality desires, the Allies, we know, will be beaten; but we do not deceive ourselves, our turn will come next, and we shall have well merited the fate that awaits us. We shall not commit that fault. At present, whatever you may be told to the contrary, we are free. I give you my word of honour, as СНАР. IX. 1813. well as that of my Sovereign, that we have no engagements with any one. But I give you my word at the same time, that at midnight on the 10th August we shall be engaged with all the world except you, and that on the morning of the 17th you will have three hundred thousand Austrians the more on your hands. It is not lightly, or without pain, for my Sovereign is a father, and loves his daughter, that he has taken this resolution; but he owes it to his people, to himself, and to Europe, to restore to all a stable state of things, since he has it in his power to do so. He has no other alternative but to fall a few days later under your blows into a state of dependence more lamentable than that in which you have put Prussia. Certainly we are not blind to the risks we run in combating, even with large armies, the Emperor Napoleon at the head of the French troops; but after having duly reflected on the matter, we prefer that chance to dishonour and slavery. Do not come, then, after the event and say we have deceived you! Till midnight on the 10th, everything is possible, even to the eleventh hour; but midnight past, not a day, not an instant of respite; instant war with all the world, even with us." 1 Thiers, xvi. "What!" said Narbonne, "not an instant of respite, even from Met- if a negotiation has commenced?" "On one condition only that the entire basis of peace has been arranged, and that nothing remains to settle but the details.”1 151, 152, ternich's archives. 49. bonne in persuade Napoleon of his danger. M. de Narbonne readily perceived, from the earnest M. de Nar- manner, solemn voice, and emphatic assurances of M. de vain tries to Metternich, that he spoke with sincerity the resolution of his Cabinet, and he was seized, in consequence, with the most mortal apprehensions as to the fate which awaited his Imperial master. Under the influence of these impressions, he wrote to Napoleon giving an account of what had passed, and urging the necessity of immediately sending M. de Caulaincourt to Prague, with full powers to begin the negotiation in good earnest ; warning him, at the same time, that if everything was not concluded by the 10th at midnight, renewed war with Austria in addition was inevitable. Napoleon, to whose secret thoughts Maret alone was privy, attached no credit to these representations, and if he had believed, he was determined not to act upon them. Still he was not the less desirous to gain as much time as he possibly could, and with this view, he resolved on the following plan. He sent powers to M. de Narbonne to commence the negotiation without M. de Caulaincourt, and enjoined him to propose as the basis of the negotiation, which he offered to conduct by means of written proposals, the principle of uti possidetis. As the French Emperor was in possession at this time of more than the half of Germany and the whole of Italy, there was little chance of its being admitted by the Allied Powers; and this was rendered still more unlikely by what he at the same time insisted on, in regard to the blockaded fortresses. He required that French officers should be sent to all of them to superintend the supply of provisions, and that a return should be furnished for 50,000 men and 6000 horses, in the fortresses on the Oder-numbers considerably superior to the garrisons, and to what had hitherto been provided under the stipulations of the armistice. The Emperor of Russia said he would not agree to this, and Napoleon stated in reply, that if it was refused he would instantly recommence hostilities. The matter was at length adjusted by mutual concessions, but in the mean time, some days were consumed in these preliminary points, and July expired without the negotiations having advanced a single step. The designs of Napoleon were quite fixed; he proposed to amuse the Allied Powers by simulate proposals for peace to the very last moment, and when this could no longer avail, to open a separate and secret negotiation with Austria, which might delay for a few days longer the commencement of hostilities with that power, during which he hoped to succeed in crushing Russia and Prussia in a pitched battle. The CHAP. IX. 1813. CHAP. IX. 1813. 1 Thiers,xvi. instructions to Caulaincourt, who was not to quit Dresden till the 26th, accordingly pointed to a separate treaty with Austria, but by no means to a general peace. The 133, 134; powers previously sent to Narbonne had been so reSir Charles stricted that Maret, in despatching them, wrote on the Lord Castle envelope: "I send you more powers than power; your 28, 1813, hands are bound, but your feet and mouth are free, and you may walk about and dine.”1 Stewart to reagh, July MS. 50. ence to meet press. Instead of remaining at Dresden to conduct the negoNapoleon tiation in person, or giving full powers to either M. de goes to May: Narbonne or M. de Caulaincourt to conduct it for him, the Em- Napoleon, on the night of the 24th July, set out for Mayence, whither the Empress had come to meet him, for the double purpose of seeing her before the campaign commenced, and of inspecting the troops which were continually passing through that fortress on their way to Dresden. What passed on this occasion is now known by the best of all evidence, that of the Empress herself: Associated," said she to the Senate, "in that short interview with the most secret thoughts of the Emperor, I then perceived with what sentiments he would be inspired if seated on a dishonoured throne, and under a crown without glory." In these words is revealed the inmost soul of Napoleon. "He was much urged by the Empress," says Sir Charles Stewart, "to make peace on 2 Lond. 108. any terms, but he answered, TOUT OU RIEN."2 The Em August 4. 66 peror spent six days at Mayence, busied in inspecting the fortifications and reviewing the troops which were incessantly urged on to swell the roll of the corps on the 3 Fain, ii. Elbe, and on the 4th August he returned in person to 56, 57; Dresden. During his stay at Mayence, he received 231; Bign. several letters from Caulaincourt complaining bitterly of 204; Thiers, the illusory nature of the powers with which he was in163. vested and the instruction which he had received, but without the slightest effect.3 Odel. i. 228 xii. 203, xvi. 159 Upon Napoleon's return to Dresden, he ascertained from Maret and Caulaincourt that the pretexts for delay |