Bohannon's Adm'x v. Southern Ry. Co (NS) determined favorable to appellee, and it seems to us this finding finds support in the evidence. Appellant also complains of instruction No. 5 given by the court, which told the jury to find for defendant if they believed that Bohannon knew the train did not stop at Hempridge, but did stop at the chute, and that he left the train at the latter point of his own free will, whether assisted or unassisted. This is on the idea that when Bohannon got on the train he knew he would get off at the chute, and when he reached that point he was at his destination, and got off the train of his own will. If he knew that he could not get off at Hempridge, but must get off at the chute, that was his destination,-the chute was his station, and to that place it must be held the contract of carriage extended and ended. Under this state of case the only question to be considered was the mental and physical condition of Bohannon. If he left the train of his own free will, it was his privilege and right, and he assumed the risks of injury from passing trains. If Bohannon was mentally incapable of having a will, and was put off the train at this time and place, and it was dangerous, appellee assumed the risk of injury; and the jury was told in instructions Nos. I and 4 to find for the appellant if decedent was ejected. Instruction No. 5 only eliminates the time and place where Bohannon was put off or got off, if the jury concludes a certain state of facts to be true. The question of whether decedent was ejected was submitted to the jury by instructions Nos. I and 4. We conclude that the instructions given fairly state the law of the case. Counsel for appellant have referred us to a number of cases to sustain his position,-those of this court as well as courts of other states. All these we have carefully considered, and find that in no case was the question considered or decided that a carrier was liable where a passenger had gotten off or been put off at his destination. The cases cited (Railroad Co. v. Weber, 33 Kan. 543, 6 Pac. 877, 52 Am. Rep. 543; Conolly v. Railroad Co. [La.] 5 South. 259, 6 South. 526, 3 L. R. A. 133, 17 Am. St. Rep. 389; Gill v. Railroad Co., 37 Hun, 107; Railroad Co. v. Ellis' Adm'r, 97 Ky. 330, 30 S. W. 979; Brown's Adm'r v. Railroad Co. [Ky.] 44 S. W. 648; and the recent case of Fagg's Adm'r v. Railroad Co. [Ky.] 63 S. W. 580, where all the authorities are reviewed) where a recovery was permitted were where a passenger had been ejected from the train and placed or left in a dangerous place, and injury or death resulted as a necessary or probable consequence. It could scarcely be contended in the case at bar, if the trains had stopped at Hempridge station, and that was where Bohannon intended and expected to get off, and that at that station he left the train voluntarily, whether assisted or unassisted, that appellee would be liable for his death because he was afterwards killed. We can see no difference from that supposed case than the facts here, if the coal chute R Cas Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bowlds was Bohannon's destination. That question was properly submitted to the jury. If the coal chute was selected by Bohannon as the point of his destination, where his contract of carriage should terminate, it must be held that he assumed the dangers of the locality if he left the car voluntarily at that point. Every question of fact upon which appellant could recover was submitted to the jury, and their finding cannot be disturbed. Judgment affirmed. Louisville, H. & ST. L. R. Co. v. Bowlds. Injury to Passenger-Sudden Stoppage of Train-Evidence of Invitation to Alight * Where plaintiff alleged in her petition that defendant, "by the gross negligence and carelessness of its officers and agents in charge of the train on which plaintiff was a passenger," inflicted serious injuries upon her, and then stated the facts as to how the injury occurred, it appearing that plaintiff was standing in the aisle when the train suddenly stopped at her station, causing her to be thrown to the floor, evidence that the brakeman when he announced the station directed plaintiff to follow him, whereby she was induced to leave her seat, was admissible. Same-Contributory Negligence-Instructions. Though the term "contributory negligence' was not used in the instructions, that defense was fully presented by an instruction telling the jury that plaintiff could not recover if she was guilty of negligence. Same--Evidence of Knowledge That Plaintiff Was a Cripple. A conversation plaintiff had with the conductor on entering the car was competent to show that defendant's servants knew of plaintiff's crippled condition. Excessive Verdict. A verdict for $2,500 for an injury rendering plaintiff a permanent cripple was not excessive. Appeal from circuit court, Daviess county. "Not to be officially reported." Action by Eliza Bowlds against the Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. Wathen & Morrison and Helm, Bruce & Helm, for appellant. Sweeney, Ellis & Sweeney and Walker & Slack, for appel lee. WHITE, J. Appellee was a passenger on appellant's train, and was injured. In this action a verdict and judgment were rendered awarding, as damages for appellee's injury, $2,500. The facts, so far as they are undisputed, seem to be that *See 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 573 et seq.; 9 Cent. Dig., col. 1154 et seq.; 2 Rap. & Mack's Dig. 393 et seq. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Bowlds (N S) appellee, quite an elderly lady and a cripple using a crutch, was a passenger on appellant's train, and her destination was Pate, a small station in Daviess county. When the train whistled for the station, and its name was called out by the brakeman, appellee arose from her seat, and stood in the aisle. In stopping the train appellee was thrown down on the floor of the car, and her limb was seriously injured, from which she suffered great pain, and which has made her a hopeless cripple for her life. A serious conflict in the testimony occurs about what took place after the station was called. The brakeman says that he called the station, and picked up appellee's basket or bundle, and started to the car door, without saying anything to appellee, and that the train was stopped in the usual way, and appellee was thrown down and injured. Appellee says that when the brakeman called the station and took her bundle he said to her, "This is your station; follow me;" that she got up, and stood in the aisle, and when the train stopped it was with a sudden jerk, and she was thrown down and injured. There was other testimony of passengers on the train and of the trainmen in charge as to the manner in which the train was stopped. The passengers who were sitting say they noticed nothing unusual in the way the train stopped. One passenger, who was walking in the aisle, stated: "I had leaned against the end of the seat to keep it from jerking me. I had the baby in my arms. I knew how it would do if you did not notice it." The appellee had never before been on a train, and she could not say whether the train stopped as usual or not. It is insisted by appellant that the petition charges negligence only in stopping the car, and that the court erred in permitting proof of the invitation or direction of the brakeman to appellee to come on,-"follow me," whereby she was induced to get up from her seat and stand in the aisle. The allegation in the petition is: "But the defendant, in the course of transporting plaintiff to Pate's Station, by the gross negligence and carelessness of its officers and agents in charge of the train on which plaintiff was a passenger, inflicted serious and lasting physical injuries upon her.' The petition then undertakes to state the facts as to how the injury occurred, the same as testified to by appellee on the trial. We are of opinion that the charge of negligence, with a statement of the facts upon which appellee would rely to recover, was sufficient, and was a charge of negligence as to the direction to "follow me," by the brakeman. Evidence as to that question was properly admitted. The instructions given say to the jury in apt language that there can be no recovery by appellee if she was negligent in starting to get off the car, or if the injury was caused by the ordinary motion and jar of the car in stopping in the usual way. While there is no mention in the instruction of the R Cas Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood term "contributory negligence," we think that phase of the case was fully presented in the instruction which said appellee could not recover if she was guilty of negligence. We are of opinion there was no error in instructing the jury. The law was fairly stated, and upon directly conflicting testimony the jury returned a verdict for appellee. We perceive no error in the admission of evidence. The conversation appellee had with the conductor on appellant's train when she got on at Waitman was competent to show that appellant's agents in charge of the train knew of appellee's crippled condition. The verdict of $2,500 is not excessive, in view of the fact that the injury rendered appellee a permanent cripple. We conclude, therefore, there is no error in the judgment, and the same is affirmed, with damages. SOUTHERN Ry. Co. v. WOOD. (Supreme Court of Georgia, Nov. 7, 1901.) [39 S. E. Rep. 894.] Ejection of Passenger for Failure to Have Round-Trip Ticket Stamped Where Ticket Agent Could Not Be Found.* When a railway company sells a round-trip ticket, which provides that it shall not be good for return passage unless the original purchaser shall procure the same to be signed and stamped by an agent of the company at the point of destination, and shall use the ticket on the date it is so signed and stamped, it is incumbent upon the company to have present, a reasonable time before the arrival of trains on which the ticket would be good for passage on any day upon which the purchaser might see fit to use it, an agent authorized to sign and stamp the ticket in the manner therein provided. Upon the failure by the company to have present at such time, on any day the original purchaser of the ticket sees fit to return, an agent so authorized, such purchaser, after having on the day he desired to return used due diligence to find some agent of the company authorized to sign and stamp his ticket so as to make it good for return passage, has authority to board the train without having the ticket so signed and stamped, and, upon explanation of the facts to the conductor, is entitled to ride upon the train; and his expulsion there from under such circumstances is a tort, for which the company will be liable in damages. Same-Waiver of Right of Action. The fact that a passenger holding a ticket of the character above referred to, and who has been expelled from the train, returns to the point where he had boarded the train, and has the ticket signed and stamped as required within the time limit fixed therein, and uses the same in this condition for return passage on another train, does not waive or extinguish any right he might have for the wrong committed in expelling him from the train before the ticket was so signed and stamped. Case at Bar. There was no error in the charges complained of, or in refusing to charge as set out in the motion for a new trial. The evidence warranted the verdict, which, under the facts appearing in the record, was not so excessive as to authorize this court to reverse the judgment of the trial court refusing to set it aside. (Syllabus by the Court.) *See note, 17 Am. & Eng. R. Cas., N. S., 654 et seq. Southern Ry. Co. v. Wood (N S) Error from city court of Floyd county; Jno. H. Reece, Judge. Action by Arthur Wood against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Shumate & Maddox, Geo. A. H. Harris & Son, and R. L. Chamlee, for plaintiff in error. Seaborn & Barry Wright, for defendant in error. COBB, J. Wood sued the railway company for damages claimed to have been sustained on account of having been ejected from one of the defendant's trains by its conductor. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $450. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and the case is here upon a bill of exceptions assigning error upon the overruling of this motion. 1. It appeared at the trial that the plaintiff had purchased a ticket from Atlanta to Rome and return at a reduced rate of. fare, at the same time entering into a special contract with the company. This contract contained, among others, the following stipulations: "This ticket shall not be good for return passage unless the holder identifies him or herself by signature on back hereof and otherwise as original purchaser to the satisfaction of the agent of the terminal line at destination of ticket, and, when officially signed and stamped by said agent, this ticket shall then be good for return passage of the original purchaser only, leaving destination only on date so stamped and canceled on back." The ticket was purchased on December 23, 1899, and was good for return passage until January 1, 1900. There was a train which passed Rome, destined for Atlanta, upon the days on which the ticket was good for return passage, at 1:30 o'clock a. m. each day. The plaintiff decided to return to Atlanta on this train on December 25th. As his ticket provided that, before it would be good for return passage, it must be dated and stamped by the defendant's agent at Rome, he went to the agent of the defendant at the depot in Rome at which he had disembarked from the train about 12 o'clock of the night of the 24th. There was no one present at the station authorized to validate his ticket, and no one appeared prior to the arrival of the train for Atlanta, which on that occasion arrived some later than its schedule time. His business being of a nature which required his presence in Atlanta on that day, he boarded the train, and tendered the unvalidated ticket to the conductor, at the same time explaining the circumstances which prevented him from having it dated and stamped in accordance with the terms of his contract. The conductor refused to accept the ticket, and ejected the plaintiff from the train. An examination of the stipulation in the contract above quoted shows that it was distinctly provided that the plaintiff could leave Rome only on the date on which the ticket was dated and |