doubt, approaches, in which the French will bring "congratulations to the national convention of Great "Britain."

"Nature and principles draw towards us England, "Scotland, and Ireland. Let the cries of friendship "resound through the two REPUBLICS"...." Principles "are waging war against tyranny, which will fall under "the blows of philosophy. ROYALTY in Europe is "either destroyed or on the point of perishing, on the "ruins of feudality: and the declaration of rights placed "by the side of thrones, is a devouring fire which will 66 consume them....Worthy REPUBLICANS," &c.

Declarations of this sort, cannot but be viewed as a direct application of the principle of the decree to Great Britain; and as an open patronage of a revolution in that country; a conduct which, proceeding from the head of the body that governed France, in the presence and on behalf of that body, was unquestionably an offence and injury to the nation to which it is related.

The decree of the 15th of November, is a further cause of offence to all the governments of Europe. By that decree" the French nation declares, that it will "treat as enemies the people, who refusing or renounc"ing liberty and equality, are desirous of preserving "their prince and privileged casts, or of entering into "an accommodation with them," &c. This decree was little short of a declaration of war against all nations having princes and privileged classes.

The formal and definitive annexation to France of the territories over which her arms had temporarily prevailed, is another violation of just and moderate principles, into which the convention was betrayed by an intemperate zeal, if not by a culpable ambition; and of a nature to justify the jealousy and ill will of every neighboring state.

The laws of nations give to a power at war, nothing more than a usufructuary or possessory right to the territories which it acquires; suspending the absolute property and dominion, till a treaty of peace, or something equivalent, shall have ceded or relinquished the

conquered territory to the conqueror. This rule is one of primary importance to the tranquillity and security of nations....facilitating an adjustment of their quarrels, and the preservation of ancient limits.

But France, by incorporating with herself in several instances the territories she had acquired, violated that rule, and multiplied infinitely the obstacles to peace and accommodation. The doctrine, that a nation connot consent to its own dismemberment, but in a case of extreme necessity, immediately attached itself to all the conquered territories: while the progressive augmentation of the dominions of the most powerful empire in Europe, on a principle, not of temporary possession, but of permanent acquisition, threatened the independence of all other countries, and gave to neighbouring neutral powers the justest cause of discontent and apprehension. It is a principle well agreed, and founded on substantial reasons, that whenever a particular state adopts maxims of conduct contrary to those generally established among nations, calculated to interrupt their tranquillity and to expose their safety, they may justifiably make common cause to resist and control the state which manifests a disposition so suspicious and exceptionable.

Whatever partiality may be entertained for the general object of the French revolution, it is impossible for any well informed or sober minded man, not to condemn the proceedings which have been stated, as repugnant to the rights of nations, to the true principles of liberty, to the freedom of opinion of mankind; or not to acknowledge as a consequence of this, that the justice of the war on the part of France, with regard to some of the powers with which she is engaged, is from those causes questionable enough to free the United States from all embarrassment on that score, if indeed it be at all incumbent upon them to go into the inquiry.

The policy of a defensive alliance is so essentially distinct from that of an offensive one, that it is every way important not to confound their effects. The first kind has in view the prudent object of mutual defence,

when either of the allies is involuntarily forced into a war by the attack of some third power. The latter subjects the peace of each ally to the will of the other, and obliges each to partake in the other's wars of policy and interest, as well as in those of safety and defence. To preserve their boundaries distinct, it is necessary that each kind should be governed by plain and obvious rules.

This would not be the case, if, instead of taking as a guide the simple fact of who began the war, it was necessary to travel into metaphysical niceties about the justice or injustice of the causes which led to it.

Inasmuch also as the not furnishing a stipulated succour, when it is due, is itself a cause of war, it is very requisite that there should be some palpable criterion for ascertaining when it is due. This criterion, as before observed, in a defensive alliance, is the commencement or not, of the war by our ally, as a mere matter of fact.

Other topics, serving to illustrate the position that the United States are not bound to execute the clause of guarantee, are reserved for another paper.

No. III.

FRANCE, at the time of issuing the proclamation, was engaged in war with a considerable part of Europe, and likely to be embroiled with almost all the rest, without a single ally in that quarter of the globe.

In such a situation, it is evident, that however she may be able to defend herself at home, of which her factions and internal agitations furnish the only serious doubt, she cannot make external efforts in any degree proportioned to those which can be made against her.

This state of things alone discharges the United States from an obligation to embark in her quarrel.

It is known, that we are wholly destitute of naval force. France, with all the great maritime powers united against her, is unable to supply this deficiency. She cannot afford us that species of co-operation which is

necessary to render our efforts useful to her, and to prevent our experiencing the destruction of our trade, and the most calamitous inconveniences in other respects.

Our guarantee does not look to France herself. It does not relate to her immediate defence, but to the defence and preservation of her American colonies; objects of which she might be deprived, and yet remain a great, a powerful, and a happy nation.

In the actual situation of this country, and in relation to a matter of only secondary importance to France, it may fairly be maintained, that an ability in her to supply in a competent degree our deficiency of naval force, is a condition of our obligation to perform the guarantee on our part.

Had the United States a powerful marine, or could they command one in time, this reasoning would not be solid; but circumstanced as they are, it is presumed to be well founded.

There would be no proportion between the mischiefs and perils to which the United States would expose themselves, by embarking in the war, and the benefit which the nature of their stipulation aims at securing to France, or that which it would be in their power actually to render her by becoming a party.

This disproportion would be a valid reason for not executing the guarantee. All contracts are to receive a reasonable construction. Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation; and though in the performance of stipulations relating to war, good faith requires that its ordinary hazards should be fairly met, because they are directly contemplated by such stipulations, yet it does not require that extraordinary and extreme hazards should be run; especially where the object to be gained or secured is only a partial or particular interest of the ally, for whom they are to be encountered.

As in the present instance, good faith does not require that the United States should put in jeopardy their essential interests, perhaps their very existence, in one of the most unequal contests in which a nation could be engaged, to secure to France.... What? Her West-India

Islands, and other less important possessions in America. For it is always to be remembered, that the stipu lations of the United States do, in no event, reach beyond this point. If they were upon the strength of their guarantee, to engage in the war, and could make any arrangement with the belligerent powers, for securing to France those islands and those possessions, they would be at perfect liberty instantly to withdraw. They would not be bound to prosecute the war one moment longer.

They are under no obligation in any event, as far as the faith of treaties is concerned, to assist France in defence of her liberty; a topic on which so much has been said, so very little to the purpose, as it regards the present question.

The contest in which the United States would plunge themselves, were they to take part with France, would possibly be still more unequal than that in which France herself is engaged. With the possessions of Great Britain and Spain on both flanks, the numerous Indian tribes under the influence and direction of those powers, along our whole interior frontier, with a long extended sea coast, with no maritime force of our own, and with the maritime force of all Europe against us, with no fortifications whatever, and with a populatiou not exceeding four millions: it is impossible to imagine a more unequal contest, than that in which we should be involved in the case supposed. From such a contest we are dissuaded by the most cogent motives of self-preservation, no less than of interest.

We may learn from Vatel, one of the best writers on the laws of nations, that "if a state, which has promised "succours, finds itself unable to furnish them, its very "inability is its exemption; and if the furnishing the "succours would expose it to an evident danger, this "also is a lawful dispensation. The case would render "the treaty pernicious to the state, and therefore not ob"ligatory. But this applies to an imminent danger "threatening the safety of the state; the case of such a