menced on the equity side of the court cannot be transferred to the
law side of that court under Equity Rule 22. That rule has no ap-
plication. Curriden v. Middleton, 633.
Illinois. Inheritance Tax Law of 1909 (see Constitutional Law, 30).
National Safe Deposit Co. v. Illinois, 58.
Iowa. Liability of common carriers; Code, § 2074 (see Interstate Com-
merce, 27). Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 490.
Louisiana. Sales of drugs, etc.; Laws of 1894 (see Constitutional Law,
15). Baccus v. Louisiana, 334.
Maryland. Oyster Inspection Tax of 1910 (see Interstate Commerce,
15). Foote v. Maryland, 494.
Massachusetts. Labor Act of 1909, § 48 (see Constitutional Law, 22,
23). Riley v. Massachusetts, 671.
Michigan. Local Option Act of 1889 (see Constitutional Law, 37, 45;
Interstate Commerce, 17). Eberle v. Michigan, 700.
Minnesota. Railroad crossings (see Railroads, 3). Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis, 430.
Taxation of banks (see Constitutional Law, 34). Farmers Bank
v. Minnesota, 516.
Mississippi. Appearance; Code of 1906, § 3946 (see Removal of
Causes, 13). Cain v. Commercial Publishing Co., 124.
New Mexico. Joinder of unknown claimants and service by publication;
application of statutes. The statutes of New Mexico which, in
1894, permitted unknown claimants to be joined as defendants
as such and to be served by publication, did not relate to partics
who could be definitely located and joined or who were confirmees
of the grant including the property under the act of June 21, 1860.
Priest v. Las Vegas, 604.
Title to Spanish &c. grants by adverse possession (see Constitu-
tional Law, 32, 33). Montoya v. Gonzales, 375.
Ohio. Railroad taxation act of 1911 (see Constitutional Law, 36).
Ohio Tax Cases, 576.
Oklahoma. Foreign corporations (see Constitutional Law, 59). Har-
rison v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 318.
Pennsylvania. Coal mining laws (see Constitutional Law, 29). Ply-
mouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 531.
Distillers' certificates (see Pledge, 2). Taney v. Penn National
Bank, 174.
Game law of May 8, 1909 (see Constitutional Law, 20). Patsone
v. Pennsylvania, 138.
Porto Rico. Right of natural child to sue for share of parent's inheritance.
While under the laws of Toro parol acts, although not amounting
to a solemn recognition, may have entitled a natural child to sue
in Porto Rico for a share of the parent's inheritance and prove the
acts in the same suit, the existing Code requires a preliminary
proceeding to prove those acts and to declare their effect, and
limits the time within which such proceeding can be brought.
(Cordova v. Folgueras, 227 U. S. 375.) Calaf v. Calaf, 371.
South Dakota. Claims against railroads (see Constitutional Law, 19).
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Kennedy, 626 (see Constitutional
Law, 31). Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Polt, 165.
Vermont. Courts; legislative powers of; nature of remedy conferred by
§§ 4599, 4600, Pub. Stat. 1909. The constitution of Vermont does
not confer legislative powers on the courts of that State, and the
appeal given by §§ 4599 and 4600, Pub. Stat. of 1909, from orders
of the state railroad commission to the Supreme Court is a purely
judicial remedy. Bacon v. Rutland R. R. Co., 134.
Generally. See BANKRUPTCY, 5;
FEDERAL QUESTION, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, A 7;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 6, 8, 9, 10;
LOCAL OPTION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 17;
MAJORITY RULE.
See STATUTES, A 15.
MARRIED WOMEN.
See DOMICIL, 4.
MARYLAND OYSTER INSPECTION TAX.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 15.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
1. Assumption of risk; when servant not charged with.
One employed for only a few days, and whose duties did not include in-
spection of the equipment or care respecting its condition, held, not
chargeable as matter of law with assumption of risk on the ground
of presumed knowledge of a defect in the condition of the equip-
ment, there being no direct evidence that he knew of it. Gila
Valley, G. & N. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 94.
2. Assumption of risk; obviousness of risk.
Where the fact is in dispute as to whether a defect in a machine is such
as to render its use dangerous, it cannot be properly held as matter
of law that the risk is obvious even to one who knew of the defect.
Ib.
3. Assumption of risk; risks assumed; duty of master as to safety of ap-
pliances.
An employé assumes the risk of dangers normally incident to the occu-
pation in which he voluntarily engages, so far as they are not at-
tributable to the employer's negligence; but the employé has a
right to assume that his employer has exercised proper care with
respect to providing safe appliances for the work, and is not to be
treated as assuming the risk arising from a defect that is attribut-
able to the employer's negligence, until the employé becomes aware
of such defect, or unless it is so plainly observable that he may be
presumed to have known of it. Ib.
4. Assumption of risk; risks assumed; negligence of master.
In order to charge an employé with the assumption of a risk attribut-
able to a defect due to the employer's negligence it must appear
not only that he knew (or is presumed to have known) of the defect,
but that he knew it endangered his safety; or else such danger
must have been so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person
under the circumstances would have appreciated it. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21-23;
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT, 6.
MEXICAN AND SPANISH GRANTS.
MINES AND MINING.
See STATES, 8, 9.
MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUST.
1. Mortgagee's interest in addition to premises, the removal of which
would not affect its integrity.
Where the addition to the premises covered by the mortgage is not in
its nature an essential indispensable part of the completed structure
contemplated by that instrument, and its removal would not affect
the integrity of that structure, the mortgagee takes just such in-
terest in the addition as the mortgagor acquired, no more no less.
Holt v. Henley, 637.
A sprinkler plant placed on mortgaged premises after the execution of
that instrument and under an unrecorded conditional sale agree-
ment held not to have attached to the freehold or to be covered by
the after acquired property clause beyond the extent which the
mortgagor had acquired. Ib.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 4, 27, 28, 29;
TERRITORIES.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 7, 8, 9, 10;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7, 20;
STATES, 11, 12.
NATURAL CHILDREN.
See LOCAL LAW (Porto Rico).
1. Contributory; effect of placing inflammable material near railroad right
In an action at law by the owner of a natural product of the soil, such
as flax straw, which he lawfully stored on his own premises and
which was destroyed by fire caused by the negligent operation of a
locomotive engine, to recover the value thereof from the railroad
company operating the engine, it is not a question for the jury
whether the owner was also negligent without other evidence than
that the railroad company preceded the owner in the establishment
of its business, that the property was inflammable in character
and that it was stored near the railroad right of way and track.
LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 340.
2. Contributory; when question not one for jury.
It is not a question for the jury whether an owner who lawfully stores
his property on his own premises adjacent to a railroad right of
way and track is held to the exercise of reasonable care to protect
it from fire set by the negligence of the railroad company and not
resulting from unavoidable accident or the reasonably careful
conduct of its business. Ib.
3. Contributory; care required of owner of property adjacent to railroad
to protect it from dangers incident to railroad operation.
As respects liability for the destruction by fire of property lawfully held
on private premises adjacent to a railroad right of way and track,
the owner discharges his full legal duty for its protection if he ex-
ercises that care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise
under like circumstances to protect it from the dangers incident
to the operation of the railroad conducted with reasonable care.
Ib.
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