Right of anticipating attack.

and, being gradual, is not suggestive of any evil intention towards others. In the same way the settlement of Colonies in distant lands, and the acquisition of Dependencies in remote quarters of the world, have been regarded as legitimate means of external development, which a Nation may pursue without giving to other Nations just cause of apprehension for their own safety. It would be contrary to Morality for Nations to combine for the purpose of retarding the innocent growth of the power of a State, which owing to the superior merits of its Political Institutions, or through the enlightened guidance of wise rulers, is enabled to advance more rapidly in the career of civilisation than its neighbours, and, as a consequence of such advance, to attain to greater material prosperity. The usage of Nations in this respect accords with the dictates of right Reason.

66

§ 102. On the other hand, an increase of power, if it be accompanied by the will to abuse that power, creates good ground for alarm, and may justify a recourse to arms.13 A Nation," writes Vattel, which has a neighbour at once powerful and ambitious, has her all at stake. As men are under the necessity of regulating their conduct in most cases by probabilities, those probabilities claim their attention in proportion to the importance of the subject; and, to make use of a geometrical expression, their right to obviate a danger is in a compound ratio of the degree of probability and the greatness of the evil threatened. If the evil in question be of a supportable nature, if it be only some slight loss, matters are not to be precipitated; there is no great danger in delaying our opposition to it, until there be a certainty of our being threatened. But if the safety of the 13 Wolff, Jus Gentium, § 651, 652.

State lies at stake, our precaution and foresight cannot be carried too far." Accordingly, as experience shews that there is in human nature a tendency to abuse power wherever it may be done with impunity, the circumstance that the possession of power is generally accompanied with the will to abuse it, entitles a State, when its safety is at stake, to treat the first appearance of such a combination of power and will as a sufficient warning. 15 Further, if a Nation has exhibited unmistakable signs of undue ambition or rapacity, she becomes an object of suspicion to her neighbours, whose duty it is to stand their ground against her, and if she is at any moment on the point of acquiring a formidable accession of power, they may demand securities from her, and if she hesitates to give them, they may prevent the probable danger to themselves by force of arms. When the safety of the State is at stake, the Right of Self-Preservation may warrant a Nation in extending its precautionary measures beyond the limits of its own dominions, and even in trespassing with that object on a neighbour's territory. As the Right of Self-Preservation is prior and paramount to the Right of Dominion and Property in the case of individuals, so the Right of Self-Preservation is prior and paramount to the Right of Territorial Inviolability in the case of Nations," and if ever these Rights conflict, the former is entitled to prevail within the limits of the necessity of the case. Thus, if a Nation takes possession

18

14 Droit des Gens, Lib. III. c. 3. § 44.

15 Potentia igitur crescens in hoc casu non modo inter rationes suasorias locum habet, sed in ipsas quoque justificas influit,; quatenus abusus potentiæ non amplius dubius. Wolff, § 650.

16 Vattel, L. III. c. 3. § 49, 50.

17 Phillimore, Tom. I. § 213. 18 Genti unicuique competit jus ad ea quibus periculum interitus avertere et ea, quæ interitum afferre possunt, vitare potest, quantum datur. Wolff, Jus Gentium, $34.

Right of Confederation.

of another Nation's territory with a view to conduct hostile operations against a third Nation, the third Nation may in virtue of its Right of Self-Preservation lawfully pass the frontier of the territory which has been so occupied, for the purpose of dislodging its enemy from it. Urgent and indisputable danger may even authorise a Nation, to occupy the territory of a neutral Nation in order to prevent the execution of an enemy's intention to occupy it for the purposes of carrying on its hostilities with greater advantage, whenever the Nation to which the territory belongs is unable or unwilling to defend it. But the exercise of this Right, which Klüber 19 regards as a Right of Necessity, entails the obligation to make compensation to the neutral State for any damages which may have accrued to it. 20

§ 103. Two or more Nations have a right to unite themselves into one Independent Political Body, so as to become one Nation, provided, the views, by which they are so actuated, be not prejudicial to other Nations. But if each of the Nations in question be able separately and without assistance to govern and support itself, and to defend itself from insult and aggression, it may be reasonably presumed, that the object of their union is to obtain dominion over their neighbours, and on occasions where it is impossible or too dangerous to wait for an absolute certainty, other Nations will be justified in acting on a reasonable

19 Klüber, Pt. II. § 44.

20

Extreme necessity may even authorise the temporary seizure of a neutral town, and the putting a garrison therein, with a view to cover ourselves from the enemy, or to prevent the execution of his designs against that town, when the sove

reign is not able to defend it. But when the danger is over, we must immediately restore the place, and pay all the charges, inconveniences, and damages, which we have occasioned by seizing it. Vattel, L. III. c. 3. § 122.

presumption, and may forthwith have recourse to measures of Self-Defence. On these grounds, Vattel 21 maintains, that the Nations of Europe would have been justified in combining together against Louis XIV of France, if he had attempted to unite the Monarchy of Spain to that of France; for to have tamely suffered an union of the two Monarchies in the person of a Prince who had already given proofs of imperious pride and insatiable ambition, "would have been, according to all the rules of human probability, equivalent to surrendering the rest of Europe into servitude, or at least would have rendered the condition of each European State too critical and precarious to be endurable by Independent Political Bodies. The safety, therefore, of the other Nations of Europe would have justified them in opposing by anticipation such a formidable accession to the power of so ambitious a Prince." The right is still clearer if a formidable Power should betray an unjust and ambitious disposition, by doing the least injustice to another Power. 22 "In such a case, all Nations may avail themselves of the occasion," writes Vattel, "and by joining the injured Party thus form a Coalition of strength, in order to humble the ambitious Potentate, and disable him from so easily oppressing his neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives to the injured Party a right to provide for his future safety by depriving an unjust Aggressor of the means of doing injury, and it is lawful and even praiseworthy to assist an injured Party, and to aid him in obtaining redress and in protecting himself from injury." The supreme arbitrator between Nations is the sword, but force of arms is not

21 Droit des Gens, L. III. c. 3.

$44.

22 Wolff, Jus Gentium, § 651. 23 Vattel, L. III. c. 3. § 45.

The Balance of Power.

the only expedient by which Nations may guard themselves against a Formidable Power. There is a moral sanction to the mutual duties of Nations, in the fear of provoking general hostility and incurring its probable evils, in case a Nation should violate the Common Law; and these mutual sanctions are enhanced by the formation of Confederacies amongst the less powerful Nations for the purpose of maintaining the Balance against a Nation whose Power causes them alarm. 24

§ 104. The Right of Confederacy under the Natural Law of Nations is at the foundation of the Right of Intervention in the interest of what has been termed, since the Peace of Utrecht, (anno 1713,) the Balance of Power. The System of Balance, or European Equilibrium, is a creation of Positive Law. The outlines of the System may be discovered in the Provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia, (anno 1648,) and of the Treaties of Copenhagen (anno 1648) and of Oliva, (anno 1660,) but the express recognition of the System of Balance, as a rule of Positive Law, dates from the Treaties of Utrecht, (anno 1713,) concluded expressly according to the recital in the Treaty between Great Britain and Spain, "Ad formandam stabiliendamque pacem ac tranquillitatem Christiani orbis Justo Potentiæ Equilibrio."25 The maintenance of the Balance of Power in Europe is expressly set forth in the Acts of Renunciation to the Crown of Spain executed by the French Princes of the House of Bourbon, which are inserted in the body of the Treaties of Utrecht, as the motive cause of their Renunciation. The European System of Positive Law may be said to have rested upon the Treaties of Utrecht down to the French Revolution, (anno 1789,) although

24 Wolff, Jus Gentium, § 652. Klüber, § 42.

25 Schmauss. Corp. Jur. Gent. Academicum, p. 1419.