States, in other words, the creation of a new independent State, is not complete until other Nations have recognised its National character. It is the quality of Independence for the first time asserted on behalf of a State which requires recognition on the part of other Nations, not the increased or diminished extent of its territorial possessions. A State may indeed notify to other States any important additions to its territorial limits, which it may have acquired either by occupation or by cession, but such notifications are matters of courtesy for mutual convenience, and the announcement of the fact of any such acquisition is not obligatory upon the State which makes it. Thus the United States of North America might have annexed the territory of Texas, and might have Annexthought fit to notify to other nations the addition of a new State to the Union, but the question of right was complete upon the admission of Texas into the Union under a Resolution of Congress, and the annexation required no recognition from third parties to give it effect. On the other hand, the transformation of the ancient kingdom of New Spain into the several independent Republics of Central America required recognition from other Powers, before it could be regarded as internationally complete, as the result of that transformation was to give birth to new independent political bodies. ation of Техая. cognition pendence. § 20. A Dependency may separate itself from the Internaindependent political community of which it has been tional rea member, and may declare itself an Independent of IndeSovereign State; and so long as the new State confines its action within the Civil Society of which it is composed, it does not require any recognition of its Sovereignty from other States. But if it seeks to hold international intercourse with other States, and claims to be received into the fellowship of Nations upon terms of equality and reciprocity with other Nations, it must obtain from them the recognition of its Independence as a preliminary step. Every other State is at liberty to grant or withhold this recognition, subject to the consequences of its own conduct in this respect; as for instance, if it grants such recognition, it may incur the hostility of the State from which the new State has separated itself; if it refuses such recognition, it may incur the hostility of the new State or its allies; but until such recognition has been universal on the part of other States, the new State is entitled to the exercise of international privileges in relation to those States only which have recognised its independence. This recognition may take place explicitly under the express provisions of a treaty of friendship or alliance, in which the independence of the new State is guaranteed by its ally: thus France recognised and guaranteed the independence of the United States of America by the Treaty of treaty of Paris3 (Feb, 6, 1778); and Prussia in a similar manner recognised and guaranteed the Confederation of the Rhine by the Treaty of Tilsit*, (July 7, 1807); or by implication, upon the mutual interchange of accredited envoys, whereby either State acknowledges de facto the competency of the other to negotiate and contract engagements under the Law of Nations. Paris, Feb. 6, 1778. Interna. tional life not deter § 21. The International Life of a State is not determined by an internal Revolution, whereby the Sumined by preme Power of the State is transferred from one political changes portion of the body politic to another portion. A State does not enjoy any international rights by rea within a State. 2 Wheaton, Part I. c. 2. § 6. 3 Martens, Recueil, II. p. 605. 4 Ibid. VIII. p. 641. son of its peculiar internal organisation, and it therefore does not forfeit any such right by a modification of its internal constitution, neither can it thereby discharge itself from any of its obligations towards other Nations. Pending a Revolution, the ordinary relations of a State towards other States may be interrupted owing to the suspended action of the Supreme Power of the State, and its temporary inability to direct the will of the entire community. But the interruption of ordinary international intercourse is an abnormal state of things, which ceases immediately upon the restoration of internal order within the State, and if the Revolution fails, the status ante revives if, on the other hand, the Revolution proves successful, the government de facto succeeds to the rights and obligations of its predecessor in all international matters, and intercourse is resumed with other nations on that understanding. There may be exceptions however to this rule with respect to certain treaty-engagements, which come under the general division3 of personal as contradistinguished from Personal real treaties. Of such kind was the famous treaty of alliance concluded in 1761, under the name of the Family Compact, between the Very Christian King The Famiand the Catholic King, and to which the other reign- of 1761. ing Princes of the House of Bourbon were invited to accede. The engagements of this treaty necessarily determined from the moment when the princes of the House of Bourbon ceased to reign in France. Treaties. ly Compact ties. § 22. On the other hand, the identity of a Repub- Real Trea lican State in respect of real treaties is not destroyed by its conversion into a Monarchical State; "Every alliance," writes Vattel", "made by a Republic is in 5 Vattel, B. II. c. 12. § 183. Wolff, Jus Gentium, § 414. 6 Martens, Recueil, I. p. 16. ty distinct its own nature real, for it relates only to the body of the State. When a free People, a popular State, or an aristocratical Republic concludes a treaty, it is the State itself which contracts, and her engagements do not depend on the lives of those who were only the instruments in forming them; the members of the people or of the governing body change and succeed each other, but the State still continues the same. Since, therefore, such a treaty relates directly to the body of the State, it subsists, though the form of the Republic should happen to be changed, even though it should be transferred into a Monarchy. For the State and the Nation are still the same, notwithstanding every change that may take place in the form of the government, and the treaty concluded with the Nation remains in force as long as the Nation exists. But it is manifest that all treaties relating to the form of government are exceptions to this rule. Thus two popular States that have treated expressly, or that evidently appear to have treated with the view of maintaining themselves in concert in their state of liberty and popular government, cease to be allies from the very moment that one of them has submitted to be governed by a single person.' "Enimvero si in foedere consensum sit, quod statui non nisi populari proprium sit, per se patet, sublato statu populari tolli etiam fœdus, ac per consequens mutata reipublicæ forma idem finiri." Sovereign- 23. Grotius has been content to define a State from Inde to be a complete body of free persons, associated pendence. together to enjoy peaceably their Right, and for their common benefit"; and has declared the mutual relations of such bodies to be the objects of Public Law. 8 Wolff, Jus Gentium, § 416. 9 De Jure Belli et Pacis, L. I. c. 1. § 14. Wolff 10 has not adopted any different view when he defined a nation as "multitudo hominum in civitatem consociatorum." Vattel, on the other hand, has defined States or Nations as "societies of men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their combined strength";" but he has subsequently endeavoured to attain to greater precision, when he says, that " every Nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without dependence on any foreign power, is a Sovereign State. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other State. Such are the moral persons who live together in a natural society, subject to the Law of Nations. To give a nation a right to make an immediate figure in this grand society, it is sufficient that it be really sovereign and independent; that is, that it govern itself by its own authority and laws 12" Vattel, however, has gone too far in combining Sovereignty with Independence as the criteria of Nationality; for Sovereign States are not necessarily Nations, while States internationally independent are not always Sovereign Powers. Thus the States of North America which compose the Fede- The United ral Union are all Sovereign States, but the nationality America of each State is merged in the nationality of the Union. Sovereign Under the Federal compact, the members of the Union have precluded themselves from entering severally into treaty-engagements with Foreign Powers, and they can only enter into such engagements jointly as an Union of States, the treaty-making power being under the constitution of the Union vested in the Federal Government. The States have accordingly ceased to be severally Independent Bodies 10 Wolff, Jus Gentium, Prolegomena, § 2. 11 Préliminaires, § 9. 12 Droit des Gens, L. I. c. 1. § 4. States of States. |