the Athenians; and the Rhodian Laws of the Sea, of which a very few fragments have been preserved in the Digest, are supposed to have been a collection of Maritime Customs observed amongst the Nations established on the shores of the Mediterranean3, and which formed at such time their Common Law on Maritime matters. Rules of Law which prevailed amongst those Nations are still recognised by the Maritime tribunals of existing European Nations, as rules for the decision of analogous questions. the Roman ters. § 167. It would appear, that the Romans under the Affinity to Empire with their usual wisdom recognised the Cus- Law in certoms of the Sea, as furnishing the rule of decision in tain matMaritime questions, where such Customs were not contrary to any positive Law of the Empire. Thus when Eudæmon of Nicomedia appealed to the Emperor Antonine against the rapacity of the Publicans in the islands of the Cyclades, on the occasion of his having suffered shipwreck, the Emperor is represented to have replied, "Ego quidem mundi dominus, Lex autem maris. Lege id Rhodia, quæ de rebus nauticis præscripta est, judicetur, quatenus nulli nostrarum legum adversatur. Hoc idem Divus Augustus judicavit." Bynkershoek, in discussing this passage of the Digest, has not approved the usual punctuation, nor admitted the received interpretation of the text, and has suggested that the words of the Emperor Antonine point only to a privilege which the Rhodians themselves enjoyed of living under their own laws, as long as they were not inconsistent with the Positive Law of the Empire. It is not very material for our present purpose to determine, which is the 2 Dig. L. XIV. Tit. II. 3 Peckii Comment. ad legem Rhodiam de jactu. 4 Dig. L. XIV. Tit. II. § 9. more correct construction of the passage in the Digest. On a careful examination of the legislation of the Roman Emperors, so little will be found of positive enactment in Maritime matters, that we are led irresistibly to the conclusion, that there must have been a Consuetudinary Law, according to which questions of Maritime Contract and Tort were settled; and the probability is, that the principles involved in that Consuetudinary Law were in harmony with principles, that were admitted in the Civil Law of Rome. At all events we find in portions of the Consuetudinary Law of the Sea, as it has come down to us in various collections of Sea-Customs, e. g. the Rooles or Jugemens d'Oleron, the Consolato del Mare, and the Maritime Law (Water-Recht) of Wisby, many features of resemblance to provisions which exist in the Civil Law of Rome, not indeed in pari materiâ, but on subjects of which the analogy is complete. It is possible that these Rules of the Sea may be actual traditions of the Civil Law itself, which, recommended by its natural equity, may have infiltered itself imperceptibly into Maritime causes. Whatever may be the true explanation of this resemblance, these Customs of the Sea have been received by all Nations, and all Nations exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to enforce them, and for this purpose there are special tribunals established in every country, known as Courts of Admiralty Jurisdiction. Origin of § 168. The origin of the term Admiral or Amiral the Admiralty Juis not agreed upon amongst learned men. Some have risdiction. inclined to derive it from the Saxon aen mere eal," that is, over all the sea, others from the Asiatic Amir, 6 Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes antérieures au XVIII Siècle. Paris, 1834. 7 Godolphin, a View of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, anno 1661, P. 3. or Emir, signifying Præfect. It seems more probable that the term came first into use amongst the Maritime Nations of Southern Europe, and that it was derived from an Oriental Source. Sir H. Spelman is of opinion, that this high Officer was not known in England by that name or style before the beginning of the reign of King Edward I, about the year 1272, although the office of Capitaneus maris existed before that time. The earliest Admiral of all France seems to have been Enguarantus Dominus de Causy in the reign of Philip the Bold, about 12808. The collection of Castilian Laws, known as Las Siette Partidas, and the origin of which is referred to a date as far remote as 1258 or 1266, contains a full definition of the Office of Admiral. "On appelle Amiral, le chef de tous ceux qui compose l'équipage des navires armés en guerre, et il a sur la flotte qui est comme le corps. d'armée principal, ou sur une escadre qui sera détachée, le même pouvoir que le roi lui-même, s'il était en personne." Such seems to have been a brief summary of the functions of the Admiral of the King of Castile and Leon. On the other hand, it would appear from a collection of Maritime Laws of Catalonia and Aragon of the Fourteenth Century 10 that the word "Amiral" in its simplest sea-meaning was used to denote the chief of any Maritime expedition, even if the expedition consisted of a single ship. It is not improbable that an extraordinary increase of piracy in the latter part of the Thirteenth Century led to a more careful administration of the Laws of the Sea in England, in France, and in Denmark, after the example perhaps of Castile, and that the jurisdiction and 8 Godolphin on the Admiralty Lex 3. Jurisdiction, p. 21. 9 Part II. Lib. IV. Tit. 34. 10 Pardessus, Lois Maritimes, Tom. V. p. 404. Its Connection with that of the Consules Maris. cognisance of all matters whatever happening upon the Sea, by reason whereof there should be cause of suit either between subjects and strangers or between strangers only, was with that object vested exclusively in a High Admiral with the full powers of the Lieutenant of the King. § 169. Whatever may have been the origin of the institution of Courts of Admiralty, the forms of their proceedings were undoubtedly borrowed from the Civil Law of Rome, and the rules by which they were governed were, as is everywhere avowed, the ancient Laws, Customs, and Usages of the Seas. There can scarcely be a doubt that the Admiralty Courts of England and the Maritime Courts of all the other Powers of Europe have been formed upon one and the same common model, and that their jurisdiction, if not restricted by the territorial law, included all those subjects of which the Consular Courts (Consules Maris) 10 in the cities of the Mediterranean had cognisance, and with which subjects the Municipal judges in those cities were forbidden to intermeddle. These Courts are described in the Consolato del Mare as having jurisdiction of all controversies respecting freights; of damages to goods shipped; of the wages of mariners; of the partition of ships by public sale; of jettison; of commissions or bailments to masters and mariners; of debts contracted by the master for the use and necessities of his ship; of agreements made by the master with merchants, or by merchants with the master; of goods found on the high sea or on shore; of the armament or equipment of ships, galleys, or other vessels, and generally of all other contracts declared in the customs of the sea". It is not within the scope 10 De Lovio v. Boit. 2 Gallison's Reports, p. 400. 11 Consolato del Mare, ch. 22. Godolphin, Adm. Jur. p. 45. of the present work to enter further into the details. of the Admiralty Jurisdiction. But it may be observed that there is a Maritime Law of Nations in time of war as well as in time of peace. The Admiralty Court exercises a voluntary jurisdiction in time of Peace ad instantiam partis, and is in such matters termed an Instance Court, whilst in time of War it exercises a compulsory jurisdiction over all the commissioned vessels of the Crown, which are required to bring their captures before it, in order that the Admiral or his Lieutenant may determine whether such captures are good prize of war or not. The Admiralty Court is for such purposes termed a Court of Prize, and its functions are not merely to administer the Law of Nations as between the belligerents, but the Law of Nations as between the belligerents and neutrals. ticiable where. § 170. The High Seas are said in a certain sense to Piracy jusbe nullius territorium, as not being subject to the ex- everyclusive Possession or Empire of any Nation. In another sense they may be called the common highway of Nations, and perhaps this is the more correct expression, seeing that all who navigate them are subject to a Common Law of Nations, and, in matters within the scope of that Law, are amenable to the maritime tribunals of all Nations. The maintenance of the peace of the Sea is one of the objects of that Common Law, and all offences against the peace of the Sea are offences against the Law of Nations, and of which all Nations may take cognisance. The robber equally with the murderer on the High Seas is technically a sea-felon or pirate, and every hand may be lawfully raised against him; he is, in fact, regarded as an enemy of the human race (hostis humani generis). The Pirate has no National character, and to |