lawful to rob and plunder Strangers, without declaring war. So inveterate indeed was the corruption of manners amongst the Greeks, that Aristotle, the Philosopher of Practical Life, maintained that hunting, as a branch of warfare, was a Natural habit of mankind, as respects wild beasts and such individuals of the human race, as, being intended by nature to be in a subject state, refuse to submit themselves".

obligation

of every

§ 209. A League in its simplest form was but the Religious extension of the Religious Obligation, under which Fellow-Citizens stood towards one another, as votaries League. of the same Gods. It was the formal recognition on the part of two Nations of a reciprocity of Duty and Right under a common Sanction. Thus the Amphictyonic Confederation was a League of States, in which the Religious character was paramount, all the members of the League being votaries of Apollo, and making offerings to that Deity in common at the Delphic Shrine.

The Civitas or Nation was in its earliest form a body of persons making sacrifices to the same Deities. The Stranger was beyond the pale of the common Religion of the Civitas. There was accordingly no obligation upon the members of a State in respect of a Stranger, as such, corresponding to the obligations which existed amongst Fellow-Citizens, who could appeal in the last resort to a Divine Sanction, which was acknowledged by all alike. The League, however, admitted the Stranger within the pale of Religion,

4 Thucydides describes in like terms the manners of the early Greeks, L. I. c. 5. Servius, in his Commentary upon the eighth and tenth Eneid, speaks in similar language of the Tyrrhenians; Diodorus Siculus, L. V. c. 34.

reports the same of the Iberians,
and Cæsar de B. Gall., L. VI.
c. 23. says of the Germans, La-
trocinia nullam habent infamiam,
que extra fines cujusvis civitatis
fiunt.

5 Politica, L. I. § 3.

and Equal

and the ceremony of his admission was the offering of a
common sacrifice to the Deity. Hence we find amongst
the Greeks that the simplest form of League was de-
noted by the term word, which signifies a common
libation poured out to the Gods, and which had a
symbolic character, seeing that the Contracting Par-
ties mixed wine together as an emblem of concord,
and then poured it forth in common with a prayer,
that whoever should first break the compact might
have his blood poured forth in like manner. The
conclusion of a League between two Nations consti-
tuted a State of amity between them, which put an
end to that vague condition which Sallust' describes,
when he speaks of King Bocchus as
nobis neque

bello neque pace cognitus."

66

Under the simplest head of Leagues may be classed all Compacts between Nations for freedom of Commerce and for Hospitality towards Strangers of either Nationality, as being agreeable to the Law of Nature. A Nation may enter freely into Leagues of this kind with every Nation, as the duties involved in them cannot conflict with one another, any more than the duties of Natural Law. "No person," says the Advocate of King Perseus before the Achæan Assembly, "seeks to induce you to enter into any new Alliance, which will embarrass us, but only into an agreement which will secure to each party freedom of Commerce and reciprocity of Right. Such an agreement will not be inconsistent with our Alliance with the Romans."

Unequal § 210. Leagues, which add something to the NaLeagues. tural Law of Nations, are divided by Grotius into Equal and Unequal Leagues. Puffendorf adopts the

6 Homer, Il. III. 300.

7 Sallust. de Bello Jugurthino, c. 22.

same classification. The first are such as are concluded on equal terms, when not only the engagements themselves are equal on both sides, either absolutely or in proportion to the strength of either party, but also when neither party is by such engagements rendered in any way dependent upon the other. Unequal Leagues are of two kinds, according as the inequality regards the stronger or the weaker party. The stronger party may undertake to give assistance without requiring it in return, or to perform more in proportion than the weaker State is required to do, or the weaker State may submit to conditions which limit the exercise of its Natural Right of independence. For instance, a Nation may undertake to account the friends and enemies of another Nation as its own friends and enemies, or not to fortify particular parts of its own territory, or not to keep on foot more than a certain number of trained soldiers or war ships, without being shorn of its Independence in any way. On the other hand, if a Nation undertakes not to make peace or war at all without the consent of another Nation, or not to send or receive Ambassadors, such an undertaking would substantially impair its Independence, and the Nation which has so contracted with another Nation will have become virtually dependent upon it.

Leagues

not con

Equity.

§ 211. Vattel has made a distinction between Un- Unequal equal Leagues which are contrary to Equity, and Unequal Leagues which are not contrary to Equity, trary to and consequently not contrary to Natural Law. Of the latter kind are those which contain conditions which a Nation may feel authorised by the care of its own safety to impose upon another Nation, either by way of precaution against probable danger, or by way of 8 Droit des Gens, L. II. § 180.

Personal and Real Leagues.

penalty in order to punish an unjust aggressor, and to
render the Nation incapable for some time of renew-
ing its aggression. A Nation, which has been victo-
rious in war, dictates for the most part to its adver-
sary unequal terms of peace. There is a limit, how-
ever, beyond which such inequality may not extend
without awakening the alarm and enlisting the sym-
pathy of other Nations in behalf of the vanquished.
Sound policy," writes Vattel," will not
"will not permit a
Great Power to suffer the Small States in its neigh-
bourhood to be oppressed. If it abandons them to the
ambition of a Conqueror, the latter will very soon be-
come formidable to it in its turn. Accordingly Sove-
reigns, who are in general sufficiently true to their
own interests, seldom fail to observe this maxim.
Hence the Leagues, at one time against the House of
Austria, at another time against its Rival, according
as the one or other Power preponderated. Hence
that Equilibrium, the perpetual object of Negociation
and War."

9

§ 212. Another celebrated distinction of Leagues, which is recognised by Grotius and Puffendorf, is that which divides them into Personal and Real.

The former," says Puffendorf10, "are such as are made with the Prince purely with relation to his Person, and expire with him; the latter are such as are made with the Kingdoms or Commonwealths, rather than the Prince or Government, and these outlive the Ministry and the Government itself, under which they were first made." Vattel" adopts a somewhat clearer and sounder definition, when he says that Personal Treaties relate to the persons of the Contract

9 De Jure Belli et Pacis, L. II. c. 16. § 16.

10 Law of Nature and of Nations, L. VIII. c. 9. § 6.
I Droit des Gens, L. II. § 183.

RIGHT OF TREATY.

ing Parties, and are confined and in a manner attached to them; whilst Real Treaties relate only to things or matters in negociation between the Contracting Parties, and are wholly independent of their persons. A Personal Treaty expires with him who contracts it; a Real Treaty attaches to the body of the State, and subsists as long as the State, unless the period of its duration has been expressly limited. It is of great importance not to confound these two kinds of Treaties. Accordingly Sovereigns are at present accustomed to express themselves in their Treaties in such a manner as to leave no uncertainty in this respect, and this is doubtless the best and surest plan. In default of this precaution the subject-matter of the Treaty, or the expressions in which it is conceived, may furnish means to ascertain whether it be Real or Personal.

Continuing

$213. Vattel has laid down certain general rules Tests of for ascertaining the character of a Treaty, whether it Treaties. be a continuing Treaty after the death of one of the Contracting Parties. The circumstance, that a Treaty is concluded in the name of a Sovereign Prince, does not thereby constitute it a personal Treaty, although when a Treaty is concluded in the name of a Republic or Popular Government, it is the Nation itself which contracts, and the Treaty is undoubtedly a Real Treaty. Public Treaties concluded by a King are Treaties of the State, and are obligatory on the Nation over which the King is Sovereign, and which he represents for external purposes. The presumption accordingly, in respect of every Public Treaty, is, that it concerns the State itself, and is so far a Real Treaty. The question however as to its continuance is not thereby settled. It may be binding on the Nation, but the length of time during which it shall