same time, in view of modern methods and altered municipal conditions, we are disposed to attach at least equal importance to those adjudications which, like State v. Jackman, 69 N. H. 331, 42 L. R. A. 438, 41 Atl. 347; Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554, 30 Am. Rep. 566; Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 Ill. 532, 53 Am. Rep. 640, hold that, under the guise of the exercise of the police power, it is not competent either for the legislature or for the municipality to impose unequal burdens upon individual citizens. Upon careful examination of the cases of Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, 28 Am. Dec. 259; Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268, 10 L. R. A. 178, 19 Am. St. Rep. 490, 25 N. E. 480; and the other authorities on that side of the question, --it will be found that there was no element of inequality found to exist in any of the enactments under consideration, but that only the question was considered whether the authority of the State or municipality extended to the promulgation of such ordinances. There was no such glaring inequality and unjust discrimination between citizens similarly situated and equally entitled to bear the same burden as is to be found in the enactment now before us. It is for this inequality and for this discrimination that we are constrained to hold the enactment to be a nullity. Equality before the law is a fundamental principle of our republican institutions. It is a principle as dear to us even as life or liberty; and any enactment that contravenes it cannot have the force of law.

We are of opinion that the act is void, and that, therefore, the judgment of the police court based upon it is erroneous. The judgment will be reversed, with costs.

The cause will be remanded to the Police Court of the District, with directions to vacate its judgment, and to discharge the defendant. And it is so ordered.

Reversed.

Syllabus.

CONSAUL v. CUMMINGS.

[24 App.

CONTRACTS, CONSTRUCTION OF; PARTNERSHIP; FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION; AUDITOR; ACCOUNTING; PUBLIC POLICY; INTEREST.

1. In construing an ambiguous contract the practical interpretation of it by the parties themselves is entitled to great, if not controlling, influence.

2. In a suit in equity for a partnership accounting between the administrator of a deceased partner and the surviving partner for attorney fees due the partnership for prosecuting claims against the government collected by the surviving partner, evidence that the deceased partner during his lifetime did not actively participate in the work of prosecuting the claims will not support a defense that the partnership had become dissolved by his abandonment of his duties thereunder, where there is nothing in the partnership articles to show the nature of the services to be performed by each of the partners, and it does not appear that the deceased was ever called upon, or even expected, to perform any, and the surviving partner testifies that in fact it was no partnership, but merely an employment of him by the deceased to at tend to his business in the court of claims.

3. Quære, whether a contract made by a party after he has been judicially declared a lunatic is void, or voidable only.

4. Where, in a suit by the administrator of a deceased partner for a partnership accounting, the defense of the surviving partner is that he purchased the interest of his deceased partner in the partnership property, the burden is on the defendant to so show by clear and satisfactory proof.

5. In a suit here by a foreign administrator the jurisdiction of the court appointing him cannot be collaterally attacked upon the ground that his decedent was not a resident of the jurisdiction where the administration was granted. (Following Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Gorman, 7 App. D. C. 91.)

6. Findings of fact by the auditor of the lower court are to be taken as presumptively correct, and, unless some obvious error has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious and important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, a decree ratifying a report by him should be permitted to stand.

7. In a partnership accounting between the administrator of a deceased partner and the surviving partner, involving the distribution of at

torneys' fees for the prosecution of claims against the government, in which there were findings by the court of claims and subsequent appropriations by Congress, claims for credit by the surviving partner, who collected the fees, for expenses paid to attorneys to procure appropriations to pay the claims, are properly denied, such services not being the subject of legal contract. (Following Owens v. Wilkinson, 20 App. D. C. 51.)

8. And in such a case a claim by the surviving partner for credit for extra compensation for services rendered after his partner's death is also properly disallowed, where no unusual services were performed, and it appears that it was not contemplated by the partners that the de ceased partner should assist in the prosecution of the claims.

9. Expenses, however, in such a case incurred by the surviving partner in the prosecution of claims disallowed by the court of claims, should be allowed him, where the partnership articles provide for the expenses incurred in the prosecution of allowed claims, but are silent as to the expenses incurred in disallowed claims; and interest should also be allowed him on advances made to his partner during the latter's lifetime.

No. 1361. Submitted May 5, 1904. Decided May 24, 1904.

HEARING on an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia in a suit in equity by the administrator of a deceased partner against the surviving partner for a partnership accounting. Reversed.

The COURT in the opinion stated the case as follows:

This bill was filed September 16, 1899, by Horace S. Cummings, as administrator of the estate of George B. Edmonds, deceased, against Gilbert Moyers for an account and settlement of the affairs of a partnership alleged to have existed between the intestate and the defendant in the prosecution of certain claims against the United States.

Edmonds and Moyers had been separately engaged as attorneys and claim agents in the prosecution of such claims before what was called the Southern Claims Commission, during its existence, and afterwards before the Court of Claims under an act of Congress known as the "Bowman act."

Or February 6, 1888, they entered into the following agree

ment:

Know all men by these presents, in duplicate, that the undersigned, attorneys of Washington, D. C., are special partners in the prosecution of the cases named in the schedule hereto attached, now pending before the United States court of claims and the Congress of the United States, the fee agreed to be paid by the client in each case being the percentum of whatever may be recovered, as is stated herein, and the agreement between the undersigned being that each shall have half of said fees and that each shall pay one half of the expense incident to the prosecution same, which expense is not to exceed two and a half per cent of the amount that may be allowed upon said claim.

of

And it is hereby agreed and understood that the said Gilbert Moyers shall represent and be associated with me in the prosecution of said claims before the court of claims and the Congress of the United States as joint attorney of record.

It is hereby understood and agreed that the undersigned, Gilbert Moyers, is to advance the expenses incident to the prosecution of said claims.

Witness our hands this 6th day of February, 1888.

(Signed) GILBERT MOYERS. (Signed) GEO. B. EDMONDS.

The bill alleges the death of George B. Edmonds while a resi dent of the State of Virginia, and the appointment of complainant as the administrator of his estate by the county court of Fairfax county in that State on August 22, 1899.

It alleges, also, that a schedule of the cases referred to in the foregoing contract was attached thereto; that many of them resulted in judgments for recovery; the payment of which was provided for by act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, and that defendant collected and retained the fees contracted for therein. An exhibit attached to the bill sets out a list of the adjudicated cases by name and number, with the date and amount of payment in each. The sum total of fees collected by the defendant,

as recited in this exhibit, amounts to $26,380.25, of which the complainant claims one half under the terms of the contract aforesaid. A separate allegation adds three other cases to the list in which the fees have not been collected, but for which warrants or drafts were about to be issued and delivered to defendant.

The bill further charges the refusal of the defendant to render any account of his collections of fees, and expenses paid in connection with the prosecution of the cases; and to pay over the amounts due to the estate of Edmonds.

The prayers are, that defendant be restrained from receiving any drafts or collecting any drafts on account of judgments in which said Edmonds had an interest; that a receiver be appointed to take charge of all of the assets of the alleged copartnership; that defendant be required to pay to the receiver all money that may have been collected by him on partnership account; that an account be taken between the said partners, and for a decree for the amount found to be due the complainant as the representative of said Edmonds.

The defendant's answer, on September 20, 1899, admits the agreement as set out, but denies any interest of Edmonds in the cases named in the exhibit to the bill, save those of Tappan and Fitzhugh. It admits the collection of the fees stated in the exhibit, but charges that the said Edmonds, in consideration of money paid him in the year 1892, relinquished to defendant all interest therein, etc. It denies the possession by defendant of any money in which complainant has an interest, and alleges defendant's solvency, and the possession of a large estate, consisting of real and personal property, more than sufficient to meet the demands of the bill. On May 18, 1900, defendant filed a motion, supported by affidavit, for leave to amend his answer and correct certain mistakes of facts inadvertently made therein. This motion was granted, and on May 26, 1900, defendant filed a supplemental answer, alleging, first, that the cases referred to in the partnership agreement were never scheduled or set out in any list attached thereto, so far as defendant has knowledge; second, that it was intended that one