(a) The total receipts in money or in kind, giving the value of articles contributed. (b) The names and addresses of contributors, where known, and the amount of money or quantity of other property contributed by each. (c) An itemized statement of the disbursements made in money or in kind, together with the purpose thereof, which statement shall also show the cost of articles purchased for disbursement. (d) Means employed in and cost of collection and disbursements. (e) Salaries paid and duties of all salaried persons. (f) Any changes [in the course of the period covered by the statement] in the matters required to be filed [under this section]. (g) Any other items required by the Postmaster General. Such statement may be limited to accounts affecting war charities or patriotic purposes. 4. Any person, association or corporation having collected or disbursed money for any war charity or patriotic purpose for more than five months prior. to the date of approval of this act shall file a statement of account as required in subdivision two of this section, covering the period for which it has made such collection or disbursement within the preceeding twelve months. 5. The Postmaster General may cause to be prepared blanks for any of the statements required by this act and may require that such statements be made upon such blanks to be furnished by him. The blanks may be made in such detail as he may deem necessary to secure complete information in regard to the receipts and expenditures of the person, association or corporation filing them. He may also make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this act. 6. All statements required under this act shall be public records and shall be open to public inspection in the Post Office Department at all reasonable times. 7. Whoever shall place or cause to be placed in any letter box any letter, post card, package, writing, circular, pamphlet or advertisement containing such appeal or such advertisement containing such appeal or such advertisement for any war charity or patriotic purposes or bazaar or entertainment, whether addressed to any person residing within or outside the United States, in any post office or station thereof, or street or other letter box of the United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the post office establishment of the United States, or shall take or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United States, or shall knowingly cause to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such letter, postal card, package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement, unless after a statement in regard to such charity or patriotic purpose has been filed, and unless a semiannual statement therefor has been filed for the preceding six months, shall be fined not exceeding $5,000 or be imprisoned for one year, or both, in the discretion of the court. 8. For the purpose of this section The expression war charity" means: (1) The supplying of needs and comforts to members or former members of the Army and Navy of the United States or of other countries at any time associated with it in the present war, or to members of their families; or (2) the relief of suffering or distress or the rehabilitation of devastation caused by the war, either in the United States or elsewhere (in any country associated with it in the present war); or (3) any other charitable purpose connected with the present war. The expression patriotic purpose' shall mean: (1) The encouragement of military or naval drill; or (2) the organization of adults or children into Boy or Girl Scouts or other organizations, one of whose objects is the promotion of patriotism; or (3) rousing in the people a love for or devotion to the United States; or (4) aiding officers of the United States in the performance of a duty connected with the war; or (5) contributions to the United States for military or naval purposes. SEC. 4. That there shall be appropriated from any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated the sum of $25,000 to be expended under the direction of the Postmaster General for the preparation of blanks, for the salaries of assistants, clerks, and such other expenses that are necessary in carrying out this act. SEC. 5. That this act shall take effect two months after its passage except that paragraphs one, two, three, four, five, and six of section three shall take effect immediately. Mr. DONOVAN. I should like permission to have entered in the record of the hearing in support of the measure two letters from Prof. John P. Chamberlain, of Columbia University, who is chief of the legislative drafting research board of that university, these letters being dated January 14 and 22, 1919, respectively. The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record at this point. (The letters referred to are as follows:) EDWIN P. KILROE, Esq., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, District Attorney's Office, Criminal Courts Building, New York City. DEAR MR. KILROE: I have been considering the use of the post office for the purpose of preventing the charitable schemes which we discussed the other day. It would help in the determination of the advisability of using this plan if we could get the judgment of the Post Office Department on the question as to whether these schemes are "devices for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises," under Revised Statutes 3929, section 485, of the Postal Laws and Regulations of 1913. If so, could you not get the Postmaster General to make a fraud order against some of these schemes; for example, against the fraudulent Boy Scouts organization. If he made such an order, then all letters addressed to this concern would be returned to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed with the word "fraudulent " stamped on the outside, and would then be returned to the writer. The Postmaster General is permitted to ascertain that a person or company is conducting such a scheme in any legal way satisfactory to himself. Would many of these schemes come under section 215 of the Criminal Code of the United States, making it a crime to use the mails to promote frauds? I can find no decision punishing a charitable scheme, but I can see no reason why such a scheme should not fall under the statute if fraudulent. You will know much better than I whether, if a person makes a promise that money shall be used to accomplish certain objects, and, in fact, the money goes largely into his own pocket, or for some other purpose, he is guilty of a crime under the statute. The power of the Postmaster General to decide that a certain scheme is fraudulent would seem to be very broad. The only appeal to the courts is said to be "in case the Postmaster General has exceeded his authority or his action is palpably wrong." (See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S., Criminal Courts Building, New York City. DEAR MR. KILROE: I am inclosing to you a draft of the Post Office bill. The drafting may seem to you clumsy in that I have repeated the definition three times. I think, however, that this is probably necessary, owing to the way in which the bill is drafted. Section 1 is an amendment of the criminal code and when it is printed in the statutes will be printed in the code with the substantive provision. The same is true in regard to the amendment of section 3929. I am not sure that one section making these definitions apply to all proisions of the law would not be sufficient; but in view of the very controversial nature of this act, I think it is better to show anybody just what these expresions "war charity" and "patriotic purposes " mean, both in the criminal code and in section 3929, referring to the police power of the Postmaster General. would have no objection, however, to striking them out and to striking out Also subdivision 9 of section 3 and substituting therefor another section, to be called section 4, which would contain the definitions. You will notice that the limitations on the associations to whom the act applies is not included either under the criminal code or section 3929 of the Revised Statutes. This is, I think, proper, because if any of these organizations are indulging in fraudulent pretenses to get money they should certainly be punished. Your purpose, as I understand it, is only to exempt them from the duty of registering; not from punishment if they actually do wrong. Revised Statutes, section 3929, authorizes the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against persons whom he believes are using the mails for the purpose of obtaining money or property by fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. When a fraud order has been issued, all mail arriving for that person is stamped "fraudulent" and returned to the sender. This is not a criminal statute, so it can be more loosely treated than section 215a of the criminal code. I am, very sincerely, yours, J. P. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. DONOVAN. I would also like to insert in the record a memorandum prepared by Prof. Chamberlain, with legal citations and suggestions in support of the amended bill this day offered. The CHAIRMAN. That may be inserted here in the record. (The memorandum referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) EXCLUSION FROM THE MAILS-THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE. Memorandum prepared by Prof. J. P. Chamberlain, of the legislative drafting research fund of Columbia University, and submitted by Edward Swann, district attorney of the county of New York, State of New York, in support of Senate bill 4972 as amended. The right to exclude matter from the mails has been frequently made use of by Congress, both as regards matter inherently harmful, in itself apt to injure other matter in the bags, or its employees, and in regard to matter which, though not in itself dangerous, is "calculated to debauch the public morality." Examples of the first class are the prohibition of poison or explosives; of the second, of lottery tickets, of obscene matter, and of matter calculated to promote a fraud upon the receivers. The Supreme Court "has thus far upheld every law restricting the use of the post office." (Postal Power of Congress, by Lindsay Rogers, p. 158.) The power has in fact been upheld in the most general terms. 6 "The power vested in Congress to establish post offices and post roads' embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of the country. Under it Congress may designate what shall be carried in the mail and what excluded." (Matter of Jackson, 96 U. S., 727; 24 Law, 877.) "The States before the Union was formed could establish post offices and post roads, and in doing so could bring into play the police power in the protection of their citizens from the use of the means so provided for purposes supposed to exert a demoralizing influence upon the people. When the power to establish post offices and post roads was surrendered to the Congress it was a complete power, and the grant carried with it the right to exercise all the powers which made that power effective." (Ex parte Rapier, 143 U. S., 110; 36 Law, 93, 102.) The constitutional principles underlying the administration of the Post Office Department were discussed in the opinion of the court in Ex parte Jackson (96 U. S., 727; 24 Law Ed., 877), in which we held that the power vested in Congress to establish post offices and post roads embraced the regulation of the entire Postal System of the country; that Congress might designate what might be carried in the mails and what excluded. * * * In establishing such system Congress may restrict its use to letters and deny it to periodicals; it may include periodicals and exclude books; it may admit books to the mails and refuse to admit merchandise; or it may include all the these and fail to embrace within its regulations telegrams or large parcels of merchandise, although in most civilized countries of Europe these are also made a part of the postal service. It may also refuse to include in its mails such printed matter or merchandise as may seem objectionable to it upon the ground of public policy, as dangerous to its employees, or injurious to other mail matter carried in the same packages. The postal regulations of this country, issued in pursuance of act of Cangress, contain a long list of prohibited articles, dangerous in their nature, or to other articles with which they may come in contact; such, for instance, as liquids, poisons, explosives, and inflammable articles, fatty substances, or live or dead animals, and substances which exhale a bad odor. It has never been supposed that the exclusion of these articles denied to their owners any of their constitutional rights." (Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S., 506-507; 48 Law, 1097-1098.) 66 * * * That statute [excluding frauds from the mail] has its sanction in the power of the United States, by legislation, to designate what may be carried in the mails and what must be excluded therefrom; such designation and exclusion to be, however, consistent with the rights of the people as reserved by the Constitution." (Burton v. United States, 202 U. S., 344, 371; 50 Law, 1057, 1067.) This power was not limited in the decision by Judge White in the Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan case (229 U. S., 288; 57 Law, 1190). The court in that case held that the requirement that newspaper editors and proprietors file certain statements to secure admission to the privileges of the second-class mail matter did not require it to pass on the question of "the existence of arbitrary power through the classification of the mails or by way of condition" in Congress, to make the right to use the mails dependent upon any condition it chose to impose. This right of Congress is based on the theory that the grant of the postal power is absolute. (See the Jackson, Rapier, and Burton cases.) To these cases may be added the statement of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (22 U. S., 196), in which he was fixing the extent to which the United States had a right to regulate commerce: 66 "It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution.” In the Civil Rights cases Mr. Justice Bradley recognized the plenary character of the power of Congress over the post office. He says: "Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation of commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post offices and post roads, the declaring of war, etc. In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof." (109 U. S., 18.) Another theory in which the right of Congress has also been upheld is that the use of the post office is a privilege to which Congress can attach conditions. This seems to be the theory in the Coyne case, which distinguishes between the duties of the Government to the individual and the privileges which the Government affords to individuals. "It (the Postal Service) is not, however, a necessary part of the civil government in the same sense in which the protection of life, liberty, and property, the defense of the Government against insurrection and foreign invasion, and the administration of public justice are, but is a public function, assumed and established by Congress for the general welfare, and in most countries its expenses are paid solely by the persons making use of its facilities, and it returns or is presumed to return a revenue to the Government, and really operates as a popular and efficient method of taxation. Indeed, this seems to have been originally the purpose of Congress. The legislative body, in thus establishing a postal service, may annex such conditions to it as it chooses." (Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S., 506; 48 Law, 1097.) * * The Postmaster General, in the exercise of some measure of delegated authority, is administering a law which confers a privilege, for the conditions under which the mails may be used are wholly in the control of Congress." (Harrison v. United States, 200 Fed., 662, 666–667.) LIMIT ON LIBERTY OF CONGRESS. The limitations on the liberty of Congress are those which limit all of its action, the reserved rights of the people. Particularly affected by the postal laws are: 1. The liberty of the press (first amendment); but this does not mean that newspapers are free from reasonable regulations. In the Rapier case, the right of Congress to exclude from the mails newspapers carrying advertisements of a lottery was upheld; and in the Lewis Publishing Co. case a statute requiring the filing of certain information as a preliminary requisite to admission to the second-class privileges and requiring further the marking of all paid matter as advertisement in newspapers entitled to the second-class privilege was upheld. The statement in the Jackson case goes far enough to authorize the exclusion from the mails of a newspaper, provided that no attempt is made to exclude the newspaper from circulation by other means. 2. Freedom from seizure (fourth amendment).—This right is guarded by not allowing letter mail to be opened by authorizing only its return to the sender. 3. The guaranty of the individual against deprivation of property without due process of law (fifth amendment).—Applied to the right to exclude from the mails, the fifth amendment means that Congress can not select arbitrarily the matter which is to be excluded; but that there must be a reasonable basis for classifying it as different from matter admitted. As was said in the Coyne case: * * While it may be assumed, for the purpose of this case, that Congress would have no right to extend to one the benefits of its Postal Service, and deny it to another person in the same class, and standing in the same relation to the Government, it does not follow that under its power to classify mailable matter, applying different rates of postage to different articles, and prohibiting some altogether, it may not also classify the recipients of such matter and forbid the delivery of letters to such persons or corporations as, in its judgment, are making use of the mails for the purpose of fraud or deception or the dissemination among its citizens of information of a character calculated to debauch the public morality." (Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S., 508; 48 Law, 1098.) REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION. The question of a reasonable classification has frequently come up in cases in which State laws were alleged to be in conflict with the similar clause of the fourteenth amendment limiting action of State legislatures. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (220 U. S., 61; 55 Law, 377), the court, on page 78, lays down rules which have been since frequently quoted to determine what is permissible classification: * * * "The rules by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this court, are these: 1. The equal protection clause admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonable can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary." POWER TO REQUIRE FILING OF STATEMENT. Congress thus may exclude objectionable matters from the mails. Exclusion implied the power to vest in an administrative officer the duty of determining what is objectionable matter, and, in fact, the statute authorized the Postmaster General not only to refuse to such matter the privilege of the post office, but goes a long step further, and to make the enforcement of the law easier it directs him to return to their senders letters addressed to individuals who are attempting to use the mails for illicit purposes. It is not so great a strain on the right of the lawmaking body to adopt the means necessary to carry out a legitimate object to require the filing of necessary information with the proper administrative officer. This is no novelty in the Post Office Department. The Postmaster General has long exercised a similar power over newspapers. Certain publications were granted the privileges of the second-class mail, and in order to determine whether a publication came within the designated class, the Postmaster General was long accustomed to require publishers to file statements containing information which the Postmaster General considered necessary. (See Postal Laws and Regulations, edition of 1902, p. 198, cited in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, p. 306.) Congress subsequently required from the publications the filing of a similar statement containing more detailed information, |