station, arose from her seat and went to the door and opened it. The guard whose duty it was to open the gate of the car was not there. When he came, he opened the gate, but signaled the train to start before she had time to leave the car. The starting of the train impelled her forward, and to prevent herself from falling she placed her hand on the side of the car door. The motion of the car caused the door to swing, injuring her hand. It was held that the questions of negligence of the carrier and contrib utory negligence of the passenger were for the jury. In Larson v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1912) 212 Mass. 262, 98 N. E. 1048, it appeared that a passenger walked from her seat to the door of the car as it neared a station, and a lurch threw her against the door. She put her hand on it to steady herself, and her hand was caught in the jamb of the door. The court sustained a recovery against the carrier. It has been held that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury, and a judgment for the plaintiff has been affirmed, where there was evidence that, while the caboose of a freight train was standing at its accustomed place for receiving passengers, the plaintiff, a passenger, attempted to close the door of the caboose, and was injured by his by his arm being jammed through the glass of the door when a box car was bumped against the caboose with unusual force. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Johnson (1914) 111 Ark. 640, 163 S. W. 1157. & F. R. Co. (1912) 12 Ga. App. 755, 78 S. E. 428, only the syllabus by the court being reported, a nonsuit was held erroneous, where a passenger who was unable to obtain a seat in a car stood near the open door, and, to keep from falling when the car gave a sudden and unusual jerk, caught the facing of the door with his hand, which was injured by the slamming of the door against it. The court said these facts raised a presumption of negligence against the railway company, and in order to exculpate itself it should show that the jerk which was the proximate cause of the injury was either incident to the ordinary and usual operation of the train, or was the necessary result of its operation at the particular time. However, where the swinging of the door is caused by a jolt or jerk which is an ordinary incident of travel, the injury to a passenger thereby is deemed an accident, and the carrier is not liable therefor. Dawson v. Maryland Electric R. Co. (1912) 119 Md. 373, 86 Atl. 1041; Weinschenk v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1906) 190 Mass. 250, 76 N. E. 662; Hunt v. Boston Elev. R. Co. (1909) 201 Mass. 182, 87 N. E. 489; Graf v. West Jersey & S. Co. (1905) - N. J. L., 62 Atl. 333; Muller v. Manhattan R. Co. (1905) 48 Misc. 524, 96 N. Y. Supp. 270; Goold v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (1908) 59 Misc. 36, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1106; Guthman v. Manhattan R. Co. (1898) 53 N. Y. Supp. 139; Skinner v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. (1901) 128 N. C. 435, 39 S. E. 65; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Leakey (1905) 39 Tex. Civ. App. 584, 87 S. W. 1168. See also Gillmore v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. (1909) 116 N. Y. Supp. 674. It is not negligence for the carrier to stop a train suddenly where it has already run beyond the station, thereby causing a door to close. Hardwick v. Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. (1890) 85 Ga. 507, 11 S. E. 832, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 193. A judgment for the plaintiff has been affirmed where there was evidence that a passenger on a street car, on the stopping of the train at her destination, in the absence of the guard from the car platform, opened the door of the car, and, while standing in the doorway of the car waiting for the guard to open the gate to the platform, was injured by the door's In Dawson v. Maryland Electric R. swinging shut upon her hand when Co. (1912) 119 Md. 373, 86 Atl. 1041, it the guard opened the gate and sig- appeared that a passenger elected to naled the train to start. Baker v. ride in the baggage car, there being Manhattan R. Co. (N. Y.) supra. no empty seats in the other cars, and Similarly, in Holleman v. Georgia S. caught his fingers in the door jamb while holding onto the same to save himself from being thrown down by a jerk of the train. It was held that the carrier was not liable. The court said: "The fact that the car gave a sudden jerk is no evidence of negligence on the part of the appellee. It does not appear that the sudden movement of the car was due to any defect in the car or to any carelessness or negligence of those in charge of it. It is well known that electric cars do not run perfectly smoothly, and that there are certain irregular movements to which they are subject, and which do not justify the inference of negligence or carelessness on the part of those in charge. . . . Nor is there any ground for imputing negligence to the appellee because the door in the car closed and mashed the appellant's fingers. It does not appear who opened the door, or that there was any defect in its construction, and the mere fact that the appellant saw a man push it back twice in order to fasten it does not justify an inference that the door was not properly constructed, or that there was a defective fastening. 'Nor could it be inferred from the mere closing of the door, either that there was a defective fastening, or that there had been negligence in putting the door on the catch, for the reasons stated in speaking of the plaintiff's own case. It is not a case to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied.' In the case at bar the appellant was not compelled to ride in the baggage compartment of the car in question, but he elected to do so in preference to remaining in the passenger compartment, which was provided by the appellee for the safety and comfort of passengers. Under such circumstances, and in the absence of some evidence to show negligence on the part of the appellee or its employees, there was no error in the ruling of the court below withdrawing the case from the jury." And in an action by a railway mail clerk against a railway company for injury by a sliding door, where there was evidence that the plaintiff knew that the door was not provided with a hook or other fastener, and would shut upon the sudden application of the brakes when the train was running rapidly, that such application might occur at any time, and that he could have taken, but did not take, precautions for his protection, it was held that the defendant was entitled to have the question of contributory negligence clearly and fully stated to the jury, and that it was not thus stated by an instruction which submitted the question only by implication, in that it required the jury to find, as a condition of the plaintiff's recovery, that his injuries resulted "solely and proximately" from the defendant's negligence. Virginian R. Co. v. Bell (1913) 115 Va. 429, 79 S. E. 396, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 804. On a later appeal reported in (1916) 118 Va. 492, 87 S. E. 570, the question whether the plaintiff was negligent in not holding the door open with his hand or foot was held to be for the jury. VI. Duty to avoid injury after entrapment by door. It is, of course, the duty of a motorman on a street car to stop the car if he knows that a passenger who has just alighted is in danger by reason of his clothing having caught in the door of the car. Hooper v. Bay State Street R. Co. (1914) 218 Mass. 251, 105 N. E. 892. W. S. R. (117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773.) WASHINGTON CRANBERRY GROWERS' ASSOCIATION, Respt., V. A. B. MOORE, Appt. Washington Supreme Court (In Banc) — November 5, 1921. 1. Contracts between fruit growers and a fruit exchange for the marketing of the fruit, which require the grower to market all his crop through the exchange, which undertakes to market to best advantage, are not void as against public policy, where the exchange controls only a small percentage of the fruit of the class handled which is grown in the country. [See note on this question beginning on page 1113.] constitutional and statutory provisions. 2. A contract between fruit growers and a fruit exchange for the marketing of the fruit, which requires the grower to market all his crop through the exchange, which undertakes to market to best advantage, is not a monopoly within the meaning of constitutional prohibition or the Sherman Anti-trust Act. [See 19 R. C. L. 192 et seq., 194; see also note in 11 A.L.R. 1185.] Injunction to prevent breach of contract. 3. Injunction lies to prevent a fruit grower, with a contract with a fruit exchange to sell his whole crop to the exchange, from selling any part of it elsewhere, where the contract shows no intent that the remedy shall be confined to actions for damages, since the remedy at law is inadequate. [See 14 R. C. L. 339 et seq., 383; 3 R. C. L. Supp. 214.] effect of inability to enforce specific performance. 4. That a contract by a grower of fruit to market his crop through an exchange cannot be specifically enforced does not prevent the granting of an injunction to restrain his selling fruit elsewhere. (Mackintosh, Holcomb, and Hovey, JJ., dissent.) APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pacific County (Hewen, J.) in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to restrain breach of a contract for the delivery to it of all cranberries grown by defendant. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Messrs. Welsh & Welsh for appellant. Mr. John J. Langenbach, for respondent: The contract is not void as against public policy. Baird v. Smith, L.R.A.1917A, 379, note; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50. The contract does not contravene art. 12, § 22, of the state Constitution. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 522, 137 Pac. 144; 19 R. C. L. § 22, pp. 42, 43 and notes; Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. 130 U. S. 396, 32 L. ed. 979, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 373, 55 L. ed. 502, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 54 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 46 L.R.A. 122, 29 C. C. A. 141, 54 U. S. App. 723, 85 Fed. 271; Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 25 Am. St. Rep. 102, 27 Pac. 36; Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co. 75 S. C. 378, 55 S. E. 973, 9 Ann. Cas. 902 and note, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 501; Slaughter v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co. 55 W. Va. 642, 65 L.R.A. 342, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1013, 47 S. E. 247, 2 Ann. Cas. 335; Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 60 W. Va. 508, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268, 116 Am. St. Rep. 901, 56 S. E. 264, 9 Ann. Cas. 667; Knight & J. Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N. E. 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146. The contract does not violate "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce against Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies." 19 R. C. L. § 40, p. 65 and notes; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso. 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. ed. 259, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25; Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 43 L. ed. 300, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 43 L. ed. 290, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 40; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 136, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96; Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 194 U. S. 618, 48 L. ed. 1142, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep: 784; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 57 L. ed. 333, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 766, note; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689, and note 699, 60 C. C. A. 290, 125 Fed. 454; Ripy v. Art Wall Paper Mills, 41 Okla. 20, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 33, 136 Pac. 1081; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 508, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 804, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; McCurry v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 54 Am. St. Rep. 180, 18 So. 806; Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110, 25 Am. St. Rep. 102, 27 Pac. 36; Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Greenwood Hardware Co. 75 S. C. 378, 55 S. E. 973, 9 Ann. Cas. 902 and note, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 501; Southern Fire Brick Co. v. Garden City Sand Co. 223 Ill. 616, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 446, 79 N. E. 313, 7 Ann. Cas. 50; Union P. Coal Co. v. United States, 97 C. C. A. 578, 173 Fed. 740; Gallup Electric Light Co. v. Pacific Improv. Co. 16 N. M. 86, 113 Pac. 850; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 188 Fed. 110; Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268 note, 60 W. Va. 508, 116 Am. St. Rep. 901, 56 S. E. 264, 9 Ann. Cas. 667; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 48 L. ed. 679, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Slaughter v. Thacker Coal & Coke Co. 55 W. Va. 642, 65 L.R.A. 342, 104 Am. St. Rep. 1013, 47 S. E. 247, 2 Ann. Cas. 335; Monongahela River Consol. Coal & Coke Co. v. Jutte, 2 Ann. Cas. 951, and note pp. 956, 958, et seq., 210 Pa. 288, 105 Am. St. Rep. 812, 59 Atl. 1088; United States v. E. C. Knight Co. 156 U. S. 1, 39 L. ed. 325, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; United States v. United States Steel Corp. 251 U. S. 417, 64 L. ed. 343, 8 A.L.R. 1121, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293. Equity will decree an injunction to restrain violations of contracts, notwithstanding their nature is such that specific performance will not be decreed. Singer Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Union Button Hole & Embroidery Co. Holmes, 253, Fed. Cas. No. 12,904; American Electrical Works v. Varley Duplex Marget Co. 26 R. I. 295, 58 Atl. 977, 3 Ann. Cas. 975; Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Reprint, 687, 21 L. J. Ch. N. S. 898, 16 Jur. 871, 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 652; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Union P. R. Co. 1 MeCrary, 558, 3 Fed. 423; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 24 Fed. 516; Alpers v. San Francisco, 32 Fed. 503; Brush-Swan Electric Light Co. V. Brush Electric Co 41 Fed. 163; Western U. Teleg. Co. v Pennsylvania R. Co. 68 L.R.A. 968, 64 C. C. A. 285, 129 Fed. 849; Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co. 157 N. Y. 60, 43 L.R.A. 854, 68 Am. St. Rep. 749, 51 N. E. 408. Main, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The purpose of this action was to restrain the breach of a contract. The trial resulted in a permanent injunction, from which the defendant appeals. The Washington Cranberry Association is a corporation organized under the laws of this state, and is engaged in the business of marketing cranberries for those with whom it has contracts, and in some instances for independent growers. The appellant had entered into a contract with the corporation by which he agreed to deliver to it all the cranberries grown by him in Pacific county on land owned by him. The contract provides as follows: "Witnesseth: That the grower, for and in consideration of $1 paid (117 Wash. 430, 201 Pac. 773.) him by the association, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and of the covenants and agreements herein contained, hereby nominates, appoints, and agrees to employ the association as exclusive sales agent for the purpose of selling and marketing the entire crop of cranberries now growing or which shall be grown for shipment by the grower or for him, or in which he may have any interest as landlord or tenant, upon all those certain tracts of land situated in Pacific county, Washington, described as follows: Metes and bounds in section 27, township 16, north of range 11 west of Willamette meridian, during the year 1916 and every year thereafter continually, provided, however, that the grower may cancel this contract on the 15th day of January in any year by giving notice in writing to the association in writing at least fifteen days prior to that date. Upon giving notice the grower shall, prior to said 15th day of January, pay any and all indebtedness due from him to the association and deliver his copy of the said contract to the manager of the association, and the same shall thereupon be canceled. "The grower agrees at his own expense to cultivate, care for, and harvest said crops. All fruit to be delivered by the grower at the warehouse of packing station of the association, at such place and at such time and in such manner as may be designated by the said association, which shall give notice to the grower for such delivery. "In the event that grower shall fail to fulfil any or all of the requirements set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the association through its manager shall give to the grower written notice setting forth the default of the grower, and in event the default so specified shall not have been overcome or corrected within ten (10) days following delivery of such written notice to grower, it is mutually agreed that the association may consider this contract as canceled, and shall be relieved from further responsi bility with regard to marketing the grower's fruit hereunder. "The grower fully understands that the purpose, among others, of this agreement, is to maintain and increase to its greatest efficiency the association as well as the Central Selling Agency, with which it is now or hereafter may be affiliated, and to accomplish this purpose it is necessary that he shall strictly and fully comply with and perform the stipulations and agreements on his part agreed herein to be performed, and therefore he hereby stipulates and agrees that he will not sell or otherwise dispose of his said fruit to any other firm, person, or corporation other than the aforesaid association; and it is hereby further mutually agreed that, inasmuch as it is impossible at this time to fix and estimate the actual damage which will be sustained by the association in the event that the grower shall fail to abide by his agreement to market his said fruit through the association, such damages are hereby estimated and agreed upon as $1 per box for each box of cranberries grown or sold by the grower, which sum shall be allowed in any action brought by the second party to recover damages for the breach of this agreement by the grower, should the association elect, as it may elect, to bring such action. "In consideration of its appointment as exclusive sales agent of grower's fruit crop, as above set forth, and in further consideration of the agreements made by the grower with the association, as hereinbefore set forth, the association agrees to receive, ship, and sell all of said fruit to the best possible advantage. To promptly remit returns therefor, less its regular charge for aforesaid services and for any other deduction, including money due for advances for supplies furnished by the association to the grower, which indebtedness grower agrees may be treated by the association as a first lien on the proceeds from his fruit, and payment therefor to be deducted accordingly. |