Barry v. New York Central, etc., Railroad Company. its attendant perils. The defendant did no affirmative act at the time, by which existing conditions were changed and new perils created. In the case of the movement of a train of cars over a track at a place which the public are permitted to use as a crossing, the company are necessarily apprised that it is attendant with danger to life. The company is an actor at the time in creating the circumstances which imperil human life, and it would be alarming doctrine that it was under no duty to exercise any care in the movement of its trains. The cases of Nicholson v. Erie Ry. Co., 41 N. Y. 525; and of Sutton v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 id. 243, do not sustain the defendant's contention. In neither of these cases was the movement of the cars the direct act of the party sought to be charged, but resulted from causes which could not reasonably or naturally have been anticipated. There was in fact no negligence shown on the part of the defendants. The court in these cases properly held that the circumstances did not create any duty toward the party injured, or tend to establish any culpable negligence. The ground of liability in this case is negligence, and the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable care existed irrespective of the fact whether the plaintiff's intestate had a fixed legal right to cross the track, or was there simply by the defendant's implied permission. The construction of the deed was not material in determining the question of reasonable care. The circumstances known to the defendant required this, whether the plaintiff's intestate was there by right or by a mere license. The judge, upon the defendant's request, charged that if the intestate was on the track by mere license of the defendant, and having no other right, the plaintiff could not recover. The learned judge, in making this charge, followed what he understood to be the ruling of the General Term on the first appeal, and the charge was, we think, for the reasons stated, erroneous. But the error was in favor of the defendant, and the jury, having found that the defendant was guilty of negligence in the management of the train which caused the intestate's death, this finding, if justified (in the absence of contributory negligence), sustains the action. [Minor points omitted.] We find no error of law in the record, and the judgment should therefore be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. All concur, except RUGER, C. J., dissenting. " People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia. PEOPLE V. FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA. (92 N. Y. 311.) Constitutional law -- regulation of foreign insurance companies. A statute providing that insurance companies of other States, seeking to do business here, shall pay to the insurance department for taxes, etc., an amount equal to that exacted by "existing or future laws of such other States from companies of this State seeking to do business there," is not unconstitutional, although such amount may be greater than that required by other existing laws of this State. (See note, p. 391.) A CTION for percentage upoh insurance premiums. The opinion shows the point. The defendant had judgment below. Leslie W. Russell, attorney-general, for appellant. Joseph H. Choate, for respondent. FINCH, J. The legislation of the State relating to foreign insurance companies is challenged on this appeal as a violation of constitutional right. The act of 1875 (chap. 60), in substance, provides that an insurance corporation of another State, seeking to do business here, shall pay to the superintendent of the insurance department for taxes, fines, penalties, certificates of authority, license fees and otherwise, an amount equal to that imposed by the State of its origin upon companies of this State seeking to do business there, when such amount charged is greater than our own. The evident purpose of the act is to treat the corporations of another State seeking to transact business here precisely as such other State should treat our own corporations seeking to do business there. It rests upon the idea that the comity due from one State to another is not required to be more than equal and reciprocal, and what is wholly a matter of privilege may be granted or withheld upon conditions. This legislation is assailed, first, upon the ground that it is an unlawful delegation of the legislative power, and the General Term have so held upon the authority of Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y 483. We do not think that case at all decisive of this. What was there denominated the school law came from the hands of the legislature, not as a law, but as a proposition. Whether it should be a law or People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia. It not was precisely the question submitted to the popular vote. The legislature proposed the law, but left it to the people to enact. The process carried out and applied to all bills would have resulted in a complete abdication by the senate and assembly of their authority and functions. Instead of making laws they would simply have suggested them, reported them for consideration, but left the judgment upon them, the determination of their expediency and wisdom, to an authority outside of their own. As to the school law, the people were made the legislature, and left to decide whether the bill proposed should or not become a law. This court held that the legislature, under the Constitution, could not so delegate its power, but was bound to determine for itself the expediency of the measure, and either enact or reject it. But nothing in that decision denied to the legislature the right to pass a law whose operation might depend upon, or be affected by, a future contingency. The opinions expressly conceded the existence of such power. was not denied that a valid statute may be passed, to take effect upon the happening of some future event, certain or uncertain. And this was said as to the character of such events, viz.: "The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law, in the judgment of the law-makers, depends. On this question of expediency the legislature must exercise its own judgment definitively and finally." The statute before us fully answers this description. It came from the hands of the legislature a complete and perfect law, having at once a binding force of its own, and dependent upon no additional consent or action for its vitality and existence. The question of expediency involved in it was not delegated to any other tribunal, but settled definitively and finally by the legislature itself. It determined, as a conclusion proper and expedient, that foreign insurance companies, as the price of admission to our territory, should pay in taxes, license fees, and the like, precisely what the States which created them should impose upon our companies in excess of our usual rates as the price of admission to the foreign territory. That was the whole question involved. Nothing else in the proposed law remained to be settled as expedient or otherwise, and that question the legislature determined for itself, upon its own reasons and its sole responsibility. Neither the law nor its expediency depended People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia. PEOPLE V. FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA. (92 N. Y. 311.) Constitutional law -- regulation of foreign insurance companies. A statute providing that insurance companies of other States, seeking to do business here, shall pay to the insurance department for taxes, etc., aÐ amount equal to that exacted by "existing or future laws of such other States from companies of this State seeking to do business there," is not unconstitutional, although such amount may be greater than that required by other existing laws of this State. (See note, p. 391.) A CTION for percentage upoh insurance premiums. The opinion shows the point. The defendant had judgment below. Leslie W. Russell, attorney-general, for appellant. Joseph H. Choate, for respondent. FINCH, J. The legislation of the State relating to foreign insurance companies is challenged on this appeal as a violation of constitutional right. The act of 1875 (chap. 60), in substance, provides that an insurance corporation of another State, seeking to do business here, shall pay to the superintendent of the insurance department for taxes, fines, penalties, certificates of authority, license fees and otherwise, an amount equal to that imposed by the State of its origin upon companies of this State seeking to do business there, when such amount charged is greater than our own. The evident purpose of the act is to treat the corporations of another State seeking to transact business here precisely as such other State should treat our own corporations seeking to do business there. It rests upon the idea that the comity due from one State to another is not required to be more than equal and reciprocal, and what is wholly a matter of privilege may be granted or withheld upon conditions. This legislation is assailed, first, upon the ground that it is an unlawful delegation of the legislative power, and the General Term have so held upon the authority of Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y 483. We do not think that case at all decisive of this. What was there denominated the school law came from the hands of the legislature, not as a law, but as a proposition. Whether it should be a law of People v. Fire Association of Philadelphia. It not was precisely the question submitted to the popular vote. The legislature proposed the law, but left it to the people to enact. The process carried out and applied to all bills would have resulted in a complete abdication by the senate and assembly of their authority and functions. Instead of making laws they would simply have suggested them, reported them for consideration, but left the judgment upon them, the determination of their expediency and wisdom, to an authority outside of their own. As to the school law, the people were made the legislature, and left to decide whether the bill proposed should or not become a law. This court held that the legislature, under the Constitution, could not so delegate its power, but was bound to determine for itself the expediency of the measure, and either enact or reject it. But nothing in that decision denied to the legislature the right to pass a law whose operation might depend upon, or be affected by, a future contingency. The opinions expressly conceded the existence of such power. was not denied that a valid statute may be passed, to take effect upon the happening of some future event, certain or uncertain. And this was said as to the character of such events, viz.: "The event or change of circumstances on which a law may be made to take effect must be such as, in the judgment of the legislature, affects the expediency of the law; an event on which the expediency of the law, in the judgment of the law-makers, depends. On this question of expediency the legislature must exercise its own judgment definitively and finally." The statute before us fully answers this description. It came from the hands of the legislature a complete and perfect law, having at once a binding force of its own, and dependent upon no additional consent or action for its vitality and existence. The question of expediency involved in it was not delegated to any other tribunal, but settled definitively and finally by the legislature itself. It determined, as a conclusion proper and expedient, that foreign insurance companies, as the price of admission to our territory, should pay in taxes, license fees, and the like, precisely what the States which created them should impose upon our companies in excess of our usual rates as the price of admission to the foreign territory. That was the whole question involved. Nothing else in the proposed law remained to be settled as expedient or otherwise, and that question the legislature determined for itself, upon its own reasons and its sole responsibility. Neither the law nor its expediency depended |