said seamen, after the completion of the voyage, against the British vessel, to recover wages which were not due to them under the terms of their contract or under the law of Great Britain, were the libellants entitled to a decree against the vessel?" Mr. Joseph Hill Brinton argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants: Under the earlier acts there was no ques ment of all seamen on American soil. any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages to any other person. Any person paying such advance wages shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not less than four times the amount of the wages so advanced, and may also be imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages shall in notion as to their applicability to the shipcase, excepting as herein provided, absolve the vessel or the master or owner thereof from full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel, suit, or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person [171]shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman or other person seeking employment as seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with employ ment, he shall, for every such offense, be liable to a penalty of not more than one hundred dollars." "(/) That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States; and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for a similar violation; provided that treaties in force between the United States and foreign nations do not conflict." The title can only be resorted to as a means of construction where an ambiguity exists in the language of the act or where a usual construction would lead to absurdity. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 58; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. ed. 304. The act applies to British subjects shipping upon a British vessel in an American port. The Kestor, 110 Fed. 432; The Troop, 117 Fed. 557. The "law of the flag" has no application where the interests extend beyond the internal or municipal affairs of the vessel. The Olga, 32 Fed. 329; The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 373. That the "law of the flag" would apply where a foreign crew is shipped in a foreign land on a foreign vessel has rarely been questioned. Covert v. The Wexford, 3 Fed. 577; The Adolph, 7 Fed. 501; The Angela Maria, 35 Fed. 430. character as to demand interference, such treaties have been to that extent suspended. The appellants were seamen on board the British bark Eudora, and filed this libel for wages in the district court of the United But the question has frequently arisen as States for the eastern district of Pennsyl- to the treatment of seamen on foreign vessels vania. By an agreed statement of facts it who have shipped in American ports, where appears that on January 22, 1900, they treaties confer exclusive jurisdiction on the shipped on board such bark to serve as sea-consuls. In those cases our courts have inmen for and during a voyage from Portland, variably refused to entertain jurisdiction Maine, to Rio and other points, not to ex- where the ends of justice fail to require it. ceed twelve months, the final port of dis-The moment, however, the conduct of the ofcharge to be in the United States or Can-ficers of the vessel amounts to a discharge ada, with pay at the rate of one shilling for of such seamen, or the cruelty is of such a forty-five days and twenty dollars per month thereafter. At the time of shipment twenty dollars was paid on account of each of them, and with their consent, to the shipping agent through whom they were employed. On the completion of the voyage, they, having performed their duties as seamen, demanded wages for the full term of service, ignoring the payment made, at their instance, to the shipping agent. The advanced payment and contract of shipment were not contrary to, The Napoleon, Olcott, 208, Fed. Cas. No. or prohibited by, the laws of Great Britain. 10,015; Patch v. Marshall, 1 Curt. C. C. 452, It was contended, however, that they were Fed. Cas. No. 10,793; Wharton, Interna probibited by the act of Congress, above tional Law, § 33; The Troop, 117 Fed. 557. quoted, and that such act was applicable. No court has ever doubted the legislative The district court entered a decree dismiss-power to protect the shipment and discharge ing the libel. 110 Fed. 430. On appeal to of seamen within its territory. the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit, that court certified the following questions to this court: "First. Is the act of Congress of December 21, 1898, properly applicable to the contract in this case? Second. Under the agreed statement of [172] facts above set forth, upon a libel filed by The Burchard, 42 Fed. 608; The Welhaven, 55 Fed. 80; The Maric, 49 Fed. 286; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 29 L. ed. 152, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; The Salomoni, 29 Fed. 534; Bolden v. Jensen, 70 Fed. 505. A vessel while in a foreign port is subject to local laws in matters pertaining to contracts there effected. Ex parte D'Olivera, 1 Gall. 474, Fed. Cas. No. 3,967; United States v. Kellum, 19 Blatchf. 372, 7 Fed. 843; United States v. McArdle, 2 Sawy. 367, Fed. Cas. No. 15,653 : United States v. Anderson, 10 Blatchf. 226, Fed. Cas. No. 14,447; Leary v. Lloyd, 3 El. El. 178; Kay, Shipmaster & Seamen, § 769; Grant v. United States, 7 C. C. A. 436, 15 U. S. App. 243. 58 Fed. 694; The Kestor, 110 Fed. 557; The Brantford City, 29 Fed. 394; The Troop, 117 Fed. 557. Mr. Horace L. Cheyney argued the cause, and, with Mr. John F. Lewis, filed a brief for appellee: A seaman who ships upon a vessel becomes a seaman of the nationality of that vessel. Re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 35 L. ed. 581, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897. Congress or this country alone has not power to change the laws of nations. The authority to regulate interstate commerce gives Congress the power to regulate the instrumentalities thereof. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. The decisions have not clearly defined what constitute these instrumentalities or the scope of the regulation thereof, but it must be assumed that Congress has the right to regulate the navigation of a ship in a broader sense than that term was used in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. But such regulation of the ship as an instrumentality of commerce must be limited The contract of shipment entered into into its business as a ship engaged in the carthis case by the seamen of "The Eudora” was riage of goods or passengers, and not to to be performed exclusively upon British ter- those incidental contracts which ship ownritory, and therefore its validity is to be de-ers may enter into for the purpose of cartermined by the British law. rying on their business as carriers. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, sub nom. Sears v. The Scotia, 20 L. ed. 822. London Assur. Co. v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, 167 U. S. 149, 42 L. ed. 113, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785; Coghlan v. South Carolina, 142 U. S. 101, 35 L. ed. 951, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150; Hall v. Cordell, 142 U. S. 116, 35 L. ed. 956, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 154; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65, 10 L. ed. 61; Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 310, 17 L. ed. 543; Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U. S. 124, 27 L. ed. 104, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397, 32 L. ed. 788, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469. The contract in this case is similar to one of insurance, which this court held not to be commerce, but a contract merely in aid of commerce. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. ed. 357; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. A vessel is a detached, floating portion of the territory of the country whose flag it flies. The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, sub nom. Sears v. The Scotia, 20 L. ed. 822; Re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 35 L. ed. 581, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 897; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 26 L. ed. The sovereignty of this country is coextensive with its territory only, and Congress possesses no power of legislation upon Brit-234; The Lamington, 87 Fed. 752; 1 Kent, ish territory. Com. 26; Wheaton, International Law, Hall, International Law, 4th ed. § 10. Dana's ed. 106; 3 Wharton, International The word "commerce" has a double signifi- Law, 228; 1 Vattel, Law of Nations, chap. cance, including traffic, that is, the buying 19, § 216; Bluntschli, International Law, § and selling or interchange of commodities 319; Seagrove v. Parks [1891] 1 Q. B. 551; and commercial intercourse or the carriage | Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1, sub nom. of those commodities. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, sub nom. Champion v. Ames, ante, 492, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321. Mali v. Keeper of Common Jail, 30 L. ed. national territory, and not a part of the territory of any particular state, Congress, over such vessels, has the same police power as the various states have over the territory within their limits. An American vessel, registered or enrolled The term has been held to include not in accordance with the laws of the United only the carriage of merchantable commod-States, being thus a detached portion of the ities, but also the carriage of passengers (Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702), bills of lading, because they represent the goods carried (Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382), and the transmission of ideas, wishes, orders and intelligence by telegraph (Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 347, 30 L. ed. 1187, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1126). It has also been held to include navigation (Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23). But as the term has been used in the decided cases it is almost equivalent to commercial intercourse or to the carriage and transportation of goods. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23. Under the power to regulate interstate commerce the Federal government has the power to improve navigable streams and to remove natural obstructions to navigation or commerce (Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 239), or an obstruction to interstate carriage by a mob (Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900). United States v. DeWitt, 9 Wall. 41, 19 L. ed. 593. Bearing in mind this distinction between the power of Congress over American and foreign vessels, it is obvious that Congress may have greater legislative power over the former than the latter; and the validity of a provision governing American vessels, therefore, is not the true test of the validity of legislation attempting to control contracts entered into by seamen with foreign vessels while lying at our ports. The prohibition contained in the act of 1898 against the payment of wages to a seaman in advance is a violation of the liberty to contract guaranteed by the Constitution. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 579, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. While it is true that it is largely in the discretion of the legislatures of the several states or of Congress to decide when public | the act of 1898 is "An Act to Amend the it has been held that the title is no part of a statute, and cannot be used to set at naught its obvious meaning. The extent to which it can be used is thus stated by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386, 2 L. ed. 304, 313: "Neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain words in the body of the statute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. *Where the mind labors to discover the de-[173] sign of the legislature, it seizes everything Only general principles can be declared, from which aid can be derived; and, in such and no fixed or invariable rule can be ap-case, the title claims a degree of notice and plied to such cases. It is a question for the determination of the court in each case whether the statute is in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13, 46 L. ed. 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. ed. 136, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 96: Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425, 46 L. ed. 623, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, ante, 323, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168. Courts have declined to take jurisdiction over claims of foreign seamen, where there would be no hardship in compelling them to go to courts of the country of the vessel. The Walter A. Wallet, 66 Fed. 1011; The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 29 L. ed. 152, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 860; The Catherine, 1 Pet. Adm. 104; The Forsoket, 1 Pet. Adm. 197. Not only does this rule apply to wages cases, but to all questions governing the rights and duties of seamen upon foreign vessels. The Sirius, 47 Fed. 825; The Amalia, 3 Fed. 652; The Kambria, 100 Fed. 118. The British law has been applied to cases of personal injuries upon British vessels while on the high seas or in British waters. The Egyptian Monarch, 36 Fed. 773; The Lamington, 87 Fed. 752. Assistant Attorney General Beck filed a brief for the United States. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: Applying the ordinary rules of construction, it does not seem to us doubtful that the act of Congress, if within its power, is applicable in this case. The act makes it unlawful to pay any seaman wages in advance, makes such payment a misdemeanor, and in terms provides that such payment shall not absolve the vessel or its master or owner for full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned. And further, it declares that the section making these provisions shall apply as well to foreign vessels as to vessels of the United States, provided that treaties in force between the United States and foreign nations do not conflict. It is true that the title of 190 U. S. U. S., Book 47. 63 will have its due share of consideration." See also Yazoo & M. Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188, 33 L. ed. 302, 307, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; United States v. Oregon & C. R. Co. 164 U. S. 526, 541, 41 L. ed. 541, 545, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 427, 43 L. ed. 749, 755, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, §§ 58, 59. When, as here, the statute declares, in plain words, its intent in reference to a prepayment of seamen's wages, and follows that declaration with a further statement that the rule thus announced shall apply to foreign vessels as well as to vessels of the United States, it would do violence to language to say that it was not applicable to a foreign vessel. But the main contention is that the statute is beyond the power of Congress to enact, especially as applicable to foreign vessels. It is urged that it invades the liberty of contract which is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and reference is made to Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 41 L. ed. 832, 835, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427, 431, in which we said: "The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citi zen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned." Further, that even if the contract be one subject to restraint under the police power, that power is vested in the states, and not in the general government, and any restraint, if exercised at all, can only be exercised by the state in which the contract is entered into; that the only jurisdiction possessed by Congress in respect to such matters is by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, interstate and foreign; that the regulation of commerce does not carry 1005 with it the power of controlling contracts where seamen are impossible to be ob[174]*of employment by those engaged in such tained-as Molloy forcibly expresses it-to service, any more than it includes the power rot in her neglected brine.' Such desertion to regulate contracts for service on inter- might involve a long delay of the vessel state railroads, or for the manufacture of while the master is seeking another crew, goods which may be intended for interstate an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some or foreign commerce; and, finally, that the cases, the safety of the ship itself. Hence, validity of a contract is to be determined the laws of nearly all maritime nations have by the law of the place of performance, and made provision for securing the personal atnot by that of the place of the contract; tendance of the crew on board, and for their that the contract in this case was one en- criminal punishment for desertion or abtered into in the United States, to be per- sence without leave during the life of the formed on board a British vessel, which is shipping articles." undoubtedly British territory, and therefore its validity is to be determined by British law, and that, as conceded in the question, sustains its validity. We are unable to yield our assent to this contention. That there is, generally speaking, a liberty of contract which is protected by the 14th Amendment, may be conceded; yet such liberty does not extend to all contracts. As said in Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 165, 39 L. ed. 657, 659, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586, 588: While it may be conceded that, generally speaking, among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and universal. It is within the undoubted power of government to restrain some individuals from all contracts, as well as all individuals from some contracts. It may deny to all the right to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery tickets; to the minor the right to assume any obligations, except for the necessaries of existence; to the common cartier the power to make any contract releasing himself from negligence, and, indeed, may restrain all engaged in any employment from any contract in the course of that employment which is against public policy. The possession of this power by government in no manner conflicts with the proposition that, generally speaking, every citizen has a right freely to contract for the price of his labor, services, or property." And that the contract of a sailor for his services is subject to some restrictions was settled in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275. 41 L. ed. 715, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, in which $$ 4598 and 4599, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 3115, 3116), in so far as they require seamen to carry out the contracts contained in their shipping articles, were held not to be in conflict with the 13th Amendment, and in which a depri[175]vation of personal *liberty not warranted in respect to other employees was sustained as to sailors. We quote the following from the opinion (p. 282, L. ed. p. 718, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 329): If the necessities of the public justify the enforcement of a sailor's contract by excep tional means, justice requires that the rights of the sailor be in like manner protected. The story of the wrongs done to sailors in the larger ports, not merely of this nation, but of the world, is an oft-told tale, and many have been the efforts to protect them against such wrongs. One of the most common means of doing these wrongs is the advancement of wages. Bad men lure them into haunts of vice, advance a little money to continue their dissipation, and. having thus acquired a partial control, and by liquor dulled their faculties, place them on board the vessel just ready to sail and most ready to return the advances. When once on shipboard, and the ship at sea, the sailor is powerless and no relief is availing. It was in order to stop this evil, to protect the sailor, and not to restrict him of his liberty, that this statute was passed. And, while in some cases it may operate harshly, no one can doubt that the best interests of seamen as a class are preserved by such legislation. Neither do we think there is in it any trespass on the rights *of the states. No question| 176 || is before us as to the applicability of the statute to contracts of sailors for services wholly within the state. We need not determine whether one who contracts to serve on a steamboat between New York and Albany, or between any two places within the limits of a state, can avail himself of the privileges of this legislation, for the services contracted for in this case were to be performed beyond the limits of any single state, and in an ocean voyage. Contracts with sailors for their services are, as we have seen, exceptional in their character, and may be subjected to special restrictions for the purpose of securing the full and safe carrying on of commerce on the water. Being so subject. whenever the contract is for employment in commerce, not wholly within the state, legislation enforcing such restrictions comes within the domain of Congress, which is charged with the duty of protecting foreign and interstate commerce. "From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor has been treated as an Finally, while it has often been stated that exceptional one, and involving, to a certain the law of the place of performance deterextent, the surrender of his personal liberty mines the validity of a contract (London during the life of the contract. Indeed, the Assur. Co. v. Companhia de Moagens do Barbusiness of navigation could scarcely be carreiro, 167 U. S. 149, 160, 42 L. ed. 113, 120, ried on without some guaranty, beyond the 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 785), yet that doctrine ordinary civil remedies upon contract, that does not control this case. It may be rethe sailor will not desert the ship at a crit-marked, in passing, that it does not appear ical moment, or leave her at some place that the contract of shipment or the ad It follows from these decisions that it is vance payment were made on board the ves- found long ago that it would be beneficial to sel. On the contrary, the stipulated fact commerce if the local government would abis that the seamen were engaged in the stain from interfering with the internal dispresence of the British vice consul at the cipline of the ship, and the general regulaport of New York." The wrongful acts tion of the rights and duties of the officers were, therefore, done on the territory and and crew towards the vessel or among themwithin the jurisdiction of the United States. selves. And so, by comity, it came to be It is undoubtedly true that, for some pur- generally understood among civilized naposes, a foreign ship is to be treated as for- tions *that all matters of discipline and all[178] eign territory. As said by Mr. Justice things done on board which affected only Blackburn, in Queen v. Anderson, L. R. 1 C. the vessel or those belonging to her, and did C. 161. "A ship which bears a nation's flag not involve the peace or dignity of the counis to be treated as a part of the territory of try, or the tranquillity of the port, should that nation. A ship is a kind of floating be left by the local government to be dealt island." Yet when a foreign merchant veswith by the authorities of the nation to sel comes into our ports, like a foreign citi- which the vessel belonged, as the laws of zen coming into our territory, it subjects it- that nation or the interests of its commerce self to the jurisdiction of this country. In should require. But if crimes are committed The Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch, 116, on board of a character to disturb the peace 136, 146, 3 L. ed. 287, 293, 297, this court and tranquillity of the country to which the held that a public armed vessel in the service vessel has been brought, the offenders have of a sovereign at peace with the United States never, by comity or usage, been entitled to is not within the ordinary jurisdiction of any exemption from the operation of the our tribunals while within a port of the local laws for their punishment, if the local [177] United States. In the opinion, by Chief Jus-tribunals see fit to assert their authority." tice Marshall, it was said that "the jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it deriving validity from an external source would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case. it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction: but, if understood, not less obligatory." And, again, after holding it "to be a principle of public law that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power, open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted, by the consent of that power, from its jurisdiction," he added: "Without doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction, either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals." Again, in Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1, sub nom. Mali v. Hudson County Common Jail Keeper, 30 L. ed. 565, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385, in which the jurisdiction of a state court over one charged with murder, committed on board a foreign merchant vessel in a harbor of the state, was sustained, it was said by Mr. Chief Justice Waite (pp. 11, 12, L. ed. p. 567, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 387): "It is part of the law of civilized nations that when a merchant vessel of one country enters the ports of another for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the place to which it goes, unless, by treaty or otherwise, the two countries have come to some different understanding or agreement. From experience, however, it was within the power of Congress to prescribe "Moreover, as 90 per cent of all com- |