Dec. 743; Streeter v. Western Union Mut. Life & Acci. Soc. 65 Mich. 199, 31 N. W. 779. The contract is one of life insurance, and cannot be modified except by the consent of both parties. plicability to the policy in question of $ Com. v. Wetherbee, 105 Mass. 149; Na-icy was written. The section is as follows: tional Union v. Marlow, 21 C. C. A. 89, 40 U. S. App. 95, 74 Fed. 775. The amendments to the by-laws did not affect this policy, because they do not purport to have any retrospective operation. Carnes v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Asso. 106 Iowa, 281, 76 N. W. 683; Spencer v. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. 22 Misc. 147, 48 N. Y. Supp. 590, Affirmed in 53 App. Div. 627, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1146; Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W. v. Stumpf, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 309, 58 S. W. 840; Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 82 Iowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. 983; Sieverts v. National Benev. Asso. 95 Iowa, 710, 64 N. W. 671; Benton v. Brotherhood of Railroad Brakemen, 146 Ill. 570, 34 N. E. 939. The company had no power to alter the contract by amendments to its constitution or by-laws. Hobbs v. Iowa Mut. Ben. Asso. 82 lowa, 107, 11 L. R. A. 299, 47 N. W. 983; Pokrefky v. Detroit Firemen's Fund Asso. 121 Mich. "In all suits upon policies of insurance that Jarman did not commit suicide within 1. The first defense in order of time is insane, this policy shall become null and void," applies, and exonerates the vided in the policy, "that in the case of the company from all liability beyond that prosuicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees such an amount of his policy as the member shall have paid to this company on the policy in assessments on the same with out interest." Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L. ed. 236, and cog- 456, 80 N. W. 240; Voigt v. Kersten, 164 The question as to the reasonableness of the change is immaterial. Gaut v. American Legion of Honor, 107 Tenn. 603, 55 L. R. A. 465, 64 S. W. 1070. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: This case turns principally upon the ap But we are of opinion that the word "suicide" is not used in this statute in its technical and legal sense of self-destruction by a sane person, but according to its popular meaning of death by one's own hand, irrespective of the mental condition of the person committing the act. The result of the construction urged by the defendant would be that, if a perfectly sane man voluntarily and from anger, pride, or jealousy, or a mere desire to escape from the ills of life, puts an end to his life, and thereby becomes guilty of the crime of self-murder, and of a fraud upon the insurance company, the company would still be responsible, unless it could be shown that the insured con templated suicide at the time he made his application for the policy; while, if he committed the same act while insane, and therefore irresponsible, the statute would [201] not apply, and the company would not be liable under the terms of the policy, which provided that it should become void "in case of the self-destruction of the holder whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane." In the one case, as we held in Ritter v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. 169 U. S. 139, 42 L. ed. 693, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 300, that is, of self-destruction by a sane man, not only would the policy be void, whether there were a provision to that effect or not, but even a contract that it should be valid under such circumstances was thought to be against public policy and subversive of sound morality (p. 154, L. ed. p. 698, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 505), while in the other case of a suicide by an insane person, the insured is guilty of no wrong to the company if he be incapable of understanding the moral consequences of his own act, and there is no reason in law or morals why the company should not pay. It is impossible to suppose that the legislature could have contemplated such a contingency, and a construction that would lead to this result should be deemed inadmissible, unless the language of the statute were too plain to be misunderstood. 2. We are next brought to the consideration of the applicability of the suicide statute (§ 5982) to policies of this company issued at this time. This act, upon its face, applies to all insurance companies "doing business in this state," and to all policies issued by such companies after the date of the act. It undoubtedly governs the rights of the parties in this case, except so far as the same may have been modified by an act passed in 1887, authorizing the incorporation of insurance companies on the assessment plan. Section 10 of this act (Laws 1887, pp. 199, 204) is now known as § 5869 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, and provides that corporations "doing business under this article" shall make certain annual statements, which, as well as other requirements, are also made applicable to foreign companies, with the following proviso: "Provided, always, That nothing herein contained shall subject any corporation doing business under this article to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth." It appears that the defendant in this case, which is a citizen of Illinois, elected to take advantage of this law, and on June 18, 1888, received from the insurance department of the state authority to do business thereunder upon the assessment plan. As to policies issued upon the assessment plan subsequent to this date and prior to 1897, the supreme court of Missouri held that the suicide stat The statute was manifestly intended to apply to all cases of self-destruction or suicide, unless the same were contemplated at the time application was made for the pol-ute, above quoted, does not apply. Haynie icy, and the fact that we may have given a v. Knights Templars & Masonic Life Indemdifferent construction to the same words nity Co. 139 Mo. 416, 41 S. W. 461. To the when used in a policy of insurance does not same effect are Hanford v. Massachusetts militate against this theory. The same Ben. Asso. 122 Mo. 50, 26 S. W. 680; Jacobs words may require a different construction v. Omaha Life Asso. 142 Mo. 49, 43 S. W. when used in different documents, as, for 375, and Aloe v. Mutual Reserve Life Asso. instance, in a contract, and a statute; and 147 Mo. 561, 49 S. W. 553. It is true the identity of words is not decisive of identity authority of these cases was somewhat of meaning where they are used in different shaken by the recent case of Aloe v. Fidelconnections and for different purposes. In ity Mut. Life Asso. 164 Mo. 675, 55 S. W. a contract, the technical rights of the par- 993, which did not involve the repeal of the [203] ties only are involved; in a statute, an im- suicide statute, but of another statute, proportant question of public policy. If this viding that no misrepresentation should be statute were read alone and disembarrassed deemed material, unless the matter misrepby the construction given to these words in resented should have contributed to the policies of insurance, not a doubt would death of the insured. The case, however, arise as to its application to all cases of turned, as did the cases above cited, upon self-destruction; and when we examine the the scope of the proviso of § 5869, and a theory of the defendant, and find that it persuasive opinion was delivered by Judge leads to the conclusion that the company Valliant in favor of the theory that the prowould be liable if the insured had commit- viso was intended to relate only to the orted a fraud upon it, and would not be liable if he had taken his life, though guilty of no ganization of the corporations, and the exfraud, the theory must be rejected without tent to which they should be subject to the hesitation. The construction we have given supervision of the department of insurance, to the words "committed suicide" in this and under the superintendent's control. [202] act is fortified by *reference to § 6570, Mo. This opinion was delivered in the first deRev. Stat. 1889, referring to the construc-partment of the supreme court, and, there tion of statutes, which provides that being a dissent, the cause was transferred "words and phrases shall be taken in their to the court in banc, wherein a majority of plain, or ordinary and usual, sense; but the court apparently differed from the views technical words and phrases, having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, shall be understood according to their technical import." Undoubtedly the word "suicide" in its usual sense includes all cases of self-destruction. expressed by Judge Valliant, and reaffirmed policies thereafter issued, and that view is, | independent and binding obligation, and as of course, binding upon this court. But we are of the opinion that this statute was intended to be prospective in its operation, and that the rights of the defendant as an assessment company under the act of 1887 began in June, 1888, with its certificate of authority to do business under that act, and with respect to policies anterior to that date the rights of the parties are to be determined by the suicide statute, § 5855, Rev. Stat. 1889. It must be borne in mind that the repealing act of 1887, now known as Rev. Stat. 1889, § 5869, was not passed as an independent statute, but as § 10 of a new statute of fourteen sections, entitled "An Act to Provide for the Incorporation and Regulation of Associations, Societies, or Companies, Doing a Life or Casualty Insurance Business on the Assessment Plan." The prior sections define what shall be deemed a contract of insurance upon the assessment plan, how the corporations are formed, what the policies should specify, giving general details with regard to the management of the business, and then providing, in § 10, for annual statements made by "every corporation doing business under this act," with the provision that [204]"nothing herein contained *shall subject any corporation doing business under this act to any provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this state, except as distinctly herein set forth." This whole act, slightly amended in language, was carried into the Revised Statutes of 1889 as chapter 89, article 3. It seems to us quite clear that the declaration of the proviso that corporations "doing business under this act" shall not be subject to the general insurance laws of the state, applies only to corporations which took out a certificate of authority from the insurance department to do business on the assessment plan, and to policies thereafter issued by such companies, notwithstanding the fact that such companies may have issued policies under the general insurance laws of the state prior to the act of 1887. The words "doing business" evidently refer to issuing policies, and not to paying them. A man does business when he contracts obligations; he ceases to do business when he discharges them. overriding and nullifying any stipulation But we do not find it necessary to express Were the act of 1887 more ambiguous than it is as to its application to past transactions, we should still be disposed to apply the cardinal rule of construction, that where the language of an act will bear two interpretations, equally obvious, that one which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution is to be preferred. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 178. This rule was applied by this court in Granada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, sub nom. Granada County v. Brown, 28 L. ed. 704, Sup. Ct. Rep. 125; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 269, 29 L. ed. 615, 620, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, and Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657, 39 L. ed. 297, 301, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. We do not wish to be understood, however, as expressing an opinion upon the constitutionality of the act of 1887, if it were applied to prior policies, but simply as holding that, in view of the language of the act, and the doubtfulness of its constitutionality as applied to prior policies, it should only be given effect in cases of policies thereafter issued. over But there is another argument in this connection which ought not to be looked, and which is, in our opinion, decisive that the suicide statute is applicable to this policy. In 1897 a law was passed by the legislature of Missouri, specially applying the suicide statute to insurance companies doing business upon the assessment plan. This was done by an amendment to § 5869, which will hereafter be considered. Two objections to the applicability of this statute are deserving of consideration. First, that it is in conflict with art. 4, § 28, of the Constitution of Missouri, declaring "that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title;" and also art. 4, § 25, that "no law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose." This is not only the natural construction of the act, but to hold that the proviso applies to policies antecedently issued might open it to the imputation of impairing the obligation of contracts previously entered into between these companies and their insured, since these policies amounted to a special agreement on the part of the companies that they would be liable in case of suicide, an agreement upon which the insured and his beneficiary were entitled to rely. The provision of the suicide statute, that it shall be no defense that the insured committed suicide, and that any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void, must be considered as imposing a condition upon every policy thereafter issued, notwithstanding any stipulation in the policy | to the contrary. It must be treated as an vised Statutes of Missouri of 1889, entitled 187 U. S. U. S., Book 47. The act was entitled "An Act to Repeal Section 5869 of Art. 3, Chap. 89, of the Re 10 145 'Insurance Companies on the Assessment by reference to sections of the authorized Plan,' and to Enact a New Section in Lieu version of the statutes (without other de[206] Thereof, and Designated as Section 5869" scription of the subject of the amending of the same chapter, "Relating to State act) has been followed quite generally in ment of Affairs of Assessment Insurance this state on the faith of early rulings of Companies and Misrepresentations Made in the supreme court approving such methods Securing a Policy of Insurance and Defense of lawmaking. So much has been done, and Thereon, for Such Misrepresentations," and so many rights have been acquired, on the as first introduced contained the section as basis of those rulings, that we hold that the herein printed in the margin.t Subse- question of their correctness ought not to be quently the bill was amended by inserting reopened at this day. We adhere to them between the word "sections" and the figures and follow them as an expression of the set"5912" the figures "5855" (the suicide stat- tled law of Missouri." ute). This was not strictly germane to the As the new act was simply an amendment other sections cited, which related to the of § 5869, these two last cases would seem purposes set forth in the title to the act, to be decisive of the opinion of the supreme and it is argued that the legislature exceed-court upon the statute in question, upon ed its constitutional powers in inserting which its decision is, of course, obligatory these figures. upon this court. In the absence of an express adjudication of the supreme court of the state upon this question, we are forced to rely upon other decisions concerning the construction given to this provision of the state Constitution. In State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, it was held that the object of this provision was to prevent logrolling, and surprise and fraud on members; and in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 271, 276, 21 S. W. 1125, 1126, it is said that "these and other cases show that this section of the Constitution is to be reasonably and liberally construed and applied, due regard being had to its object and purpose. It was designed to prevent the insertion of disconnected matters in the same bill. The section asserts only two propositions. The first is that no bill shall contain more than one subject, and the second is that this single subject must be [207]clearly expressed in the title. If all the provisions of the bill have a natural relation and connection, then the subject is single, and this, too, though the bill contains many provisions. As to the second proposition, namely, that the single subject must be clearly expressed in the title, it is sufficient to say that the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act: mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title." And in State ex rel. Kirkwood v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112, 118, 36 S. W. 614, it is said: "A mere reference to the section to be amended, without other description of the subject-matter of the amendatory law, is ur der the rulings of this court a sufficient title to an act which deals exclusively with the subject of the section amended." It was also said in State ex rel. Dickason v. Marion County Ct. 128 Mo. 440, 30 S. W. 105: "The practice of legislation +Sec. 5869. Every corporation doing busi-state; and all such foreign companies are hereness under this article shall annually, on or by declared to be subject to, and required to before the first day c February, return to the conform to, the provisions of sections 5912, and superintendent of the insurance department, in 5849, and 5850 of the Revised Statutes of Missuch manner and form as he shall prescribe, souri of 1889, and governed and controlled by & statement of its affairs, for the year ending all the provisions in said section contained: on the preceding 31st day of December, and Provided, always, That nothing herein conthe said superintendent, in person or by dep- tained shall subject any corporation doing busiuty, shall have the power of visitation of and ness under this article to any other provisions examination into the affairs of such corpora- or requirements of the general insurance laws. tion, which are conferred upon him in the case of this state, except as distinctly herein set of life insurance companies by the laws of this forth and provided. Section 5869 of the Revised Statutes of 1889 deals with four questions relating to the law of insurance by companies doing business on the assessment plan. First, providing for an annual statement; second, a visitation and examination into the affairs of the corporation; third, a general statement that foreign companies are subject to certain provisions; and, fourth, a recital as to what, among the general insurance laws of the state, shall be applicable to these companies. While, as already stated, the supreme court has not decided as to the constitutional power of the legislature to incorporate the suicide statute into this amended § 5869, the decisions *above cited, that a[208] mere reference to the section amended is sufficient to sustain the validity of the law, would seem to cover the case, and for this reason the suicide statute, though not strictly germane to the other sections mentioned, is germane to the business of insurance on the assessment plan. Bearing in mind that the suicide statute was originally repealed, as to these policies, by § 5869, as enacted in 1887, it would seem that an amendment introduced into the same section restoring its application to these same policies would not be unconstitutional. A second objection to the application of this statute is that if the petitioner be right in his contention that, by the repeal of the suicide statute, the contract between the assured and the company relieving the latter from liability in case of suicide, became effective, the legislature could not thereafter, by re-enacting the statute or attempting to subject assessment companies to its provisions, impair the contract subsisting between the assured and this petitioner. The answer to this argument is not difficult. No new contract was made, and no The proviso of art. 7, § 1, was also amended at the same time to correspond with the above amendment and to read as follows: "Provided, That a policy of membership for $5,000 shall be good for all the money in the death fund arising from one *assess-[210] ment; provided, that it shall not exceed $5,000 and all the money paid on the policy in assessments for the first five years." On February 20, 1894, this section was again amended by striking out the proviso altogether. Our conclusion, then, is that the court be low was correct in holding that the suicide It seems that these sections thus changed statute, as originally applied to this policy, from an agreement to repay all assessments had not been repealed at the death of Jar-upon policies to an agreement to pay all asman in 1898, when the cause of action arose. sessments for the first five years, was found, 3. It is also assigned as error in this case or deemed to be, too liberal; and in Januthat the court permitted a recovery, not ary, 1898, the company made an important only of the amount of the policy, but of all additional amendment by striking out enthe money paid by assured in assessments tirely the proviso for the repayment of asupon such policy. sessments, under which it now claims to be relieved altogether from paying more than the principal sum of the policy. The article as finally amended reads as follows: "Sec. 3. Policies of membership may be issued upon a basis of benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, but no member shall hold more than one policy at the same time, except one additional policy on the term plan," etc. The promise of the company was to pay the plaintiff "the sum of $5,000, and all the money paid on the policy in assessments, subject to the limitation as to the amount [209] of such payment as is provided in § 1 of art. 7 of the constitution on the back of this policy, which section reads as follows: "Sec. 1. Upon due notice and satisfactory proof of the death of a member of this company, the board of directors shall within In view of the fact that both of these sixty (60) days pay the widow, children, or amendments imply a prospective operation heirs of the deceased member (and in the upon policies which may be issued, it would order named unless otherwise ordered by the seem to be unnecessary to consider the quesmember during his lifetime or in his will), tion discussed with much detail in briefs of the amount set forth in the deceased mem- counsel, whether the amendments were inber's policy of membership: Provided, that tended to operate upon policies already isa policy of membership for $5,000 shall be sued. In our opinion it is clear that they good for all the money in the death fund were not, and conceding the proposition arising from one assessment; provided, it that Jarman had agreed to abide by the conshall not exceed $5,000 and all the money stitution, rules, and regulations of the compaid on the policy in assessments: and a pany, as they then were, or might be concertificate for $4,000 shall be good for four stitutionally changed thereafter, this agreefifths of all the money in the death fundment could have no operation upon changes arising from one assessment, provided it which, upon their face, indicated that they shall not exceed $4,000 and all the money applied only to policies thereafter to be ispaid on the policy in assessments; and so on sued. To cover this case he should have in the same proportion as to all certificates." promised to abide by amendments thereThe assessments paid upon the policy after made, though they were intended to amounted to $811.83, and the right of the apply only to future policies. plaintiff to recover this amount in addition The judgment of the court below awardto the principal sum of $5,000 would be being the plaintiff the full amount agreed yond question, were it not for certain upon in the policy, without damages, is acchanges thereafter made in the constitu- cordingly affirmed. tion, which it is insisted were binding upon the plaintiff under the following clause, Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the found in the application of Jarman for decision of this case. membership: "I further agree, if accepted, istrator of the Estate of Sumner W. Mat- to abide by the constitution, rules, and reg-*SECURITY TRUST COMPANY, as Admin-[211] ulations of the company, as they now are, or may be constitutionally changed hereafter." The application further stated that the application was made a part of the policy by reference thereto. In virtue of the privilege thus given to amend its constitution, the company, on January 8, 1889, amended art. 4, § 3, of the constitution so as to read as follows: "Sec. 3. Policies of membership may be issued upon a basis of benefits ranging in amounts to $5,000, and all the money paid in assessments upon the policy for the first five years." บ. BLACK RIVER NATIONAL BANK OF (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 211-237.) A nonresident owner of a claim against a de- |