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for Indians under the care and custody of | dian_reservations, we do not determine, bethe general government, and that taxation cause, even if such were the case, and the therein is permitted only to a limited ex- assessor for the county were the one to make tent and upon certain kinds of property, the assessment in the reservations also, the not including Indians or their property; and mere fact of the change of the officer who the imposition and collection of those taxes was to make the assessment did not on that which are permitted do not thereby render account make a reservation part of the the reservation a part of the same taxing same taxing district as the county to which district as the organized county to which it was attached for judicial purposes, withit is attached for judicial purposes. The in the meaning of the rule requiring unidifference between the two domains, the res- formity of taxation within the same taxing ervation and the organized county, is rad- district, assuming such rule to apply to the ical and wide. The lands in the former are, territory named. as we have said, mostly wild and uncultivated and used principally for grazing purposes, and the domain is the home of a different and distinct race from that occupying the organized county, the inhabitants of which are of civilized races, following the customs of civilized life, and in almost everything differing from their Indian neighbors. Property therein is clearly very differently placed than the same kind in an organized county. Those who live and own property in an organized county receive more benefit from the taxes levied for general purposes than do the owners of property located in a reservation. The act of 1899 makes certain personal property in the reservations bear its proportion of the burdens of taxation for territorial and court purposes, from which such property derives some benefit. The owners of such personal property can derive very little, if any, benefit from the taxes raised for other purposes than those just mentioned. There is no township government existing there; no provision for the organization of school and It is true the taxation in the reservation road districts or for the establishment under the act of 1895 was for all purposes, of other municipal governments, and hence and this court held that the act was not for it may be seen that, even assuming the pow- that reason an illegal exercise of legisla er of the legislature to tax for all such pur- tive power. It was recognized that there poses at the same rate as in an organized were differences in the amount of benefits county, and to provide for the collection and derived from such taxation by the organpayment of such taxes into the county treas-ized county as compared with the reservaury for disbursement for county purposes, yet still the injustice of such a rate of taxation would naturally appeal to the legisla[332]ture and result in some legislation of the kind passed in 1899. The territorial legislature has evidently recognized that fact and enacted that statute in consequence.

The foundation of the rule which may be said generally to obtain, that there shall be uniformity in taxation of the same kind of property in the same taxing district, rests on the assumption that in such district the circumstances regarding the property to be taxed are ordinarily the same in substance, although there may, and necessarily must be, some differences as to the extent to which the different owners of property may be benefited by the taxes collected thereon, and it is to be assumed that an alteration as to rate would work an unjust and illegal discrimination in taxing property situated alike. When the difference is deep and radical between the two domains in which the same kind of property may be situated, the law which makes them one district for taxation, so that all the property of the same[333] kind in the same district must be taxed alike, and no reasonable distinction be permitted, must itself be so plain and urgent that no other intention can be suggested. No such case is now before us.

tion, but it was not thought that, for that reason, the law was invalid. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 275, 42 L. ed. 740, 744, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340. It was a matter of legislative discretion with which the courts had in general no concern.

It has not, however, been held that the legislature could not recognize the difference in circumstances and provide for a different rate of taxation for property in the reservation from that levied on property in the organized county to which the reservation was attached for judicial purposes. The power to make this distinction does not depend upon the existence of a separate officer to assess or to collect the tax.

All this goes to show the legislature never intended to create a single taxing district of an organized county and a reservation composed of such different materials. As further evidence of the substantial difference between the two places, attention is called to the fact that the general laws providing for taxation in an organized county do not authorize such taxation in a reservation, even after it has been attached to a If it required special legislative authority county for judicial purposes. There must to tax at all, how can it reasonably be mainbe special legislative authority for it. Wag-tained by the taxing officer that the act oner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588, 592, 42 L. ed. 1154, 1156, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.

Whether the legislature, by the act of 1897, providing the method of thereafter making assessments in townships by means of one assessor for each county, did thereby repeal the provision in the act of 1895, in relation to a special assessor for the In

which provides for the taxation, although at a reduced rate, is illegal? And if an act were once passed which authorized the same rate of taxation as in the organized county, could not the legislature repeal it? And if it could repeal, why could it not modify it by reducing the rate of taxation, although not totally exempting property from all tax

ation? If the legislature had repealed the
act of 1895, and had passed no other, there
plainly would be in that case no law for tax-
ing the property in the reservation. If sub-
sequently it passed an act for the taxation
of such property at a reduced rate from
that existing in the organized county, it
could not be said there was any exemption
from taxation, but, on the contrary, it
would be the case of an act providing for
taxation.

court, but they have paid the taxes assessed for the purposes mentioned in the act of 1899, and do not seek to recover them back in this case, and the question is of no consequence to them.

In the view we take of the case we are unable to see that any provision of the act of Congress of 1890, organizing the territory, or the other act of 1886, in regard to territories then or thereafter to be organized, has been violated by the territorial act of 1899, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is therefore affirmed.

The only answer made by the appellants is the assumed fact that all property of the same kind in the same taxing district of this territory must, in all circumstances, be [334]taxed at the same rate or must be wholly exempted, and that no discrimination can, in any event or under any circumstances; A. C. FINNEY, as Receiver, et al., Plffs. in be permitted; otherwise there is a discrimination which is illegal. But if it be not in the same taxing district the reasoning fails, even if otherwise good.

The recognition by the legislature of the difference in the situation between Noble county proper and the Indian reservation attached to it for judicial purposes, and the taxation of the property in the latter at a different rate from that in the county, may be upheld upon the same principle as in the case of general city taxation, where the whole of the city is first assessed equally as a taxing district and then the more compact portions thereof are assessed at a greater rate and required to pay a greater proportionate share of the expense of the city government, because of the fact of the greater proportionate protection and benefit afforded by the police and fire departments and other like matters, to the portions of the city thus subjected to greater taxation.

Err.,

v.

MARY A. GUY, etc.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 335-346.) Judgments-full faith and credit-enforcement of stockholders' liability outside state of incorporation—pleadings-construction of statutes of other state not admitted by demurrer-comity.

1.

2.

3.

Full faith and credit are not denied to a judgment of a Minnesota court against resident stockholders of a domestic corporation in an action to enforce their statutory liability, by the judgment of a court of another state denying the right to maintain a further action to enforce such liability outside the state of incorporation, where, under the Minnesota laws as construed by its courts, the only remedy provided for the enforcement of the liability of stockholders in domestic corporations is a suit in equity in that state by a creditor in behalf of himself and all other creditors against the stockholders who can be served with process.

A state court is not concluded as to the proper construction of the statutes of another state and the decision of its courts construing them, on the theory that defendant, by demurring to the complaint, which contained an allegation in the form of an averment of fact as to the meaning of such laws and decisions set forth therein, admit ted that such was the correct conclusion to be drawn from them.

Whether a state court should permit an action to be maintained therein on the principle of comity between the states is a question exclusively for the courts of that state to decide.

Cooley, in his work on Taxation (p. 118), affirms the validity of such legislation, and refers in a note (3) to cases which establish it, and he dissents from the view taken by the Wisconsin court in Knowlton v. Rock County, 9 Wis. 410, 421. Where the difference between the different portions of territory is plain and palpable, the right of the legislature to recognize that difference and to provide for a difference in taxation cannot be denied without imposing, as said by Judge Cooley, restraints upon the constitutional power of the legislature which cannot in reason be justified. Whether there is such a difference would generally be for the legislature to determine, although we would not say that the courts could not in any possible state of facts, review that determination. In the case before us the legislative Argued February 27, March 2, 1903. Deact providing for this difference in taxation amounts, in itself, to a provision for a dif ferent taxing district within the principles just stated, and certainly no one would say that it was not a most reasonable and just recognition of a plain difference in circumstances, which ought to lead to a difference in the proportion of taxation between the two places.

Whether the proper officer made the as[335] sessment or not is immaterial *in this case. The defendants in error have not only not appealed from the decree of the supreme

[No. 180.]

cided April 6, 1903.

to state records and judicial proceedings-see Lindley v. O'Reilly (N. J. L.) 1 L. R. A. 79, and note: Cummington v. Belchertown (Mass.) 4 L. R. A. 131, and note; Rand v. Hanson (Mass.) 12 L. R. A. 574, and note. And see notes to Wiese v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc. (Cal.) 7 L. R. A. 578; Darby v. Mayer, 6 L. ed. U. S. 367; and Mills v. Duryee, 3 L. ed. U. S. 411.

NOTE. As to full faith and credit to be given

On the right to enforce stockholder's liability outside of state of incorporation-see note to Cushing v. Perot (Pa.) 34 L. R. A. 737.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

bank to it, and also in favor of the other

state Wisconsin judgment who had

which reversed a judgment of the Circuit
Court of Pierce County in favor of plaintiff
in an action to enforce the liability of stock-
holders in a foreign corporation. Affirmed.
See same case below, 111 Wis. 296, 87 N.
W. 255.

Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: [336] *This action was commenced in the proper court of the state of Wisconsin to enforce the shareholders' liability under a Minneso ta statute, in a corporation of Minnesota and doing business in that state. The defendant deinurred to the complaint on the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled by the trial court and judgment given for the plaintiff, which was reversed by the supreme court of the state, and the case has been brought here by plaintiff to review the judgment of reversal.

The facts alleged in the complaint are in substance these: That during all the times therein mentioned the American Savings & Loan Association, one of the plaintiff's herein, was a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Minnesota, and on June 18, 1896, William D. Hale, another plaintiff in this action, was appointed receiver thereof; that the Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank was on June 6, 1888, a banking organization, by virtue of the laws of the state of Minnesota, and doing business as such; that the bank became insolvent in June, 1893, and the entire net proceeds of the bank's assets amounted to the sum of $12,539.95, all of which had been paid over to the state of Minnesota on account of the indebtedness of the bank to the state of over $28,000, which was a preferred claim under the laws of that state; that its other debts amounted to the sum of more than $100,000, and it had no property to satisfy the same; that the defendant, Mary A. Guy, a resident of the state of Wisconsin, was the owner of three shares of the capital stock of the bank in her own right, and that she owned sixteen shares of the stock of the bank as executrix of the will of her husband and as legatee thereunder.

vened, for the various amounts due them from the bank. It was also adjudged that the amount of the debts of said bank aggregated the sum of $106,471.71.

It was then further averred in the complaint that Finney (one of the plaintiffs herein) was appointed receiver in the Minnesota suit for the purpose of collecting and enforcing the respective liabilities of the defendant stockholders, and that an order had been made authorizing and empowering him to proceed against those of the defendant shareholders residing in other jurisdictions in such other jurisdictions, for the purpose of enforcing the liabilities of such shareholders, and with full power and authority to distribute the proceeds of such action among the parties entitled thereto, after final payment in full, out of the proceeds, of the costs and expenses incurred, etc. It was then averred that, pursuant to the instructions of the Minnesota court, Finney, as receiver therein, commenced this action against Mary A. Guy, and joined with him as plaintiffs all the creditors of the bank who had proved their claims in the Minnesota suit, and it was also averred that Mrs. Guy was liable to the creditors of the bank in the sum of $3,800, double the amount of the par value of the three shares owned by her individually and of the sixteen shares formerly owned by her husband, and that she was the only stockholder who was a resident of Wisconsin, and therefore the only defendant in the case, and that the full amount of her double liability, if recovered, would be wholly insufficient to pay the indebtedness of the bank after applying everything that could be collected from all the other stockholders, some of whom were insolvent, some had been compromised with, and from others nothing could be collected.

*The complaint then set forth several sec-[338] tions of the General Statutes of the State of Minnesota of 1878, among them being §§ 5905-5907 and 5911, and it was averred that this action could be maintained by reason of such sections. They are the same as are set forth in Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, ante, 380, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 244. It was then averred that decisions in the courts of the It was then averred that suit had been state of Minnesota had been rendered recommenced in Minnesota in 1894 to enforce lating to the liability of stockholders under the liability of the stockholders of the bank those statutes, in corporations organized ununder and by virtue of the laws and Con-der the laws of that state, as to the proper stitution of the state of Minnesota; that such suit had been commenced by the American Savings & Loan Association, which was a creditor of the bank, in behalf of itself and all other creditors who should come in and make themselves parties to the suit and [337] prove their claims therein, and against all the stockholders of the bank; process was, however, not served on this defendant, but only on those residing within the state; that such proceedings were had in the suit that judgment was duly rendered therein on April 28, 1897, in favor of the complainant, the American Savings & Loan Association, for the amount of the indebtedness of the

method of enforcing such liability. The complaint then referred to some twenty different decisions in the state courts of Minnesota by titles, and gave a reference to the volumes in which they were reported, and it then stated what the law of Minnesota was under those decisions and statutes as to the liability of stockholders and the manner in which that liability could be enforced, and the effect of a judgment recovered in a state court by a creditor in his own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated, and it averred that a judgment such as was obtained in the Minnesota suit was conclusive upon stockholders, even though

they were not parties thereto, as to all questions of indebtedness of the bank and who were its creditors, and that defendant, though not served with process in that suit, was concluded by the judgment as to her liability as shareholder, except as therein stated. It also averred that, after such a judgment had been obtained, the Minnesota decisions held that under those statutes a suit could be maintained in the courts of another jurisdiction, similar to the one before us, and the complaint ended with a prayer for judgment that the defendant should pay the plaintiff the sum of $3,800, with interest thereon since April 28, 1897, and that A. C. Finney, one of the plaintiffs, be appointed receiver herein, to collect the amount and distribute the same pro rata among the other plaintiffs.

Mr. Frederick W. Reed argued the cause, and, with Mr. Fred G. Coldren, filed a brief for plaintiffs in error:

Such provisions as those of the Minnesota
Constitution are not merely directory to
the legislature, but themselves declare and
fix a liability and are self-executing.
Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 150, sub nom.
Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co. 16 L. R.
A. 281, 50 N. W. 1110; Whitman v. National
Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 44 L. ed. 587, 20 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 477.

The liability, however, whether depending on the constitutional provisions as well as statutes, or on statutes alone, is, though statutory in its origin, contractual, and not penal, in its nature.

1; Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27, 30 L. ed. 864, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788.

As regards its enforcement in foreign jurisdictions, there is no essential difference between this liability and the liability for assessments for unpaid subscriptions for stock.

Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 47 L. R. A. 725, 56 N. E. 489; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 49 L. R. A. 301, 56 N. E. 888; Whitman v. National Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 44 L. ed. 587, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 477; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; Holland v. Duluth Iron Min. & Development Co. 65 Minn. 324, 68 N. W. 50; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn. 454, 76 N. W. 254.

The right to enforce this liability is not a mere matter of comity, but it is a right under the general principles of jurisprudence

to enforce a contract.

Dennick v. Central R. Co. 103 U. S. 11, 26 L. ed. 439; Western Nat. Bank v. Reckless, 96 Fed. 70; Morawetz, Priv. Corp. § 875; Western Nat. Bank v. Lawrence, 117 Mich. 669, 76 N. W. 105; Judson v. Stewart, 7 Ohio N. P. 160; Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489, 42 L. R. A. 804, 52 N. E. 346; First Co. 42 Minn. 327, 6 L. R. A. 676, 44 N. W.

Nat. Bank v. Gustin Minerva Consol. Min.

198.

home court is binding on all other courts.
The construction of the statute by the

S. 452, 45 L. ed. 619, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423;
W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.
Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 49
L. R. A. 301, 56 N. E. 888; Hancock Nat.

Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed.
619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; James H. Rice
Co. v. Libbey, 45 C. C. A. 78, 105 Fed. 825;
Hancock Nat. Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414,
44 N. E. 349; Brunswick Terminal Co. v.
National Bank, 48 L. R. A. 625, 40 C. C. A.

The proceedings in the home court are binding on stockholders who are not before the court otherwise than by virtue of their membership in the corporation.

Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 144, 46 L. ed. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52; Whitman v. Na tional Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 44 L. ed. 587, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 477; Bagley v. Tyler, 43 Mo. App. 195; Dennis v. Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 91 Cal. 548, 27 Pac. 1031; Hodg son v. Cheever, 8 Mo. App. 318; Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo. 650, 32 S. W. 1132; Tin-22, 99 Fed. 635; Bank of North America v. ker v. Van Dyke, 1 Flip. 521, Fed. Cas. Nat. Bank, 34 L. R. A. 742, 13 C. C. A. 612, Rindge, 57 Fed. 279; Rhodes v. United States No. 14,058; Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U. S. 10. 17 L. ed. 776; Hobart v. Johnson, 1924 U. S. App. 607, 66 Fed. 512; McVickar v. Jones, 70 Fed. 754; Eau Claire Nat. Bank Blatchf. 359, 8 Fed. 493; Flash v. Conn, v. Benson, 106 Wis. 624, 82 N. W. 604. 109 U. S. 371, 27 L. ed. 966, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263; Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 47 L. R. A. 725, 56 N. E. 489; Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489, 42 L. R. A. 804, 52 N. E. 346; Western Nat Bank v. Reckless, 96 Fed. 70; Coleman v. White, 14 Wis. 700, 80 Am. Dec. Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me. 498, 50 Atl. 714; 797; Gianella v. Bigelow, 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. 111; Rehbein v. Rahr, 109 Wis. 137, 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; 85 N. W. 315; First Nat. Bank v. Gustin Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 49 L. Mineral Consol. Min. Co. 42 Minn. 327, 6 R. A. 301, 56 N. E. 888; Sheafe v. Larimer, L. R. A. 676, 44 N. W. 198; Hencke v. Two-79 Fed. 921; Howarth v. Ellwanger, 86 Fed. mey, 58 Minn. 550, 60 N. W. 667; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn. 454, 76 N. W. 254; Evans v. Nellis, 101 Fed. 920; Deweese v. Smith, 45 C. C. A. 408, 106 Fed. 438; Brown v. Hitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667; Judson v. Stewart, 7 Ohio N. P. 160; First Nat. Bank v. Hawkins, 174 U. S. 365, 43 L. ed. 1007, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Western Nat. Bank v. Lawrence, 117 Mich. 669, 76 N. W. 105; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570, 49 L. L. R. 301, 56 N. E. 888; Kirtley v. Holmes, 52 L. R. A. 738, 46 C. C. A. 102, 107 Fed. U. S., Book 47.

189 U. S.

53

54; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn. 454, 76 N. W. 254; Holland v. Duluth Iron Min. & Development Co. 65 Minn. 324, 68 N. W. 50; Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co. 80 Minn. 32, 82 N. W. 1088; Gaw v. Glassboro Novelty Glass Co. 20 Ohio C. C. 416; Dexter v. Edmands, 89 Fed. 467; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, 33 L. ed. 184, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 739; Hale v. Hardon, 37 C. C. A. 240, 95 Fed. 747.

This does not mean that it is conclusive against any stockholder that he is such, or

841

that he has not discharged his liability, or that he has not offsets against the claim; but he is so far a part of the corporation that it is in other respects an adjudication against him.

Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; Hanson v. Davison, 73 Minn. 454, 76 N. W.

254.

Where the home court has thus construed the nature of the liability, and determined such to be the effect of the proceedings there, to refuse to give the same effect to such contract and proceedings in the courts of another state is contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 36 L. ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 224; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506.

Messrs. W. E. Hale and Frederick W. Reed also filed a brief in support of the pe tition for certiorari.

Mr. Robert M. Bashford argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in er

ror:

The demurrer admits the existence of the decisions and statutes of Minnesota specifi-| cally referred to in the complaint, but It does not admit the interpretation placed upon the law of Minnesota by the pleader,| or his legal conclusions therefrom.

State ex rel. Veeder v. Collins, 5 Wis. 339; Brown v. Phillips, 71 Wis. 239, 36 N. W. 242; Stedman v. Berlin, 97 Wis. 505, 73 N. W. 57; 6 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 336.

Where a special remedy is provided, and especially if it contemplates a joint action in favor of all creditors against all stockholders, it can be enforced only in the courts of the state which creates the liability, and where the corporation is organized to carry on business.

Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U. S. 520, 22 L. ed. 376; May v. Black, 77 Wis. 102, 45 N. W. 949; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 30 L. ed. 825, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757; Thomp. Corp. § 3055.

The courts of Minnesota have enforced the statutory liability there created, within their own jurisdiction, but they have not enforced a statutory liability created by the legislature of another state against citizens of their own state, or even the common-law liability of the stockholders of a foreign corporation,

resident in that state.

First Nat. Bank v. Gustin Minerva Consol. Min. Co. 42 Minn. 327, 6 L. R. A. 676, 44 N. W. 198; Rule v. Omega Stove & Grate Co. 64 Minn. 326, 67 N. W. 60.

The remedy prescribed by the Minnesota statute is by a single action in which all the creditors shall be joined or represented, against all the stockholders.

Allen v. Walsh, 25 Minn. 543.

The unpaid subscription is an obligation arising from contract, and must be recovered in the right of the corporation.

Gager v. Paul, 111 Wis. 638, 87 N. W. 875.

The statutory liability cannot be enforced by the corporation, or through its right, or

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by its assignee or receiver. It is an obliga tion of the stockholders to the creditors, and must be enforced for the benefit of the latter in a proper proceeding instituted for that purpose, to which all the stockholders and creditors must be made parties.

Coleman v. White, 14 Wis. 700, 80 Am. Dec. 797; Gager v. Marsden, 101 Wis. 598, 77 N. W. 922; Booth v. Dear, 96 Wis. 516, 71 N. W. 816; Terry v. Little, 101 U. S. 216, 25 L. ed. 864.

The settled construction of a statute, so far as contract rights thereunder are acquired, is as much a part of the statute as the text itself; and a change of decision is the same in its effect on pre-existing contracts as a repeal or an amendment of a legislative enactment.

Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L. ed. 968; Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 12 L. ed. 85; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 520; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50, 19 L. ed. 594; Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 16 Wall. 678, 21 L. ed. 382; Chicago L. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 28 L. ed. 1084, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Anderson v. Santa Anna Twp. 116 U. S. 356, 29 L. ed. 633, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 27 L. ed. 73, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Johnson v. Keith, 117 U. S. 199, 29 L. ed. 888, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669; German Sav. Bank v. Franklin County, 128 U. S. 526, 32 L. ed. 519, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Knox County v. Ninth Nat. Bank, 147 U. S. 91, 37 L. ed. 93, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023; Wade v. Travis Coun ty, 174 U. S. 499, 43 L. ed. 1060, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Loeb v. Columbia Twp. 179 U. S. 472, 45 L. ed. 280, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174.

The question here involved is not one of local law, to be settled by the decisions of the Minnesota court; but it is one of general law, to be determined by reference to all the authorities and a consideration of the principles underlying the contract relations between the parties.

Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 37 L. ed. 772, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914. Plaintiffs have not the legal capacity to sue.

Hilliker v. Hale, 54 C. C. A. 252, 117 Fed. 220; Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 15 L. ed. 164; Filkins v. Nunnemacher, 81 Wis. 91, 51 N. W. 79.

A suit to reach equitable assets can only be maintained by a creditor who has recovered judgment and whose execution has been returned unsatisfied, under the Wisconsin Code and practice.

North Hudson Mut. Bldg. & L. Asso. v. Childs, 86 Wis. 292, 56 N. W. 870; Weber v. Weber, 90 Wis. 467, 63 N. W. 757; Northwestern Iron Co. v. Central Trust Co. 90 Wis. 570, 63 N. W. 752, 64 N. W. 323.

The same rule has been recognized and enforced by this court.

Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119, 25 L. ed. 370; National Tube Works Co. v. Ballou, 146 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 1070, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165.

Jurisdictional facts must be pleaded.

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