. To

contention is that Congress has not by this | words that are in the section, but by insertsection acted in the exercise of such power. ing those that are not now there. Each of It is not legislation in respect to elections the sections must stand as a whole or fall [140]of Federal officers, but is leveled at all altogether. The language is plain. There is elections, state or Federal, and it does no room for construction, unless it be as to not purport to punish bribery of any the effect of the Constitution. The question, voter, but simply of those named in the 15th then, to be determined is, whether we can Amendment. On its face it is clearly an at- introduce words of limitation into a penal tempt to exercise power supposed to be con- statute so as to make it specific, when, as ferred by the 15th Amendment in respect expressed, it is general only. to all elections, and not in pursuance of the "It would certainly be dangerous if the general control by Congress over particular legislature could set a net large enough to elections. To change this statute, enacted catch all possible offenders, and leave it to to punish bribery of persons named in the the courts to step inside and say who could 15th Amendment at all elections, to a stat- be rightfully detained and who should be set ute punishing bribery of any voter at cer- at large. This would, to some extent, subtain elections would be in effect judicial stitute the judicial for the legislative delegislation. It would be wresting the stat-partment of the government. ute from the purpose with which it was limit this statute in the manner now asked enacted and making it serve another pur- for would be to make a new law, not to enpose. Doubtless even a criminal statute force an old one. This is no part of our may be good in part and bad in part, provid- duty." ing the two can be clearly separated, and it is apparent that the legislative body would have enacted the one without the other, but there are no two parts to this statute. If the contention be sustained, it is simply a transformation of the statute in its single purpose and scope. This question has been by this court in two cases carefully considered and fully determined. States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563, there was an indictment, one count of which was based upon the 3d and another upon the 4th section of the act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. at L. 140, chap. 114, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 506) the 5th section of which act is substantially repeated in § 5507, Rev. "It has been suggested that if Congress Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3712). It has power to regulate trademarks used in is true that, as stated, § 4 contains commerce with foreign nations and among words of limitation or reference, even, that the several states, these statutes shall be can be construed as manifesting any inten-held valid in that class of cases, if no furtion to confine its provisions to the terms While it may be true that of the 15th Amendment. That section has when one part of a statute is valid and confor its object the punishment of all persons stitutional, and another part is unconstituwho by force, bribery, etc., hinder, delay, tional and void, the court may enforce the etc., any person from qualifying or voting." "valid part where they are distinctly separaAnd it is also true that the government ex-ble, so that each can stand alone, it is not pressly waived the consideration of all within the judicial province to give to the claims not arising out of the enforcement of the 15th Amendment to the Constitution. Nevertheless the decision is directly in point. We said (p. 221, L. ed. p. 565):

In United

66

no

"We are, therefore, directly called upon to decide whether a penal statute enacted by Congress, with its limited powers, which is in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial construction so as to make it [141]operate *only on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish. For this purpose, we must take these sections of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitu tional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding

Again, in the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82. sub nom. United States v. Steffens, 25 L. ed. 550, the validity of an indictment under the 4th and 5th sections of the act of Congress to punish the counterfeiting of trademarks (19 Stat. at L. 141, chap. 274) was considered. The congressional enactments at that time attempted to authorize trademarks generally, and the statute rethat under the Constitution Congress did ferred to was equally general. It was held not have control over the subject of trademarks generally, and, referring to the contention that to a limited extent it had, we said (p. 98, L. ed. p. 553):

ther.

words used by Congress a narrower meaning[142] than they are manifestly intended to bear in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body. This precise point was decided in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563. In that case Congress had passed a statute punishing election officers who should refuse to any person lawfully entitled to do so the right to cast his vote at an election. This court was of the opinion that, as regarded the section of the statute then under consideration, Congress could only punish such denial when it was on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. It was urged, however, that the general description of the offense included the more limited one, and that the section was valid where such was in fact the cause of denial. But the court

[143]

said" (and then follows the quotation we
have already made from that case).

as § 30 of the act of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 11, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1991), is as follows:

"Sec. 22. That where imported materials on which duties have been paid are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to the du

We deem it unnecessary to add anything to the views expressed in these opinions. We are fully sensible of the great wrong which results from bribery at elections, and do not question the power of Congress to punish such offenses when committed in respect to the election of Federal officials. At the same time it is all-important that a crim-ties paid on the materials used, less one per inal statute should define clearly the offense centum of such duties: Provided, That which it purports to punish, and that when when the articles exported are made in part so defined it should be within the limits of from domestic materials the imported matethe power of the legislative body enacting it. rials, or the parts of the articles made from Congress has no power to punish bribery at such materials, shall so appear in the comall elections. The limits of its power are pleted articles that the quantity or measure thereof in respect to elections in which the nation may be ascertained: And provided is directly interested, or in which some man- allowed under existing law shall be continfurther, That the drawback on any article date of the national Constitution is dis-ued at the rate herein provided. That the obeyed; and courts are not at liberty to take a criminal statute, broad and comprehensive in its terms and in these terms beyond the power of Congress, and change it to fit some particular transaction which Congress might have legislated for if it had seen fit. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McKenna took no part in the decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice
Brown dissented.

*SWAN & FINCH COMPANY, Appt.,

v.

UNITED STATES.

The drawback provided for by the act of Con-
gress of August 27, 1894, § 22 (28 Stat. at L.
551, chap. 349), re-enacted as the act of July
24, 1897, § 30 (30 Stat. at L. 211, chap. 11, U.
S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1991), "on the ex-
portation" of articles manufactured from im
ported materials on which duties had been
paid, will not be allowed on goods placed on
board a vessel bound for a foreign port, to be

used and consumed on board the vessel dur-
ing its voyage, and in fact so used and con-
sumed.

imported materials used in the manufacture
back of customs duties when exported shall,
or production of articles entitled to draw-
in all cases where drawback of duties paid
on such materials is claimed, be identified,
the quantity of such materials used and the
amount of duties paid thereon shall be as-
certained, the facts of the manufacture or
production of such articles in the United [144]
States and their exportation therefrom shall
be determined, and the drawback due there-
on shall be paid to the manufacturer, pro-
ducer, or exporter, to the agent of either, or
to the person to whom such manufacturer,
producer, exporter, or agent shall in writing
order such drawback paid, under such regu.
lations as the Secretary of the Treasury
shall prescribe.”

During the years 1895, 1896, 1897, the appellant, a corporation engaged in business as importer, manufacturer, and exporter of oils at New York city and elsewhere in the United States, having used in the manufacture of certain kinds of lubricating oils imported rape seed oil on which duties had been paid, placed on board of vessels bound for foreign ports, lubricating oils so manufactured, and claimed a drawback of the duties paid on the imported rape seed oil used therein. The Treasury Department allowed and paid the drawback on such manufactured oils as were shipped to foreign countries and there relanded, but refused to pay any on such as were placed on board for use and consumed in use on the vessels. The appellant brought this suit in the court of claims to recover the drawbacks on the last-named oils. That court decided against it (37 Ct. Cl. 101), and from such decision this appeal was taken.

Mr. William B. King argued the cause,

APPEAL from the Court of Claims to re- and, with Mr. George A. King, filed a brief

view a judgment denying the right to a drawback of duties on goods manufactured from imported materials, used and consumed by a vessel bound to a foreign port. Af firmed.

for appellant:

The word "exportation" has two meanings: (1) Its primary, general, or essential meaning to carry or send out of a place, and (2) Its secondary, specific, or especial meaning to send out from one country to another.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: Section 22 of the act of August 27, 1891 Murray's Philological Dict. title "Export:" (28 Stat. at L. 551, chap. 349), re-enacted' Webster's Dict. title "Export;" Century

है

Dict. title "Export;" Standard Dict. title] Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 2: "Export:" Anderson's Dict. title "Export;" Ex parte Hall, 1 Pick. 261; Brocket v. Ohio Black's Dict. title "Export." & P. R. Co. 14 Pa. 243, 53 Am. Dec. 534; State v. Smith, 5 Humph. 396.

Which meaning is to be preferred in this statute is to be decided by finding which is more in accord with the purpose of the statute.

Black, Constr. & Interpretation of Laws, p. 56.

The purpose of the drawback law is to place the American manufacturer in a position equal to that of his foreign competitor in those markets where the protective tariff laws of the United States can give no advantage to the American.

Campbell v. United States, 107 U. S. 407, 27 L. ed. 592, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759; Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 210, 216, 43 L. ed. 139, 140, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; Schlitz Brewing Co. v. United States, 35 Ct. Cl. 110.

This rule has found especial application by this court in the interpretation of statutes relating to the revenue laws.

American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 471, 35 L. ed. 822, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; Two Hundred Chests of Tea, 9 Wheat. 430, 438, 6 L. ed. 128, 129; Maddock v. Magone, 152 U. S. 368, 38 L. ed. 482, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 588; De Jonge v. Magone, 159 U. S. 569, 40 L. ed. 263, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 119.

The word "exportation" has a well-known restricted technical meaning.

Anderson, title "Export;" Black, title "Export;" Bouvier, title "Exportation;" English (1899), title "Exportation;" Jacobs-Tomlins, title "Exportation;" Rapalje & Lawrence, Whenever the question has been clearly title "Exportation;" Wharton, title "Expresented for judicial decision, it has been portation;" Century, title "Export;" Stanuniformly held that exportation was com- dard, title "Exportation;" Webster, title plete upon leaving the port, and that reland-"Export." ing in a foreign country is not an essential of exportation.

The words "imports," "exports," and "exportation" have frequently received judicial Sampson v. Peaslee, 20 How. 571, 15 L. definition, and in every case in which the ed. 1022; Irvine v. Redfield, 23 How. 170, 16 words were employed in their commercial L. ed. 418; Greely v. Thompson, 10 How. sense they have been held to apply to for225, 13 L. ed. 397; Forman v. Peaslee, Fed.eign commerce,-to goods shipped from one Cas. No. 4,941; Muller v. Baldwin, 43 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 164.

The essential to importation is entrance, just as the essential to exportation is exit. Marriott v. Brune, 9 How. 619, 13 L. ed. 282; Lauder v. Stone, 187 U. S. 281, ante, 178, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States, 181 U. S. 610, 45 L. ed. 1024, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 830.

Several cases in this court have laid down the principle that in the Constitution the word "export" is used in relation to foreign commerce, and not interstate or domestic

commerce.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. ed. 257, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1091; Dooley v. United States, 183 U. S. 151, 46 L. ed. 129, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62.

In an English case where the question arose whether "exportation" in a statute in cluded domestic trade, it was defined in its broader meaning of carrying out of port. Stockton & D. R. Co. v. Barrett, 11 Clark & F. 600.

Where goods leave the United States only temporarily, the owner intending to reland them in this country, there is no exportation, because the intent is absent. The courts hold the purpose of permanent absence essential to the exportation.

United States v. The Forrester, Newberry, Adm. 81, Fed. Cas. No. 15,132; Kidd v. Flagler, 54 Fed. 367; Kennedy v. United States, 37 C. C. A. 25, 95 Fed. 127.

Assistant Attorney General Pradt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee:

It is to be assumed that the words and phrases are used in their technical meaning, if they have acquired one.

country to another in foreign trade, and in no such instance were the words given their general meaning.

Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 131, 19 L. ed. 382, 384; De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 176, 45 L. ed. 1048, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743; Kidd v. Flagler, 54 Fed. 367, Reversed in 24 C. C. A. 123, 45 U. S. App. 461, 78 Fed. 341; United States v. The Forrester, Newberry, Adm. 81, Fed. Cas. No. 15,132.

The essential element of an importation or an exportation, in its constitutional sense, is the intent to reland the goods in some foreign port.

The Mary, 1 Gall. 206, Fed. Cas. No. 9,183; McLean v. Hager, 31 Fed. 604; Forman v. Peaslee, Fed. Cas. No. 4,941; Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods, 408, Fed. Cas. No. 2,846.

The meaning of the word as employed in the Constitution must be given to it in the statutes of the United States.

Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 334, sub nom. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 29 L. ed. 418, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57.

This court has construed the purpose of the drawback provision to be not only the encouragement of manufactures in this country, but the enlargement of our trade with foreign countries.

Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 216, 43 L. ed. 141, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837.

If there can be any ambiguity found in the statute, the doubt should be solved in favor of the government, since the claimant is claiming the benefit of a special privilege,— exemption from the burden of a general stat

ute.

Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Missouri River | mary definition of the word should be apPacket Co. 125 U. S. 271, 31 L. ed. 736, 8 plied to goods carried out of the country on Sup. Ct. Rep. 874. vessels in the foreign trade, although they never reach a foreign country."

No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for, justify any judicial addition to the language of

the statute.

United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 103, 42 L. ed. 398, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The statute allows the drawback "on the exportation," and the question is whether goods placed on board a vessel bound for a foreign port, to be used and consumed on board the vessel during its voyage, and in fact so used and consumed, are exported.

To this we are unable to yield our assent: *First. The fact that the words "export"[146] and "exportation" are, as we have indicated, generally used in the sense of transportation from this to a foreign country, makes against the contention that it is here used in a different sense.

Second. The purpose with which the drawback statute was enacted is against it. In Campbell v. United States, 107 U. S. 407, 413, 27 L. ed. 592, 595, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759, 765, we said:

"The purpose of the drawback provision is to make duty free, imports which are manu factured here and then returned whence they came or to some other foreign country.articles which are not sold or consumed in the United States."

So, also, in Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 210, 216, 43 L. ed. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837, 839:

The careful opinion of the court of claims, which, in general, we approve and to which we refer, relieves us from the necessity of an extended discussion. Whatever primary [145] meaning *be indicated by its derivation, the word "export," as used in the Constitution and laws of the United States, generally "The object of the section was evidently, means the transportation of goods from this not only to build up an export trade, but to to a foreign country. "As the legal notion encourage manufactures in this country, of emigration is a going abroad with an in- where such manufactures are intended for tention of not returning, so that of exporta-exportation, by granting a rebate of duties tion is a severance of goods from the mass upon the raw or prepared materials importof things belonging to this country with an ed, and thus enabling the manufacturer to intention of uniting them to the mass of compete in foreign markets with the same things belonging to some foreign country or articles manufactured in other countries." other." 17 Ops. Atty. Gen. 583.

True, the context may sometimes give to the word a narrower meaning, and in the execution of the administrative affairs of gov. ernment it may have been applied to cases in which there was not in the full sense of the term an exportation, yet these are exceptions and do not destroy its general signification. It cannot mean simply a carrying out of the country, for no one would speak of goods shipped by water from San Francisco to San Diego as "exported," although in the voyage they are carried out of the country. Nor would the mere fact that there was no purpose of return justify the use of the word "export." Coal placed on a steamer in San Francisco to be consumed in propelling that steamer to San Diego would never be so designated. Another country or state as the intended destination of the goods is essential to the idea of exportation.

Counsel for appellant, after quoting from several dictionaries, say:

"These definitions show that the word has two meanings:

"(1) Its primary, general or essential meaning, to carry or send out of a place; and

"(2) Its secondary, specific or especial meaning, to send out from one country to another.

"Of all goods sent out of this country but a small proportion fails to reach a foreign country; the amount consumed or lost at sea is minute in comparison. In ordinary use, therefore, the foreign destination is implied. We claim that, however usual, it is not essential, and that here the original and pri

Third. The uniform construction placed by the department charged with the execu tion of the statute has been against it.

Fourth. Being a governmental grant of a privilege or benefit it is to be construed in favor of the government and against the party claiming the grant. Where the burden is placed upon a citizen, if there be a doubt as to the extent of the burden it is resolved in favor of the citizen, but where a privilege is granted any doubt is resolved in favor of the government. In Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 616, 30 L. ed. 1012, 1015, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1240, 1244, the one rule was thus stated:

"We are of opinon that the decision of the circuit court was correct. But, if the question were one of doubt, the doubt would be resolved in favor of the importer 'as duties are never imposed on the citizen upon vague

or

doubtful interpretations.' Poicers v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 202, Fed. Cas. No. 11,361; United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 504, 21 L. ed. 728, 730; Gurr v. Scudds, 11 Exch. 190, 191; Adams v. Bancroft, 3 Sumn. 384, Fed. Cas. No. 44." See also American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 474, 35 L. ed. 821, 824, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55.

*On the other hand, in Hannibal & St. J.[147] R. Co. v. Missouri River Packet Co. 125 U. S. 260. 271, 31 L. ed. 731, 735, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 874, 880, we said, citing several authorities:

"But if there be any doubt as to the proper construction of this statute (and we think there is none), then that construction must be adopted which is most advantageous

Service of process on foreign corporation Argued April 24, 27, 1903. Decided May 18, service on state officer after cancelation of license-Federal courts-enjoining procecdings in state courts.

1. The cancelation, by the insurance commissioner of Kentucky, of the license to do business in that state, granted to an insurance NOTE. As to service of process on foreign 1628, 75 N. W. 635: Mutual Reserve Fund Life corporations--see notes to Foster v. Charles Betcher Lumber Co. (S. D.) 23 L. R. A. 490; Eldred v. American Palace-Car Co. 45 C. C. A. 3.