Forrest v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co. 53 C. C. A. 577, 116 Fed. 357: Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. v. Boyer, 62 Kan. 31, 50 L. R. A. 538, 61 Pac. 387; Millan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 103 Fed. 764; Swann v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Asso. 100 Fed. 922; Friedman v. Empire L. Ins. Co. 101 Fed. 535; People v. Commercial Alliance L. Ins. Co. 7 App. Div. 297, 40 N. Y. Supp. 269. The Federal court may judge for itself upon the sufficiency to meet the constitutional requirement of due process. McCord Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 38 C. C. A. 34, 97 Fed. 22; Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 180; Cady v. Associated Colonies, 119 Fed. 420; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 355, 27 L. ed. 222, 223, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 617. 43 L. ed. 569, 574, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L. ed. 1170. The "amended and supplemental petition" in which the receiver was appointed was essentially a suit of a civil nature in equity. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 85, 25 L. ed. 407, 408; Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281. 286, 26 L. ed. 447, 448; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 598, 35 L. ed. 870, 873, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62. As such, it was removable under the judiciary act of 1875 as amended by the act of August 13, 1888. It is no longer open to question that such a creditor's bill on a judgment of a state court may be filed in a United States circuit court. Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202, 207, 37 L. ed. 1052, 1054, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75. policies is still "doing business" within the incaning of the statute regulating foreign corporations, and within the meaning of tax laws. Kerr, Ins. § 26. The Kentucky court of appeals, considering the statute of its own state, holds a foreign insurance company to be in court when served with summons as the appellant here was served by process executed on the commissioner. Home Ben. Soc. v. Muehl, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1264, 60 S. W. 371; Germania Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1564, 65 S. W. 611. These decisions of the Kentucky court of appeals are controlling upon all other courts, both state and Federal. Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317, 12 L. ed. 169; Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149, 14 L. ed. 364; Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80. The decision of the state court, relative to the agencies of both the commissioner and Frese, and the authority of these parties to receive service of process for the defendant, was not open to review or reversal by the United States circuit court. All questions raised and determined in the state court were, as to the Federal court, res judicata. Moch v. Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. 4 Hughes, 61, 10 Fed. 696. The proceedings subsequent to the rendition of the judgment were not removable. Dere v. Strother, 10 Fed. 406. No case was shown permitting a removal. Cook v. Whitney, 3 Woods, 715, Fed. Cas. No. 3,166; Claflin v. McDermott, 20 Blatchf. 522, 12 Fed. 375; Cortes Co. v. Thannhauser, Blatchf. 59, 9 Fed. 226; Desty, Fed. Proc. 9th ed. p. 448. The fact that at the time the bill of complaint in the present suit was filed-one day after the filing of the petition for removal-20 the removal record had not yet been filed in the United States circuit court was immaterial. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5, 13, 26 L. ed. 643, 645; National S. S. Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 122, 27 L. ed. 87, 89, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58. If the case was removable, there should be no reasonable doubt of the power of the circuit court to enjoin the defendant Phelps and the receiver from further proceeding in the state court, within the cases of French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 238, 248, 22 L. ed. 854, 857 and Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 494, 497, sub nom. Kern v. Huidekoper, 26 L. ed. 497, 498. Mr. Benjamin F. Washer argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Frederick Forcht, William H. Field, and Norton L. Goldsmith, filed a brief for appellees: A foreign insurance company which has been doing business within a state through its agents does not cease to do business therein when it withdraws its agents and ceases to obtain or ask for new risks or obtain new policies, while, at the same time, its old policies continue in force. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308. A life insurance company which is merely collecting premiums and paying losses on old The petition for removal, if considered as contemplating the entire cause, certainly came too late. The original petition was filed on February 28, 1900, the defendant summoned March 1, 1900, the motion to remove made on August 22, 1900. Under the Kentucky practice the defendant has twenty days, after service of summons, to answer. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Newport News & M. Valley Co. 70 Fed. 403. The circuit court of the United States had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings in a state court. Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 179, 2 L. ed. 587; Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 15 L. ed. 1028; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 12 L. ed. 841; Covell v. Heyman, 111 U. S. 179, 28 L. ed. 391, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; Senior v. Pierce, 31 Fed. 628; Kohn v. Ryan, 31 Fed. 638; Rothschild v. Hasbrouck, 65 Fed. 284; Re Hall & S. Co. 73 Fed. 530; Leathe v. Thomas, 38 C. C. A. 75, 97 Fed. 136; Mills v. Provident Life & Trust Co. 40 C. C. A. 394, 100 Fed. 344; Southern Bank & T. Co. v. Folsom, 21 C. C. A. 568, 43 U. S. App. 713, 75 Fed. 929; American Asso. v. Hurst, 7 C. C. A. 598, 16 U. S. App. 325, 59 Fed. 5; Hutchinson v. Green, 2 McCrary, 471, 6 Fed. 838; Rens sclaer & S. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. Co. 18 Fed. 617; Yick Wo v. Crowley, 26 Fed. 207; Rhodes & J. Mfg. Co. v. New Hampshire, 70 Fed. 721; Dillon v. Kansas City Suburban |ness in the state issued the policy sued on, Belt R. Co. 43 Fed. 111; Missouri, K. & T. R. | but in April, 1894, before the action was Co. v. Scott, 4 Woods, 386, 13 Fed. 793; Tar- brought, ceased to do business and withble's Case, 13 Wall. 401, sub nom. United drew all of its agents. Service on the comStates v. Tarble, 20 L. ed. 598; Gates v. missioner was held good. The court, in its Bucki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 12 U. S. App. 69, 53 opinion, after referring to the statute of Fed. 964. 1870 and the change made by § 631, under which this service was made, said (p. 1379. S. W. p. 521): Mr. Benjamin F. Washer also filed a supplemental brief for appellees: The process of garnishment after judgment is clearly a mode of execution. Its purpose is to obtain satisfaction of the judgment out of the debtor's effects which are in a third person's hands. Dere v. Strother, 10 Fed. 406. Every court is left to decide for itself in what way and by what procedure its judgments and decrees are to be enforced; subject, of course, to review by its own appellate tribunals. "It is sufficient to say that the agency created by the act of 1893 is, in its terins. broader than that created by the act of 1879. The words of the later statute express no limitation. Whatever limitation shall be applied to it must be by implication. And when we consider the purpose of the act it becomes clear that it would be frustrated by the construction contended for. There is no need of the right to serve process upon the insurance commissioner so long as the company has agents in the state, and we think the purpose of the section was to provide a means of obtaining service of process upon foreign companies which no longer had On the right of courts of coequal, concur-agents in the state upon whom process might rent jurisdiction to impede and obstruct the proceedings of each other, see Gumbel v. Pitlin, 124 U. S. 156, 31 L. ed. 382, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379. Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 198, 18 L. ed. 777; Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432, 42 L. ed. 807, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403. be served in suits upon contracts made in this state, whatever may be held as to suits upon contracts entered into elsewhere." See also Germania Ins. Co. v. Ashby, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1564, 65 S. W. 611. În Evans v. Gorman, 115 Fed. 403, a United States circuit court decided that under 720 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 581), and the comnity between courts of concurrent jurisdiction, it had no power to enjoin proceedings in a state court notwithstanding the positive allegatation of a contract created by the statute. tions of the bill that the state court was without jurisdiction and acting fraudulently. *Such decision of the highest court of Ken-[158] tucky. construing one of its own statutes, if not controlling upon this court, is very persuasive, and it certainly is controlling unless it be held to be merely an interpre Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: As an original question, and independently of any expression on the part of the court of appeals, we are of the opinion that such is the true construction. This and other kindred statutes enacted in various states inMany questions were elaborately discussed dicate the purpose of the state that foreign by counsel both orally and in brief, but we corporations engaging in business within its are of the opinion that the decisions of two limits shall submit to controversies growor three will dispose of the case. First, the ing out of that business to its courts, and service of summons on the insurance com- not compel a citizen having such a contro[157]missioner was sufficient to bring *the asso-versy to seek the state in which the corporaciation into the state court as party defend- tion has its home for the purpose of enforeant. It was stipulated between the parties ing his claims. Many of those statutes simthat the outstanding policies existing be-ply provided that the foreign corporation tween the association and citizens of Ken- should name some person or persons upon tucky were continued in force after the whom service of process could be made. The action of the insurance commissioner on insufficiency of such provision is evident, for October 10, 1899, and that on said poli- the death or removal of the agent from the cies the association had collected and state leaves the corporation without any was collecting dues, premiums, and as- person upon whom process can be served. sessments. It was, therefore, doing busi- In order to remedy this defect some states, ness within the state. Connecticut Mut. L. Kentucky among the number, have passed Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. statutes, like the one before us, providing ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308. The plaintiff that the corporation shall consent that servwas a citizen of Kentucky, and the cause of ice may be made upon a permanent official action arose out of transactions had between of the state, so that the death, removal, or the plaintiff and defendant while the latter change of officer will not put the corporation was carrying on business in the state of beyond the reach of the process of the counts. Kentucky under license from the state. It would obviously thwart this purpose if Under those circumstances the authority of this association, having made, as the testithe insurance commissioner to receive sum- mony shows it had made, a multitude of conmons in behalf of the association was suifi- tracts with citizens of Kentucky, should be cient. Such was the ruling of the court of enabled, by simply withdrawing the authorappeals of Kentucky. Home Ben. Soc. v. ity it had given to the insurance cominisMuchl, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1378, 59 S. W. 520. sioner, to compel all these parties to seek In that case the society while doing busi-the courts of New York for the enforcement ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TELEGRAPH of their claims. It is true in this case the | *in the appellate court of the state, and not [160] association did not voluntarily withdraw by collateral attack in the Federal court. from the state, but was in effect by the state For these reasons we think the decision of prevented from engaging in any new busi the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit ness. Why this was done is not shown. It was right, and it is affirmed. must be presumed to have been for some good and sufficient reason, and it would be a harsh construction of the statute that, because the state had been constrained to compel the association to desist from engaging in any futher business, it also deprived its citizens who had dealt with the association [159] of the right to obtain relief in its courts. We conclude therefore, that the service of summons on the insurance commissioner was sufficient to bring the association into the state court, and, there being nothing else to impeach the judgment, it must be considered as valid. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 160-169.) Interstate commerce 1. 2. jury. rea A telegraph company, though engaged in interstate commerce, may be compelled by a municipality to pay a reasonable license fee for the enforcement of local government supervision of its poles and wires. The reasonableness of a municipal license charge of $1 per telegraph pole and $2.50 for each mile of overhead telegraph wires within the city limits must be submitted to the jury, where there is testimony that the actual cost of maintenance, repairs, and supervision by the telegraph company was less than one half the sum thus charged by the city for supervision alone, and that an additional charge of $1 per mile for underground wires had been removed as an inducement to the removal of all overhead wires. [No. 163.] 1, 1903. Decided June Again, the proceeding for the appointment of a receiver was not a new and independent suit. It was not in the strictest sense of the term a creditor's bill. It did not purport to be for the benefit of all creditors, but simply a proceeding to enable the plaintiff in the judgment to obtain satisfaction thereof, satisfaction by execution at law having been shown to be impossible by the return of nulla bona. It is what is known as a supplementary proceeding. It is a proceeding known to the jurisprudence of many states, and one whose validity in those states has been recognized by this court. Williams v. Hill, 19 How. 246, 15 L. ed. 570; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 94 U. S. 11, 24 L. ed. 48: Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647, 26 L. ed. 1200; Canal & C. Streets R. Co. v. Hart, 114 U. S. 654, 29 L. ed. 226, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1127. It is recognized in some cases in Ken- Argued February 24, 1903. tucky. Well v. Deposit Bank, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 156, 35 S. W. 625; Caldwell v. Deposit Bank, 22 K. L. Rep. 684, 58 S. W. 589. This proceeding was treated by the state court as one merely supplemental in its character. It was initiated by the filing of an amended and supplementary petition. It was a mere continuation of the action already passed into judgment, and in aid of the execution of such judgment. As such it was not subject to removal to the Federal court, the time therefor prescribed by the statute having passed. 24 Stat. at L. 554, chap. 373, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 514; Martin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 151 U. S. 673-684, sub nom. Gerling v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 38 L. ed. 311, 315, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533. Being a mere continuation of the action at law, and not removable to the Federal court, the latter had no jurisdiction to enjoin the proceedings under it. It is contended that such a supplementary proceeding is not warranted by the laws of Kentucky; that there is no statute of that state justifying it. But it has been sanctioned by the judgment of the court in which the proceeding was had, and cannot be treated by the Federal courts as unauthorized. Laing v. Rigney, 160 U. S. 531, 40 L. ed. 525, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 366. See also Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 141 U. S. 475, 478, 35 L. ed. 824, 826, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28. If not warranted by the law of the state relief must be sought by review United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to review a judgment for plaintiff in an action by the city of Philadelphia to recover license charges imposed by it upon a telegraph company. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the See same case below on motion by defendant to enter judgment with the re NOTE.--On state regulation of interstate or foreign commerce see notes to Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Com. (Va.) 13 L. R. A. 107; McCanna & F. Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Surety Co. 24 C. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. C. A. 13: Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg, Co. ed. U. S. 216; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041; and Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311. On license taxes as affecting intestate commerce-see notes to Rothermel v. Meyerle (Pa.) 9 L. R. A. 366: American Fertilizing Co. North Carolina Bd. of Agri. (C. C. E. D. N. C.) 11 L. R. A. 179. V. As to limit of amount of license fees-see note to State ex rel. Toi v. French (Mont.) 30 L. R. A. 415. On the power of states to control or impose burdens upon interstate telegraph and telephone companies-see note to Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Baltimore (Md.) 24 L. R. A. 161. For cases collated on the question as to the validity of charges on telegraph and telephone poles and wires-see note to Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, ante, 240. duction specified in the reserved point. 109 | Pittsburgh's Appeal, 115 Pa. 4, 7 Atl. 778; Fed. 55. The charge cannot be imposed in this case for the purpose of providing an insurance or guarantee fund to insure the municipality from damages for which it may be held liable by reason of the construction and maintenance of telegraph poles and wires. Smith v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. 181 U. S. 248, 45 L. ed. 847, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803; Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 728, 40 Fed. 616. Williamsport Pass R. Co. v. Williamsport, 120 Pa. 1, 13 Atl. 496: Homestead Street R. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: Co. v. Pittsburg & H. Electric Street R. Co. This action was commenced in the common 166 Pa. 162, 27 L. R. A. 383, 30 Atl. 950, pleas court of Philadelphia on December 31,955; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 657. 1891, to recover the sum of $3,715 as license fees alleged to be due the city for the six preceding years. The case was removed by the defendant to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania. A trial was had before the court and a jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for a part of the sum claimed, which judgment was thereafter reversed by the circuit court of appeals. A second trial was had in April, 1901, before the court and a jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for the full amount claimed, with interest. From such judgment the case was brought to this court directly on writ of error, on the ground that it involved the construction and application of the Constitution of the United States; that the action was brought to recover from the telegraph company certain license charges imposed by the city which the company claimed the city had no right or power to impose, for the reason that it was a regu-a 'ation of commerce between the states. Messrs. John F. Dillon and H. B. Gill agued the cause, and, with Messrs. Silas W. Pettit, George II. Fearons, Rush Taggart, Henry D. Estabrook, and Messrs. Brown & Wells, filed a brief for plaintiff in error: No right exists to impose a larger charge than will reimburse to the municipality the expense of regulation. Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 242; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. pp 597, 598; Dill. Mun. Corp. 3d ed. § 768; The Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 701; State, Benson, Prosecutor, v. Hoboken. 33 N. J. L. 280; State, North Hudson County R. Co., Prosecutors, v. Hoboken, 41 N. J. L. 71; Saginaw v. Swift Electric Light Co. 113 Mich. 660, 72 N. W. 6. Under the guise of the power to regulate, city cannot exercise the power to tax. New York v. Second Ave. R. Co. 32 N. Y. 261; Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625, 45 Am. Dec. 593; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; Dunham v. Rochester, 5 Cow. 462; Jackson v. Newman, 59 Miss. 385, 42 Am. Rep. 367; Dill. Mun. Corp. § 764; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. 573, 597; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 213, 6 L. ed. 74. The tax imposed by the city in this case exceeds the limits prescribed by the author The pretended power of the city of Philadelphia to impose the tax in question is derived solely from its possession of the "powers, rights, privileges, and immunities inci-ities. dent to a municipal corporation and necessary for the proper government of the same," and from no other source whatsoever. But this does not confer power to enact the ordinances in question. Cooley, Taxn. 597. Philadelphia v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 82 Fed. 797; Philadelphia v. Atlantic & P. Teleg. Co. 42 C. C. A. 325, 102 Fed. 254; St. Louis v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 148 U. S. 92, 37 L. ed. 380, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485. The plaintiff in error is engaged in interis in itself commerce, and by virtue of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, and its acceptance thereof, said telegraph company is entitled to all the privileges and immunities, and is subject to all the restrictions, which flow from the power given to Congress by the Constitution to regulate commerce, and the legislation in that behalf enacted by Congress. Under the law of Pennsylvania the prop-state commerce, and the business it transacts erty of the telegraph company necessary to the exercise of its franchises is not taxable by the municipality. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co. v. Northampton County, 8 Watts & S. 334; Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. 70; Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Berks County, 11 Pa. 202; New York & E. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 Pa. 242; West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Pa. 232; Ridgway Light & Heat Co. v. Elk County, 191 Pa. 465, 43 Atl. 323. The commonwealth owns the franchise of every highway, and no municipal corporation has any power over them except in so far as it is delegated to it by the state. 187; O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnp. Co. 13 Pa. 555; Millvale v. Evergreen R. Co. 131 Pa. 1, 7 L. R. A. 369, 18 Atl. 993: Com. v. Erie & N. E. R. Co. 27 Pa. 339, 67 Am. Dec. 471; Philadelphia & T. R. Co.'s Case, 6 Whart. 25, 36 Am. Dec. 202; Northern Liberties v. Northern Liberties Gas Co. 12 Pa. 318; Mercer v. Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 36 Pa. 99; Danville, H. & W. R. Co. v. Com. 73 Pa. 29; Pensacola Teleg. Co. v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380. The plaintiff in error as an interstate commerce company, whose business is commerce itself, and in the nature of the postal service has the right to invoke the protection of the Constitution of the United States against this attempt to burden and regulate interstate commerce. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 299, sub nom. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 L. ed. 169; Philadelphia & S. Mail S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 30 L. ed. 1200, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118. The property of a telegraph company is li able to taxation by a state on the same basis as all other property is so liable, a tax which the plaintiff in error has always paid to the Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all by the state, and the fact that the tax is imposed by a law or an ordinance purport-state of Pennsylvania. ing to be an enforcement of the police power, or a privilege tax, can make no difference in the application of the rule. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Atty. Gen. 125 U. S. 530, 31 L. ed. 790, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961. And even where the tax is imposed in form as a privilege tax, but is "in lieu of other state, county, and municipal taxes," and the amount of the tax is made dependent in fact upon the value of the property of the taxpayer situated within the jurisdiction of the state imposing the same, it will, nevertheless, and notwithstanding its form, be held valid and sustained by this court. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 39 L. ed. 311, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, 360. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 32 L. ed. 368, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 241, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 Ú. S. 141, 32 L. ed. 637, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, 34 L. ed. 391, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 181, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. ed. 719, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, And so a state may impose a specific tax 35 L. ed. 649, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 851; on each telegraph message which the comHannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. pany sends over its line wholly within the S. 465, 24 L. ed. 527; Minnesota v. Bar state imposing such tax, but not upon mesber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. sages sent by officers of the United States on Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; public business, and not upon messages sent Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. or received to or from points without the ed. 862, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup.state. The power to tax such messages is Ct. Rep. 213; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. 183 U. S. 79, sub nom. Cotting v. Godard, 46 L. ed. 92, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U. S. 203, 46 L. ed. 872, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252. confined to messages sent from one place to another exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state imposing the tax. Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 26 L. ed. 1067. And so a state may tax the gross receipts of a telegraph company derived from business transacted exclusively within the state. Even where the regulation imposed was in Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 127 relation to the selling of intoxicating liquors, U. S. 411, 32 L. ed. 229, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. which is peculiarly a matter of police cog-59, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1127; Western U. Teleg. nizance, this court has held that the power must be so exercised as not to operate as a burden on or regulation of interstate com merce. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 34 L. ed. 128, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161, 34 L. ed. 150, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 143, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 725. Co. v. Alabama State Bd. of Assessment, 132 Again, it has been held that a license tax imposed by a municipality duly authorized thereto by the state upon, inter alia, “telegraph companies or its agencies, each, for business done exclusively within the city of A license tax, irrespective of whether the Charleston, and not including any business amount is much or little, where levied upon done to or from points without the state, the occupation itself, or upon the means of and not including any business done for the carrying on the business, is, where the busi-government of the United States, its officers, ness carried on is interstate commerce, a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 678; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 23 L. ed. 347; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 304, 38 L. ed. 724, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 658, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Henderson v. Wickham, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. ed. 543. or agents, $500,"-was valid. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692, 38 L. ed. 871, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 637, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1094. But the reasoning of these cases is wholly inconsistent with the right of a state, or of a municipality under the law of a state, to require a telegraph company to take out a license for the transaction of its business, or to impose upon it a tax for such license. See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 32 L. ed. 311, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 134, Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380. Mr. John L. Kinsey argued the cause, and, with Mr. James Alcorn, filed a brief for defendant in error: In the Mississippi case the tax was only $1 per mile of wire, which was "in lieu of other state, county, and municipal taxes" (Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 39 L. ed. 311, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 1, 158 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, 360), and it would seem that a charge which amounts to nearly four times that much, and levied as a charge for inspection alone, is manifestly exorbitant It is lawful for a state to impose taxes and practically a tax, and therefore a regu- upon property owned and used within it by a lation of interstate commerce, for the trans-corporation of another state, even when such action of which these poles and wires are necessary appliances. corporation is engaged in interstate commerce, and the exaction of a license tax is |