whole question must turn upon whether there has been an unreasonable user of the highway of such a character as to amount to an obstruction. Upon the facts of this case I have come to the conclusion that there was no evidence of an unreasonable user of the highway on the part of the appellants, and the appeal must be allowed and the conviction quashed. GILL AND (apps.) v. (resp.). 1917. HighwayHorses and carts left unattended AVORY, J.-I am of the same opinion. As the case was originally stated I can quite understand that it might occur to the court that there was some excuse or reason for these horses Improper and and carts stopping in the manner described in this special case. unreasonable The case was sent back to the justices for a fuller statement of user of highwaythe facts, and the result is that the case has now come back to Obstructionus with an explanation of the reasons why the horses and carts Evidencewere stopping-namely, in order that the horses might be Town Police watered, and that the appellants, who were in charge of them, 1847 (10 & 11 might go and procure refreshment. Under the circumstances, Vict. c. 89), therefore, I think that there was no evidence before the justices upon which they could find that there had been an unreasonable user of the highway. It is not to be supposed that a person who has the care of horses and vehicles can leave them unattended with impunity. The charge against the appellants was one of obstruction, and it was brought under one of the paragraphs of sect. 28 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847. But there is another and earlier paragraph of the same section which makes it an offence for every person having the care of any waggon, cart, or carriage, or any animal drawing the same, to be at such a distance from such waggon, cart, or carriage as not to have due control over every animal drawing the same. It is just possible that the appellants by leaving their horses and carts unattended might have rendered themselves liable to be proceeded against under that paragraph. But with that we have nothing whatever to do. It is sufficient to say in this case that there was no evidence upon which the justices could arrive at their conclusion, and therefore the conviction must be quashed and the appeal allowed. SHEARMAN, J.-I agree, and I should not add anything were it not for the fact that the case of Reg. v. Long (ubi sup.) has been cited in the course of the argument, which decided that unless some clear case of obstruction could be established there could not be a conviction for obstruction. That case has been impliedly overruled by the case of Hinde v. Evans (ubi sup.). As soon as the facts are such that a clear inference can be drawn that what has been done amounts to an obstruction, the justices can assume an obstruction even though no persons are called to prove that they were in any way obstructed. But before an obstruction in fact can be assumed, it must be shown that something has been done which is not a legitimate or reasonable user of the road. In the present case I am of the same opinion as my Lord and Avory, J, that there was no fact upon which the ་ Clauses Act, s. 28. GILL AND ANOTHER (apps.) v. CARSON (resp.). 1917. Highway- carts left unattendedImproper and justices could find that there was an illegitimate or improper user of the highway-that is, there was no evidence before them upon which they could find that there had been any obstruction and for that reason I agree that the conviction was wrong and that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for the appellants, Rochester Pusey and Co., for T. A. Needham, Manchester. Solicitors for the respondent, Snow, Fox, and Higginson, for unreasonable Sir H. E. Clare, Preston. user of highwayObstruction- Evidence Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 89), s. 28. COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. Monday, June 25, 1917. (Before Lord READING, C.J., DARLING and AVORY, JJ.) REX V. PERFECT. (a) Uttering letter demanding money with menaces and without reasonable or probable cause-Verdict of jury-Disagreement of judge with verdict-Question of fact-Larceny Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50), s. 29 (1) (i.). During the absence of the appellant's husband on active service the appellant wrote a letter to the prosecutor alleging that he was the father of her expected child and demanding money. The appellant was convicted on a charge of demanding money with menaces and without reasonable or probable cause. The learned judge, in giving his certificate for an appeal, stated that he disagreed with the verdict, but wished the case to be considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal. (a) Reported by R. F. BLAKISTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Held, that the verdict was not unreasonable, and that no miscarriage of justice had occurred; that the question involved was entirely one of fact on which the finding of the jury must be accepted; and that there being no allegation that the jury had been misdirected, or that there was no evidence at all to support their verdict, the appeal must be dismissed. REX v. PERFECT. 1917. Uttering letter demand ing money reasonable or judge with verdict APPEAL on the certificate of Horridge, J. against a con- with menaces viction at the Norfolk Assizes for uttering a letter and without demanding money with menaces and without reasonable or probable cause probable cause. The appellant was the wife of an agricultural —Verdict of labourer who joined the army and had been serving abroad for jury-Dissome time. The prosecutor was a travelling draper who had agreement of occasion to call at the appellant's house in the course of his business. The appellant alleged that she was pregnant by the Question of fact-Larceny prosecutor, who had induced her to become intimate with him, Act, 1916 and said that she was demanding money for the benefit of her (6 & 7 Geo. 5, expected child. The prosecutor denied the story told by the c. 50), 8. 29 appellant, but admitted calling at the appellant's house several times in order, as he said, to obtain payment of money which she owed him. The appeal was based on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence brought forward at the trial. In giving his certificate for an appeal, Horridge, J. said: "I think the verdict was quite wrong, although there may be a difficulty in interfering where the jury have seen both the principal witnesses and have believed the prosecution. However, I should like the case to be considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal." A. S. Leighton for the appellant. The sole ground of appeal in this case is that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable. It cannot be contended that there was no evidence on which the jury could convict. The story told by the prosecutor, however, was so inconsistent and involved so many contradictions that the jury were not justified in convicting the appellant, and this was the view taken by the learned judge in giving his certificate. H. Claughton Scott, for the Crown, was not called upon. The judgment of the court was delivered by Lord READING, C.J.-The learned judge who presided at the trial gave his certificate for an appeal to this court against the conviction of the appellant. It has been argued on her behalf that there has been a miscarriage of justice, and that the verdict is so unreasonable that it cannot be supported. We cannot accede to that argument. It has not been and cannot be alleged that the jury were misdirected, or that any evidence was wrongly admitted, or that there was no evidence on which the conviction could be supported. It is obvious that the judge at the trial wished the jury to acquit the appellant, and summed up very much in her favour. But the questions in issue were, entirely matters of fact and had to be determined by the jury and not by (1) (i.). REX V. PERFECT. the judge. The only important evidence was given by the prosecutor and the appellant, and it was for the jury to say which they believed. They had to decide accordingly, remembering 1917. that if there was any doubt they must acquit the appellant. In these circumstances this court must accept the decision of the Uttering letter demand. jury on the facts and cannot quash this conviction unless we are ing money prepared to substitute ourselves as a tribunal to judge the facts with menaces without having heard and seen the witnesses. The appeal must and without therefore be dismissed. Obviously, from the wording of his probable cause certificate, the learned judge at the trial took the same view as -Verdict of to the functions of this court. reasonable or jury-Dis agreement of judge with verdict Appeal dismissed. Counsel for the appellant instructed by the Registrar of the Question of Court of Criminal Appeal. fact-Larceny Act, 1916 Counsel for the Crown instructed by the Director of Public (6 & 7 Geo. 5, Prosecutions. c. 50), 8. 29 (1) (i.). APPENDIX. STATUTES AND PARTS OF STATUTES PASSED IN THE SESSION OF PARLIAMENT OF 1916 AND 1917. An Act to consolidate and simplify the Law relating to Larceny triable on Indictment and Kindred Offences.-[31st October 1916.] Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 1. For the purposes of this Act— (1) a person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently Definition. Provided that a person may be guilty of stealing any such thing (a) by any trick; (b) by intimidation; includes obtaining the possession— (c) under a mistake on the part of the owner with knowledge (ii) the expression "carries away" includes any removal of anything. (iii) the expression "owner" includes any part owner, or person having possession or control of, or a special property in, anything capable of being stolen : (3) Everything which has value and is the property of any person, and Provided that- |