ber or early part of December, 1852, Luther Jewett informed me that he had handed Longley & Co. $2,500, to be deposited with the United States sub-treasurer in Boston, and he feared that he had not deposited the same. And I further testify, that Luther Jewett exerted himself to obtain of Longley & Co., after their failure, said sum—that is to say, the sum of $1,000; for he believed said firm would exert their energies to pay this sum, and if he demanded the $2,500 they would not make any exertion to pay, for it would be out of their power to pay so large a sum." Deponent knew these facts from daily conversations with his brother. He further testifies that Longley acknowledged, in his presence, the receiving said $2,500 to pay to the sub-treasurer, and that he had converted it to his own use. ponent has no pecuniary interest in the case.

De

Although, by the act of 1846, the failure of a receiver to account for the public money received by him, by the proper vouchers, is regarded as prima facie evidence of embezzlement, (9 Stat., 63,) it has been the practice of Congress, in cases of great hardship, where the public money has been lost without any fault, or negligence on the part of the receiver, and under circumstances over which he could. have had no control, and where no want of care and diligence could be alleged, to interpose and assume the loss. But from the great danger of abuse to which this special legislation is liable, it is conceived to be essential to the public safety that the utmost strictness and exactness of proof should be required.

In this case, the committee being satisfied that the collector used due care and prudence in the mode adopted for depositing the public money with the assistant treasurer as directed, and that it was lost. without any fault or negligence on his part, report a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to credit the amount to his account, and recommend its passage.

The Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the report of the Court of Claims in the case of Ernest Fiedler, report:

This is a claim for the return of excess of duties paid on a quantity of ammonia imported into New York, to the amount of $392 90. The principles upon which the claim is allowed by the court are laid down in the case of James Beatty's executor, to which reference is made.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

AUGUST 8, 1856.-Ordered to be printed.

Mr. BRODHEAD made the following

REPORT.

[To accompany Bill S. 441.]

The Committee of Claims, to whom was referred the report of the Court of Claims in the case of Sturges, Bennett & Co., report:

Between the years 1847 and 1851, the claimants imported a large quantity of brandy and whiskey, in casks. The quantity entered and appearing on the invoices largely exceeded the quantity ascertained by the return of the gaugers. Duties were levied and paid on the whole invoice quantity. The claim is for a return of the money paid as duty on so much of the liquor as had leaked out of the casks on thevoyage of importation, as shown by the return of the gaugers. After an elaborate examination of the legal principles and judicial decisions bearing upon the case, the court hold that the regulations of the Treasury Department, under which duties were levied on the deficiencies shown by the return of the gaugers, were unlawful, and that the petitioners are entitled to relief against the United States for the amount so levied."

Judge Blackford dissents, on the ground "that the duties sued for were paid without protest."

The questions raised in this case are of some importance to the treasury as well as to the importers; and as they are fully and ably examined on both sides, by the court and by the dissenting judgein order to bring the subject distinctly to the notice of the Senate, the committee annex to this report the several opinions delivered in the

case.

The bill prepared by the court to carry their opinion into effect is: herewith reported back to the Senate, without amendment, with the recommendation that it do pass.

STURGES, BENNETT & CO. vs. THE UNITED STATES.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Scarburgh. In this case the petitioners allege that, during the years 1847, 1848, 1849, 1850, and 1851, they imported into the United States certain quantities of brandy and other liquors, in casks, and paid duties thereon at the rate of one hundred per centum, not only on the value of the quantity of liquor ascertained by gauge to be contained in the

casks, but also on the value of the quantity of liquor which had leaked out of the casks on the voyage of importation; and that they claim a return of the moneys exacted from them as import duties on such leakage or non-imported liquors.

The petitioners refer in their petition to a certified statement prepared by the collector of New York, by order of the Secretary of the Treasury, for a particular account of their claims. From this statement it appears that, under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury, the duties upon their importations were levied according to their invoice value, without reference to deficiencies, unless arising from accident at sea. It was conceded, in the argument submitted in this case, that the leakage arose, not from any accident at sea, but from other causes, and that the deficiency was ascertained from the return of the guagers.

The act of Congress entitled "An act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes," approved July 30, A. D. 1846, imposed a duty of one hundred per centum, ad valorem, on brandy and other spirits distilled from grain or other materials, imported from foreign countries. According to the principles settled by the cases of Marriott vs. Brune, (9 How. R., 619,) the United States vs. Southmayd, (Ibid 637,) and Lawrence vs. Caswell, (13 How. R., 488,) this duty is imposed, not upon the quantity of brandy which may have been purchased abroad, but upon the quantity which actually arrives in this country.

In the case of Marriott vs. Brune, duties had been imposed upon importations of sugar and molasses made after the act of 1846, according to the invoice quantity; but the report of the weighers and gaugers showed a deficiency between that quantity and the quantity actually imported. Mr. Justice Woodbury, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The general principle applicable to such a case would seem to be, that revenue should be collected only from the quantity or weight which arrives here. That is, what is imported— for nothing is imported till it comes within the limits of a port.-(See cases cited in Harrison vs. Vose, 9 Howard, 372.) And by express provision in all our revenue laws, duties are imposed only on imports from foreign countries; or the importation from them, or what is imported.-(5 Stat. at Large, 548, 558.) The very act of 1846, under consideration, imposes the duty on what is imported from foreign countries.'-(p. 68.) The Constitution uses like language on this subject. (Art I, §§ 8, 9.) Indeed, the general definition of customs confirms this view; for, says McCulloch, (vol. I., p. 548,) 'customs are duties charged upon commodities, upon their being imported into, or exported from a country.'

As to imports, they, therefore, can cover nothing which is not actually brought into our limits. That is the whole amount which is entered at the custom-house; that is all which goes into the consumption of the country; that, and that alone, is what comes in competition with our domestic manufactures; and we are unable to see any principle of public policy which requires the words of the act of Congress to be extended so as to embrace more.

"When the duty was specific on this article, being a certain rate