Where son farmed parents' homestead under
agreement that he should have one-half inter-
est in land, adjudged void by reason of Const.
art. 14, § 2, farm machinery to be paid for out of
profits of farm, on settlement son is entitled151(3) (S.D.) That defendant just before
to one-half interest in necessary farm ma-
chinery bought.-Id.

136 (Minn.) Upon death of surviving wife
before probate of husband's will disposing of
homestead without providing for wife, the tes-
tator's children might insist that the homestead
should descend as provided by the statute unaf-
fected by the will.-Hawkinson v. Oleson, 168 N.234(5) (Minn.) In a trial for murder, evi-
W. 13.

145 (Minn.) Sons of testator to whom he
devised no interest in a homestead held not es-254 (Iowa) Evidence held to support con-
topped from claiming that the disposition there-viction of murder in the second degree.-State
of was invalid, because they took no steps to v. Dillman, 168 N. W. 204.

X. APPEAL AND ERROR.

334 (N.D.) Where evidence of guilt of a

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.

homicide is overwhelming, and the homicide is See Master and Servant, 217, 286.
practically admitted, and the real defense is in-
sanity, mere technical or immaterial errors in
relation to the homicide will be disregarded. See Bastards.
State v. Mueller, 168 N. W. 66.

HOSPITALS.

See Charities, 45.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

IMPROVEMENTS.

See Drains, 45, 57; Municipal Corpora-
tions, 266-434.

See Criminal Law,

INCEST.
678.

See Damages, 26; Divorce; Dower; Ex-
ecutors and Administrators, 181; Fraud-
ulent Conveyances, 43, 104, 300; Gifts, 16 (Neb.) In prosecution for incest, de-
29; Homestead, 31, 141; Indictment
and Information, 137; Intoxicating Liq-
uors, 309; Judgment, 693, 891; Mar-
riage; Master and Servant, 387, 398;
Pleading, 246; Trial, 251; Vendor
and Purchaser, 343; Wills, 689; Wit-
nesses, 76.

I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

6(1) (Mich.) It is a presumption of law
that things brought into the house by the hus-
band and by his purchase are his property.-
Le Blanc v. Sayers, 168 N. W. 445.

fendant, on request, was entitled to instruction
that evidence of unchastity should be consid-
ered as bearing on whether prosecuting wit-
ness contracted gonorrhea from him.-Guyle v.
State, 168 N. W. 567.

INDEMNITY.

See Attachment, 343; Guaranty.

14 (Mich.) A judgment against township in
action for personal injury when alleged defec-
tive bridge railings gave way was conclusive
as to existence of defects causing injury, as to
injury to plaintiff therein, and that he was free
from contributory negligence and as to amount
of damages awarded.-Hart Tp. v. Noret, 168

2334 (N.D.) In an action for merchandise
furnished defendant's family during his absence, N. W. 1023.
held, that there was sufficient evidence of agen-15(9) (Mich.) In action by township for in-
cy to charge defendant with goods supplied.demnity following a judgment against it in ac-
Evenson v. Nelson, 168 N. W. 36.

III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS. AND

OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

492(1) (Mich.) A husband who purchases
a piano has a right to give it to his wife; and,
if he does so at the time of the purchase, the

piano is hers, and its taking under a judgment
against the husband was wrongful.-Le Blanc
v. Sayers, 168 N. W. 445.

491/2(8) (Mich.) The wife, claiming title to
a piano purchased by the husband, has the bur-
den of showing by a preponderance of the ev-
idence that the husband gave the piano to her
to be her own separate property.-Le Blanc v.
Sayers, 168 N. W. 445.

V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.
(A) What Constitutes.

tion for personal injury based on defective
bridge railings, defendant's admission that he
was responsible for the railings, in addition to
matters concluded by judgment against town-
ship, left no question of fact for jury.-Hart
Tp. v. Noret, 168 N. W. 1023.

INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
See Adultery, 5; Criminal Law, 628,
678; False Pretenses, 26, 27; Intoxicat-
ing Liquors, 211; Rape, 35; War,
Com4.

II. FINDING AND FILING OF INDICT-
MENT OR PRESENTMENT.

10 (Minn.) In a prosecution for adultery,
the grand jury, in view of Gen. St. 1913, § 9117,
may not receive the evidence of the innocent
spouse, without the consent of the defendant,
and base a true bill in part upon such testimony.

122 (Mich.) Where the husband has not-State v. Marshall, 168 N. W. 174.
given his wife the right to her own earnings,
the mere fact that she paid part of purchase
price of piano levied on under judgment against
the husband did not give her title to the piano.
-Le Blanc v. Sayers, 168 N. W. 445.

VII. MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS,
AND DEMURRER.

VI. ACTIONS.

209 (3) (Mich.) Where wife, having sustain-
ed personal injuries, paid expenses of treat-
ment on request and promise of her husband

137(4) (Minn.) An indictment for adultery
will not be set aside on motion on the ground
merely that incompetent evidence was received
by the grand jury.-State v. Marshall, 168 N.
W. 174.

137(4) (Minn.) A motion to quash an in-
dictment against husband, because his wife had

1103

INDEX-DIGEST

him before the grand jury, was properly de- by deterring the public from patronizing it, if
nied. State v. Ruther, 168 N. W. 587.

to compel the owner not to work himself, is un-
lawful, and may be enjoined.--Roraback v. Mo-
tion Picture Machine Operators' Union of Min-
neapolis, 168 N. W. 766.

IX. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE.
176 (S.D.) Upon error in information as
to true time when act charged was committed, 101(2) (Mich.) A master against whom a
the state is not barred from proving such act strike has been declared, and whose plant has
on another date, unless that shows the prose- been picketed peacefully without threats and
cution barred by the statute of limitations.- intimidation, is nevertheless entitled to an in-
junction.-Clarage v. Luphringer, 168 N. W.
State v. Yeager, 168 N. W. 749.

INFANTS.

See Executors and Administrators, 315;
Habeas Corpus, 113; Master and Serv-
366, 400; Physicians and Surgeons,
18.

ant,

IV. CONTRACTS.

440.

IV. PRELIMINARY AND INTERLOCU-
TORY INJUNCTIONS.
(A) Grounds and Proceedings to Procure.

132 (Iowa) Whether an ex parte restrain-
ing order to hold matters in suit in statu quo
should be considered a temporary injunction de-
pends upon the circumstances of each case, and
fargely in the discretion of the judge, and a
restraining order, when considered a temporary
injunction, may be modified, vacated, or con-
tinued.-State v. Raph, 168 N. W. 259.

47 (Wis.) Where minor heir who, together
with guardian, executed unobjectionable trust
agreement, making disposition of intestate's es
tate and deed made pursuant thereto, was fully
informed of legal effect of agreement and deed
and comprehended their significance, legal ef-
free from doubt, the trial court did not abuse
ficacy of instruments was subject only to mi-137(4) (Minn.) Where the facts were not
its discretion in refusing to issue a temporary
nor's right to disaffirm at majority.-In re
injunction. Roraback v. Motion Picture Ma-
Kane's Estate, 168 N. W. 402.
57(1) (Wis.) Where minor heir after machine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, 168 N.
W. 766.
jority, and after full information of contents of
trust agreement making disposition of estate
between parties interested, of trustee's doings,
and property embraced in trust, ratified agree-
ment, ratification was binding. In re Kane's 228 (Minn.) A district court has no juris-
Estate, 168 N. W. 402.

(C) Contracts.

62(3) (Mich.) Where one defendant owned
easterly 50 feet of lot 50, and other owned
westerly 50 feet and easterly 40 feet of lot 51,
remaining 20 feet of lot 51 being owned by
plaintiff, with lot 52, plaintiff could not re-
strain erection by defendants of their dwellings,
one on lot 50, the other on lot 51, on ground
they violated restriction, that there should be
nothing but single dwelling on each lot, no
nearer than 10 feet to west line.-Gnau v. Fitz-
patrick, 168 N. W. 1007.

(G) Personal Rights and Duties.
99 (Minn.) "Bannering" a moving picture
house as unfair to organized labor, and there-

VII. VIOLATION AND PUNISHMENT.

diction to punish the Governor of the state for
contempt for disregarding its order restraining
closing of a licensed saloon, where Governor
was in good faith discharging a constitutional
duty to enforce an order of the Public Safety
Commission created by Laws 1917, c. 261 (Gen.
St. Supp. 1917, §§ 117-10 to 117-19).-State
District Court, Second Judicial Dist., 168

N. W. 634.

The district court has no power to punish the
adjutant general of the state for contempt in
closing a licensed saloon by order of Governor
of state in disregard of court's restraining or-
der; he being a proper agency in Governor's
hands to aid him in enforcing a duly enacted
law.-Id.
INSANE PERSONS.

See Cancellation of Instruments,
211; Homicide, 334;
Purchaser, 44; Witnesses,

INSOLVENCY.

34; Deeds.
Vendor and
160.

See Bankruptcy, Corporations, 566; Fraud-
ulent Conveyances, 61.

INSTRUCTIONS.

See Appeal and Error, 1067; Criminal Law,
763-829, 1173; Master and Servant,
150, 154; Trial, 191-296, 312.

BROKERS.

(A) Agency for Insurer.

75 (Iowa) Under Code, §§ 1749, 1750, de-
fining an agent of a company dealing in insur-
ance other than life, every person who in any
manner, directly or indirectly, transacts busi-
ness for such company is an agent of such
company.-Johnson v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 16S
N. W. 264.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

of title increasing hazard.-State Central Sav.
Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 168
N. W. 201.

393 (Iowa) Where fire insurer accepted
premium from purchaser of property knowing
he desired to continue policy, it cannot assert
there was no proper assignment of policy from
vendor to purchaser.-State Central Sav. Bank
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 168 N. W.
201.

93 (Iowa) Where it was the practice of an
insurance agent to secure data from applicant
and to prepare and sign application, and in-
surance company had acquiesced in such prac-449 (Neb.) While,
tice and issued its policy on such application,
the company was liable for damages for negli-
gence of agent in not preparing and submitting
an application after agreement so to do and
acceptance of premium.-Johnson v. Farmers'
Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 264.

In an action against insurance company for
damages caused by negligence, of its agent in
not forwarding application, evidence that agent
promised applicant to deposit policy in his
safe is admissible on question of contributory
negligence.-Id.

a

XII. RISKS AND CAUSES OF LOSS.
(E) Accident and Health Insurance.
strictly speaking,
ciated from any human agency, such interpre-
means may be accidental only when disasso-
tation is not recognized in the law of accidental
insurance, but any event occurring without ex-
pectation of person affected is accidental, though
it would not have happened but for his volun-
tary act.-Grosvenor v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York, 168 N. W. 596.

454 (Minn.) Policy of insurance covering ac-
cident and health indemnity, with indorsements
and attached papers, held to provide for a death
benefit upon death resulting from sickness, as
well as from accident.-Phillips v. Duluth Casu-
alty Ass'n, 168 N. W. 9.

In action against insurance company for neg-
ligence of agent in failing to send application
to company, applicant can recover as damages
only amount of actual loss, and not amount of 455 (Iowa) Under a policy covering injury
policy.—Id.

by external, violent, and accidental means, in-
sured, who while pulling a tire from an auto-
mobile slipped and fell when it suddenly loos-
ened, sustained an accidental injury from an
leider v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 168
accidental, external, and violent means.-Lick-
N. W. 884.

V. THE CONTRACT IN GENERAL.
(A) Nature, Requisites, and Validity.
130(5) (Iowa) Where applicant paid pre-
mium under agreement of agent to prepare,
sign, and forward application and deposit the 458 (Iowa) An accident certificate exempt-
policy, when received, in his safe, the fact that ing insurer from liability for death caused by
applicant did not sign application or inquire if
"gases
policy had been issued does not relieve company
accidentally or otherwise
or agent from notifying applicant upon rejec asphyxiation, regardless of whether death is
inhaled" exempts insurer in case of
tion.-Johnson v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 168 N. voluntary or involuntary; an "accidental death"
al.-Jones v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n,
being of necessity involuntary and unintention-
168 N. W. 305.

W. 264.

141(1) (Iowa) Where it was uniform prac-
tice of insurer to issue policies on applications
prepared and signed by its agent, the name of
the agent appearing underneath that of insured
to show that insured's name had been signed by
agent, the company thereby waived necessity of
application by insured.-Johnson v. Farmers'
Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 264.

(B) Construction and Operation.

146(3) (Iowa) Where the language of an
accident insurance contract has been chosen by
the insurer, it must be construed most favor-
ably to support the claim of the insured.-Ellis
v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 168 N.
W. 212.

146(3) (Iowa) An accident certificate will
be construed in favor of insured.-Jones v.
Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n, 168 N. W.
305.

*

*

*

*

*

XV. ADJUSTMENT OF LOSS.

579 (N.D.) Where an insured agreed to an
adjustment of the loss at $335 and, being un-
able to read English, signed a paper fixing it
at $250, such paper did not constitute a con-
tract; the statute providing that there can be
no contract where the consent of the parties is
when obtained by fraud, undue influence, or
not free and mutual, and consent not being free
mistake.-Mathias v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail
Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 664.

Where an insured had received a payment on
a loss and sued for more on the ground that the
written contract of adjustment under which
payment was made was fraudulent and did not
represent the actual contract of adjustment, he
was not barred from suing by acceptance and
retention of the payment.-Id.

XVIII. ACTIONS ON POLICIES.

645(3) (N.D.) In a suit on an insurance
policy wherein certain payments were recited
where defendant set up a contract of adjust-
ment fixing recovery at a smaller amount, it
was not error to permit plaintiff to introduce
evidence of fraud in the execution of such con-
tract although no fraud had been alleged; it
not being necessary to controvert expressly the
new matter contained in the answer, under
Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7467-7477, and § 7452.-
Mathias v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co.,
168 N. W. 664.

XI. ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, OR AGREE-
MENTS AFFECTING RIGHT TO
AVOID OR FORFEIT POLICY.
646(6) (Iowa) In an action under an insur-
ance policy covering the death of a mare by
392(1) (Iowa) Fire insurer which accepted lightning, the burden was on plaintiff to show
premium from last purchaser of premises with that the mare was killed by lightning.-Carpen-
knowledge of transfers and that purchaser de- ter v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 231.
sired to continue insurance did continue pol-646(7) (Iowa) Death caused by escaping gas

1105

INDEX-DIGEST

Jones v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n,
168 N. W. 305.

646(7) (Neb.) Where petition averring death
from "accidental carbolic acid or toxic poison-
ing" was denied by answer, averring "suicide
by intentional drinking of a deadly poison,
namely, by the drinking of carbolic acid," and
reply admitted death from drinking carbolic
acid, burden was on plaintiff to show that death
was accidental and not suicidal.-Grosvenor v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 168 N.
W. 596.

651(2) (Iowa) Evidence that insurer's agent
promised insured to take care of the policy and
deposit it in his safe is competent testimony
on the question of a delivery of the policy.-
Johnson v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 264.
665 (2) (Iowa) Evidence held insufficient to
show that life policy applied for by deceased
was ever issued.-Straight v. American Life
Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 84.

665(5) (Iowa) An accident insurance policy,
requiring accidental injury by firearms to be
established by an eyewitness, though the lim-
itation might be waived when insurer was sat-
isfied that discharge was accidental, limits in-
surer's exemption from liability to cases where
accident is not established to insurer's satisfac
tion.-Ellis v. Interstate Business Men's Acc.
Ass'n, 168 N. W. 212.

An insurer cannot make himself the final
judge of the merits of the claim by providing in
the policy that any claim thereunder must be
established by proof to his satisfaction.-Id.

Where insured was killed by a rifle hidden
among rubbish, that the death was accidental
held established under a policy requiring the
accident to be proven to insurer's satisfaction.

-Id.

Where an insurance policy requires an acci-
dental injury to be proven by eyewitnesses,
enough must be testified to by eyewitnesses to
show the operating cause of the injury, or that
there was an operating cause to which the ac-
cident might fairly be attributed.-Id.

Where insured was killed by discharge of a
rifle, his wife was an "eyewitness," within pol-
icy requiring proof by eyewitness, when she
saw him before his death, three minutes after
the injury.-Id.

ultra vires, and as between the society and a
member chargeable with knowledge of its want
of power to make a contract based thereon, it
is wholly void.-Haner v. Grand Lodge A. O.
U. W. of Nebraska, 168 N. W. 189.

(B) The Contract in General.

719(1) (Iowa) Power to enact new by-laws,
conferred on a society by its contract with a
member, makes a change binding only as to
benefits derived from mere membership, and not
as to an independent contract with the associa-
tion.-Richey v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen
of the World, 168 N. W. 276.

General consent by member that constitution
and by-laws may be amended permits adoption
of a by-law interfering with no vested right,
relating merely to procedure, or providing a rea-
sonable rule of evidence.-Id.

Though a member agreed to be bound by
changes in by-laws, change whereby presumption
of death from absence was declared insufficient
evidence of death, and which provided no pay-
ment should be due, however long the absence,
unless premiums be paid for expectancy of mem-
ber, was ineffective.-Id.

If society, after ineffective change in by-laws
purporting to render presumption of death from
absence insufficient evidence of death, had the
right to receive assessments, beneficiary's pay-
iginal by-laws.-Id.
ments did not estop her to claim under the or-

If a society, after ineffective change in by-
laws purporting to render insufficient evidence
of death presumption arising from absence,
was not entitled to assessments from a benefi-
actions does not create estoppel to discontinue
ciary, fact that she submitted to illegal ex-
them.-Id.

Payment of assessments by beneficiary, after
the society made ineffective change in by-laws
death presumption from absence, was not au
purporting to render insufficient evidence of
acquiescence in the change.-Id.

A society which made ineffective change in
by-laws purporting to render insufficient evi-
dence of death presumption from absence could
estop itself to urge making of assessment pay-
ments by beneficiary as defense to her claim,
if its agents induced payments after the parties
knew assured had disappeared.-Id.

665 (7) (N.D.) In an action on an insur-
ance policy wherein a written agreement to ac-
cept a less sum was interposed, evidence held 719(3) (Iowa) Change in by-laws of a soci-
ety operating to raise assessment must be rea-
to show that plaintiff's signature to such agree-onable to bind a member, though he has given
ment was obtained by fraud.-Mathias v. State general consent to constitution and by-laws be
Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 664.
ing amended.-Richey v. Sovereign Camp of
Woodmen of the World, 168 N. W. 276.

668(10) (Iowa) In an action under a pol-
icy covering the death of a mare by lightning,
evidence that the mare was killed by lightning719(4) (Iowa) Benefit society's change in
held to justify submission of the question to by-laws cannot authorize reduction of benefit
consent that constitution and by-laws may be
the jury-Carpenter v. Security Fire Ins. Co., agreed upon, though member has given general
168 N. W. 231.
amended.-Richey v. Sovereign Camp of Wood-
men of the World, 168 N. W. 276.

668(15) (N.D.) An insured who had un-
knowingly signed an agreement to accept a less
amount than that orally agreed upon held not
under the evidence as a matter of law to have
waived his right of action by accepting the pay-
inent, the question of waiver being one for the
jury. Mathias v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail
Ins. Co., 168 N. W. 664.

XX. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.

724(1) (Neb.) A fraternal beneficiary soci-
ety is not estopped from pleading ultra vires as
to contract which is beyond the powers con-
ferred upon it by the statute (Rev. St. 1913, §§
3295, 3296), under which it is organized.--Haner
v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of Nebraska, 168
N. W. 189.

726 (Mich.) The constitution of a mutual
benefit association embodying the contract be-
tween the association and a member, having
(A) Corporations and Associations.
693 (Iowa) All by-laws of benefit society been prepared for or by the association, is
must be reasonable and consistent with princi- construed most strongly against the associa-
v. Cigar Makers' International
ples of law as determined by courts when case tion.-Smith
is properly before them.-Richey v. Sovereign Union of America, 168 N. W. 954.
Camp of Woodmen of the World, 168 N. W.726 (Neb.) Ambiguous expression in con-
tract should be construed most strongly against
276.
693 (Neb.) A by-law of fraternal beneficiary the insurer, because he writes the contract.-
society contravening the statute (Rev. St. 1913 Kane v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 168
§§ 3295, 3296), under which it is organized, is N. W. 598.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER