have a tendency to create or increase tempta- | position to assert the claim thus urged tion or motive for the destruction of the prop against the policy and its validity. Even if erty, or decrease the owner's interest in guard- there were no assignment of the policy, it ing and preserving it." would still be good so far as the rights of this plaintiff are concerned. But we think the jury could well have said, under this rec

the courts as indicated in the authorities

the policy to Henkle; that defendant recognized Henkle's desire to continue the policy in force upon the property; that it accepted

See, also, Russell v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 71 Iowa, 69, 32 N. W. 95; Weigen v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 104 Iowa, 410, 73 N. W. 862. [3] These provisions of the policy are in-ord, that there was an oral assignment of tended for the protection of the company against increased hazard, whether moral or physical, and this purpose is recognized by above. Of course, the incumbrancing of property against provisions such as we have here is prima facie to avoid the policy. But the facts attending their execution are open to inquiry, and where it is made to appear affirmatively that the transaction resulted only in a change in the form of the security, and that neither the moral nor the physical hazard is increased by the act complained of, it ought not to be held as invalidating the policy.

As said in Ayres v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 176, 85 Am. Dec. 553:

"The object of the insurance company, by this cause, is that the interest shall not change so that the assured shall have a greater temptation or motive to burn the property, or less interest and watchfulness in guarding and preserving it from destruction by fire. Any change in or transfer of the interest of the assured in the property of a nature calculated to have this effect is in violation of the policy. But if the real ownership remains the same if there is no change in the fact or title, but only in the evidence of it, and if this latter change is merely nominal, and not of a nature calculated to increase the motive to burn, or diminish the motive to guard the property from loss by fire, the policy is not violated."

We think that under the record made here there was no such incumbrance of the property as violated the spirit and purpose against which the forfeiture clause was intended to operate.

[4, 5] Some contention is made by the defendant that there was no proper assignment of the policy to Henkle. Technically this probably is true. There was no written assignment, but the jury could well find that at the time of the conveyance to Henkle it was understood and agreed between Sage and Henkle that the policy should pass to Henkle with the property. There is such a thing recognized in law as an oral assignment of a written instrument. It clearly was the intention of these parties that Henkle should become invested with all the rights under the policy upon the purchase of the property. The defendant was informed that Henkle desired to continue the policy in force upon the property as originally written. To this end Henkle paid the premium on the policy for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the policy as originally written. This fact could not have been unknown to the defendant. It received the premium, and has ever since retained it. We think it is not in a

the premium, knowing Henkle's purpose in paying the premium, and knowing Henkle's relationship to the property at the time. The effect of it was to continue the policy it, with all the indemnity that the policy upon the property after Henkle's purchase of gave. The effect of the transaction was to preserve the integrity of the policy in favor of Henkle and these plaintiffs, and we see no ground for relief to the defendant upon this contention. Whatever the contention may be, it was surely kept alive for the benefit of these plaintiffs.

Upon the whole record, we think the verdict of the jury does substantial justice between the parties, and upon the whole record the defendant has had a fair and impartial trial.

The defendant assigned 25 errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court during the progress of the trial. We have examined these with care, and, without entering upon a detailed discussion of them, we have to say that we find no error prejudicial to the rights of the defendant upon the issues tendered, under the record made.

Finding no ground for interfering with the action of the district court, the cause is affirmed.

4. WITNESSES 337(1)—IMPEACHMENT-TES- me"; that he went over that way; that as TIMONY OF ACCUSED.

Where one accused of murder tendered himself as a witness, he was subject to all the tests of credibility applicable to other witnesses. 5. WITNESSES

-SCOPE.

Scarlett and Schneider went across the street from Mrs. Miranda's house they noticed Mrs. Miranda and defendant's wife, when Scar337(4)-CROSS-EXAMINATION lett remarked, "There is more of them from up at that house and I am going over to hammer hell out of them;" that when they came up a discussion arose as to the lan

Specific acts tending to discredit a witness, even though he be the accused, may be inquired

into on cross-examination.

6. WITNESSES 337(4)—IMPEACHMENT-EVI-guage Scarlett had employed at the house,

DENCE-ADMISSIBILITY.

In prosecution for murder, where accused had only recently come to the place of the offense, his character as a peaceful, law-abiding man at the place of his last residence could be shown, but it was improper to admit evidence and to cross-examine accused as to a diary, he kept eight or nine years before the offense, when he was only a youth, and which contained statements as to his frequent fights.

Appeal from District Court, Lee County; W. S. Hamilton, Judge.

The indictment charged defendant with having committed the crime of murder in the first degree. He was found guilty of murder in the second degree, and sentenced accordingly. He appeals. Reversed and remanded. John E. Craig, of Keokuk, for appellant. H. M. Havner, Atty. Gen., J. M. C. Hamilton, Co. Atty., of Ft. Madison, and E. W. McManus, Asst. Co. Atty., of Keokuk, for the State.

LADD, J. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of September 23, 1916, defendant shot and killed Ed Scarlett. To the indictment charging him with having committed murder in the first degree he interposed the plea that the shooting was in self-defense. Several errors are assigned, and, among these, that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the verdict, and that, in any event, it should have been for manslaughter only.

one or both of the women insisting that he ought not to have made use of the names he did; that he denied having called them names; that defendant then came up and remarked that he did not call them the names. According to Mrs. Miranda Scarlett then "struck at Forrest [defendant]. He had something in his hand and Forrest staggered back towards them. I am not going to say that he hit him but he surely must have for Forrest staggered back against me. I stepped back out of the way and started to run, and the shot was fired."

Schneider testified that defendant's wife accused Scarlett of calling her a whore, whereupon Scarlett said, "You're a damned liar," and that defendant interposed, "You're a damned liar; you did; and I am going to take a poke at you;" that Scarlett undertook to strike him, when defendant shot; that he did not see the shot fired, but, as he ran, heard it; that he did not see anything in Scarlett's hand when he raised it to strike defendant; but that Scarlett raised his hand and was plainly preparing to strike defendant. Defendant's wife's story of the transaction is not essentially different from her mother's, for she swore that as defendant came up decedent declared that "whoever said I cussed everybody in the house is a "G- d- liar"; that her husband remarked, "Yes, Ed; you cussed everybody in the house;" that thereupon decedent with a vile name said, "I fix you right now," and struck at defendant. The witness was unable to say whether he hit him, but declared that he attempted to strike again when she heard a shot fired. The defendant's version of the affair was:

The evidence tended to show that the defendant and his wife walked over to the residence of her mother, who was keeping a boarding house, Mrs. Miranda, shortly after 8 o'clock in the evening, and while seated in the kitchen decedent, Ed Scarlett, accompanied by one Schneider, came to the house; that they had had three drinks each at Jerry That as he returned to where the parties were Stack's before coming; that as Scarlett en- standing he "stepped around in front of them about three feet from him"; that decedent said, tered he remarked that he was hunting trou-"I never called you that; whoever said I did ble, and suggested a fight with Mrs. Ellis, is a G- d-lying s▬▬ of a b," to which who was making her home with her mother, Mrs. Miranda, and then with the latter; that, as both declined, he walked into the kitchen where defendant's wife offered him a chair; that he immediately returned to the front room, where he denounced those present in the vilest language; that Mrs. Miranda requested him to leave, which he at first declined to do, but was finally induced by Schneider, assisted by Mrs. Ellis, to go; that defendant and his wife left immediately afterwards; that Mrs. Miranda overtook them and requested defendant "to go over on Main street and see if you can find the police for

he replied in a kindly manner "Ed, you did call at him probably 10 seconds; that he (defendthem all names;" that decedent stood looking ant) turned with his left side towards decedent, and was not looking when Scarlett struck him. "I got the full force of the blow. He struck next morning. He knocked me back three feet, pretty hard, and I had the welt from it until the and I took a couple of staggering steps backwards, and staggered into my mother-in-law, and the first thing that popped into my mind when he said, 'You son of a bitch, I'll fix you,' and I seen that he hit me and I staggered that way was that he was coming at me with some weapon; his hand was back here just like this. I or not, and he made one step at me, and the could not see whether it was in his hip pocket first law of nature entered my mind. I knew

of Scarlett was 176 pounds or more. The evi-wife, after testifying to what happened at the dence was in conflict as to whether Scarlett was peaceable and quiet or a quarrelsome man, and a like conflict appears as to the character of the accused. The record is silent as to any attempt to retreat having been made. From this evidence it cannot be

ly, Mo., when the accused was 19 or 20 years of age, according to the diary, or 17 or 18 years of age, as he testified and was corroborated by Little and, as observed, 8 or 9 years previous to the offense charged in the indict-cently acquired that the neighbors of the ment. As the defendant had tendered himself as a witness, he was subject to all the tests of credibility applicable to other witnesses. State v. Teeter, 69 Iowa, 717, 27 N. W. 485; State v. Hayden, 131 Iowa, 1, 107 N. W. 929; State v. Wasson, 126 Iowa, 320, 101 N. W. 1125; State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa, 216, 90 N. W. 733; State v. Pugsley, 75 Iowa, 742, 38 N. W. 498.

youth and inexperience. Even though all he recorded were true, the subsequent years, without apparent fault on his part, would seem quite sufficient to wipe away the stain of youthful follies. The prejudicial characters of the evidence is manifest. We are of opinion that the court abused its discretion in receiving this evidence.

The suggestion was made on oral argument that the evidence was elicited on cross-examination of defendant that he was "not a man that looks for trouble," but that was brought out in cross-examination, and surely might not be regarded as a basis for cross-examination otherwise improper. No inquiry was made of him as to his character as a peaceable person.

Exceptions to the instructions are hypercritical, and require no attention.

eral in the period covered by cross-examina- | eral moral character as bearing on his creditions. And so for the very evident reason bility as a witness at the trial. Especially that the matter of best evidence is not in- so inasmuch as in so doing the inquiry revolved in the latter and the search in cross-lated to the indiscretions and vanities of examination is into the inner life of the witness as manifested by what he has done. Character, the inner man, can be known to the world through what he has done and said, as manifested by the outerman, and the world's estimate of him is reputation, and reputation is taken as proof of character. It is not always correct, for a person of bad character sometimes is of good repute, and vice versa. It is, however, the best evidence available. Cross-examination tends to uncover for the jury or court the life the witness has led and allow the jury to say for themselves what influence of the life lived would have on the credibility of the witness. Even to cross-examination there should be some limit beyond which the veil should not be raised. State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 Pac. 174, 42 Am. St. Rep. 322; Eads v. State, 17 Wyo. 490, 101 Pac. 946; 40 Cyc. 2597, and cases collected. See interesting discussion in 2 Wig. on Ev. § 381 et seq. Where the line shall be drawn is quite generally left to the discretion, of the trial court, and only on abuse thereof will its exercise be interfered with. So much depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case that no unvarying rule can be laid down, but it may be said the cross-examination can be extended back as far as inquiry of general reputation for truth and veracity or proof of general moral character, and there seems no tenable reason for permitting cross-examination relating to specific acts to extend farther in the past unless these are in some way related to the facts or acts preceding and are in some manner given significance thereby. This is a rule well calculated to allow sufficient lee way to inquiry, and, at the same time, put a stop to opening up the past, short of turning cross-examination into oppression and an attempt to harass or disgrace the witness rather than test his credibility.

The accused had come to Keokuk in March 16th previous to the shooting, prior to which he had resided at Moberly, Mo., since November 8, 1913. He seems to have been in Keokuk from February 2, 1913, until May Sth, and to have gone from there to Moberly, Mo., and on to Marshall, where he remained until shortly before returning to Moberly as before stated. What he did, save that he was married July 21, 1912, or where he lived during the years from 1908 to 1913, does not appear, but he certainly in living at Moberly from November 8, 1913, until September 23, 1916, nearly three years, remained there long enough to establish a reputation as to character and veracity, and there was no occasion for skipping back another five years for proof in the evidence of others, and in his cross-examination as to his gen

For the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PRESTON, C. J., and EVANS and SALINGER, JJ., concur.

FRANCE v. CITY OF DES MOINES et al. (BOLGER, MOSSER & WILLAMAN, Interveners). (No. 32238.)

(Supreme Court of Iowa. June 27, 1918.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 916 - LIMIT OF

INDEBTEDNESS-BRIDGES.

Under Code Supp. 1913, §§ 758d, 758e, providing that cities of the first class could bond the city not to exceed 5 per centum of the actual value of taxable property for the purpose of building bridges, and that the act should be construed as granting additional powers, a city of the first class could exceed the 14 per centum cities and counties, even before the passage of indebtedness limit provided by section 1306b, for Acts 37th Gen. Assem, c. 85, amending section 1306b, so as to make the 14 per centum limitation apply only to indebtedness incurred for general or ordinary purposes.

Salinger, J., dissenting.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; Lawrence De Graff, Judge.

This is a suit by a resident and taxpayer of the city of Des Moines to restrain the defendants, who are the mayor, city council, and officers of said city, and William Horrabin, contractor, from carrying out the terms of a contract, between the said city and Horrabin, for the construction of a bridge across the Des Moines river at a point connecting University avenue with North street in said city, and to restrain the issuance and sale of bonds in the sum of $400,000 for that purpose. The contract complained of was entered into on June 22, 1917, and on July 1st the bid of Messrs. Bolger, Mosser & Willaman, interveners, for the bonds was accepted by the proper officers of said city. There is lit