contract was bona fide and in force at the time in controversy then Burt and Margaret Putrah were freeholders. The status of the holder of such a contract has been considered by this court in many cases. These will be found reviewed and collated in Wellington v. Railway Co., 123 Minn. 483, 144 N. W. 222, and Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N. W. 1032. The holder of such a contract holds land. G. S. 1913, § 9412 (9); Hook r. N. W. Thresher Co., 91 Minn. 482, 98 N. W. 463. He has an inheritable estate in land. Starkweather v. Chatfield, 149 Mich. 444, 112 N. W. 1071; Harney v. Donohoe, 97 Mo. 141, 10 S. W. 191; Williams v. Kinney, 43 Hun, 1, affirmed 118 N. Y. 679, 23 N. E. 1147. See, also, Abbott v. Moldestad, 74 Minn. 294, 298, 77 N. W. 227, 73 Am. St. Rep. 348; Stearns v. Kennedy, 94 Miun. 439, 103 N. W. 212; 3 Pomeroy, Eq. § 1261. An inheritable estate in land is an estate of freehold (G. S. 1913, § 6656), and the holder of an inheritable estate is a freeholder. Hamilton v. Village of Detroit, 85 Minn. 83, 87, 88 N. W. 419. [3] 3. The court found that this contract was bona fide and in force and there is evidence to sustain this finding. LICENSED RETAIL LIQUOR DEALERS' (Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 12, 1918.) (Syllabus by the Court.) PLEADING 359-SHAM ANSWER-STRIKING OUT. The answer was clearly shown to be sham, and the court did not err in striking it out. Hallam, J., dissenting. Appeal from Municipal Court of Minneapolis; C. L. Smith, Judge. Action by the Licensed Retail Liquor Dealers' Association of Minneapolis against L. R. Denton. Motion to strike out the answer as false, frivolous, and sham granted, with leave to defendant to serve an amended answer upon payment of costs, and he appeals. Order affirmed. Edward M. Nash, of Minneapolis, for appellant. Brady, Robertson & Bonner, of Minneapolis, for respondent. HOLT, J. The action is brought upon 16 promissory notes, each for $5, given by defendant to plaintiff. The answer admits Reliance is placed on an isolated state the execution of the notes, but alleges "that ment made by Philip J. Putrah on the stand said notes were given as part of a slush fund which the plaintiff was collecting to unlawthat "there wasn't any consideration" for fully and wrongfully influence certain public this contract. This is not conclusive. Quite officials in regard to the regulations to be likely he had reference to money considera-imposed upon the sale of poisonous and intion for he had fully testified to the facts toxicating drinks;" that the notes were as above stated and these facts showed ade- given for an illegal consideration; "that no quate consideration. steps were taken or nothing was ever done [4] 4. Appellant school district complains by the plaintiff herein to benefit this defendthat the court rejected evidence that Burtant in any way in his business as a retail Putrah had made the statement, when im- liquor dealer, and that this was the sole portuned to sign the petition, that he had consideration for said 16 notes;" and that no interest in the land and no writing to defendant has received nothing at all for show for any. Burt was in court but was said notes. Upon affidavits plaintiff moved not called as a witness. He did not sign to strike out the answer as false, frivolous, the petition. The evidence was hearsay and and sham. The motion was granted, with came within none of the exceptions to the leave to defendant to serve an amended anhearsay rule. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1712.swer upon payment of costs. Defendant apThe court found that William F. Blume was a resident elector and freeholder in district No. 90. There was evidence that he had an ordinary contract for deed of the land on which he lived in the district. This was sufficient. peals. The answer is not frivolous. But, if it conclusively appears to be false and sham, the action of the court below was right. Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of this state. The affidavit of its secretary [5] 5. A new trial is asked on the ground sets forth that defendant, upon his own apof newly discovered evidence. The alleged plication, was elected a member of the cornewly discovered evidence is for the most poration, and, pursuant to its by-laws, paid part that of persons who were witnesses on $10 entrance fee; and, in payment of his the former trial. Some contradicted their monthly dues, executed and delivered to it his former testimony. No reason appears why 23 promissory notes, each for $5, maturing the evidence so far as true could not have one each month thereafter, and that defendbeen elicited on the former trial. This ant continued to be a member as each note ground of motion for a new trial was prop-matured; that the notes sued upon are the notes so given, except the ones that have erly denied. been paid by defendant; that the by-law of Orders affirmed. the corporation pursuant to which the notes eration must therefore he held sham. were executed reads as follows: "Section 1. Initiation Fee. "(a) All members of this corporation shall, upon joining the same, pay to the treasurer, an initiation fee of ten dollars ($10.00), which shall also cover and pay the dues of said member for the first month of such membership. "Section 2. Monthly Dues. "(a) The monthly dues shall be the sum of five dollars ($5.00) per month for each member of the corporation. Immediately upon becoming a member of the corporation each member shall forthwith make, execute and deliver to the treasurer of said corporation twenty-three promissory notes in writing payable to the order of said corporation, each for the sum of five dollars and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from its maturity, which date of maturity shall be so fixed and designated in each of said notes as to make one of said notes mature each consecutive month from and after the sign ing and delivery of the same; the payment of each of said notes at its respective date of maturity being equivalent to the payment of dues for a corresponding period." The affidavit of plaintiff's attorney shows that defendant paid 2 of the 23 notes to the attorney, and sets out a letter from defendant wherein he promised to pay the balance as soon as able. The opposing affidavit of defendant states that, if it be true that the notes were given in payment of monthly dues to the corporation, he signed them because of false representations made by plaintiff's agents; he admits paying $10 to join the corporation and the attendance at one meeting; and he states that his membership was terminated, but concedes this occurred after the maturity of the notes in suit. It will be noticed that the answer admits the execution of the notes, and does not set up the defense, suggested in the affidavit, that they were procured by means of misrepresentation or fraud. It attempts to set forth an illegal consideration; but it seems to us that this defense is refuted by the subsequent admission above set forth that the sole consideration was that steps were to be taken and something done by plaintiff to benefit defendant in his business of retail liquor dealer which he was conducting in Minneapolis, Minn. It is to be assumed, until the contrary is made to appear, that defendant had the lawful right to conduct the business in which he was engaged at that place. That being so, it cannot be unlawful to procure and pay for such assistance as may be lawfully rendered in promoting the success of that business. But, aside from the above consideration, we think it conclusively appears that the notes represent membership dues, under the by-law of the corporation, and that they all matured while defendant remained a member in good standing. The attempted defense of And so must be held the defense of illegal consideration; for it cannot be regarded unlawful to become a member of a corporation and pay the monthly dues imposed upon such member by the by-laws of the organization. Order affirmed. HALLAM, J. I dissent. The trial court struck out defendant's answer as false, sham, and frivolous. The majority opinion sustains this order. I do not agree. The answer alleges that the notes sued upon were given "as part of a slush fund which the plaintiff was collecting to willfully and wrongfully influence certain public officials in regard to the regulations to be imposed upon the sale of poisonous and intoxicating drinks." This states a good defense of illegal consideration. The answer accordingly is not frivolous. This the majority opinion concedes, but holds that it conclusively appears that the answer is false and sham. In my opinion it has not been made to appear that the allegations of the answer are false. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of its motion in which it is stated that plaintiff corporation has by-laws which provide that all members upon joining the corporation shall pay $10 as an initiation fee and one month's dues and shall give notes in advance for 23 months' dues at $5 a month, and that these notes were given therefor. The calling of contributions membership dues does not make the fund raised thereby any the more or the less legitimate. The use of the term "dues" may be a sham. The question is for what purpose the fund, whether called dues or by some other name, was raised. Nowhere does plaintiff make any showing as to the purpose for which these alleged membership dues of $60 a year for two years were to be used. There is no showing as to what legitimate expenses this association had that would absorb so large annual contributions from its membership nor that it bad any legitimate expenses at all. There is no denial that the money was really raised for the purpose stated in the answer, nor is there any denial of the more specific statement, made by the defendant in an affidavit opposing the motion, to the effect that the plaintiff's representatives stated to him when they procured the notes that it was necessary for the retail liquor dealers to raise a fund to work among state legislators and other public officials to stop certain pending legislation which would be detrimental to their business, and that, if "he and the other boys" did not do so, they would be out of the business. Such transactions are illegal. Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, 30 L. R. A. 737, 51 Am. St. Rep. 493. In my opinion an issue is tendered by the answer which STATE ex rel. COMMON SCHOOL DIST. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 12, 1918.) (Syllabus by the Court.) ished, she started for her boarding house taking a short cut through the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in the evening and a book to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she was criminally assaulted by this man for the gratification of his passions and as a part of the transaction he shot her destroying the sight of her left eye. Some months later his body was found in a creek some miles away with a bullet wound through the heart and a revolver nearby. He had evidently committed suicide. There is no mistaking the facts recited. The assailant saw the teacher in the morning, lurked about until the opportunity came after she left school, and then committed the assault for purposes of his own. The Compensation Act requires of the em A school district employed a young woman teacher for a one-room school in a densely wooded and sparsely settled part of the country. On her way to her boarding house, after her day's work at the schoolhouse was done, and when off the schoolhouse grounds, she was assaulted by an unknown man for the gratification of his passions and as a part of the transaction she was shot and the sight of one eye was destroyed. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, § 8195 et seq.) gives compensation for personal injury "caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of employ-ployer compensation "in every case of perment." It does not cover workmen except while engaged in or about the premises where their work is done or their service requires their presence and it excludes "an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employé intended to injure the employé because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employé, or because of his employment." Without determining whether the injuries to the teacher arose in the course of the employment it is held that they were not caused by accident arising out of the employment and that they are not compensable under the Compensa sonal injury or death of his employé, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of employment," etc. G. S. 1913, § 8203. The meaning of the word "accident" and the phrase "personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment" is defined as follows: "(h) The word 'accident' as used in the phrases 'personal injuries due to accident' or 'injuries or death caused by accident' in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexCertiorari from District Court, Itasca pected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly County; B. F. Wright, Judge. tion Act. Original writ of certiorari in Supreme Court by the State, on relation of Common School District No. 1, in Itasca County, Minn., to review a judgment of the district court of Itasca County, etc., awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a school-teacher in the employ of such district. Judgment reversed. Baldwin, Baldwin & Holmes, of Duluth, for relator. Ralph A. Stone, of Grand Rapids, for respondent. DIBELL, C. Certiorari to the district court of Itasca to review a judgment awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a school-teacher in the employ of school district No. 1 of the county. The facts are not in dispute. The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school some 35 miles from Deer River in Itasca county and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami county, these two places being the nearest railway points. The country is densely wooded and sparsely settled. and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body. "(i) Personal Injuries, etc.-Without otner wise affecting either the meaning or interpretaarising out of and in the course of employment,' tion of the abridged clause, 'personal injuries it is hereby declared: "Not to cover workmen except while engaged ices are being performed, or where their servin, on, or about the premises where their service requires their presence as a part of such hours of service as such workmen, and shall not service at the time of the injury, and during the include an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employé intended to injure the employé because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employé, or because of his employment." G. S. 1913, § 8230. It is not questioned that a willful assault may be an accident within the definition of the act. Without stopping to consider whether the injury to the teacher occurred in the course of employment, as the statute uses the term, since she was away from the place of her definite school work, and on her way home, and upon that question this opinion is not to be taken as intimating a view, we pass to a consideration of whether it arose out of employment within the meaning of the statute. The school was a one-room school and 15 pupils attended. The nearest house was a half mile away and the boarding place The phrase, “arising out of employment," was a mile or a mile and a quarter. On the is usual to compensation acts though some morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown do not have it, and it has been provocative man asked for food at the boarding place of of litigation. That under some circumstances the teacher. On the evening of that day, an injury from an assault is one caused by when her work at the schoolhouse was fin- accident arising out of the employment is the corporation pursuant to which the notes eration must therefore he held sham. were executed reads as follows: "Section 1. Initiation Fee. "(a) All members of this corporation shall, upon joining the same, pay to the treasurer, an initiation fee of ten dollars ($10.00), which shall also cover and pay the dues of said member for the first month of such membership. "Section 2. Monthly Dues. "(a) The monthly dues shall be the sum of five dollars ($5.00) per month for each member of the corporation. Immediately upon becoming a member of the corporation each member shall forthwith make, execute and deliver to the treasurer of said corporation twenty-three promissory notes in writing payable to the order of said corporation, each for the sum of five dollars and bearing interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from its maturity, which date of maturity shall be so fixed and designated in each of said notes as to make one of said notes mature each consecutive month from and after the signing and delivery of the same; the payment of each of said notes at its respective date of maturity being equivalent to the payment of dues for a corresponding period." The affidavit of plaintiff's attorney shows that defendant paid 2 of the 23 notes to the attorney, and sets out a letter from defendant wherein he promised to pay the balance as soon as able. The opposing affidavit of defendant states that, if it be true that the notes were given in payment of monthly dues to the corporation, he signed them because of false representations made by plaintiff's agents; he admits paying $10 to join the corporation and the attendance at one meeting; and he states that his membership was terminated, but concedes this occurred after the maturity of the notes in suit. It will be noticed that the answer admits the execution of the notes, and does not set up the defense, suggested in the affidavit, that they were procured by means of misrepresentation or fraud. It attempts to set forth an illegal consideration; but it seems to us that this defense is refuted by the subsequent admission above set forth that the sole consideration was that steps were to be taken and something done by plaintiff to benefit defendant in his business of retail liquor dealer which he was conducting in Minneapolis, Minn. It is to be assumed, until the contrary is made to appear, that defendant had the lawful right| to conduct the business in which he was engaged at that place. That being so, it cannot be unlawful to procure and pay for such assistance as may be lawfully rendered in promoting the success of that business. But, aside from the above consideration, we think it conclusively appears that the notes represent membership dues, under the by-law of the corporation, and that they all matured while defendant remained a member in good standing. The attempted defense of And so must be held the defense of illegal consideration; for it cannot be regarded unlawful to become a member of a corporation and pay the monthly dues imposed upon such member by the by-laws of the organization. Order affirmed. HALLAM, J. I dissent. The trial court struck out defendant's answer as false, sham, and frivolous. The majority opinion sustains this order. I do not agree. The answer alleges that the notes sued upon were given "as part of a slush fund which the plaintiff was collecting to willfully and wrongfully influence certain public officials in regard to the regulations to be imposed upon the sale of poisonous and intoxicating drinks." This states a good defense of illegal consideration. The answer accordingly is not frivolous. This the majority opinion concedes, but holds that it conclusively appears that the answer is false and sham. In my opinion it has not been made to appear that the allegations of the answer are false. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of its motion in which it is stated that plaintiff corporation has by-laws which provide that all members upon joining the corporation shall pay $10 as an initiation fee and one month's dues and shall give notes in advance for 23 months' dues at $5 a month, and that these notes were given therefor. The calling of contributions membership dues does not make the fund raised thereby any the more or the less legitimate. The use of the term "dues" may be a sham. The question is for what purpose the fund, whether called dues or by some other name, was raised. Nowhere does plaintiff make any showing as to the purpose for which these alleged membership dues of $60 a year for two years were to be used. There is no showing as to what legitimate expenses this association had that would absorb so large annual contributions from its membership nor that it had any legitimate expenses at all. There is no denial that the money was really raised for the purpose stated in the answer, nor is there any denial of the more specific statement, made by the defendant in an affidavit opposing the motion, to the effect that the plaintiff's representatives stated to him when they procured the notes that it was necessary for the retail liquor dealers to raise a fund to work among state legislators and other public officials to stop certain pending legislation which would be detrimental to their business, and that, if "he and the other boys" did not do so, they would be out of the business. Such transactions are illegal. Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 898, 30 L. R. A. 737, 51 Am. St. Rep. 493. In my opinion an issue is tendered by the answer which STATE ex rel. COMMON SCHOOL DIST. (Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 12, 1918.) (Syllabus by the Court.) ished, she started for her boarding house taking a short cut through the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in the evening and a book to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she was criminally assaulted by this man for the gratification of his passions and as a part of the transaction he shot her destroying the sight of her left eye. Some months later his body was found in a creek some miles away with a bullet wound through the heart. and a revolver nearby. He had evidently committed suicide. There is no mistaking the facts recited. The assailant saw the teacher in the morning, lurked about until the opportunity came after she left school, and then committed the assault for purposes of his own. A school district employed a young woman teacher for a one-room school in a densely wooded and sparsely settled part of the country. On her way to her boarding house, after her day's work at the schoolhouse was done, and when off the schoolhouse grounds, she was assaulted by an unknown man for the gratification of his passions and as a part of the transaction she was shot and the sight of one eye was destroyed. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Gen. St. 1913, § 8195 et seq.) gives compensation for personal injury "caused by acci- The Compensation Act requires of the emdent, arising out of and in the course of employ-ployer compensation "in every case of perment." It does not cover workmen except while engaged in or about the premises where their work is done or their service requires their presence; and it excludes “an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employé intended to injure the employé because of reasons per sonal to him, and not directed against him as an employé, or because of his employment." Without determining whether the injuries to the teacher arose in the course of the employment it is held that they were not caused by accident arising out of the employment and that they are not compensable under the Compensa Sonal injury or death of his employé, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of employment," etc. G. S. 1913, § 8203. the phrase "personal injuries arising out of The meaning of the word "accident" and and in the course of employment" is defined as follows: "(h) The word 'accident' as used in the phrases 'personal injuries due to accident' or 'injuries or death caused by accident' in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexCertiorari from District Court, Itasca pected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly County; B. F. Wright, Judge. tion Act. Original writ of certiorari in Supreme Court by the State, on relation of Common School District No. 1, in Itasca County, Minn., to review a judgment of the district court of Itasca County, etc., awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a school-teacher in the employ of such district. Judgment reversed. Baldwin, Baldwin & Holmes, of Duluth, for relator. Ralph A. Stone, of Grand Rapids, for respondent. DIBELL, C. Certiorari to the district court of Itasca to review a judgment awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act to a school-teacher in the employ of school district No. 1 of the county. The facts are not in dispute. The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school some 35 miles from Deer River in Itasca county and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami county, these two places being the nearest railway points. The country is densely wooded and sparsely settled. The school was a one-room school and 15 pupils attended. The nearest house was a half mile away and the boarding place was a mile or a mile and a quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown man asked for food at the boarding place of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when her work at the schoolhouse was fin and violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body. "(i) Personal Injuries, etc.-Without otnerwise affecting either the meaning or interpretation of the abridged clause, 'personal injuries arising out of and in the course of employment,' it is hereby declared: "Not to cover workmen except while engaged ices are being performed, or where their servin, on, or about the premises where their service requires their presence as a part of such hours of service as such workmen, and shall not service at the time of the injury, and during the include an injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employé intended to injure the employé because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employé, or because of his employment." G. S. 1913, § 8230. It is not questioned that a willful assault may be an accident within the definition of the act. Without stopping to consider whether the injury to the teacher occurred in the course of employment, as the statute uses the term, since she was away from the place of her definite school work, and on her way home, and upon that question this opinion is not to be taken as intimating a view, we pass to a consideration of whether it arose out of employment within the meaning of the statute. The phrase, "arising out of employment," is usual to compensation acts though some do not have it, and it has been provocative of litigation. That under some circumstances an injury from an assault is one caused by accident arising out of the employment is |