it cannot enact such severe laws as will amount to a prohibition of importation of foods from another State. "The general rule to be deduced from the decisions of this court," said the Supreme Court of the United States, "is that a lawful article of commerce can not wholly be excluded from importation into a State from another State where it was manufactured or grown. A State has power to regulate the introduction of any article, including a food product, so as to insure purity of the article imported, but such police power does not include the total exclusion even of an article of food." If the inspection law relating to an article of food be not a rightful exercise of the police power of the State so that the inspection prescribed is of such a character, or if it be burdened with such conditions as to wholly prevent the introduction of the sound article from other States, it is invalid. "Whatever our individual views may be," said the Supreme Court of the United States in a case involving intoxicating liquors, "as to the deleterious or dangerous qualities of particular articles, we can not hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as subjects of interstate commerce are not such, or whatever are thus recognized can be controlled by State laws amounting to regulations while they retain that character, although, at the same time, if directly dangerous in themselves, the State may take appropriate measures to guard against injury before it obtains complete jurisdiction over them. To concede to a State power to exclude, directly or indirectly, articles so situated, without Congressional permission, is to concede to a majority of the people of a State, represented in the State Legislature, the power to regulate commercial intercourse between the States by determining what shall be its subjects, when that power was distinctly granted to be exercised by the people of the United 1 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. 757, 43 L. Ed. 49, reversing 170 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 85, 30 L. R. A. 396. 2 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455, affirming 39 Fed. 641; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 11 Sup. Ct. 213, 34 L. Ed. 862, affirming 43 Fed. 638; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 Sup. Ct. 265, 41 L. Ed. 632. States represented in Congress, and its provision by the lat ter was considered essential to that more perfect union which the Constitution was adopted to create." § 62. Discrimination in the Inspection of Domestic and Imported Food. In Georgia, an ordinance of the city of Augusta created a packing house inspector to inspect all meats shipped into the city, or brought from outside the county in which it was situated and offered for food. It was made his duty to visit all packing houses daily and all other places of importers of meat stuffs not otherwise provided for, and secure from them their bills of lading, for the purpose of determining whether or not the shipments had made proper time, and whether the cars containing the meat stuff had been properly iced during transit. It was made his duty to open the cars, and, by proper inspection, ascertain whether the meat stuffs contained in the cars were in a healthful condition for sale; and "all meats and other foodstuffs found not to be in a healthful condition" were to be condemned and ordered out of the city as condemned meat at the expense of the packer. The inspector was allowed to charge the following fees: "Each beef carcass 20 cents, each calf carcass 10 cents, each sheep carcass 10 cents, each hog carcass 10 cents, all cuts of fresh meat, sausage, poultry, game, and fish, per hundredweight, 10 cents." The ordinance imposed no such charge on others engaged in like business. It was held to be an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, discriminatory in character, and invalid. "Discrimination against products of other States," said the court, "can not be allowed, nor can a municipal ordinance undertake to regulate interstate commerce. Inspection laws must be confined to their legitimate purpose, and municipal ordinances must be reasonable. In the ordinance under consideration a special packing house inspector was created, and it was provided 465, 24 L. E. -; Red C. Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board, 172 Fed. 695. 3 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128; Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. that he should visit all packing houses daily, and all other places of importers of meat stuff not otherwise provided for, and secure from them their bills of lading, 'for the purpose of determining whether or not such shipments have made proper time, and whether the cars containing said meat stuff have been properly iced during transit.' These are matters of regulation of commerce, and the municipal authorities had no power to deal with them. Fees were also provided to be paid for the inspection of articles thus received by packing houses or similar establishments to which meat was imported from without the State, but no similar fees or charges were provided as to other establishments selling meat. As to the administration of the ordinance, while it was denied that any discrimination was intended, it was admitted that the defendants considered that the abattoir just outside the city line, and inspected thoroughly by Federal inspection before slaughtering, occupied a much different position from a packer who had his product shipped thousands of miles after it was inspected. This ordinance before us exceeds the authority of the municipality, undertakes to deal with regulations of interstate commerce, is discriminatory in character, and void." 971 § 63. State Inspection Law in Contravention of Federal Meat Inspection Law of 1906. The Act of Congress of 1906 for the inspection of meat1 in so far as it relates to the inspection of animals slaughtered and meats prepared by packing houses for interstate or foreign commerce, does not entirely exclude the States, or municipalities under their authority, from enacting proper inspection laws to prevent meat which has become unfit for 1 Armour & Co. v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178, 67 S. E. 417, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677. See also Evans v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 109 Minn. 64, 122 N. W. 876, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 279, note. A less stringent law was held unconstitutional in Louisiana. 674. ute. food by reason of decay or similar cause from being distributed or sold, to the injury of the health of its citizens. "It will not be presumed," said the court, "that Congress intended to abrogate the power of the State to have meat or food inspected for the protection of its citizens, except in a plain case, certainly it will not be assumed that they intended to delegate such power to an administrative officer, or a bureau, or a meat inspector. An examination of that portion of the Act of Congress of 1906 referring to the Bureau of Animal Industry will show that it dealt principally with the inspection of cattle, sheep, swine and goats before being slaughtered, of carcasses or parts of carcasses after being slaughtered, and of meat products at packing houses and similar establishments where they were prepared for interstate commerce. Persons, firms and corporations were prohibited from transporting or offering for transportation, and carriers of interstate or foreign commerce were prohibited from transporting or receiving for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, any carcass, meat or meat food products thereof which had not been inspected, examined and marked as required by the Act. The Act did not undertake wholly to destroy the right of local inspection by a State or a municipality under its authority after the meat had been shipped to a warehouse or branch agency located in a State other than that where the packing house was, and where it was kept for distribution and sale. It by no means follows because meat has been inspected in Chicago, and found to be in condition suitable for shipment, that, after being shipped into Georgia and there held, it still remains suitable for sale and use as food. The conferring of authority on the Secretary of Agriculture to make rules and regulations necessary for the efficient execution of the Act of Congress did not authorize him to go further and to deny to the States their inherent right of passing legitimate inspection laws. Nor will a regulation by him directing inspectors to notify municipal authorities, and on request to advise with such authorities with a view of preventing the entry into the local market of diseased animal or other prod ucts, and providing that the details of any proposed co-operative arrangement must first be submitted to and approved by the Chief of the Bureau of Animal Industry, be treated as an effort to exclude the State or its subordinate municipalities from exacting proper laws. We can not sustain the broad position that States and municipalities are wholly prohibited from enacting inspection laws touching meats slaughtered or prepared in packing houses located in other States.''2 § 64. Labeling Impure Food. Since a State may entirely prohibit the sale of impure or unhealthful food, so it may permit the sale of such food, but require it to be so labeled as to indicate to the purchasers that it is impure. Such a regulation clearly falls within a State's police power to protect the health of its inhabitants. Speaking of an Act which required all fruit packed for shipment to be marked with the locality in which it was grown, and in holding it invalid, it was said: "If it is a question of the shipping of diseased apples, it would be simple enough for the Legislature, and quite within its power, to regulate or prohibit the transportation of such diseased fruit. If it were a question merely of deception in the label, the direct and efficacious method would be for the Legislature to prohibit false labeling."" § 65. Labeling to Prevent Deception-Baking Powders. In order to protect the public from deception, there is no doubt that the Legislature has ample power to require labels 81 Iowa 642, 47 N. W. 777, 11 L. R. A. 355; Pierce v. State, 63 Md. 592; Steiner v. Ray, 84 Ala. 93, 4 So. 172, 5 Am. St. 332 (fertilizers). 2 Armour & Co. v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 178, 67 S. E. 417, 27 L. R. A. 677. But see Savage v. Scovel, 171 Fed. 566. 1 Ex parte Hayden, 147 Cal. 649, 82 Pac. 315, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, 109 Am. St. 183; State v. Hammond Packing Co., 105 Minn. 359, 117 N. W. 606; State v. Snow, No one can insist upon his right to sell impure food merely because he has placed upon it a label that it is impure. State v. Earl, 152 Mo. App. 235, 133 S. W. 402. |