was misbranded in not having a statement on the casks containing the product of the quantity or proportion of the alcohol contained therein. The bottles were properly labeled. It was contended that "this liquid extract was not shipped in these casks for the purpose of sale thus in bulk, but was so shipped to the owner thereof from one State to another for the purpose of bottling into small packages suitable for sale," and there was therefore no violation of the statute. The court upheld this contention.' But the Supreme Court of the United States has disapproved of it, holding that under similar circumstances there was a clear violation of the statute. In that case eggs were stored by the owner in St. Louis, Missouri. They were preserved in cans, but unfit for food. The owner was a corporation of the State of Illinois, having its bakery business at Peoria in that State. It procured the shipment of the eggs to itself at Peoria, and upon their receipt placed them in their store room in its bakery factory along with other bakery supplies. The eggs were intended for baking purposes, and were not intended for sale in the original unbroken packages or otherwise and were not so sold. The United States instituted libel proceedings against these eggs to secure their condemnation and confiscation. The Supreme Court held that there had been a violation of the statute and that the eggs were liable to confiscation. It carefully reviews the case cited above, but differs from it in the conclusions there reached. The court made the following quotation from one of the cases cited: "Following the words 'having been transported' is an ellipse.-an omission of words necessary to the complete construction of the sentence. Those words are found in the preceding part of the section, and, when supplied, the clause under which this libel is found reads and means 'any article 1 United States v. Knowlton Danderine Co., 170 Fed. 449, N. J. 284; affirmed 175 Fed. 1022, 99 C. C. A. 667. These two cases were followed by United States V. Forty-six Packages and Bags of Sugar, 183 2 United States V. Forty-six Packages and Bags of Sugar, 183 of food, drug, or liquor that is adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this Act, having been transported from one State to another for sale, remaining unloaded, unsold, or in original unbroken packages, shall be liable," etc. "It may well be considered," said the Supreme Court of the United States, "that there is no analogy between an article in the hands of its owner, or moved from one place to another by him, to be used in the manufacture of articles subject to the statute, and to be branded in compliance with it, and an adulterated article itself the subject of sale, and intended to be used as adulterated, in contravention of the purpose of the statute. A legal analogy might be insisted upon if cakes and cookies, which are the compounds of eggs and flour, which several products could be branded to apprise of their ingredients like compounds of alcohol. The object of the law is to keep adulterated articles out of the channels of interstate commerce, or, if they enter into such commerce, to condemn them while being transported or when they have reached their destination, provided they remain unloaded, unsold, or in original unbroken packages. The situations are clearly separate, and we can not unite or qualify them by the purpose of the owner to be a sale. It, indeed, may be asked, in what manner a sale? The question suggests that we might accept the condition, and yet the instances of this record be within the statute. All articles, compound or single, intended for consumption by the producers, are designed for sale, and, because they are, it is the concern of the law to have them pure. It is, however, insisted that 'the proceeding in personam authorized by the law was intended to, and no doubt is, capable of giving full force and effect to the law;' and, further, that a producer in a State is not interested in an article shipped from another State, which is not intended to be sold or offered for consumption until it is manufactured into something else. The argument is peculiar. It is certainly to the interest of a producer or consumer that the article which he receives, no matter whence it comes, shall be pure, and the law seeks to secure that interest, not only through personal penalties, but through the condemnation of the article if impure. There is nothing inconsistent in the remedies, nor are they dependent. The first contention of the egg company is therefore untenable.” § 92. Goods Passed out of Interstate Commerce Before A United States District Court has jurisdiction to proceed in rem under section ten of the food and drugs Act of 1906 against goods which have passed out of interstate commerce before the proceedings in rem have been commenced. Such is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and in rendering its decision it used the following language: "The statute declares that it is one 'for preventing the transportation of adulterated foods . . . and for regulating traffic therein;' and, as we have seen, section two makes the shipper of them criminal, and section ten subjects them to confiscation, and, in some case, to destruction, so careful is the statute to prevent a defeat of its purpose. In other words, transportation in interstate commerce is forbidden to them, and, in a sense, they are made culpable as well as their shipper. It is clearly the purpose of the statute that they shall not be stealthily put into interstate commerce and be stealthily taken out again on arriving at their destination, and be given asylum in the mass of property of the State. Certainly not, when they are yet in the condition in which they were transported to the State, or, to use the words of the statute, while they remain 'in the original, unbroken packages.' In that condition they carry their own identification as contraband of law. Whether they might be pursued beyond the original package we are not called upon to say. That far the statute pursues them, and, we think, legally pursues them, and to demonstrate this 3 Citing The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed. 897, 17 Sup. Ct. 495. 4 Hipolite Egg Co. V. United States, 219 U. S. —, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. -; United States v. Two Barrels of Eggs, 185 Fed. 302. but little discussion is necessary. The statute rests, of course, upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce; and, defining that power, we have said that no trade can be carried on between the States to which it does not extend, and have further said that it is complete in itself, subject to no limitations except those found in the Constitution. We are dealing, it must be remembered, with illicit articles,-articles which the law seeks to keep out of commerce because they are debased by adulteration, and which punishes them (if we may so express ourselves) and the shippers of them. There is no denial that such is the purpose of the law, and the only limitation of the power to execute such purpose which is urged is that the articles must be apprehended in transit, or before they have become a part of the general mass of property of the State. In other words, the contention attempts to apply to articles of illegitimate commerce the rule which marks the line between the exercise of Federal power and State power over articles of legitimate commerce. The contention misses the question in the case. There is here no conflict of national and State jurisdictions over property legally articles of trade. The question here is whether articles which are outlaws of commerce may be seized wherever found; and it certainly will not be contended that they are outside of the jurisdiction of the national government when they are within the borders of a State. The question in the case, therefore, is: What power has Congress over such articles? Can they escape the consequences of their illegal transportation by being mingled at the place of destination with other property? To give them such immunity would defeat, in many cases, the provision for their confiscation, and their confiscation or destruction is the especial concern of the law. The power to do so is certainly appropriate to the right to bar them from interstate commerce, and completes its purpose, which is not to prevent merely the physical movement of adulterated articles, but the use of them, or rather to prevent trade in them between the States by denying to them the facilities of interstate commerce. And appropriate means to that end, which we have seen is legitimate, are the seizure and condemnation of the articles at their point of destination in the original unbroken packages. The selection of such means is certainly within that breadth of discretion which we have said Congress possesses in the execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. § 93. Inspection of Materials and Factories. Regulation sixteen provides that "The Secretary of Agriculture, when he deems it necessary, shall examine the raw materials used in the manufacture of food and drug products, and determine whether any filthy, decomposed, or pu trid substance is used in their preparation." He can make this inspection as often as he may deem necessary. Regulation eight provides that "The factories in which proprietary foods are made shall be open at all reasonable times to the inspection provided for in regulation sixteen." These provisions rest upon a narrow base. Nowhere in the pure food and drugs Act is specific power conferred to make such inspection as these provisions provide for. And it may well be doubted if Congress could confer such power, unless it be limited to food or drugs intended for interstate or foreign commerce. Congress has no power over food and drugs manufactured and sold in the State of their manufacture; and any rule or regulation concerning the inspection of such food or drugs is not only unauthorized but void. But where it is the intention to put the food or drugs into interstate or foreign commerce a different aspect of this question is presented. If Congress has the power to authorize the analysis of food and drugs that have actually entered into interstate or foreign commerce, may it not provide for their analysis before entering into such commerce, if it is the intention of the owner to thus handle them? The difference between an analysis and an inspection, so far as the question of |