if the Legislature takes the view that such a powder is unwholesome, and prevents its sale, the courts can not reverse its decision. "How can we say, in view of the contradictory evidence as to the effect on the health of bread made with alum powders, that the Legislature, beyond a reasonable doubt, transcended its constitutional right in prohibiting the use of alum in bread? We are not authorized to do so. It may be that, in the small quantities now used in these alum powders generally, it can not be shown that any particular person has ever lost his health from their use. But that the Legislature deemed their use deleterious can not be denied, and there is no such conclusive evidence to the contrary as to justify this court in holding that this Act, intended for the benefit of the public health, is void. The mere wisdom or unwisdom of the Act is not for us to decide."" 1 State v. Layton, 160 Mo. 474, 61 S. W. 171, 62 L. R. A. 163, 83 Am. St. 487. "The evidence shows," said the court, "that the trade in alum baking powders, as a trade, has given entire satisfaction to the people. Alum baking powders are nearly as standard an article as flour or sugar. They are to be found upon the shelves of every grocery store, not only in Missouri, but in the United States. They were first introduced about 1870. In spite of the fiercest competition and most hostile rivalry upon the part of the manufacturers of cream of tartar powders, who, the evidence shows, have made every effort to prejudice the minds of the public by every manner of advertisement, and representations, the trade rapidly expanded, until it has now reached vast proportions. The evidence tended to show that alum baking powder sold in the United States last year [1900] amounted to not fewer than 120,000,000 pounds, and involved an enormous expenditure in its manufacture and distribution. The defendant's evidence also tended to show that not only was it a particular can of baking powder, known as "Layton's Health Food," for the sale of which he was prosecuted, but also all alum baking powders in general are, and always have been, healthful and wholesome adjuncts in the preparation of human food. The evidence tends to show that no one had either heard or had known of a single case where the health of a single human being had been injured or had been supposed to have been injured by the use of alum baking powder in the preparation of food, and that the trade in alum baking powder, as a trade prior to the passage of this law, was an honest and lawful business in a generally harmless and useful preparation, and as an adjunct in the cooking of food. The manufacturers and An early statute of Parliament2 absolutely forbade the use of alum in the making of bread. And, irrespective of the statute, it was held indictable to use it in large quantities. Such an act is a common law offense.3 So a statute which requires baking powder to be so labeled as to show the use of alum in it, if such is the case, is valid,* even though it does not require baking powder containing no alum to be labeled.5 § 51. Patented Food. Many articles of food have been patented, so as to secure to the patentee the exclusive right to manufacture it; and efforts have been made to sell such food notwithstanding it was such food as a State statute forbade the sale thereof. But such efforts have been unavailing. "The fact that complainants produced Ariosa under a process protected by letters patent of the United States does not prevent it from coming within the operation of laws passed in the exercise of the police power of the State. The enactment of laws for the protection of health and to prevent imposition in the sale of food products is within this power, and the fact that the process by which it is made is protected by a patent, while it may prevent others from using it during the life of the sellers of both such powders— 2 37 Geo. III, Chap. 98, § 21. Cowp. 12, 15 R. R. 381. In this case a baker was convicted who supplied children at an asylum with bread, into which his servants, to his knowledge, had introduced alum. See also Regina v. Stevens on 3 F. & F. 106, and Burnby v. Bollet, 16 M. & W. 644, 17 L. J. Exch. 190, 11 Jur. (O. S.) 827. 4 Stolz v. Thompson, 44 Minn. 271, 46 N. W. 410; State v. Sherod, 89 Minn. 446, 83 N. W. 417, 50 L. R. A. 660. 5 Stolz v. Thompson, supra. patent, does not deprive the State of this power of regulation for the general good."" § 52. Colored Netting Over Fruit or Vegetables. The city of Chicago prohibited the use of a colored netting to cover any box, basket, or any other package or parcel of fruit, berries or vegetables of any kind; and the ordinance was held invalid, because it was vexatious and unreasonable interference with and restriction upon the rights of dealers in fruits and vegetables. "It was shown," said the court, “and is a matter of common knowledge, that much fruit is shipped and sold wrapped up in tissue paper and in tinfoil, and in packages and baskets covered with wood, all of which material effectually conceals the 'true color and quality' of the fruit until removed. It would be as reasonable to prohibit the one as the other. Fruit dealers would be subject to unjust and offensive discrimination by the enforcement of such an ordinance. Being unreasonable and oppressive in character, the ordinance is void."" § 53. Restricting Sale of Fresh Pork During Summer. Under a power "to prevent or regulate the carrying on of any trade, business or vocation of a tendency dangerous to morals, health or safety, or calculated to promote dishonesty or crime," a municipality can not adopt an ordinance forbidding the sale of fresh pork during the warm season of the year, or between June 1 and October 1. Such an ordinance is unreasonable and void, since, it is said, it violates the inalienable right of man to procure food. "Fresh pork is an article of food for general consumption," said the court, "and when sound and free from disease is useful and nutritious. Like all other food, it may become unwholesome when eaten to excess. The quantity eaten, under ordinary eircumstances, produces the sickness when it proves unwhole 1 Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 51 C. C. A. 122, 113 Fed. 616, 65 L. R. A. 864. 1 Frost v. Chicago, 178 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 869, 49 L. R. A. 657, 69 Am. St. 301. some. Any food is calculated to produce that effect when eaten in the same manner. The mere sale of it is not detrimental to the public health. The fact that individuals may be made sick by it when imprudently eaten does not justify a city council prohibiting the sale of it. For the same reason it could prohibit the sale of any or all other food. The most delicious food-that which is most liable to be eaten to excess would be subject to interdiction. If it be conceded that the city council may prohibit the sale of any article of food, the wrongful use of which will or may injure the health of the consumer, then they can prescribe what the citizens of that city shall eat by prohibiting the sale of all other food. The Legislature or any of its creatures has no such power. The exercise of such power, we have seen, would be a violation of the inalienable right of man to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which life may be preserved and enjoyed. It would be an interference with the liberty of the citizen, which is not necessary to the protection of others or the public health,-would be an invasion of his personal rights."" § 54. Requiring Fresh Meats to be Sold in Markets. A municipality has power to forbid the sale of fresh meats elsewhere than at market houses established by it where its charter empowers it to establish market houses, designate, control and regulate market places, and regulate the vending of fresh meats; and the fact that the city has licensed a person to keep a private meat market for several years does not compel the municipality to continue granting a license, 1 Helena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark. 424, 42 S. W. 1071, 39 L. R. A. 266, 62 Am. St. 206. The court quotes at length Professor Tiedeman's work on Limitations of Police Power, pp. 294, 295. A statute may prevent the sale of the meat of calves slaughtered before they are four weeks old. People v. Dennis, N. Y. —, 114 N. Y. Supp. 7; People v. Jackson, 36 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 282, 73 N. Y. Supp. 461; Williams v. Rivenburg, 129 N. Y. Supp. 473. So one requiring the meat of calves to be tagged with the owner's name, and address. People v. Bishopp, 44 N. Y. Misc. Rep 12, 89 N. Y. Supp. 709. or to prohibit keeping a market within the district where it is situated. Such a person is not deprived of his property without due process of law. The denial of the privilege to sell meats in a municipality except at certain places is not void as in restraint of trade. "Such a power is most necessary for the protection of the health of a city, and has often been recognized."" § 55. State Prohibiting Importation of Food-Interstate Commerce. A State can not exclude from its markets pure food from other States. Thus the State of Minnesota adopted a statute the effect of which was to exclude from the markets all fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, in whatever form, and although entirely sound, healthy and fit for human food, taken from animals slaughtered in other States. This statute tended to restrict the slaughtering of animals whose meat was to be sold in that State, to those engaged in such business in Minnesota. "If the object of the statute," said the Supreme Court of the United States, "had been to deny altogether to the citizens of other States the privilege of selling, within the limits of Minnesota, for human food, any fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork, from animals slaughtered outside of the State, and to compel the people of Minnesota, wishing to buy such meats, either to purchase those taken from animals inspected and slaughtered in the State, or to incur the cost of purchasing them, when desired for their own domestic use, at points beyond the State, the object is 1 Newson v. Galveston, 76 Tex. 559, 13 S. W. 368, 7 L. R. A. 797; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. 100; Buch v. Seabury, 8 Johns, 418; Winnsboro v. Smart, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 552; Bowling Green v. Carson, 10 Bush 65; New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 La. Ann. 417, 21 Am. Rep. 563; St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 549; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 209; Ash v. People, 11 PURE FOOD-7. Mich. 351; Le Claire v. Davenport, 13 Iowa 210; Palestine v. Barnes, 50 Tex. 538; Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, 7 So. 885, 9 L. R. A. 69; Ex parte Canto, 21 Tex. App. 61; State v. Schmidt, 41 La. Ann. 27, 6 So. 530; State v. Barth, 41 La. Ann. 46, 6 So. 531; State v. Natal, 41 La. Ann. 887, 6 So. 722; State v. Sarradat, 46 La. 700, 15 So. 87, 24 L. R. A. 584. |