Government in a war with France in a matter in which we had no interest whatever.

Lord J. Manners, with considerable warmth and vehemence, repudiated the opinions expressed by Mr. Bright, which did not, he said, represent the sentiments of the people of England; and he inquired whether the Emperor of the French still intended to consult the great Powers, prior to annexing Savoy.

Lord J. Russell, in reply to Lord J. Manners, reiterated the reply he had already given-that, reading the speech of the Emperor in conjunction with the assurances given by the ambassador, he did not doubt that the intention of the Emperor was to consult the great Powers with reference to the annexation. He proceeded to observe, that the question was one which related to the position of France and the protection of her frontier, and the Emperor thought it was due to the security of France that Savoy, if the assent of the people could be obtained, should be annexed to its territory; but he (Lord John) understood that the Emperor wished to consult the great Powers of Europe as to the measure, and the opinion of Europe could not be a matter of indifference to the Emperor of the French. He differed from the Government of France in this matter; he conceived that the annexation of Savoy and the occupation of the passes of the Alps by France would be more threatening to Italy than Sardinia could ever be to France. With regard to England, her power did not consist in the Government, but in the Parliament; and if, in a matter of this kind, mere assertion was to be taken for proof, the only effect of discussions in this temper would be to create angry feelings. This

was a question which should be fairly considered, and he had heard with concern, he said, the speeches of both Sir R. Peel and Mr. Bright. It was the duty of the Government and of the House of Commons to consider, in the present state of affairs, in what way the peace of Europe could be best maintained and consolidated, and not to give cause for the increase of suspicion and animosity. With respect to the two versions of the Emperor's speech, the Government had only a telegram; the authentic version would appear in the Moniteur.

Three days afterwards the annexation question was again reopened by Mr. Roebuck, the subject of Savoy having been brought before the House in connection with the pending commercial treaty with France, and some members having expressed an opinion that no further steps ought to be taken in regard to the treaty until the intentions of France in reference to Savoy were made known. The hon. and learned member for Sheffield inveighed on this occasion in strong terms against the Emperor of the French, whom he accused of breach of treaties. He feared, he said, lest England should be thought to truckle to him. There was something in the grave, solemn declaration of a nation like England. With the treaty of commerce he should be anxious to close, if he could; but the consideration of that question ought to be deferred until the House had an opportunity of declaring its opinion on the annexation of Savoy.

Mr. Coningham protested against such language as Mr. Roebuck had applied to the ruler of France, than which nothing, he said, could be more injurious to the interests of

liberty.

Lord J. Russell said, if it was thought necessary to take the whole question of Savoy out of the hands of Her Majesty's Government, that might be a useful course; but there was one course which was consistent neither with constitutional proceedings in that House nor with the confidence usually placed in the Government, and, above all, not consistent with amicable feelings between this country and France; and that was, renewing, day after day, irritating discussions upon this subject, asking for no decisive vote, proposing no definite result, but sowing suspicion and distrust, calculated to bring about a total rupture with a neighbouring friendly country. After recapitulating the course which the question had taken, and the position in which it now stood, he asked whether the present was the moment for raising this discussion. His persuasion was, he said, that if the language of disapprobation was heard from all the great Powers, the project of annexation would not be persevered in. The Government of Sardinia, the Power most interested in the question, had not spoken upon the subject. His opinion was, that the treaty of commerce with France was destined, if approved by Parliament, to draw closer the ties of friendship between the two nations, by giving both an interest in the blessings of peace, which would tend to prevent the great calamity of war.

After some further desultory discussions on the same subject in both Houses, Lord John Russell undertook to give a formal explanation on behalf of the Govern

tion. The noble Lord discharged this undertaking on the 12th of March. He began his speech by representing the state in which the question of Savoy and Nice had been left by the late Administration, and proceeded to vindicate the present Government from the accusation that they had pursued a policy which, by promoting the annexation of the Romagna and Tuscany to Sardinia, laid a ground for that of Savoy to France. This accusation was founded, he said, upon an entire misapprehension. Their policy had been to endeavour, by negotiation, to secure to the Italian people the power of managing their own affairs. He then explained the communications which had taken place on the subject of certain proposed combinations for the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the establishment of a kingdom of Central Italy. The British Government, he observed, were not hostile to either; they wished the people of Italy to decide for themselves; to assert their independence of any Power whatever, and, if they thought proper, to unite themselves to Sardinia. It had been said that for a long time he had acquiesced in the design of France to annex Savoy, and that he took no step in the matter until late in the month of January. But this was a mistake of dates. On the 5th of July he had stated what he considered would be the consequences to the Emperor of the French if the plan of annexing Savoy was carried into effect, in the general distrust it would create. But, according to Count Walewski, no such plan was then contemplated, and, the contingency he referred to being improbable, it was unnecessary for

him (Lord John) to say that, supposing the Grand Duke of Tuscany not to be restored, and a kingdom of Central Italy not to be formed, he must reiterate the declaration he had made. In January, however, the question had assumed a different shape, showing that there was a project on foot for the annexation of Savoy, and at the end of that month the Government renewed the expres sion of its fears as to the consequences of the measure. It had been objected, he continued, that the Government had been so anxious for the independence of Italy that they had neglected other objects. But in 1856 Lord Clarendon had thought the question of the state of Italy of so much importance that he brought it before the Conference, and later occurrences had induced the Government to consider it one of European interest, and, if so, of British interest. It was for European objects that they had employed the influence of Great Britain, and employed it peacefully, to reconcile differences, prevent war, and lay the foundations of peace between the great Powers of Europe. If, in doing so, they could enable Italy to regain her independence, and raise a country, which had for three centuries been sunk and degraded, into one of the leading Powers of Europe, so far from being ashamed, and shrinking from any responsibility, he should always take a pride in having been allowed to participate in such an object.

Mr. Whiteside adverted to the repeated warnings given by Swit zerland, which, he observed, had always seemed to know what was about to happen, that a bargain had been struck between France

and Sardinia for handing over Savoy and Nice to the former Power, and that this question was of vital importance to the safety and independence of Switzerland. The British Government, however, had done nothing in consequence of these repeated warnings; and, although Lord Cowley, in the month of January, wrote for instructions, up to the 28th there was nothing to show what the Government thought or did on the subject. On that day Lord J. Russell wrote a very good despatch; but in that despatch he did not make a remonstrance founded upon the general law of Europe. Mr. Whiteside referred to some of the papers laid before the House, with the view of showing that the French Government had very frankly declared its views that if Sardinia was aggrandized by the addition of Tuscany and the Romagna, France must have Savoy and Nice; and he contended that the Government had laboured to bring about this contingency.

After some observations by Mr. Milnes and Mr. Cochrane,

Mr. Horsman said he believed the House would be unanimous in thinking that the annexation of Savoy should not be made a cause of war. But the question was, whether France would not thereby acquire a new military frontier. The treaties of 1815 were securities taken by the great Powers of Europe against the traditional policy of France-a policy of war and aggrandizement-and what right had Sardinia to liberate France from obligations for the protection of Europe? Then what was to be done? Had Sardinia no alternative but war or acquiescence? Lord J. Russell, in his despatch, had re

ferred to the Rhine and to Belgium; then, if we apprehended danger, the policy of this country was to take precautions and form alliances with other Powers. This was the traditional policy of this country, to form alliances in order to check aggression and the preponderance of any great Power, and he thought the Government would have done wisely upon this occasion by entering into such an alliance. Instead of this, they had busied themselves with a commercial treaty with France. The policy of tame acquiescence would be a dangerous and an unworthy policy; the other would place us in a dignified attitude before the world.

Lord Palmerston thought the course which the Government had pursued in this matter was much more clear and consistent than Mr. Whiteside had represented. It was evident that this was not a case upon which the issue of peace or war ought to depend. The cession of Savoy did not involve the interests of this country so as to induce us to go to war to prevent it. As regarded England, France would not be stronger after the acquisition of Savoy than before. If this was agreed upon, it was clear that some of the measures recommended in the debate would not be expedient. To enter into alliances with the great Powers of Europe, unless the matter was of sufficient importance, would inspire alarm, and rouse the national feeling in France. Her Majesty's Government, when it appeared that no Congress would take place, and there would be no opportunity to bring the matter into discussion in the assembly of the great Powers, stated to France and to the other Powers their objections to the measure. He thought it would be

a great mistake in the French Government if they persisted in the plan of annexation, and it would be a glorious act on the part of France if, after having restored independence to Italy, she was content with the renown of that generous enterprise without mixing it up with so small an object. The reasons assigned for the annexation he thought insufficient, and the objection felt by the British Government was not founded upon what they considered British interests, but upon the danger to Europe of the precedent and of the principles,-those of natural boundaries and the identity of language,-upon which the annexation was justified. As it was not to be done without the consent of the sovereign and the people of Savoy, and the assent of the great Powers of Europe, we were not come to the point when we were authorized to hold that reflection might not induce the Government of France to abandon the design. In the opinion of our Government this was a question of European interest, and he could not help thinking that other Governments would take the same view as our own, and that the Government of France would find that it would gain more by preserving the good opinion of Europe than by the acquisition of this small territory.

Mr. Disraeli, after disclaiming any desire to make the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France a ground of war, observed that Lord J. Russell had not denied that he had received ample and repeated warnings of the design of the French Government. His defence was, that he thought the intimations mere threats, and he treated them with indifference. Then he (Mr. Disraeli) contended that,

being acquainted with the policy of France, if Sardinia was aggrandized by the acquisition of the duchies, it might be expected that she would demand the anannexation of Savoy, and the Government had pursued a course favouring that policy. This was the charge he had brought against the Government, and Lord J. Russell had given the House no information upon this subject. The conduct of France had been

frank and open; but, if the principle of natural boundaries was to be acted on-if distrust was excited in Europe-if sanguinary war followed and dynasties were subverted-the Government which had assisted that policy would be responsible to the country and to history for the consequences.

After speeches from Mr. Kinglake, Mr. Seymour Fitzgerald, and Mr. B. Osborne, the discussion terminated.