such his estate in the said reversion, at whose death the said reversion, with the appurtenances, descended to the plaintiff as son and heir of the said B B; whereby the plaintiff became seized of the said reversion, with the appurtenances, and being so seized, and the said D being so possessed of the demised premises, with the appurtenances, the sum of $-of the rent aforesaid, for one year ending on &c., became in arrear from the said D to the plaintiff, and still remains unpaid; whereby an action hath accrued to the said plaintiff, to demand and receive of the said D, the said sum of $; yet though requested, &c.

Against assignee of lessee for rent.

For that whereas heretofore, to wit, on &c., at &c., by a certain indenture, then and there made, between the said plaintiff of the one part, and one E F of the other part (the counterpart of which said indenture, sealed with the seal of the said E F, the plaintiff now brings here into court, the date whereof is the day and year aforesaid,) the plaintiff, for the consideration therein mentioned, did demise, lease, &c., to the said E F, his executors &c., all that &c., (here follow the language of the indenture to the end of the reservation of the rent on which the action is grounded,) as by the said indenture, reference thereto being had will more fully appear; and the plaintiff in fact saith, that after the making of the said indenture, to wit, on &c., at &c., all the estate of the said E. F., in the said demised premises, by assignment then and there legally made, came to and vested in the said D; whereupon and whereby the said D entered into the said demised premises, with the appurtenances, and became and was possessed thereof, to wit, at &c. aforesaid; and although the plaintiff hath in all things, well and truly observed and performed all things in the said indenture, on his part to be performed and observed, yet protesting that the said D, since the assignment, hath not performed all things in the said indenture, on his part to be performed, the said plaintiff in fact saith, that after the said assignment, and during the continuance of the said term, and whilst the said D was so possessed of the demised premises as aforesaid, to wit, on &c., at &c., a large sum of money, viz. $- ofthe rent aforesaid, for three years of the said term, ending on the day and year last aforesaid, became due from the said C D to the plaintiff, and still is in arrear and unpaid, contrary to the form and effect of the said in

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denture, by the said E F, in that behalf made; by reason whereof an action hath accrued to the plaintiff to demand and have of the said D, the said sum of $-; yet though requested, &c.

7. On Judgments.

By the act of Congress, May 6, 1790, ch. 38, it is provided in substance, that the records of judicial proceedings of each state, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have, by law or usage, in the courts of the state where such records are taken.

The settled construction of this section of the act is, that the judg ment of a state court shall have the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where pronounced; and that, whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none other, can be pleaded in any other court in the United States. See the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234. The law is laid down to a similar effect by Mr. Justice Story, in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481.

This simple proposition furnishes a principle, which serves as a master-key to unlock all the difficulties in relation to the efficacy, which shall be allowed to the judgment of one state, in the judicial tribunals of another. Suppose, for instance, A recovers judgment against B, in Massachusetts, and afterwards sues B on the judgment in New-York, of what pleas may B avail himself, supposing circumstances to bear him out? He may plead any plea that he might plead to a suit on the same judgment in Massachusetts: as, 1. No such record; this the plaintiff may answer, by replying and producing an exemplification of the record. 2. He may plead to the jurisdiction of the court before whom the original judgment against him was recovered; as if the judgment in Massachusetts was rendered before a Justice of the Peace for a greater amount of damages than $20, &c. Or he might show that he was not within the jurisdiction of the court, when the suit was commenced, or at any time afterwards; in which case that part of his property only, which was within the jurisdiction at that time, and not his person, or his other property, would be bound by the judgment. 3. He might plead that the judgment was obtained against him by fraud, and that he never had any actual or constructive notice of the suit. 4. He might be allowed to show, that he had paid the judgment, &c., or that it was released, or satisfied by a levy, &c. These pleas, going to show, that the judgment was either void, or was satisfied, or released, he might plead in the courts of the state, where judgment was obtained, and consequently might avail himself of them, in any other court of the United States, where he happened to be sued. But he would not be allowed to object to or to inquire into the consideration, on which the judgment was originally recovered, as he perhaps would, in the case of a foreign judgment; nor would he be permitted to show, that the court had decided wrong, supposing the merits of the case, and the person and the estate of the defendant to be within the jurisdiction of the court making the decision. For, these he could not plead or show, in an action

on the judgment, brought in the same court where the judgment was recovered.

Quære, &c.

See the following references; 9 Mass. R. 462; 4 Cranch, 442; 6 Wheat. 129; 1 Dal. 261; 15 Johns. 121.

Where suits on foreign judgments are brought, whether they are only prima facie evidence of a debt, or whether they are conclusive, except when liable to the objections of fraud, want of jurisdiction, &c. does not seem settled. See Mass. R. 273. See 1 Starkie on Evidence, p. 214, with the notes on these topics, by the learned editor, Mr. Metcalf.

DECLARATIONS IN DEBT ON JUDGMENT.

On judgment of Common Pleas.

In a plea of debt; for that the said plaintiff by the consideration of our justices of our court of C. P. held within and for our county of &c., on &c., recovered judgment against the said T by the name of T T, of &c., for the sum of $100 damages, and $10 costs of the same suit, as by the record thereof, now remaining in said court, appears ; which said judgment is in full force, and not reversed, annulled, or satisfied; whereby an action hath accrued to the said plaintiff to have and recover of the said T, the said several sums of $100, and of $10, amounting in the whole to $110; yet the said T, though requested, hath never paid the same, but wholly refuses so to do. F. DANA.

NOTE. If the action is on a judgment of a court in another state, say, "a copy whereof, duly authenticated, the said plaintiff here in court produceth." U. S. L. vol. 1, p. 115.

If judgment is satisfied in part, say, "which said judgment remains in full force and unsatisfied in part, to wit, for the sum of $-, although our writ of execution hath issued thereupon, which is returned into our said court, satisfied in part only, to wit, for the sum of $-, whereby an action hath accrued to the plaintiff, to demand and recover of the said T, the said sum of $-, with the sum of &c, more for the writ aforesaid; yet the said T hath not paid either of the two last mentioned sums, though requested, but detains them." R. DANA.

On a judgment of the S. J. Court against administrator. For that the said plaintiff, by the consideration of our justices of our S. J. Court, holden at &c., on &c., [" by adjournment from &c., then next preceding," if so] recovered judgment against the said B B, for the sum of $1000 damages, and $20 costs of suit, as, by the record thereof, in the same court remaining, appears; since which, the said B B is deceased, and administration of his estate is duly

committed to the said T, and the said judgment still remains in full force; and the several sums aforesaid are still due and unpaid; whereby an action hath accrued to the said plaintiff, to have and recover the same out of the estate of the said B B, in the hands of the said T, his administrator as aforesaid; yet though often requested, the said T hath never paid the same, but refuses so to do. TROWBRIDGE.

NOTE. If on justice's judgment, say, "for that the said A, on &c., at &c., before CC, Esq. one of the justices of the peace within and for the county of &c., by the consideration of said justice, recovered judg ment against the said T for the sum of $10 debt or damage, and $2 costs of suit, as by the record thereof remaining, more fully appears," &c., [as before.]

Great care is necessary in setting forth the particulars of a judgment; for where there was a judgment for £288. Os. 1d. and debt was brought for £288, omitting the penny, it was held to be a fatal variance, and not to be cured by a remittit of the penny, because the remittit should be before judgment. Strange's R. 1171.

Debt on Statutes.

Where a Statute is made for the remedy of any injury, mischief, or grievance, an action lies by the party grieved, either by the express words of the Statute, or by implication. This action is considered as a remedial action, and not as a penal one, and the damages are considered in the light of a compensation for an injury sustained, and not as a penalty. 10 Co. 75, b; 2 T. R. 154. Where a penalty, or damages, is given, or a remedy provided by a Statute, in general terms, for a grievance, the party aggrieved alone shall have an action on the Statute for it, and without saying qui tam. 2 Inst. 486, 650; Mod. Cases, 26, 27.

Where a particular mode of redress, form of action, or manner of declaring is pointed out in a Statute, that must be strictly observed. But, where no particular form of action is designated, if the Statute gives damages to the party aggrieved, he may recover these in an action on the Statute, in the nature of an action on the Case, as for a tort; but, if a particular penalty is imposed by the Statute, it is more agreeable to analogy, to bring an action of Debt.

If a Statute gives a penalty to every one who will sue, a qui tam action lies by the informer. 2 Lev. 237. But a common informer can sue on his own account, only where that privilege is given him by the Statute, in express words, or by necessary implication. Stra. 828; 5 East's R. 313. In such case, the person who first commences a popular action, attaches a right in himself, which no subsequent suit can divest. 6 Johns. R. 102.

Of the nature of a qui tam action.

A qui tam action is the suit of the informer, and therefore he may be nonsuited. 3 Lev. 398; Lutw. 196. If the informer die after verdict,

his executor or administrator shall have judgment for his moiety. Hard. 161. It is discretionary with the court to permit a penal action, brought by a common informer, to be compounded. 1 Wils. 79. But it seems otherwise in a qui tam action, brought by the party aggrieved, without whose consent it cannot be done. It is a general rule, in compounding penal actions, to require the part of the king, people, &c., to be first paid, unless there appear some special circumstances to the contrary. 10 Johnson's R. 118; 4 Bur. 1929; 2 Black. R. 1154. Under favorable circumstances a penal action may be compounded after verdict. 1 B. & P. 18. If process is not sued out within the time limited by the Statute, no Debt vests in the informer, and therefore the defendant is not obliged to plead, that the time limited has expired. 3 T. R. 11. In actions on penal Statutes the defendant may pay the penalty into court with costs. Bul. N. Prius,

197.

Of the manner of declaring in actions on Statutes.

If a Statute gives a remedy, for a matter which was actionable at common law, without expressly or by necessary implication, taking away the common law remedy, the action may be brought either at common law, or on the Statute. 2 Inst. 200. If, in such case, the informer, or plaintiff, means to rely on the Statute, he must recite so much of it, as is necessary to show the grounds of his action, if it is a private Statute; or, if it is a public one, he must refer to it, otherwise it will be a waiver of his remedy on the Statute, and he will be obliged to rely on his remedy by the common law, or fail in his action. It was usual anciently to set out the Statute, on which the action was grounded, although a public one, of which the courts were bound to take notice without pleading, but even then it was not held necessary to rehearse any more than sufficient, to show on what the plaintiff grounded his action, or which was applicable to the matter in question. And accordingly, it was held sufficient to say, "that it was, among other things, enacted," &c. Com. Digest, (2 S. 3.) But now it is held inexpedient to recite any part of a public Statute, as a misrecital is always dangerous; and, if in a material part, it is usually fatal; especially if the declaration concludes, with referring to the Statute so erroneously rehearsed, by saying, "contrary to the form of the Statute aforesaid." If, therefore, it is thought expedient to recite any part of the Statute, the declaration should always conclude with, contrary to the form of the Statute in this case made and provided;" for these words will aid the declaration, and any public act (if there be any) which furnishes a foundation for the action, will be considered as referred to; and the misrecital of the Statute will be rejected as mere surplusage. Lut. 140; Com. Dig. Pleader, (2 S. 10.)

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So also, where the action is sustainable at common law, and the declaration concludes, "against the Statute or Statutes," &c., and the Statutes have been misrecited, or incorrectly referred to, or there is no Statute in fact, in relation to the subject, those words in the declaration shall be rejected as surplusage, and the action shall be maintained at common law. See Salk. 212; Comyn's Digest, Action upon Statute (C.)

If a Statute creates a new offence, of which the common law takes