cerned in them; and entertaining a wish to prevent a confusion of works, titles, editions and editors, the present editor thought best to bestow a new title on this work, to which its new arrangement of materials, as well as the large quantity of additional matter contained in it, which has doubled its original size, well entitles it.

The additions to this work consist, 1. Of a number of valuable forms, selected, partly from manuscripts prepared under the direction of Judge Story, partly from approved draughts of distinguished pleaders found on the records; the rest from the best English authorities: 2. Of notes marked (MSS.) which are taken from the same manuscripts: 3. Of a new general Introduction to the whole work: 4. Of a concise Introduction to each form of action; and 5. Of annotations introduced occasionally throughout the work without any distinguishing mark. For the three last numbers, viz. the general Introduction to the whole work, the introduction to each form of action, and the annotations, and a few original draughts of comparatively small importance, amounting in the whole to about 150 pages closely printed, the present editor is alone responsible.

In the general Introduction, as well as in the introductory remarks to each form of action, and in the annotations throughout the whole, which he has generally inserted in immediate connexion with the forms to which they relate, the present editor's aim has been to make the work as useful as possible. For this purpose he has often omitted such matters as every professional gentleman is necessarily presumed to be acquainted with, and with which much space is not infrequently occupied in works of practice. By adopting this course, he thus gains room for other things less obvious, and, if not of such general application, at least not so commonly known, nor so readily obtained.

It would have been his utmost ambition to make the work a manual of safe practice, but this object is attainable only in a moderate degree. For the passing of general laws with a view merely to particular occasions, purposes, and persons, without duly considering what the operation may be on the public at large, or how far such new laws may trench upon or deform the whole system of the common or previous law; the desire, which many judges on their first appointment seem to have to break through the trammels of former decisions, by which in their practice at the bar they had found themselves shackled, and perhaps considered their clients aggrieved; the wavering and uncertainty, which occasionally seems to affect the most able and discerning judges in determining, from a comparison of the ill effects in either case, whether at once to

overrule an inconvenient decision, or, by suffering a long continued error to be matured into right, to yield to its authority, and thus give their own sanction to its injustice or impolicy; the influx of false opinions, from which the law is not exempt any more than religion or philosophy; the progress of society, whether to or from its zenith, occasioning new relations of individual or political intercourse, and consequently requiring new regulations; in an especial manner in our own state, the gradual introduction of equity into our municipal law, in portions not well defined and incoherent, by laws enacted from time to time, and perhaps suggested by particular emergencies, so that the whole system has become like the coat of the patriarch's son, and if regularity had not been wanting, might well be entitled to the denomination of the law and Court of Exchequer, has for a long time kept, and probable will always to a certain extent, keep the law in a state of continual flux and change.

It is from this uncertainty and instability of the law, that the dif ficulty arises, which is so often seen, of ascertaining, à priori, the result of any law case, where able counsel are employed, and which is sometimes so great, that little more than mere conjecture can be hazarded in relation to it; and hence, too, there can be no decision of any question, whichwill probably arise hereafter among men eminent in the profession, but which may be justified by authority, sanctioned by precedent, or at least grounded on analogy.

From these evils, the imperfection of our legislative system, however admirable in some respects, affords no hopes of deliverance; and a mitigation of them can only be hoped from the wisdom and prudence of those, who preside in the courts. And while the benches of our Supreme Judicial Court, and Court of Common Pleas are filled, as now, with men of the highest respectability for religion, learning, and probity, reliance may safely be placed on them for that purpose, and justice in the abstract, without doubt, will be administered to all, without distinction, as far as the compliance with indispensable forms will permit. But if hereafter, byinjudicious appointments, men of a different character should obtain possession of these honorable stations, it will be found, that a test is wanting of the proper discharge of judicial duty, and that official delinquency is perfectly consistent with the absence of proof of palpable corruption, and that a most unjust decision may be sustained and justified, by plausible deductions of reason, from expediency, analogy and precedent.

But in the present work there are other sources of imperfection

of a personal nature, for which apology would be useless and inef fectual, since, in the words of the wise man, "what is wanting cannot be numbered;" and the editor would have made it more useful if he could.

The author thinks he cannot conclude this preface better than by reciting the following case, which, as relating to the official conduct of one of the greatest judges that ever sat on the King's Bench, cannot fail to give rise, in the mind of the discerning reader, to many interesting reflections.

In the month of November, 1768, a woman having appeared before two of his majesty's justices of the peace, to swear a child against the secretary to Count Bruhl, the Saxon minister, the Count interfered, and the justices were afraid to proceed. The woman applied to Sir Fletcher Norton, who advised that a motion should be made in the Court of King's Bench, for a peremptory mandamus to the justices to proceed in that filiation. The motion was according. ly made by Mr. Mansfield.

The Lord Chief Justice Mansfield received it with marks of anger and surprise; he said he did not understand what was meant by such collusive motions, unless it was to draw from that court an opinion upon the privileges of foreign ministers, which they had no right to meddle with; that the motion was absolutely improper; that he wondered who advised it, and that he certainly should not grant the mandamus.

Sir Fletcher Norton then got up, and said that the party was his client; that his majesty's subjects, when injured, had a right to redress somewhere or other; and that he knew of no place where such redress could be legally applied for or obtained, but in the Court of King's Bench; that therefore he had advised the motion.

Lord Mansfield, upon this, began to flourish, in his usual style, upon the sacred privileges of ambassadors, the law of nations, &c. &c., repeated something about collusive motions, and took notice that the application for redress ought regularly to have been made to Count Bruhl, or to his majesty's attorney general.

Mr. Justice Aston said, deliberately, that he agreed entirely with the Lord Chief Justice, and that the motion ought not to be granted.

Sir Fletcher Norton then said, that after he had declared himself the adviser of the motion, he did not expect to have heard it again called collusive; that he despised and abhorred all ideas of collusion as much as any man in that court; that it was the first time, and he hoped it would be the last, that he should hear the Court of King's Bench refer an injured subject of England to a foreign minister or to an attorney general for redress; that the laws of this

country had not left his majesty's subjects, complaining of injury, without a legal and certain protection; that their claim was a claim of right, upon which the Court of King's Bench had full authority to inquire, and must determine; that if his clients were injured, he should always bring them to that court for redress, let who would have committed the injury, and he would take care that that court should do them justice; that his motion was proper and should not be withdrawn.

Judge Yates then said, that the reasons offered by Sir Fletcher Norton had clearly convinced him; that he had not the least doubt of the authority of the court to protect his majesty's subjects; and that, for his part, he should never refer them either to a foreign minister, or to an officer of the crown; that he thought the motion perfectly regular, and that it ought to be granted.

Judge Aston then began to recant. He said, that he was always glad to be convinced of a mistake, and happy in having an early opportunity of acknowledging it; that from what his brother Yates and Sir Fletcher Norton had said, he saw clearly that his first opinion had been erroneous, and that he agreed the motion ought to be granted.

Lord Mansfield then, in great confusion, said that he should take time to consider of it. To this Sir Fletcher Norton replied, that as two of the three judges were of the same opinion, the motion must be granted; but that, for his part, if his lordship wanted any time to consider, whether, when a subject applied to the Court of King's Bench for redress, he was or was not to be referred to a foreign minister or to an attorney general, he had no objection to allowing him all the time he wanted.

THE compiler avails himself of the opportunity, afforded by a call for another edition of this work, to improve it by the addition of new and valuable matter, and the retrenchment of what might best be spared. In this way, he hopes to increase its utility, without much increasing its size. For this purpose, the whole work has been carefully revised, the general Introduction written over again, and a great number of points of practice, decided since the last edition, interwoven among the forms. The Precedents have been left without alteration. To attempt to alter them, to make them conform to the modifications introduced by the Revised Stat

utes, would weaken their authority, as by so doing, they would lose the sanction of the names of the eminent counsel by whom they were originally draughted. The annotations, however, give notice of these modifications, and suggest the alterations, which the young practitioner may find it expedient to adopt. These changes are not so numerous, as might reasonably have been apprehended. Because the Revised Statutes, though occasionally introducing important changes in the law, for the most part were intended merely to simplify the law, by collecting, arranging, condensing and reducing to a systematic code, the various provisions and enactments, which otherwise, are only to be found dispersed, here and there, through the statutes of many previous years. Besides, it cannot be dissembled, that, judging from the past, it was impossible to have any implicit confidence, that those changes in the law, however specious they might be in appearance, would be of any long continuance.

The advantage to be derived from a revision of the statutes in the manner referred to, is, that they are reduced within a reasonable compass, and thus brought within the reach of the general reader. But great benefits are often accompanied with some serious disadvantages, and this case seems to furnish no exception to this general remark. Before the Revised Statutes, the law, consisting of the statutes then in force, and the decisions grounded on them, constituted one great and tolerably harmonious system, which, though too large to be within the grasp of any other than professional students, afforded to a certain limited extent, to parties contending in law, sufficient rules, by which they might generally arrive at a probable conjecture, as to the extent of their legal rights, and furnish their legal advisers grounds, on which to anticipate the result of any suit, which they might be compelled to institute, to settle or assert those rights. But the Revised Statutes, having repealed all those statutes, on which the learned opinions of the courts were grounded, have absolutely shaken to the foundation the whole system of law previously existing. It is true, that, in most cases, the Legislature merely intended to condense, arrange, and re-enact those statutes, which they repealed; and for the sake of the argument, it may be admitted, that all the modifications introduced by the Revised Code,, are, in the highest degree politic and salutary; yet, in cases where it may be considered somewhat doubtful, whether the Legislature intended to alter the law or not, as well as in cases where it seems tolerably clear they did not intend any alteration, by altering the phraseology of the repealed statutes, which they intended substantially to re-enact, they have weakened, if not destroyed the