welfare of the noblest part of the creation, the intelligent part of it.

But if there were the uncertainty that is not; the right confequence would not be, Favour yourself: it would be, Secure yourfelf: Provide against the worft. Let your prefent enjoyments be directed by the influence they may have on your future happiness: confider the whole poffible extent of your existence, and forego the fatisfaction of a few moments, rather than hazard the loss of a good that may continue for endless ages.

Such feem the proper inferences in this cafe; and the fecurity of ourfelves is very unlikely to be effected by favouring our felves: the refult of this, in a remoter period, may, with the highest degree of probability, be conjectured from what is, every day, experienced.

Bear and forbear, is the leffon for him who merely feeks to give his prefent life all the comfort in his power. Great inconveniences we cannot even here avoid, but by fubmitting to leffer.

Freedom from pain is the price of the enjoyments we deny ourselves; and ftrength of body purchased by the exercise that to feverely fatigues it.

To what fleepless nights would he be condemned, whofe cafe throughout the day was to have no interruption? How little relifh fhould we have of our food, were we to know nothing of the difquiet of hunger? The man who would moft tafte the gratifications of fenfe, must be the most sparing in his application to them; thence it is they not only are heightened, but continued to us. It seems the condition of our being, that we should have no pleasure gratis that we should pay for each, before or after its enjoyment. To decline whatever we could be lefs pleased with, is the fureft way to increase both the number of our fufferings, and their weight.

What can be more precarious than the continuance of human life? Who in his twentieth year acknowledges not, how uncertain it is whether he fhall fee his fortieth? Yet no one of common prudence feeks barely to crowd as much fatisfaction into his life, as can confift with his reach ing that period: there is no prudent man but denies himself many things, in hopes of attaining a much longer term.

We muft unufually fail in the love of our children, if we would not purfue their welfare, in the fame way by which we judge

our own best confulted. But where is the advocate for "Favour yourfelf, fince all "things are uncertain," who, if discretion makes any part of his character, governs himself by that principle in their education-who does not reftrain them in a thoufand inftances? while yet the uneafinefs it gives, and the tears it coffs them, may probably never find that very small recompence, which must be the utmost he can propose from it. I fay, this recompence may, probably, never be found; a late eminent mathematician having, upon an exact calculation, obferved, that one half of thofe that are born, are dead in feventeen years time.

Some claim to a public fpirit, to a love of their country, we find made by the generality of us, even in this very profligate age. But from him, whofe rule it is to favour himfelf, the public can have nothing to expect. Were this the prevailing principle among us, 'tis obvious how little regard would be fhewn to the common welfare.

All of the learned profeffions would regulate their application, by its fubferviency to their maintenance, and think they had nothing fo much to fludy, as how to make their fortune.

Soldier and failor would have no notion of any honour diftinct from their advantage of any obligation they could be under, when their pay might be fafe, to endanger their perfons.

The people would judge none fo fit to reprefent them, as they who had been at the greatest expence in corrupting them: and the reprefentatives of the people would fee no reafon why the whole of what was to be gained fhould go to their conftituents.

In fhort, nothing but fupinenefs and floth-an attachment to their eafe, and the gratification of their fenfes-low, unmanly views-pursuits throughout the most felfifh and fordid could prevail, among orders and degrees of men, in any country, where the received doctrine was, favour yourself.

all

Hence certainly is it, that not only the better conftituted governments, but even the nations of a lefs refined policy, have encouraged fo much an indifference to the feanty portion of life here allotted us-to the continuance, the eafe, the conveniences of it; exciting, by various methods, each member of the community, to have chiefly at heart the public intereft—to be ever di

higent and active in promoting it-to fubmit to any difficulties for the fervice of his country, and to defpife death in its defence.

Nor do we, univerfally, efteem any charafters more, than those of the persons who have diftinguished themselves by their difinterefedncis-by their zeal for the common good-by their flighting all private advantages that came in competition with it. What has been the language of the more generous Heathen, but the very reverfe of Favour thyfelf? Plato advifes his friend Archy:as to confider "that we are "not born for ourselves alone-that our country, our parents, our friends have their refpective claims upon us." Epift. ix. p. 358. vol. 3.

Aristotle, in fettling the true difference between the lawful and culpable love of curfelves, obferves, that fuch love of ourfelves is, undoubtedly, blameable, as indeces us to feek as large a fhare as may be, of wealth, honour, and fenfual pleasure. He, afterwards, confiders a life of reafon and virtue, as the proper life of a man, and pronounces him the true lover of himfelf, who makes fuch a life his care.

He goes on, "When all are intent on "the practice of what is right, and each "lays himself out on the worthieft actions, the public welfare will, thereby, be effectually provided for, and every private perfon confult his own greateft happinels. It is most truly faid, of the good "man, that he will ferve his friends and "his country-will do it, even at the ex"pence of his life. For, as to wealth, honour, and all thofe other goods about which there is so much stir in the world, "he will have no regard to them, when they come into competition with the difcharge of his duty. He will rather chufe "to live one year well, than many at ran"dom. He is justly thought the good man, "who has nothing fo much at heart, as "how to act rightly."

To mention another Greek writer; We are born, fays the excellent empeperor Antoninus, to affift each other, 1. z. 1. His counfel is, "Whatfoever you do, do it with a view to your being a good man; good, not in the ordinary, bat in the strict and proper fenfe of the word," 1. iv. § 10. In this delight, in this repofe yourself, in paling from one “afeful action to another; ftill mindful of "the Deity." 1. vi. § 7.

"Whatsoever I do," fays he, " by my"felf, or the affiftance of others, ought "wholly to be directed by what the common advantage requires." 1. vii. § 5.

He, elsewhere, cenfures every action of ours, that has no reference either immediately, or more remotely, to the duties of tocial life, 1. ix. § 23. To defpile, fays Tully, and make no account of pleasure, life, wealth, in comparison of the public welfare, is the part of a great and generous mind. A life of toil and trouble in order to promote, if poffible, the good of all mankind, would be much more agreeable to nature, than to pafs one's days in folitude, not only without any care, but enjoying the greatest pleasures, and having every thing could be wanted at command. De Off. I. iii. 283, 284.

We are all, according to Seneca, members of one great body, Ep. 95. We must confult the happinels of others, if we would our own. In his treatife of a Happy Life, mentioning what the man must be, who may hope to pafs hence to the abodes of the celeftial beings; part of his defcription of him is, "That he lives as if "he knew himself born for others-con"fults in all he does the approbation of "his confcience-regulates his every ac<tion by confidering it as well known to "the public, as it is to himself-treats the "whole world as his country-regards " the gods as prefent wherever he is, and as remarking whatever he acts and fpeaks."

True happiness is, throughout this author's works, confidered as derived from virtue-from the steady purfuit of what is right and our duty.

These reflections will, I hope, appear not improperly introducing the confideration of the part we have to act as expectants of happiness in a future ftate; the fubject of the following effty.

This expectation does not indeed furnish any employment of our time that would not be comprehended under the heads on which I have already enlarged; but it is the strongest poffible enforcement of what they teach us.

Can I fuppofe that beyond the grave there is any happiness prepared for me, if I live unmindful of the privileges here vouchfafed me if, when I am placed above the beafts, I will put myself level with them-if that fpiritual part of me, which makes me a fit subject for this M 4 happiness,

upon a

happiness, be neglected, and all my care and pains laid out on my body, on what was earth fo lately, and muft fo fpeedily be earth again?

Are there certain difpofitions which prepare us for, and which, by being perfected, probably conftitute the happiness of another life; and may we hope to obtain it, when our purfuits contributed to fupprefs thefe difpofitions, or when we are wholly regardless of cultivating them? Whatever I hope for in a future abode, I ought to think the reward of fomething here done by me; and when the time for action here is so short, even in its longest continuance when likewife our opportunities are fo few, and fo irrecoverably loft, we muft conclude it moft fitting, in order to the fuccefs of our hopes, to embrace the opportunity before us; not to neglect it from a prefumption of finding others which perhaps may never come, or, if they do come, may be less favourable to us than the prefent; but to derive from this every advantage it is capable of yielding us.

Further, if according to the greater or lefs ufe of which we make ourselves to our fellow-creatures, we more or lefs answer the end of our creation, we must conceive this to be a point, our special regard to which will be the neceffary confequence of the views we have beyond the grave. The blifs we then promise ourselves cannot be thought a likelier reward of any practice, than of that which aims at the most extenfive good; nor can one of common fenfe think fuch happiness likely to be our portion, after a life fpent as unprofitably, as that of those creatures, the whole of whofe fatisfactions we all confine to thofe they at prefent enjoy to their prefent existence. Hence our hopes after death will be perpetually urging us to what we can do most for the good of mankind, and must be a motive to it of the greatest weight.

Thus, likewife, when I contemplate a more defirable ftate of being, than what I am now granted, awaiting me at my departure hence; as it is impoffible that I fhould not at the fame time take into my confideration, to whom I must owe this bleffing, from whom it can be received; I mutt hereby be neceffarily led to a great defire of pleafing him from whom it is to come, and therefore to all fuch application to him, and acknowledgment of his excellencies, as can be supposed due from and required of me.

To all the feveral tasks I have mentioned, we are thus particularly directed by attending to the happiness referved for us; the confideration of it thus ftrongly enforces their performance.

How far it must in general contribute to the best employment of our time, the following obfervations may, I hope, fully convince us.

If we furvey the things, on the value of which we are univerfally agreed, we shall perceive few, if any, of them obtained or fecured without more or lefs care on our part, and fome of them only the recom pence of our painfulleft endeavour. The long enjoyment of health is in vain expected, if we wholly decline the fatigue of exercife, and the uneafinefs of self-denial. nial. The greatest estate must at length be wafted by him, who will be at no trouble in the management of it, who cannot torment his brains with examining accounts, and regulating the various articles of a large expence. Whofe power is fo eftablifhed that the prefervation of it cofs him not much folicitude-many anxious thoughts; and compels him not to mortify himself in numerous inftances? This is the cafe of them whom we efteem the most fortunate of their kind. As to the generality, how difficult do they find the acquifition of the meaneft of these advantages? What years of diligence does it coft them to raife but a moderate fortune? Vaft numbers we find ftruggling throughout their lives for a bare fupport.

The chief bleflings of life-the goods moft worthy our purfuit, are not only for the most part, but altogether, the fruits of long and unwearied endeavours after them. Where is the very ufeful art that can be learned without a close and tedious application-that we can make any tolerable progress in, before many of our days are paffed? How much, and what an attentive experience-what repeated obfervations, and how exact a reafoning upon them, are neceffary to form us to any degree of wifdom?-Duly to regulate our paflions-to have them under command-rightly directed, and more or lefs warm proportionably to the influence their object has upon our happiness, will coft us, as every one is fenfible, a watchfulness and care of fuch continuance, as is fubmitted to by few even of thofe, who beft know how far it would be overpaid by the good its purchase.

If then we pay fo dear for every fatiffaction

faction we now enjoy-if there be nothing defirable on earth but what has its price of labour fet upon it, and what is molt defirable comes to us by the most labour; who in his wits can believe that happiness far exceeding the utmost in our present ftate, will at length be our portion without any folicitude we need be at about it-without any qualifications we have to acquire in order to it-without any pains we are to take after it? Nothing in Paganism or Mahemmedijm, nothing in Popery is fo abfurd as this fuppofition.

There is an uniformity in all the proceedings of God. As they are all grounded on an unerring wisdom, they mult teftify their correfpondence to it, by what they have to each other: and fo we find they do in all cafes wherein we can fathom them. We know not, indeed, in what way we are to be made happy in another life; but with what our being fo is connectedEn ubat it must depend, we are fufficiently intructed. The means of making ourfeives thus happy which are put in our power, plainly teach, that by their use it must be effected. Leffer goods, derived to us only by our care and industry, demontrate how we are to fecure greater. The chief bleilings, that are now within our reach, being never vouchfafed but to our extraordinary efforts to our most cartell endeavours to gain them, lead us to the fullest conviction, that the fame must be the condition of whatever enjoyments we can promife ourselves after our death that they will only be the reward of the digence with which they have been fought of the difficulties their purfuit has

occafioned us.

The Atheist himself-he who having no views beyond this world, gives his lufts their full range in it, acts with abundantly more fenfe and confiftency, than he who, full of the hopes of immortality, yet confaits his humour or his ease, his pleasure or his profit, regardless of any understanding he has to improve, or any progrefs in virtue he has to make. Nor is there any thing that fo much confirms the irreligipus man in his bad principles, as his obferving this conduct in them who profefs to believe a God and another life. He thinks, and, I must own, but too juftly, that it is the fame thing not to be influenced by fuch a belief, and not to have it-that it is even much more reasonable to give up all expectations of future hap

pinefs, than to expect it, and yet do nothing in order to it-do nothing that can appear at all qualifying us for, or entitling us to it: in a word, he rightly thinks that, fuppofing there be a God of that perfect juftice and wisdom which he is reprefented, he cannot make any difference here. after between them who have abfolutely denied his juftice-his wifdom-nay his very being, and them who, with all their acknowledgments of him and his perfections, would yet never facrifice any of their inclinations to him-would not be at any pains to know his will, or, if they did know it, would only fo far obey it, as it was agreeable to their own.

I hardly can quit this fubject. So great is the danger-fo certain, I may fay, is the mifchief of perfuading ourselves, that an eternal happiness will recompence the little we do to fecure it, that I fcarcely know when I have faid enough to evince what conduct alone it can reward.

As the visible world is the only univerfal guide to our conjectures on the invifible, and therein, as I have observed, the method of Providence in difpenfing its blefling, is manifeft to every eye; all thofe which can moft engage our wishes depending wholly on what we do to obtain them: as, likewife, whether we confider the wisdom of God, or his truth, or his juftice, they all concur in teaching us this leffon, that an ever-continuing felicity can only be prepared for a diftinguished virtue.

As things, I fay, are thus, may it not properly be asked, What can it be that fo trangely infatuates us-that poffeffes us with hopes fo extravagantly absurd—that makes a purfuit fo lazy and remifs, which ought to be fo vigorous and uninterrupted? I

know not what this poffibly can be, but, either, the numbers that countenance our practice, or, the reliance we have on the Deity's undbounded goodness.

As to the former, how little ftress we fhould lay on numbers, will be evident from thefe four confiderations.

First, They, who in every age, are most commended for their wisdom and prudence, never take the multitude for their pattern; but, on the other hand, conftantÎy live in a direct oppofition to its practices, and diffuade all, to whom they are well-wishers from them.

Secondly, Thofe follies and vices, which are the reproach of numbers, are not therefore, the lefs mifchievous in their con

fequences.

fequences. The increafing multitudes of the lewd and drunken do not, in any inftance, occafion lewdness and drunkennefs to have more favourable circumftances at tending them, either with refpect to the perfons, or the pofterity of the guilty: and if God be, in no inftance, more favourable to the vicious in this world, because of their numbers; we have hence too fad a proof that they have not the leaft ground to expect he should be fo in the next.

Thirdly, What we call great numbers, are, probably in respect of the whole creation of rational beings, extremely few; perhaps no more than fome few grains of fand, in comparison of thofe amazing heaps that fpread the defarts of the earth, and fhores of the ocean. Suppofing, therefore, all offenders among the human kind, punifhed by God according to their deferts; that punishment might be making examples of a very fmall, of the very fmalleft part of his creatures, for the good of the reit-for preferving innumerable millions -an infinite race in their due obedience.

Fourthly, An cftablished order taking place in all the works of God that we are acquainted with; every thing in the natural world being fubjected to certain laws; and in the moral world, good having ftill a tendency to produce good, nor ever failing to do it, unless from fome accidental hindrances; and evil, when things are in their proper courfe, producing evil: we have very strong reafon to believe, that an unchangeable God-he whofe wifdom uniformly displays itfelf-has fixed things thus, that thus they will proceed to all eternity; good following from good, evil from evil; with this difference alone, with refpect to us, in another ftate, that all hindrances of the natural consequences of things will there be removed-nothing will prevent the virtuous man's reaping the fruits of his virtue, nor will any thing hinder the whole of the difmal effects of vice from being felt by them, who have here allowed themfelves in it. And, if this be the cafe, than which nothing is more probable, it is then quite clear, that all the hopes of the guilty from their numbers must be utterly vain-that it would be full as reasonable to think a plague could not be a dangerous diftemper, because it is so infectious an one; as to think that we shall be safe amidst our crimes, because of the multitude that share them.

With regard to the goodness of God,

how groundless our reliance must be upon it, when we act contrary to the ends for which we were made when we neglect our opportunities, and abuse our capacities, will, I hope, be fufficiently plain to us, if we attend to the following short remarks.

1. We afcribe goodness to God as a perfection; but nothing can be a perfection in him, which has, morally speaking, a neceffary tendency to make his creatures lefs perfect-lefs careful to answer the ends of their creation; and this the divine goodnefs would certainly do, if it were indeed fuch as allowed us nothing to fear, tho' we neglected to use rightly the abilities and opportunities afforded us.

2. As God is the Governor of the world is acknowledged fo by all who own his being; we muit, therefore, confider his goodness, as that of a governor, or as confiftent with, and agreeable to, a wife go. vernment: but can this be faid of his goodness, if it exempt from all punishment our wilful and continued difobedience to his laws, and thereby encourage us to difobey them?

3. One attribute or perfection of the Deity cannot clash with another: his goodness, for inftance, with his juftice: but the punishment of evil is as much a part of justice, as the rewarding of good. To treat evil, as if it were not evil, can neither be agreeable to justice or truth; and this would be the cafe-evil would be regarded as if it were not evil, did the goodness of God fo favour the wilful offender, that his crimes would never receive their defert.

4. To reftrain evil, to obftruct its progrefs, muft be the care of a good Governor, nay would be the fureft proof of his goodness. To punish, therefore, fuch as act contrary to the law of their nature

contrary to the well-being of fociety, and therein contrary to their own and the common happiness, is not only a part of juftice, but even of goodness itself. We could not confider God as good, had he not properly guarded against his creatures corrupting themselves, and against that corruption extending itself: and what are the difcouragements to this, but in the way of punishment-but by the fufferings the guilty have to fear? The more there are who act in defiance of these fufferings, the more neceffary it becomes to inflict them; and offenders can have no

reafon