Europe, can hardly be regarded as equal to them in philosophical acumen, and there are no others able to dispute the field. In fact, the metaphysician of the Baconian philosophy was yet to appear, before the analytic method could be said to be strictly and successfully applied to the science of the human mind.

It was just at this time, while there was a perpetual conflict of opinions going on between the school of Hobbes on the one side, and those who, like Cumberland, were seeking to lay an immoveable foundation for morality and religion on the other, that a company of scholars within the University of Oxford were assembled by chance at the chambers of John Locke. Finding themselves perplexed and baffled in their discussions, it occurred to Locke that they were taking the wrong road to arrive at truth; that the first thing to be done was not to analyse things themselves, or doctrines themselves, to their simplest and most abstract forms, but to investigate the faculties of the human mind, in order to see what objects lie within its reach,

and what beyond it. From that day is dated the commencement of a work which was destined to exert a greater influence upon metaphysical science than any which had appeared since the age of Aristotle and Plato-I mean the "Essay on the Human Understanding." We must proceed, therefore, to investigate succinctly, but as clearly as possible, the real tendency of this immortal work, and to estimate the effect it produced upon the progress of speculative philosophy.

SECTION II.-Criticism of Locke.

First of all, it is abundantly evident, that Locke is to be placed amongst those independent thinkers, who, instead of grounding their opinions upon any previous authority, determine rather to seek anew for themselves a solid foundation for human knowledge. In so doing he was evidently following, and that boldly, in the track which had been previously opened by the writings of Bacon. When the spirit of independent thinking is once acquired, there are, of course, many different directions which it may follow, and according to the path first struck out, will ever be the method and character of the whole subsequent investigation.

As to the plan which Locke proposed to follow, we are not left in doubt for a single moment; it is clear and decisive from the first page, and indeed is made manifest in the very circumstances which gave rise to his "Essay." He affirms in the very outset, that it is of no use to search deeply into any subject, with the hope of attaining ultimate truth, before we have estimated aright the instrument we have to employ; that is, to use his own words, "before we have found out the powers of the understanding, the extent to which they reach, and the points in which they fail." It is impossible to indicate more clearly than this his fixed opinion, that the foundation of all philosophy must be

1 Essay, chap. i. sec. 4.

found in Psychology, and that the starting-point must ever be an accurate observation and analysis of the facts or phenomena of our own consciousness. Here we see at once that Locke had imbibed not only Bacon's independence, but also the spirit of the Baconian method; that he both avoided and despised (as he tells us in almost the first paragraph') the fruitless speculations of former philosophers to ascertain such things as "the essence of the mind," or "by what motions of our spirits, or changes in our bodies, we experience sensations," or to solve any similar question, the evidence of which does not come directly within the range of our own consciousness; but that, on the contrary, he considered the study of mind as well as of matter to have reference simply to such actual phenomena as can be observed, classified, and correctly reasoned upon.

But then arises the inquiry, Can we observe the phenomena of mind as surely as we do those of the material world, and can we equally regard them as real objects of science? That we can make observations upon the facts of our inward life must be evident to every reflecting mind; for what do we mean when we speak of consciousness, except that there is something or other passing within us of which we are conscious? Everything, therefore, that passes through the mind, of whatever nature it be regarded as a legitimate object of mental

be, may

1 Essay, chap. i. sec. 2.

philosophy; it is a phenomenon, and as such can be set down upon our roll as a real and unquestionable fact, equally valid with those of any other science.

Locke takes it for granted, accordingly, as a thing resting on the direct evidence of our consciousness, that man has an understanding, that if his consciousness assures him of anything, it assures him that he does think, and, if he think, that there must be something within, which is the immediate object of his thoughts. Such object, whatever it be, he terms an idea, the proper definition of which accordingly he considers to be, "Anything with which our minds are immediately occupied when we think." Thus the whole science of the human understanding, or, as it may be otherwise expressed, the whole search after the true principles of hnman knowledge, is reduced simply to the study of ideas.

This study he proposes to prosecute in a threefold manner. He proposes, first, to investigate the origin of our ideas, and the means by which we acquire them; that being done, he offers, secondly, to show what knowledge we possess by means of our ideas, and to determine its certainty, evidence, and extent; and then, as there are objects in the mind which we cannot call objects of knowledge, but the reality of which rests solely upon opinion or faith, he proposes, thirdly, to examine the grounds and the degrees of our assent in matters of this nature.2

1 Essay, chap. i. sec. 8.

2 Ibid. chap. i. sec. 3.

Now, what does this sketch (which Locke gives us in his introduction) of the course he intended to follow in the work at large indicate? It shows us most clearly his full conviction, that the phenomena of the mind itself must be our first study; and that the ideas we may be found to possess within our consciousness must be thoroughly probed and traced to their very origin, before we raise any inquiry as to their certainty, their validity, or their accurate correspondence with any external object to which we may suppose them to answer. In a word, it exhibits the great principle, that both logic and ontology are out of place, until we have laid a foundation for them in psychology. When we have once learned to appreciate the true nature of our faculties, and have observed and classified all the inward phenomena of our consciousness, then, first, we may begin to mark out, in order, the abstract forms which our thoughts and reasonings assume that is, to create a science of formal logic; and then, first, also, may we begin to inquire how far these subjective ideas are the signs and proofs of objective existences, that is, how far we can lay securely the ground-principles of ontology. So far Locke was true to his proposed method, so far he applied admirably the Baconian system to the study of the human mind, and bid fair to build up a superstructure of metaphysical philosophy upon a fixed and immoveable basis.*

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See Cousin's "Cours de l'Histoire de la Phil." Leçon 16, in which Locke's Methodology is very fully discussed.