Such, then, are the rigid conclusions to which Kant arrived, concerning the speculative reason of man-conclusions by which he hoped to place every future system of philosophy upon a correct foundation.1

From the view we have just taken of the pure reason, it is evident, that upon Kant's system its whole procedure is negative. Sensation and understanding combined, can introduce us into a world of real objective existence; but reason in its sphere, entirely fails to do so; its whole office is formal or constructive; and the proper discipline of it is entirely occupied in warning us against the delusions we run into, when we imagine ourselves capable of holding direct converse with the noumenal or supersensual world. But now having established these negative conclusions from the Critick of pure reason, Kant proceeds to find a positive ground of certainty for supersensual realities in the practical reason. Let it be admitted that we have no faculty by which we can communicate objectively with pure being, by which we can know, by direct intuition, the soul-the essence of the universeand God; it does not follow that we may not find a

1 Kant's great work, the "Kritik reiner Vernunft," concludes with a division called Transcendental Methodology. He has there given practical remarks on the discipline of reason-the canon of reason, (proper use of the moral faculties ;) the architectonick of pure reason, (division of the pure sciences,) and the history of pure reason. I only indicate this, in passing, to show the completeness of Kant's Survey of the Reason.

subjective ground of belief in these things within our own consciousness. Does then such a ground of belief really exist within us? Assuredly, Kant replies, it exists in our moral nature; for here the whole question of human destiny, with every thing implied in it, finds a meaning and a reality. Ideas, therefore, which in theory cannot hold good, in practice are seen to have a reality, because they are indissolubly related to the laws of human action, and involved in the very principles, by which our moral life is regulated.

To explain this, let it be observed, that the fact of our possessing a moral nature, is one which rests upon the direct evidence of consciousness. We can no more deny the existence of moral ideas and the inward authority of conscience, than we can deny the very categories of our understanding. Reason, in truth, has not only a theoretical, but it has also a practical movement, by which it regulates the conduct of man; and this it does with such a lofty bearing and such an irresistible authority, that it is impossible for any rational being to deny its dictates. In the language of Kantism, consciousness reveals to us the autonomy of the will, and this autonomy expresses itself in an absolute moral law, in a categorical imperative.

Now, what do this moral nature and unconditional command to right action imply? Manifestly they imply freedom; for on no other ground is moral action, strictly so termed, possible. Again, they imply the existence of a God, otherwise there

were a law without a lawgiver, without an appeal, without a judge. Lastly, they imply a future state as the goal to which all human actions tend, and in which our moral existence shall find its completion. Theoretical or pure reason showed that these things were possible, although it could never attain to their actual existence; but practical reason asserts their reality, not indeed as a demon. strative truth, but as a truth that is implied in the whole constitution and tendency of our moral nature. In this part of his philosophy Kant rendered good service to the true interests of morality; neither can we too much admire the force with which he repels every low, selfish, or utilitarian ground of morality, basing it all upon the categorical imperative-the authoritative voice of the great Lawgiver of the universe, as its everlasting foundation. It is true that all these matters lie beyond the region of actual science; but nevertheless they are within the bounds of a rational faith, (Vernunftglaube,) the dictates of which every sound mind will readily admit.

Between the theoretical and the practical movement, however, there is a third division of philosophy which Kant terms "The Critick of the Judging Faculty," (Kritik der Urtheilskraft.) The judging faculty is regarded by Kant as the intermediate step between the understanding and the reason; and the results of it are certain feelings of pleasure and displeasure, such as we express under the terms sublime and beautiful, or their reverse.

The Critick of this faculty unites that of the theoretical and the practical reason, as it were, in a middle point. Pure reason contemplates nature, practical reason contemplates freedom, the judging faculty unites the two provinces by viewing nature as a system of means, constructed by the highest reason to bring about certain ends. In this part of his philosophy Kant first analyses the notions of the sublime and beautiful, and then develops the principle of Teleology or final purposes in nature, as the legitimate offspring of the judgment. The great benefit of this Critick, therefore, arises from its connecting the theoretical philosophy with the practical, from the explanation it offers of those lofty emotions which result from our perception of the design everywhere manifested in organised nature, and the consequent notion which it imparts of a final end to which the whole universe is tending (Teleologie.) In this way our æsthetic sentiments confirm the belief of the practical reason in immortality and God, and make the real conclusion of the whole system as assertative of the great fundamentals of morality and natural religion, as could possibly be attained to without an actual demonstration.

Let us, then, briefly review the object, which the Kantian philosophy as a whole professedly kept in view, and sum up the steps by which it endeavoured to accomplish it. The great question of the school both of Descartes and Locke was this-Does all our knowledge come from experience, or is some of

it stamped with an absolute and a priori character? Hume assumed the Lockian or empirical hypothesis, and educed from it a system of universal scepticism. On the other hand, Wolf, taught by Leibnitz, assumed the Cartesian hypothesis in a modified form; and by the incessant use of mere logical definitions, as though they could stand in the place of things themselves, gave rise to a system of empty formalism. Kant originally belonged to the Wolfian school; but he so far sympathised with Hume as to feel the absolute necessity of admitting the claims of experience, the very element which the Wolfian school had disregarded.

The question, then, with Kant was this-Cannot the claims of these two schools be adjusted? Admitting the necessity of experience, of what does experience consist? what are the elements of it? does it not itself contain some a priori principle? To answer this was the aim of his "Critick," and the answer it returned was decisive. Knowledge, it declared, cannot consist simply in the intimations of sense, for they alone would be formless; neither can it consist simply in a priori conceptions, for they would be matterless; but it consists in a synthesis of both, the one giving the form, the other the matter. What conclusions then flow from this view of the case? Manifestly these that valid objective knowledge must be confined to the limits of experience; that beyond these limits there may be formal ideas, but no matter, no reality; that the universal conceptions which arise from the synthesis