Opinion of the Court.

United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, where a statute against passing counterfeit money failed to aver the scienter; but where the statute sets forth every ingredient of the offence, an indictment in its very words is sufficient, though that offence be more fully defined in some other section. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460, 473; United States v. Wilson, Baldwin, 78, 119; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; Harrington v. State, 54 Mississippi, 490, 494.

Notwithstanding the cases above cited from our reports, the general rule still holds good that upon an indictment for a statutory offence the offence may be described in the words of the statute, and it is for the defendant to show that greater particularity is required by reason of the omission from the statute of some element of the offence. Where the statute completely covers the offence, the indictment need not be made more complete by specifying particulars elsewhere obtained. Whiting v. State, 14 Connecticut, 487; Simmons v. State, 12 Missouri, 268; State v. Smant, 4 Rich. (S. C., 356; Parkinson v. State, 14 Maryland, 184.

2. The only allegation of time and place in this indictment is that the offence was committed "on the-day of April, A.D. 1896, in the county of Appanoose, in the Southern District of Iowa."

Good pleading undoubtedly requires an allegation that the offence was committed on a particular day, month and year, but it does not necessarily follow that the omission to state a particular day is fatal upon a motion in arrest of judgment. Neither is it necessary to prove that the offence was committed upon the day alleged, unless a particular day be made material by the statute creating the offence. Ordinarily, proof of any day before the finding of the indictment, and within the statute of limitations, will be sufficient. Armstrong v. State, 145 Indiana, 609; Gratz v. Commonwealth, 96 Kentucky, 162; United States v. Conrad, 59 Fed. Rep. 458; Fleming v. State, 136 Indiana, 149; State v. McCarthy, 44 La. Ann. 323.

In the case under consideration the indictment was found on the 28th day of April, 1896, and the allegation is that the crime was committed "on the-day of April, 1896," which

Opinion of the Court.

must necessarily have been a day preceding the finding of the indictment. Under such circumstances, the defendant could not possibly have been misled by the allegation, particularly in view of the fact that the carrying on of a business is in the nature of a continuing offence; and while it is true that a business can be carried on only for a single day, the ordinary inference would be that it was carried on for a longer period. It would seem illogical to hold that, if the offence had been charged to have been committed upon a particular day in April, evidence could have been given of any day within the statute of limitations, and yet to hold that the defendant could be misled by an averment that the offence was committed on the day of the month in which the indictment was found.

3. Much the same observations may be made with respect to the averment of place, which was simply "in the county of Appanoose, in the Southern District of Iowa, and within the jurisdiction of this court."

Properly speaking, the indictment should state not only the county, but the township, city or other municipality within which the crime is alleged to have been committed. But the authorities in this particular are much less rigid than formerly. Under the early English law, where the jurymen were also witnesses and were summoned from the vicinage, it was necessary that the locality of the crime should be stated with great particularity in order that the sheriff might be informed from what vicinage he should summon the jury. But this requirement was long since abolished in England by statute, and it is not now necessary there "to state any venue in the body of any indictment, but the county, city or other jurisdiction named in the margin thereof shall be taken to be the venue for all the facts stated in the body of such indictment." 1 Bish. Crim. Procedure, sec. 368.

While in this country it is usual to state the town as well as the county, it has not been generally deemed necessary to do so, and most of the authorities assume that an allegation is sufficient after verdict which shows it to have been done within the jurisdiction of the court. Heikes v. Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St. 513; United States v. Wilson, Baldwin, 78;

Order of the Court.

Carlisle v. State, 32 Indiana, 55; State v. Goode, 24 Missouri, 361; State v. Smith, 5 Harr. 490; Barnes v. State, 5 Yerg. 186; Covy v. State, 4 Port. 186; Wingard v. State, 13 Georgia, 396; State v. Warner, 4 Indiana, 604. Indeed, an indictment charging the offence to have been committed in one town is supported by proof that it was committed in a different town within the same county, and within the jurisdiction of the court. Commonwealth v. Tolliver, 8 Gray, 386; Commonwealth v. Creed, 8 Gray, 387; Carlisle v. State, 32 Indiana, 55; Commonwealth v. Lavery, 101 Mass. 207; People v. Honeyman, 3 Denio, 121.

We do not wish to be understood as approving the practice that was pursued in this case, or even as holding that this indictment might not have been open to special demurrer for insufficiency as to the allegations of time and place, but upon motion in arrest of judgment we think it is sufficient.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.

NEW YORK INDIANS v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

Announced May 28, 1898.

The judgment and mandate in this case, 170 U. S. 1, are amended.

In this case it is ordered that the judgment and mandate be amended so as to read as follows:

"The judgment of the Court of Claims is therefore reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to enter a new judgment for the net amount actually received by the Government for the Kansas lands, without interest, less any increase in value attributable to the fact that certain of these lands were donated for public purposes, as well as the net amount which the court below may find could have been obtained for the lands otherwise disposed of if they had all been sold as public lands, less the amount of lands upon the basis of which settle

Statement of the Case.

ment was made with the Tonawandas, and less the 10,240 acres allotted to the thirty-two New York Indians, as set forth in finding twelve, together with such other deductions. as may seem to the court below to be just, and for such other proceedings as may be necessary and in conformity with this opinion."

HOLLOWAY v. DUNHAM.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF OKLA

HOMA.

No. 247. Argued May 4, 1898. Decided May 23, 1898.

On an appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court of a Territory, the findings of fact are conclusive upon this court.

One general exception to thirteen different instructions cannot be considered sufficient when each instruction consists of different propositions of law and fact, and many of them are clearly correct.

THIS action was brought in a district court of the Territory of Oklahoma to recover the value of certain goods sold and delivered by the plaintiffs (defendants in error here) to the defendant below, amounting to the sum of $5004.58, the sales having been made between the 1st of November, 1890, and the 10th of March, 1891, and the defendant at the time of the sales being a resident of Fort Worth in the State of Texas. At the time of the commencement of the action plaintiffs also commenced attachment proceedings against the defendant on the ground that he was at that time a non-resident of the Territory of Oklahoma, and also on the ground that he was about to sell, convey and otherwise dispose of his property subject to execution, with a fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder and delay his creditors.

The defendant filed an answer, denying the plaintiffs' complaint, and also one denying each and every material allegation contained in the plaintiffs' petition and affidavits for an attachment.

Counsel for Parties.

Under the practice in Oklahoma there were two issues thus made: one in regard to the existence and amount of defendant's indebtedness to the plaintiffs, and the other as to the facts upon which the attachment could be sustained. These two separate issues came on for trial on the 16th of June, 1892, before the district court and a jury, and after the evidence was in the court submitted to the jury the two issues, and directed a separate verdict to be returned in regard to each issue. The jury returned the following verdicts:

"We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the above case, find for the plaintiff on the attachment issue.

"EUGENE WALKER, Foreman."

"We, the jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the aboveentitled case, find for the plaintiffs and assess their damages at $5434.61.

"EUGENE WALKER, Foreman."

At the request of the defendant the court also submitted to the jury the following questions in writing:

(1) "Was J. R. Holloway, on the 31st day of October, 1891, about to sell and convey or otherwise dispose of his property subject to execution, with the intent to cheat, hinder and delay his creditors?"

(2) "Was J. R. Holloway, on the 31st day of October, 1891, a non-resident of Oklahoma Territory?"

The jury returned an affirmative answer to each question. Judgment was entered for the amount of the verdict.

The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the Territory where the judgment was affirmed, and thereupon he obtained a writ of error from this court, and the record is now here for review.

Mr. Fred Beall for plaintiff in error. Mr. Amos Green and Mr. C. M. Green were on his brief.

Mr. Selwyn Douglas for defendants in error. Mr. McGregor