the clothing of a hiring of service was used in the contract, the substantial body within was essentially different. So clearly is this so that their fear for the existence of the leases if the contract remained in force was fully justified. An agreement in the form of lease for a limited term of years, such as these were, granting the right to explore for oil and gas, and to retain that found and extracted, is of a peculiar class. The interest of the lessee is more like a license than an estate in the land itself. Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okl. 772, 110 Pac. 902, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451; Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Co., 29 Okl. 719, 119 Pac. 260; Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 66 S. E. 1005, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 176; O'Neil v. Sun Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 123 S. W. 172; Dickey v. Coffeyville, 69 Kan. 106, 76 Pac. 398. Unlike a grant of coal in place, the lease does not give the oil and gas, unless the lessee finds and removes it during the term, and under the regulations governing such leases as those here only so much of the land may be used as is reasonably necessary for the work. A contract by which a lessee parts with the management and control of the operations to another, and gives him the beneficial interest in the fruits, is within the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, however it may be disguised by words.

With these principles in mind, let us examine the contract between Barnsdall and Owen, which the former wishes restored. It put Barns dall in charge of the operations for oil and gas, and gave him the same privileges and subjected him to the same restrictions as were granted and imposed upon Owen by the leases. Saving the right of Barns dall to terminate the contract as to any of the leases after exploration, it was to endure during the entire leasehold term. It was "binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of both of the parties." Barnsdall's operations were to be carried on at his own expense, subject to reimbursement from the proceeds of oil if any were found. If any of the land proved to be gas-producing, without oil, he was to have the entire benefit, except he was to pay Owen $10 per acre of gas territory and also the royalty due the lessors. If gas territory once proved ceased as such, and turned to oil, Owen was to refund the $10 per acre, and thereafter share the oil with Barnsdall. Owen incurred no personal responsibility for Barnsdall's expenditures for oil wells. The latter was to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the oil after the royalties were paid, and the balance was to be divided equally. In respect of the operations, each lease was to be independent of the others, so that, if one was unprofitable, Owen should still have his half of the oil profits of the others. Barnsdall was to offset all paying oil wells drilled within 200 feet of the leased lands. The tanks, etc., placed by Barnsdall on the leased premises were to remain his property until they were fully paid for out of the proceeds of oil, when they were to own them equally. In all cases the royalties due the Indian lessors were to be paid through Owen, by Barnsdall as to the gas, and by both as to the oil.

It needs no discussion to show that this was not a mere working agreement or employment of Barnsdall's services for the development of the lands. It transferred to Barnsdall Owen's entire interest un

der the leases of gas-producing land, and admitted him to a complete half interest in those of oil. Whether technically an assignment or a subletting is immaterial. It was a transfer of interest contrary to the leases, the form of which was prescribed by the Secretary, and it also violated the limitation prescribed by him to prevent the natural resources of the Indian lands from falling into the control of a few hands. The retention of Owen as the medium of royalty payments does not affect the substantial character of the contract.

[2] The plan set forth in the bill appears to have been one to circumvent the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, to dissolve temporarily a contract relation which it was feared, and rightly so, would, if known, prevent his approval of the leases, and then, after approval was secured, to restore it in the name of some third party for complainant's benefit, thus accomplishing the same object by indirection. A contract, the direct and sole object of which is the deception of a public official in the performance of his duties, is contrary to public policy and void. A court of equity will neither enforce such a contract nor aid the parties to regain their prior status. It will leave them as it found them. Something is said about the machinery, etc., which complainant put on the premises. We do not determine his right to it in this case; if he has one, he can assert it in an action at law.

The decree is affirmed.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.

BARNSDALL v. DELAWARE INDIAN OIL CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. October 28, 1912.)

No. 3,672.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma.

Suit in equity by Theodore N. Barnsdall against the Delaware Indian Oil Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Affirmed. John J. Jones, of Chanute, Kan., and James A. Veasey, of Bartlesville, Okl., for appellant.

George S. Ramsey, of Muskogee, Okl. (C. L. Thomas, of Muskogee, Okl., and George & Campbell, of Bartlesville, Okl., on the brief), for appellee. Before SANBORN, HOOK, and ADAMS, Circuit Judges.

HOOK, Circuit Judge. In all important respects this case is like that of Barnsdall v. Owen (No. 3,671) 200 Fed. 519, just decided, and it is governed by the same principles of law.

The decree is therefore affirmed.

SANBORN, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.

BILLINGS v. BAUSBACK et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

No. 2,123.

1. SEAMEN (§ 10*)-PROVISIONS AND SUPPLIES.

October 7, 1912.)

Findings by a District Court that seamen on a voyage were not furnished with food of the kind, quality, or quantity required by Rev. St. § 4612, as amended by Act Dec. 21, 1898, c. 28, § 23, 30 Stat. 762 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3120), held sustained by the evidence.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 34-38; Dee. Dig. § 10.*]

2. SEAMEN (§ 10*)-PROVISIONS AND SUPPLIES-LIEN FOR FAILURE TO PRO

VIDE.

Under the provision of Rev. St. § 4612, as amended by Act Dec. 21. 1898, c. 28, § 23, 30 Stat. 762 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3120), giving seamen the option of accepting the fare the master may provide, instead of that prescribed in the schedule contained therein, their acceptance of the fare provided, without making formal demand for the statutory scale, is not an election which will debar them from enforcing a lien on the vessel for a failure to provide the same, where they had no opportunity for choice, because the provisions enumerated in the scale were not on the ship, and where they in fact complained of those furnished. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 34-38; Dec. Dig. § 10.*]

3. SEAMEN (§ 10*)-SUIT FOR REDUCTION OF PROVISIONS-ESTOPPEL BY RELEASE "WAGES."

A release, signed by seamen on their discharge at the end of a voyage, releasing the master and owners "from all claims for 'wages' in respect of the said past voyage or engagement," did not debar them from the right to maintain a suit, under Rev. St. § 4568 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3099), to recover for a reduction of allowance, or for the bad quality of the provisions furnished.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Seamen, Cent. Dig. §§ 34-38; Dec. Dig. § 10.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7369-7373, 7831.]

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the First Division of the Northern District of California; Robert S. Bean, Judge.

Suit in admiralty by Erwin Bausback and others against the schooner W. H. Talbot, George E. Billings, claimant, to recover compensation for short allowance and bad quality of food furnished libelants as seamen during a voyage. Decree for libelants, and claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Chickering & Gregory and Geo. H. Whipple, all of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.

F. R. Wall, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellees.

Before GILBERT, ROSS, and HUNT, Circuit Judges.

HUNT, Circuit Judge. Appeal in admiralty from a final decree of the District Court for the Northern District of California, allowing to appellees certain compensation for reduction of food allow

For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

ance, and because of the bad quality of food furnished during a voyage made in March and April, 1911, on the sailing ship W. H. Talbot from Newcastle, Australia, to San Francisco, Cal.

The libel was brought by appellees, seamen, who alleged that during the voyage referred to the allowance of the provisions to which each of the seamen was entitled under section 4612 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3120) was reduced in certain specified ways; that from March 14th to April 12th libelants had neither potatoes nor any substitute therefor, nor lard or any substitute therefor; that for 19 days libelants had no beans or any substitute therefor; that for 16 days there was no butter and no substitute; that for 13 days libelants had no sugar and no substitute therefor; that for 17 days libelants had no peas or any substitute therefor; that for 7 days libelants had no molasses and no substitute therefor; that for 7 days they had no onions and no substitute therefor; and that for 74 days they had no biscuits or any substitute. The libel further alleges that the provisions furnished were bad in quality and unfit for use, in that the biscuits which were served during the last fortnight of the voyage contained weevils and maggots, and that during the last 50 days of the voyage the flour with which the bread was made was sour, moldy, and lumpy, so that the bread was unfit for use.

The claimant answered, denying the averments pertaining to any reduction of food to which libelants were entitled under section 4612 of the Revised Statutes, and alleged that libelants accepted the fare of the master provided during the voyage, and that none of them at any time demanded the scale of provisions set forth in section 4612 of the Revised Statutes. It is admitted that the potatoes gave out about 3 weeks before the arrival of the ship at San Francisco; but it is averred that canned peas, canned beans, and canned corn were furnished as substitutes; that, after the canned peas gave out, canned string beans and corn were furnished; that the canned string beans gave out about 7 days before the arrival of the ship, but that libelants were furnished with canned beans or corn every day after the potatoes gave out; that every care was taken to preserve the potatoes, which were of the best quality obtainable, but that many spoiled, and lasted only from 60 to 65 days, while the voyage consumed 84 days. It is admitted that the lard gave out, but alleged that butter was substituted until that gave out, when syrup or molasses or milk was given. It is admitted that the beans gave out 19 days before the voyage was ended, but averred that canned peas and string beans were furnished, and later, when those articles gave out, canned corn and tomatoes were served; admitted that the sugar gave out between March 30th and April 12th, but alleged that syrup or molasses and milk were substituted; admitted that the molasses gave out 5 or 6 days before arrival in San Francisco, but averred that, after the molasses was gone, libelants were served with sweetened milk; admitted that the onions gave out, but alleged that canned peas and string beans were furnished until they, too, gave out, when canned corn and tomatoes were furnished. It is alleged that fresh bread was served at every

meal, and that, in addition to the various articles of food mentioned in the government schedule under section 4612 heretofore referred to, libelants were furnished with soup, canned milk, puddings or pies, oatmeal, ham or bacon, and pancakes. Claimants deny that the biscuits served were bad, or had weevils or maggots, or that the flour used in the bread was sour or bad, and admit that no substitute was provided for the bread that was served, other than the biscuits referred to. Claimant then sets up that shipping articles were signed by libelants when they shipped; that on April 11, 1911, at San Francisco, when the voyage was ended, the libelants were regularly discharged; and that, upon receiving the amount due for services upon the voyage, each signed a receipt to the effect that, in consideration of settlements made before the shipping commissioner at San Francisco, a release from all claims for wages in respect of the past voyage or engagement was duly made. The shipping articles referred to, after setting forth the provisions of section 4612 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, referring to the scale of provisions to be allowed and served out to the crew during the voyage, quoted the provision in the law that seamen should have the option of accepting the fare the master might provide, but the right at any time to demand the scale provided by statute. It is alleged that during the voyage each of the libelants was supplied with food sufficient for all purposes, both in quality and quantity, and that no demand ever was made of the captain of the vessel or any other person for the allowance of food set forth in said shipping articles or in section 4612 of the Revised Statutes, and that each of the libelants accepted the fare which the master provided without complaint, except in one or two cases, when one of the libelants requested the captain to provide him with some canned meat, which request was complied with.

The case was heard by the District Court, which decided that the potatoes and lard gave out 29 days before the end of the voyage; that the beans gave out 19 days, the butter 16 days, the sugar 13 days, and the peas, molasses, and onions 7 days, before the vessel reached San Francisco. The court was of the opinion that none of the substitutes provided for in the statute was furnished in place of any of these provisions, and that there was nothing aboard the ship which could have been furnished as substitutes. The court held that biscuits were not served until the latter part of the voyage, but that flour and bread were served as substitutes for biscuits; that the bread was of good quality for the first half of the voyage, but that during the latter part it was very poor, because the flour out of which the bread was made had been wet and was molded and lumpy.

[1] We have read the testimony of the several witnesses, and, without quoting what they say, we find that the great weight of the evidence is in accord with the deductions of the District Court. Not only was there an insufficiency of many articles or substitutes called for by the schedule, but the pies, pancakes, and duff that were served to seamen were made from flour that was of bad quality. Several of the witnesses for the claimant admitted that in the latter part of the voyage the bread was not good. Biscuits were not served until