postponed until to-morrow 11 o'clock A. M.
Sanuel Houston was then removed into the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms.
And then the House adjourned until to-mor-
row, 11 o’clock, A. M.

APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES.
IN SENATE, APRIL 5, 1832.
Mr. WEBSTER male the following report:
The Select Committee to whom was referred,
on the 27th of March,the bill from the House

o of Representatives, entitled “An act for the must necessarily speak of particular States, but loo apportionment of representatives among the it is hardly necessary to say, that they speak of aw;

several States according to the fifth census,” have had the subject under consideration, and now ask leave to report: This bill, like all laws on the same subject, must be regarded as of an interesting and deli. cate nature. It respects the distribution of po. litical power among the States of the Union. It is to determine the number of voices which,

for ten years to come, each State is to possess in the popular branch of the legislature. In the opinion of the committee, there can be few or no questions which it is more desirable should be settled on just, fair, and satisfactory princi

les, than this; and, availing themselves of the

enefit of the discussion which the bill has al. ready undergone in the Senate, they have gi. ven to it a renewed and anxious consideration. The result is, that, in their opinion, the bill ought to be amended. Seeing the difficulties which belong to the whole subject, they are fully convinced that the bill has been framed and passed in the other House with the sincerest desire to overcome those difficulties, and to enact a law which should do as much justice

as possible to all the States. But the commit

tee are constrained to say, that this object appears to them not to have been obtained. The unequal operation of the bill on some of the States, should it become a law, seems to the

committee most manifest; and they cannot bu express a doubt whether its actual apportion

ment of the representative power among the several States, can be considered as conformaThe bill

ble to the spirit of the constitution.
provides, that, from and after the 3d of March

1833, the House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected agreeably to a ratio of one representative for every forty-seven

thousand and seven hundred persons in eacl State, computed according to the rule pre scribed by the constitution. The addition o

them as examples only, and with the most per of
fect respect, not only for the States themselves, o
but for all those who represent them here. to
. Although the bill does not commence by fix *
ing the whole number of the proposed House on:
of Representatives, yet the process adopted on
by it brings out the number of two hundred and wo
forty members. Of these two hundred and mm
forty members, forty are assigned to the State to
of New York, that is to say, precisely one-sixth sm.
part of the whole. This assigument would seem to
to require that New York should contain one- wo
sixth part of the whole population of the Uni- so
ted States, and would be bound to pay one- or
sixth part of all her direct taxes. Yet neither s.
of these is the case. The whole representative to
pupulation of the United States is 11,929,005; so
that of New York is 1,918,623, which is less
than one-sixth of the whole by nearly 70,000.
Of a direct tax of two hundred and forty thou.
sand dollars, New York would pay only 38.59.
But if, instead of comparing the numbers as-
signed to New York with the whole numbers
of the House, we compare her with other
States, the inequality is still more evident and
striking.
To the State of Vermont, the bill assigns
five members. It gives, therefore, eight times
as many representatives to New York as to Wer.
mont; but the population of New York is not
equal to eight times the population of Vermont
by more than three hundred thousand. Wer-
mont has five members only for 280,657 per-
sons. If the same proportion were to be ap-
plied to New York, it would reduce the num-
ber of her members from forty to thirty-four-
making a difference more than equal to the
whole representation of Vermont, and more
than sufficient to overcome her whole power in
the House of Representatives.
A disproportion, almost equally striking, is
manifested, if we compare New York with
Alabama. The population of Alabama is 263,”
208, for this she is allowed five members. The
rule of proportion which gives to her but five
members for her number, would give to New
York but thirty-six for her number; yet New
York receives forty. As compared with Ala-
bama, then, New York has an excess of repre-
sentation equal to four-fifths of the whole
presentation of Alabama, and this excess itse
will give her, of course, as much weight in the
House as the whole delegation of Alabama,
within a single vote. Can it be said, then, that
representatives are apportioned to these States
according to their respective numbers?
The ratio assumed by the bill, it will be per-
ceived, leaves large fractions, so called, or re-
siduary numbers, in several of the small States,
to the manifest loss of a part of their just pro-
portion of representative power. Such is the
operation of the ratio, in this respect, that New
York, with a population less than that of New
England by thirty or thirty-five thousand, has
yet two more members than all the New Eng-
land States; and there are seven States in the

t

y

l

:

Union, whose members amount to the number of 123, being a clear majority of the whole House, whose aggregate fractions, altogether, amount only to fifty-three thousand; while Wer. mont and New Jersey, having together but ele. ven members, have a joint fraction of seventyfive thousand, Pennsylvania by the bill will have, as it happens, just as many members as Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New Jersey; but her population is not equal to theirs by a hundred and thirty thousand ; and the reason withis advantage derived to her from the protions of the bill, is, that her fraction, or resi. dium, is twelve thousand only, while theirs is shundred and forty-four. But the subject is capable of being present. td in a more exact and mathematical form. Thelt House is to eonsist of two hundred and forty members. Now, the precise proportion of t power, out of the whole mass represented by the numbers two hundred and fort y, which New York would be entitled to according to her po pulation, is 38.59; that is to say, she would be entitled (0.38 members, and would have a residuum or faction, and, even if a member were given her for that fraction, she would still have but thirty-nine but the bill gives her forty. These are a part, and but a part, of those re

t

t

and undeniable.

fifths of all other persons.
ration shall be made within three years after

direct.
not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but
each. State shall have at least one representa-

understanding these provisions.
used, are designed, doubtless, to be received
in no peculiar or technical sense, but according

The main question has been, whether the principle itself be constitutional 2

and this question the committee proceeded to examine, respectfully asking of those who have doubted its constitutional propriety, to deem the question of so much importance as to justify a second reflection.

The words of the Constitution are, “repre

sentatives, and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a

erm of years, and excluding Indians, threeThe actual enume.

he first meeting of the Congress of the United

States, and within every subsequent term of

en years, in such manner as they shall by law The number of representatives shall

ive.”
There would seem to be little difficulty in
The terms

o their common and popular acceptation. To

folls, produced by the bill in its present form, apportion, is to distribute by right measure; to

which the committee cannot bring themselves
to approve. While it is not to be denied that,
under any rule of apportionment, some degree
forelative inequality must always exist, the
committee cannot believe that the Senate will
auction inequality and injustice to the exten

in which they exist in this bill, if they can be
avoided.' But recollecting the opinions which i
had been expressed in the discussions of the
Senate, the committee have diligently sought
to learn whether there was not some other num.
ber which might be taken for a ratio, the ap-
plication of which would work out more jus-
to and equality. In this pursuit, the com-
milee have not been successful. There are,
it is true, other numbers, the adoption of which
would relieve many of the States which suffer
under the present; but this relief would be
obtained only by shifting the pressure on to
other, States, thus creating new grounds of i
omplaintin other quarters. The number for.

ourthousand has been generally spoken of
*the most acceptable substitute for 47,700;

withould this be adopted, great relative ine

quality would fall on several States, and,among **, on some of the new and growing States, *:Telative disproportion,thus already great, would be constantly increasing. The commit*therefore,are of opinion that the bill should *Altered in the mode of apportionment. They tink that the process which begins by assum"#" ratio should be abandoned, and that the ologht to be framed on the principle of the *ndment which has been the main subject of *ision before the senate the fairness of the Principle of this amendment, and the gene. hl equily of its results, compared with those *hich flow from the other process, seem plain

adopted the Constitution, were, of course,

fuly acquainted with this necessary ope

ration of the provision. In the Senate, the

States are entitled to a fixed number of Senators; and, therefore, in regard to their representation, in that body, there is no consequential or incidental inequality arising. But being represented in the House of Representatives according to their respective numbers of people, it is unavoidable that, in assigning to each State its number of members, the exact proportion of each, out of a given number, cannot always or often be expressed in whole numbers; that is to say, it will not often be found that there belongs to a State exactly onetenth, or one-twentieth, or one-thirtieth of the whole House; and, therefore, no number of representatives will exactly correspond with

the right of such State, or the precise share of

representation which belongs to it, according to its population.

The Constitution, therefore, must be understood not as enjoining an absolute relative equality—because that would be demanding an impossibility--but as requiring of Congress to make the apportionment of representatives among the several States according to their That which cannot be done perfectly, must be done If exactness cannot, from the nature of things, be attained, then the greatest practicable approach

respective numbers, as near as may be.

in a manner as near perfection as can be.

itself be reached, prevails in other cases, not as

a matter of discretion, but as an intelligible and

definite rule, dictated by justice, and conform

ing to the common sense of mankind; a rule of
no less binding force in cases to which it is
applicable, and no more to be departed from,
than any other rule or obligation.
The committee understand the constitution
as they would have understood it, if it had
said, in so many words, that representatives
should be apportioned among the States ac-
cording to their respective numbers, as near as
may be. If this be not its true meaning, then
it has either given, on this most delicate and
important subject, a rule which is always im.
practicable, or else it has given no rule at all;
because, if the rule be that representatives
shall be apportioned exactly according to num-
bers, it is impracticabie in every case; and if,
for this reason, that cannot be the rule, then
there is no rule whatever, unless the rule be
that they shall be apportioned as near as
may be. -
This construction, indeed, which the com.

the question before the Senate, taking for
granted that such is the true and undeniable
meaning of the constitution.
The next thing to be observed is, that the
constitution prescribes no particular process by
which this apportionment is to be wrought out.
It has plainly described the end to be accom-
plished, viz. the nearest approach to relative e.
guality of representation among the States; and
whatever accomplishes this end, and nothing
else, is the true process. In truth, if, without
any process whatever, whether elaborate or
easy, Congress could perceive the exact pro-
portion of representative power rightfully be:
ionging to each State, it would perfectly fulfil
its duty by conferring that portion on each,
without reference to any process whatever. It
would be enough that the proper end had been
attained. And it is to be remarked further,
that, whether this end be attained best by one
rocess or by another, it becomes, when each
process has been carried through, not matter
of opinion, but matter of mathematical certain:
ty. If the whole population of the United
States, the population of each State, and the
proposed number of the House of Representa"
tives, be all given, then, between two bills ap:
portioning the members, among the several
States, it can be told, with absolute certainty,
which bill assigns to any and every State the

State; in other words, which of the two bills, if either, apportions the representatives ac

tively, as near as may be. If, therefore, a par. ticular process of apportionment be adopted, and objection be made to the injustice or ine

cessarily results from the nature of the process. Before such answer could avail, it would be necessary to show, either that the cons itution

ry, or that there is no other mode of proceed: ing which would produce less inequality and less injustice. otherwise been avoided, be produced by a given process, then that process is a wrong one. It is not suited to the case, and should be rejected. Nor do the committee perceive how it can be matter of constitutional propriety or validity, or in any way a constitutional question, whether the process which may be applied to the case be simple or compound, one process or many processes; since, in the end, it may always be seen whether the result be that which has been aimed at, namely, the nearest practicable approach to precise justice and relative equality. The committee, indeed, are of opinion, in this case, that the simplest and most obvious way of proceeding is also the true and constitutionalway. To them it appears that, in carrying into effect this part of the constitution, the first thing naturally to be done is, to decide on the whole number of which the House is to be

mittee adopt, has not, to their knowledge, been] composed; as when, under the same clause of denied; and they proceed in the discussion of the constitution, a tax is to be apportioned

wumber nearest to the exact proportion of that

cording to the number of the States, respec

quality of its result, it is, surely, no answer to such objection to say, that the inequality ne:

prescribes such process, and makes it necessa

If inequality, which might have

among the States, the amount of the whole tax is, in the first place, to be settled. When the whole number of the proposed House is thus ascertained and fixed, it becomes the entire representative power of all the neople in the Union. It is then a very simple mator to ascertain how much of this representative power each State is entitled to by its numbers. for example, the House is to contain 240 members, then the number 240 expresses the mpresentative power of all the States ; and a •o him calculation readily shows how much of one; this power belongs to each State. This por** ton, it is true, will not always, nor often, be foressed in whole numbers, but it may always i he precisely exhibited by a decimal form of exto pression. If the portion of any State be seldom, to or never, one exact tenth, one exact fifteenth, yo tone exact twentieth, it will always be capa* | *k of prise decimal expression, as one-tenth wal otwo hundredths, one-twelfth and four-hun. a dredths, one-fifteenth and six hundredths, and soon; and the exact portion of the State being

Missouri qught to be satisfied, when it is said that this obvious injustice is the necessary result of the process adopted by the bill? May they not say, with propriety, that since three is the nearest whole number to their exact right, to that number they are entitled, and the process which deprives them of it must be a wrong process? A similar comparison might be made between New York and Vermont. The exact proportion to which Vermont is entitled in a representation of 240, is 5.646. Her nearest whole number, therefore, would be six. Now, two things are undeniably true : first, that to take away the fortieth member from New York, would bring her representation nearer to her exact proportion, than it stands by leaving her that fortieth member. Second, that giving the member thus taken from New York, to Wermont, would bring her representation nearer to her exact right than it is by the bill. And both these propositions are equally true of a transfer of the twenty-eighth member assigned by the bill to Pennsylvania, to Delaware, and of the thirteenth member assigned to Kentucky, to

Fo to thus decimally expressed, will still always show, to tomathematical certainty, what integral number o' comes nearest to such exact portion. For ex* imple, in a House consisting of 240 members, of the tract mathematical proportion to which to her mumbers entitle the State of New York, is on 3839;itiscertain,therefore, that 39 is the inteow onlor whole number nearest to her exact proof portion of the representative power of the o, Union. Why, then, should she not have thirat Womine? and why should she have forty? She is * | *ot quite entitled to thirty-nine; that number * is something more than her right. But, allow. ca ingher thirty-nine, from the necessity of giving * her whole numbers, and because that is the o nearest whole number, is not the Constitution te fully obeyed when she has received the thirty* ninth member? is not her proper number of is representatives then apportioned to her, as near a is may be! And is not the Constitution disrea garded, when the bill goes further, and gives * her a fortieth member?" For what is such a for * | Heth member given? Not for her absolute num * I of for heribsolute numbers do not entitle or to thirty-nine. Not for the sake of apporoning her members to her numbers as near as

* be, because thirty-nine is a nearer appor onment of members to numbers than forty.— *it is given, say the advocates of the bill, *use the process which has been adopted, *il. The answeris, nu such process is en*1 by the Constitution. The case of New York may be compared or *sted with that of Missouri. The exact *posion of Missouri, in a general representa* of 240, is two and six tenths: that is to say, ones nearer to three members than to two, | "it is confined to two. But why is not Mi. *ntitled to that number of representatives "oth comes nearest to her exact proportion *the Constitution fulfilled as to her, while *number is withheld, and while, at the some * in another State, not only is that neares *er given, but an additional member given

Missouri; in other words, Vermont bas, by her numbers, more right to six members, than New York has to forty. Delaware, by her numbers, has more right to two members, than Pennsylvania has to twenty eight; and Missouri, by her numbers, has more right to three members, than Kentucky has to thirteen. Without dis. turbing the proposed number of the House, the mere changing of these three members from and to the six States respectively, woull bring the representation of each of the whole six, nearer to their due proportion, according to their respective numbers, than the bill, in its present form makes it. In the face of this indisputable truth, how can it be said that the bill apportions these members among those States according to their respective numbers, as near as may bez The principle on which the proposed amendment is founded, is an effectual corrective for these and all other equally great inequalities. It may be applied at all times, and in all cases, and its result will always be the nearest approach to perfect justice. It is equaily simple and impartial. As a rule of appor. tionment, it is little other than a transcript of the words of the constitution, and its results are mathematically certain. . The constitution, as the committee understand it, says, representatives shall be apportioned among the States according to their respective numbers of people, as near as may be. The rule adopted by the committee, says, out of the whole number of the House, that number shall be apportioned to each State which comes nearest to its exact right according to its number of people. Where is the repugnancy between the constitution and the rule? The arguments against the rule seem to assume that there is a necessity of instituting some process adopting some number as the ratio, or as that number of people which each member shall be understood to

represent; but the committee see no occasion

* is it an answer with which the people osfor any other process whatever, than simply the