adopted the Constitution, were, of course, the question before the Senate, taking for fuly acquainted with this necessary ope granted that such is the true and undeniable ration of the provision. In the Senate, the meaning of the constitution. States are entitled to a fixed number of Sena- The next thing to be observed is, that the tors; and, therefore, in regard to their repre- constitution prescribes no particular process by sentation, in that body, there is no consequen- which this apportionment is to be wrought out. tial or incidental inequality arising. But being It has plainly described the end to be accomrepresented in the House of Representatives plished, viz. the nearest approach to relative eaccording to their respective numbers of quality of representation among the States; and people, it is unavoidable that, in assigning to whatever accomplishes this end, and nothing each State its number of members, the exact else, is the true process. In truth, if, without proportion of each, out of a given number, any process whatever, whether elaborate or cannot always or often be expressed in whole easy, Congress could perceive the exact pronumbers; that is to say, it will not often be portion of representative power rightfully befound that there belongs to a State exactly one-longing to each State, it would perfectly fulfil tenth, or one-twentieth, or one-thirtieth of the its duty by conferring that portion on each, whole House; and, therefore, no number of without reference to any process whatever. It representatives will exactly correspond with would be enough that the proper end had been the right of such State, or the precise share of attained. And it is to be remarked further, representation which belongs to it, according that, whether this end be attained best by one to its population. process or by another, it becomes, when each The Constitution, therefore, must be under-process has been carried through, not matter stood not as enjoining an absolute relative of opinion, but matter of mathematical certainequality-because that would be demanding an ty. If the whole population of the United impossibility--but as requiring of Congress to States, the population of each State, and the make the apportionment of representatives proposed number of the House of Representaamong the several States according to their tives, be all given, then, between two bills sp. respective numbers, as near as may be. That portioning the members, among the several which cannot be done perfectly, must be done States, it can be told, with absolute certainty, in a manner as near perfection as can be. If which bill assigns to any and every State the exactness cannot, from the nature of things, be number nearest to the exact proportion of that attained, then the greatest practicable approach State; in other words, which of the two bills, to exactness ought to be made. if either, apportions the representatives ac

Congress is not absolved from all rule, cording to the number of the States, respecmerely because the rule of perfect justice can- tively, as near as may be. If, therefore, a par not be applied. In such a case, approximation ticular process of apportionment be adopted, becomes a rule; it takes the place of that other and objection be made to the injustice or inerule which would be preferable, but which is quality of its result, it is, surely, no answer to found inapplicable, and becomes, itself, an such objection to say, that the inequality neobligation of binding force. The nearest ap- cessarily results from the nature of the process. proximation to exact truth or exact right, when Before such answer could avail, it would be that exact truth or that exact right cannot necessary to show, either that the cons itution itself be reached, prevails in other cases, not as prescribes such process, and makes it necessaa matter of discretion, but as an intelligible and ry, or that there is no other mode of proceeddefinite rule, dictated by justice, and conforming which would produce less inequality and ing to the common sense of mankind; a rule of less injustice. If inequality, which might have no less binding force in cases to which it is otherwise been avoided, be produced by a giv applicable, and no more to be departed from, en process, then that process is a wrong one. than any other rule or obligation. It is not suited to the case, and should be rejected.

The committee understand the constitution as they would have understood it, if it had Nor do the committee perceive how it can be said, in so many words, that representatives matter of constitutional propriety or validity, or should be apportioned among the States ac-in any way a constitutional question, whether cording to their respective numbers, as near as the process which may be applied to the case may be. If this be not its true meaning, then be simple or compound, one process or many it has either given, on this most delicate and processes; since, in the end, it may always be important subject, a rule which is always im-seen whether the result be that which has been practicable, or else it has given no rule at all; aimed at, namely, the nearest practicable apbecause, if the rule be that representatives proach to precise justice and relative equality. shall be apportioned exactly according to num- The committee, indeed, are of opinion, in this bers, it is impracticabie in every case; and if, case, that the simplest and most obvious way for this reason, that cannot be the rule, then of proceeding is also the true and constitutionthere is no rule whatever, unless the rule be al way. To them it appears that, in carrying that they shall be apportioned as near as into effect this part of the constitution, the first may be. thing naturally to be done is, to decide on the This construction, indeed, which the com- whole number of which the House is to be mittee adopt, has not, to their knowledge, been composed; as when, under the same clause of denied; and they proceed in the discussion of the constitution, a tax is to be apportioned

among the States, the amount of the whole tax Missouri qught to be satisfied, when it is said s, in the first place, to be settled. that this obvious injustice is the necessary reWhen the whole number of the proposed sult of the process adopted by the bill? May House is thus ascertained and fixed, it becomes they not say, with propriety, that since three is The entire representative power of all the Reo- the nearest whole number to their exact right, ole in the Union. It is then a very simple mat- to that number they are entitled, and the proer to ascertain how much of this representative cess which deprives them of it must be a wrong power each State is entitled to by its numbers. process? A similar comparison might be made If, for example, the House is to contain 240 between New York and Vermont. The exact members, then the number 240 expresses the proportion to which Vermont is entitled in a rerepresentative power of all the States; and a presentation of 240, is 5.646. Her nearest whole plain calculation readily shows how much of number, therefore, would be six. Now, two this power belongs to each State. This por- things are undeniably true : first, that to take tion, it is true, will not always, nor often, be away the fortieth member from New York, expressed in whole numbers, but it may always would bring her representation nearer to her be precisely exhibited by a decimal form of ex- exact proportion, than it stands by leaving her pression. If the portion of any State be seldom, that fortieth member. Second, that giving the or never, one exact tenth, one exact fifteenth, member thus taken from New York, to Veror one exact twentieth, it will always be capa-mont, would bring her representation nearer to ble of prcise decimal expression, as one-tenth her exact right than it is by the bill. And both and two-hundredths, one-twelfth and four-hun- these propositions are equally true of a transfer dredths, one-fifteenth and six hundredths, and of the twenty-eighth member assigned by the so on; and the exact portion of the State being bill to Pennsylvania, to Delaware, and of the thus decimally expressed, will still always show, thirteenth member assigned to Kentucky, to to mathematical certainty, what integral number Missouri; in other words, Vermont has, by her comes nearest to such exact portion. For ex-numbers, more right to six members, than New ample, in a House consisting of 240 members, York has to forty. Delaware, by her numbers, the exact mathematical proportion to which has more right to two members, than Pennsylher numbers entitle the State of New York, is vania has to twenty eight; and Missouri, by her 38 59: it is certain, therefore, that 39 is the inte- numbers, has more right to three members, gral or whole number nearest to her exact pro- than Kentucky has to thirteen. Without disportion of the representative power of the turbing the proposed number of the House, the Union. Why, then, should she not have thir- mere changing of these three members from ty-nine? and why should she have forty? She is and to the six States respectively, woul I bring not quite entitled to thirty-nine; that number the representation of each of the whole six, is something more than her right. But, allow nearer to their due proportion, according to ing her thirty-nine, from the necessity of giving their respective numbers, than the bill, in its her whole numbers, and because that is the present form makes it. In the face of this innearest whole number, is not the Constitution disputable truth, how can it be said that the bill fully obeyed when she has received the thirty-apportions these members among those States ninth member? Is not her proper number of according to their respective numbers, as near representatives then apportioned to her, as near as may be?

as may be? And is not the Constitution disre- The principle on which the proposed amendgarded, when the bill goes further, and gives ment is founded, is an effectual corrective for her a fortieth member? For what is such a for these and all other equally great inequalities. tieth member given? Not for her absolute num It may be applied at all times, and in all cases, bers: for her absolute numbers do not entitle and its result will always be the nearest apher to thirty-nine. Not for the sake of appor-proach to perfect justice. It is equally tioning her members to her numbers as near as simple and impartial. As a rule of appor may be, because thirty-nine is a nearer apportionment, it is little other than a transcript tionment of members to numbers than forty.of the words of the constitution, and its results But it is given, say the advocates of the bill, are mathematically certain. The constitution, because the process which has been adopted, as the committee understand it, says, represen gives it. The answer is, no such process is enjoined by the Constitution.

tatives shall be apportioned among the States according to their respective numbers of people, as near as may be. The rule adopted by the committee, says, out of the whole number of the House, that number shall be apportioned to each State which comes nearest to its exact right according to its number of people.

The case of New York may be compared or contrasted with that of Missouri. The exact proportion of Missouri, in a general representation of 240, is two and six tenths: that is to say, comes nearer to three members than to two, yet it is confined to two. But why is not Mis Where is the repugnancy between the conour entitled to that number of representatives stitution and the rule? The arguments against which comes nearest to her exact proportion the rule seem to assume that there is a necesIs the Constitution fulfilled as to her, while sity of instituting some process adopting some bat number is withheld, and while, at the same number as the ratio, or as that number of peotime, in another State, not only is that nearest ple which each member shall be understood to number given, but an additional member given represent; but the committee see no occasion aao? Is it an answer with which the people of for any other process whatever, than simply the

ascertainment of that quantum, out of the whole portionment of representatives among the sevemass of the representative power, which each ral States according to their respective numState may claim. bers, and stops there. It makes no provision

But it is said that, although a State may re- for the representation of districts, of States, or ceive a number of representatives which is for the representation of any portion of the peosomething less than its exact proportion of re-ple of a State less than the whole. It says nopresentation, yet, that it can, in no case, con- thing of ratios or of constituent numbers. All stitutionally receive more. How is this propo- these things it leaves to State legislation. The sition proved? How is it shown that the con- right which each State possesses to its own due stituation is less perfectly fulfilled by allowing a portion of the representative power, is a State State a small excess, than by subjecting her to right, strictly: it belongs to the State, as a a large deficiency? What the constitution re- State; and it is to be used and exercised as the quires, is the nearest practicable approach to State may see fit, subject only to the constituprecise justice. The rule is approximation; and tional qualifications of electors. In fact, the we ought to approach, therefore, on whichever States do make, and always have made, differside we can approach nearest. ent provisions for the exercise of this power. But there is still a more conclusive answer to In some, a single member is chosen for a cerbe given to this suggestion. The whole num-tain defined district; in others, two or three fier of representatives of which the House is members are chosen for the same district; and, to be composed, is, of necessity, limited. This in some again, as New Hampshire, Rhode Islnumber, whatever it is, is that which is to be and, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Georgia, apportioned, and nothing else can be appor- the whole representation of the State is exerttioned. This is the whole sum to be distribu-ed as a joint, undivided representation. In ted. If, therefore, in making the apportion. these last mentioned States, every member of ment, some States receive less than their just the House of Representatives has for his constishare, it must necessarily follow that some other tuents all the people of the State; and all the States have received more than their just people of those States are consequently represhare. If there be one State in the Union with sented in that branch of Congress. If the bill less than its right, some other State has more before the Senate should pass into a law, in than its right, so that the argument, whatever its present form, whatever injustice it might do be its force, applies to the bill in its present to any of those States, it would not be correct form, as strongly as it can ever apply to any to say of them, nevertheless, that any portion bill. of their people was unrepresented. The well But the objection most usually urged against founded objection would be,as to some of them the principle of the proposed amendment, is, at least, that they were not adequately, comthat it provides for the representation of frac-petently, fairly, represented; that they had not tions. Let this objection be examined and con- as many voices and as many votes in the House sidered. Let it be ascertained, in the first place, of Representatives as they were entitled to. what these fractions, or fractional numbers, or This would be the objection. There would residuary numbers, really are, which it is said be no unrepresented fractions; but the State, will be represented should the amendment as a State, as a whole, would be deprived of prevail. some part of its just rights.

A fraction is the broken part of some inte- On the other hand, if the bill should pass as gral number. It is, therefore, a relative or it is now proposed to be amended, there would derivative idea. It implies the previous exist be no representations of fractions in any State; ence of some fixed number, of which it is but for a fraction supposes a division and a remaina part or remainder. If there be no necessity der. All that could justly be said, would be, for fixing or establishing such previous num- that some of these States, as States, possessed ber, then the fraction resulting from it, is itself a portion of legislative power a little larger no matter of necessity, but matter of choice or than their exact right; as it must be admitted, of accident. Now, the argument which con- that, should the bill pass unamended, they siders the plan proposed in the amendment as would possess of that power much less than a representation of fractions, and therefore un- that exact right. The same remarks are subconstitutional, assumes as its basis, that, ac- stantially true, if applied to those States which cording to the Constitution, every member of adopt the district system, as most of them do. the House of Representatives represents, or In Missouri, for example, there will be no fracought to represent, the same, or nearly the tion unrepresented, should the bill become same, number of constituents; that this number law in its present form; nor any member for is to be regarded as an integer; and any thing fraction, should the amendment prevail; beless than this is therefore called a fraction or a cause the mode of apportionment which assigns residuum, and cannot be entitled to a repre- to each State that number which is nearest to sentative. Bat all this is not the provision of its exact right, applies no assumed ratios, the Constitution of the United States. That make no subdivisions, and, of course, produces Constitution contemplates no integer, or any no fractions. In the one case, or in the other common number for the constituents of a mem- the State, as a State, will have something more, ber of of the House of Representatives. It or something less, than its exact proportion of goes not at all into these subdivisions of the representative power; but she will part out population of a State. It provides for the ap-this power among her own people, in either

case, in such mode as she may choose, or ex- plicable and applied impartially to all the States, ercise it altogether as an entire representation it is quite true. But, if that which is intended of the people of the State. be, that the population of each State must be Whether the subdivision of the representative divided by a fixed ratio, and all resulting fracpower within any State, if there be a subdivi- tions, great or small, disregarded, this is but to sion, be equal or unequal, or fairly or unfairly take for granted the very thing in controversy. made, Congress cannot know, and has no au-The question is, whether it be unconstitutional thority to inquire. It is enough that the State to make approximation to equality, by allowing presents her own represen、ation on the floor of representatives for major fractions? The affirCongress in the more she chooses to present it. mative of this question, is, indeed, denied, but If a State were to give to one portion of her ter it is not disproved, by saying that we must abide ritory a representative for every twenty-five by the operation of division, by an assumed rathousand persons, and to the rest a representa- tio, and disregard fractions. The question still tive only for every fifty thousand, it would be remains as it was before; and it is still to be an act of unjust legislation, doubtless, but it shown what there is in the constitution which would be wholly beyond redress by any power rejects approximation as the rule of apportion. in Congress, because the constitution has left ment. But suppose it be necessary to find a diall this to the State itself. visor, and to abide its results. What is a divi. These considerations, it is thought, may show sor? Not necessarily a simple number. It may that the constitution has not, by any implication be composed of a whole number and a fraction, or necessary construction, enjoined that which it may itself be the result of a previous process; it certainly has not ordained in terms, viz. that it may be any thing, in short, which produces every member of the House shall be supposed accurate and uniform division: whatever does to represent the same number of constituents, this, is a common rule, a common standard, or, and, therefore, that the assumption of a ratio, if the word he important, a common divisor. as representing the common number of consti- The committee refer, on this part of the case, tuents, is not called for by the constitution. All to some observations by Professor Dean, with a that Congress is at liberty to do, as it would table, both of which accompany this report. seem, is to divide the whole representative As it is not improbable that opinion has been power of the Union into twenty-four parts, as- a good deal influenced on this subject by what signing one part to each State, as near as prac took place on the passing of the first act mak. ticable, according to its right, and leaving all ing an apportionment of representatives among subsequent arrangement, and all subdivisions, the States, the committee have examined and to the State itself. considered that precedent. If it be in point to If the view thus taken of the rights of the the present case, it is certainly entitled to very States, and the duties of Congress, be the cor- great weight; but if it be of questionable aprect view, then the plan proposed in the amend. plication, the text of the Constitution, even if ment is, in no just sense, a representation of it were doubtful, could not be explained by a fractions. But suppose it was otherwise; sup-doubtful commentary. In the opinion of the pose a direct provision were made for allowing committee, it is only necessary that what was a representative to every State in whose popu- said on that occasion should be understood in lation, it being first divided by a common ra- connexion with the subject matter then under tio, there should be found a fraction exceeding consideration; and, in order to see what that half the amount of that ratio, what constitution- subject matter really was, the committee think al objection could be fairly urged against such it necessary to state, shortly, the case. a provision? Let it be always remembered that The two Houses of Congress passed a bill, the case here supposed provides only for a after the first enumeration of the people, profraction exceeding the moiety of the ratio, for viding for a House of Representatives which the committee admit, at once, that the rep.e- should consist of 120 members. The bill exsentation of fractions less than a moiety is un-pressed no rule or principle by which these constitutional; because, should a member be members were assigned to the several States. allowed to a State for such a fraction, it would It merely said that New Hampshire should have be certain that her representation would not be five members, Massachusetts ten, and so on; 80 near her exact right as it was before. But going through all the States, and assigning the the allowance of a member for a major fraction whole number of one hundred and twenty.is a direct approximation towards justice and Now, by the census, then recently taken, it equality. There appears to the committee to appeared that the whole representative popu be nothing, either in the letter or the spirit of lation of the United States was 3,615,920; and the constitution, opposed to such a mode of ap it was evidently the wish of Congress to make portionment. On the contrary, it seems entire- the House as numerous as the Constitution y consistent with the very object which the would allow. But the Constitution has said constitution contemplated, and well calculated that there should not be more than one memto accomplish it. The argument commonly ber for every thirty thousand persons. This urged against it, is, that it is necessary to apply prohibition was, of course, to be obeyed; but some one common divisor, and to abide by its did the Constitution mean that no State should results. have more than one member for every thirty

If by this it be meant that there must be thousand persons? or did it only mean that the some common rule, or common measure, ap-whole House, as compared with the whole po.

pulation of the United States, should not con-dent Washington said: "The Constitution has tain more than one member for every thirty prescribed that Representatives shall be apporthousand persons? If this last were the true tioned among the several States according to construction, then the bill, in that particular, their respective numbers; and there is no one was right; if the first were the true construc- proportion or divisor, which, applied to the retion, then it was wrong; because so many spective numbers of the States, will the nummembers could not be assigned to the States ber and allotment of Representatives proposed without giving to some of them more members by the bill."

than one for every thirty thousand. In fact, This was all undoubtedly true, and was, in the bill did propose to do this in regard to se- the judgment of the committee, a decisive obveral States. jection against the bill. It is nevertheless to President Washington adopted that construc- be observed, that the other objection completetion of the Constitution which applied its pro-ly covered the whole ground. There could, in hibition to each State individually. He thought that bill, be no allowance for a fraction, great or that no State could, constitutionally, receive small; because Congress had taken for the ratio more than one member for every thirty thou- the lowest number allowed by the Constitution, sand of her own population. On this, there- viz. thirty thousand. Whatever fraction a State fore, his main objection to the bill was found- might have less than that ratio, no member ed. That objection he states in these words: could be allowed for it. It is scarcely necessa"The Constitution has also provided that ry to observe, that no such objection applies to the number of representatives shall not exceed the amendment now proposed. No State, one for every thirty thousand; which restric- should the amendment prevail, will have a tion is, by the context, and by fair and obvious greater number of members than one for every construction, to be applied to the separate and thirty thousand; nor is it likely that that objec respective numbers of the States; and the bill tion will ever again occur. The whole force has allotted to eight of the States more than of the precedent, whatever it be, in its applione for every thirty thousand." cation to the present case, is drawn from the It is now necessary to see what there was other objection. And what is the true import further objectionable in this bill. The number of that objection? Does it mean any thing more of one hundred and twelve members was all than that the apportionment was not made on a that cou'd be divided among the States, with common rule or principle, applicable, and apout giving to some of them more than one mem plied alike to all the States? ber for thirty thousand inhabitants. Therefore, President Washington's words are, "there is having allotted these one hundred and twelve, no one proportion or divisor, which, applied to there still remained eight of the one hundred the respective numbers of the States, will yield and twenty to be assigned; and these eight the the number and allotment of Representatives bill assigned to the States having the largest proposed by the bill."

fractions. Some of these fractions were large, If, then, he could have found a common pro.. and some were small. No regard was paid to portion, it would have removed this objection. fractions over a moiety of the ratio, any more He required a proportion or divisor. These than to fractions under it. There was no rule words he evidently uses as explanatory of each laid down, stating what fraction should entitle other. He meant by divisor, therefore, no more the States to whom they might happen to fall, than by proportion. What he sought was, some or in whose population they might happen to common and equal rule by which the allotment be found, to a representative therefor. The had been made among the several States; he assignment was not made on the principle that did not find such common rule; and, on that each State should have a member for a fraction ground, he thought the bill objectionable. greater than half the ratio; or that all the States In the opinion of the committee, no such obshould have a member for a fraction, in all cases jection applies to the amendment recommendwhere the allowance of such member would ed by them. That amendment gives a rule, bring her representation nearer to its exact pro- plain, simple, just, uniform, and of universal portion than its disallowance. There was no application. The rule has been frequently common measure or common rule adopted, but stated. It may be clearly expressed in either the assignment was matter of arbitrary discre-of two ways. Let the rule be, that the whole tion. A member was allowed to New Hamp-number of the proposed House shall be apportioned shire, for example, for a fraction of less than among the several States according to their reone ha f the ratio, thus placing her representa- spective numbers, giving to each State that numtion further from her exact proportion than it ber of members which comes nearest to her exact was without such additional member; while a mathematical part or proportion; or, let the rule member was refused to Georgia, whose case be, that the population of each State shall be diclosely resembled that of New Hampshire, both vided by a common divisor, and that, in addition having what were thought large fractions, but to the number of members resulting from such diboth still under a moiety of the ratio, and dis-vision, a member shall be allowed to each State tinguished from each other only be a very whose fraction exceeds a moiety of the divisor. slight difference of absolute numbers. The Either of these is, it seems to the commitcommittee have already fully expressed their tee, a fair and just rule, capable of uniform apopinion on such a mode of apportionment. plication, and operating with entire impartialiIn regard to this character of the bill, Presi-ty. There is no want of a common proportion,