tives, when she ought not to bear, and would the constitution is thereby directed to be made not bear, a similar share of a direct tax, and among the several States;" and no process of this, too, under a rule prescribed by the consti- apportionment can conform to this command tution, whereby both representatives and direct which does not include and apply the same rule taxes are to be apportioned in like manner? to all the States. But if you give a representa2d. Because the requirement of the consti- tive to fractions, some of the States must netution is to apportion representatives, and not the cessarily be excluded from the apportionment, fractional parts of representatives, for the plain although they are contributors to the fund to be reason that the latter was physically impossible. distributed.

You cannot have the fraction of a representa- 5th. Because the constitution requires that tive. Each representative must have a consti- representatives should be apportioned among tuency, and as you cannot have the fraction of the several States "according to their respecta representative, so the fraction of a constituen-ive numbers;" but by this, or any other scheme cy cannot have an entire representative. of representing fractions which can be con

3d. Because, if such an apportionment was ceived, we are compelled to disregard the repermissible, it would violate its own fundamen- spective numbers of the several States, in the tal principles, and be contrary to justice; for, as apportionment, and to give to some only what there are twenty-four States, each of which will, belongs to all. We are obliged to consolidate in all probability, ever have a fraction at any into one mass the fractional population of all the ratio, the fractions of some of these must be ta States, and instead of giving to them, severalken to make up the fractions of others. Thus, ly, what they are entitled to according to their for illustration, suppose that twelve of the respective numbers, we force some to contriStates had each a major fraction, or a fraction bute to the benefit of others. a unit greater than the moiety of the ratio as- It has been argued that, as exact equality can sumed, and the remaining twelve States have not be attained in the apportionment of repreeach a minor fraction, or a fraction a unit less sentatives, the rule of construction is, that it than the moiety of the ratio assumed, the twelve must be made as nearly equal as may be. WithStates, according to the principle assumed by out admitting that a representation of fractions the amendment, having minor fractions a unit approximates to equality, and believing that it less than the moiety of the ratio, must contri-tends to greater inequality than the r rejection, bute the fractional parts of their population to this argument appears inadmissible; and, if make up the larger fractional parts of the adopted in our legislation on this subject, may twelve other States, each having fractions a unit lead to the worst consequences-for if, in greater than the moiety of the ratio assumed, the apportionment, Congress must make the and so give to the latter twelve States each an apportionment as nearly equalras may be, Conadditional representative. That is to say, in the gress must fix the numbers of the House and the case supposed, (and if it be an extreme case, it ratio of representation so as to attain this supwill not be denied that approximations to it posed equality. In practice, it will be found in may and must occur, according to the principle almost, perhaps every case, that the lowest ratio of the amendment,) if the ratio assumed be fifty will make the most equal apportionment; and, thousand, and twelve of the States have each according to this argument, Congress must, a fraction of 25,001, and twelve other States adopt that ratio, to whatever extent the increashave each a fraction of 24,999, the fractions of ing population of the country might swell the the latter twelve States must contribute to the numbers of the House. The minimum ratio former the whole of their fractional numbers, fixed by the convention, and their knowledge so as to give them twelve additional represen- that the numbers of the House could not keep tatives. And can any one, the committee ask, pace with the increase of population, are, in consider as apportionment that process which the opinion of the committee, a conclusive regives all of the subject to be apportioned to futation of the argument which interpolates on some, and none to others of the contributors, or the constitution the words as near as may be; which makes a whole of equal value with a where the Convention thought proper to omit fractional part of itself? them.

The inequality and injustice of giving to a The view already taken, it would appear, is State a representative for a major fraction, must the natural and just interpretation of the conbe apparent to all, when it is considered that, stitution, and that which ought to be placed upin practice it may, and probably will, so hap-on it, if, for the first time, we were about to fix pen that only a few States whose aggregate po- its meaning. But such is not the case. The pulation may be equal to one-tenth of the whole very question involved by the amendment ocpopulation of the Union, may each be entitled curred at the very commencement of this goto a representative for its major fraction, and vernment, and was then fully discussed and setthe residue of the States, containing eight-tled. The decision then made has regulated tenths of the whole population, each having mi- the proceedings of Congress, in reference to nor fractions, in the aggregate, much greater this matter, ever since, and, if practice or prethan the aggregate of such major fractions, will cedents can settle any question arising under be denied a representative, not only for their the constitution, this, it would seem, is now setseveral fractions, but for the total aggregate of tied in the strongest possible manner. It may not be altogether unprofitable to trace the his 4th. Because the apportionment required by (tory of this question, the discussion and the de

them.

cision upon it at the first apportionment of re-respect to individual States?" We find, too presentatives. The constitution had required an actual enumeration of the people to be made within three years after the first meeting of Congress, in order that the representatives might be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers.

that numerous tables of calculation were then, as now, prepared, and with the same view, to wit: to show the nearer approach to equality which it was then, as now, contended would be attained by adopting the principle of representing fractions in some of the States, than could be attained in any other mode. The House at first disagreed to the Senate's amend

House, when all its members were not present, receded from their disagreement to the amendment by a majority of two votes, and the bill passed. When this bill was presented to President Washington, he refused to approve it, and, returning it to Congress, assigned two reasons for the veto which he interposed. These reasons the committee will here give in his own words, to wit:

"UNITED STATES, April 5th, 1782. "Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

"I have maturely considered the act passed by the two Houses, entitled An act for an apportionment of representatives among the sereral States according to the first enumeration,' and I return it to your House, wherein it originated, with the following objections:

"First. The Constitution has prescribed that representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, and there is no one proportion or di visor which, applied to the respective numbers of the States, will yield the number and allotment proposed by the bill.

Second, The Constitution has also provid

The first census having been taken, Congress, at their session of 1791-2, undertook to make the required apportionment of represen-ment; the Senate insisted; and, finally, the tatives. Great difficulties were found to, exist between the House and the Senate in agreeing upon any bill of apportionment. The first bill passed by the House fixed the ratio of 30,000, the Senate amended it by striking out 30,000, and inserting 33,000, but in neither was any provision made for representing fractions; Both the House and the Senate adhered, and this bill was lost by the disagreeing votes of the two bodies. A new bill was immediately brought into the House and passed. In the Senate, this same principle of representing fractions was proposed and carried by a majority of one vote, as an amendment to the House bill. It is proper here to remark that the amendment of the Senate then, as now, fixed, not the ratio of representation, but the numbers of the House. Upon its return to the House, it gave rise to much discussion. It was sustained by its advocates by precisely the same arguments now urged in support of the amendment now under consideration. It was then, as now, contended, that the true meaning of the Constitution was, that the apportionment should be made, "as nearly as may be," according to the numbers of the States. To show that the question we are now considering is the identical ques-ed that the number of representatives shall not tion then considered, discussed, and decided, exceed one for every thirty thousand, which the committee beg leave to make an extract or restriction is, by the context, and by fair and two from the debates of that period. One of obvious construction, to be applied to the sepa the advocates of the principle of representing rate and respective numbers of the States, and fractions, (N. Niles,) "observed that there the bill has alloted to eight of the States more were evidently wanting to complete the sentence than one for every thirty thousand. [of the Constitution] these words, as nearly as may be;' with this explanation added, he went on to show that the principle of equality would be more strictly adhered to by admitting this amendment than by rejecting it; for, if Delaware contains 58,000 inhabitants, 28,000 were certainly nearer to 33,000 than 33,000 were to 58,000. He recited other passages of the Constitution to show that his idea was compatible with it." Mr.Madison, then a member of the House of Representatives, in the course of the debate, expressed his opinion in the following strong language: "We are called on to violate the Constitution, by adopting a measure that will give representatives for these separate and distinct fractions in the respective States, and afterwards are told it is not to the fractional numbers in the States that they refer, but to the aggregate of the fractions in the United States. If this reasoning is good, why do the gentlemen stop at this boundary of a representation by States? why not proceed to erect the whole of the United States into one district, without any division, in order to prevent the inequality they conceive to exist in

GEORGE WASHINGTON."

Upon the return of the bill, accompanied by this message, the constitutional majority re quired to pass it could not be obtained; but, on the contrary, a majority of five of the House voted against it, and so it failed to become a law. Immediately after the failure of this, a third bill was brought in, which, adopting a ratio of 33,000, and rejecting all the fractions in every State produced by this divisor, passed both Houses of Congress, received the sanction of the President, and so became a law, which gave the first apportionment of representatives under the Constitution.

The committee are aware that it has been urged in argument, that the chief, if not the sole reason why President Washington refused to approve the bill containing the principle of giving a representative to fractions, was, because that bill allotted to some of the States more representatives than one for every 30,000 of their people, and that this objection does not apply to the amendment now under consideration. The committee are not of that opinion. It is admitted that the second objection does not

pected and intended an apportionment which York. But the increase of New York, in popu should produce equality as to fractions, in each lation, for the last ten years, has been nearly State. This surely never was the case. But, 40 1-6 per centum, whilst that of those sever it is said, we must approach equality "as near States has been but 124 per cent. Is this an as may be." This is more specious than solid. apportionment "as neur as may be," among See where such a principle will carry us. We these States, according to their respective num are at present to represent fractions greater than bers, or is it not, in fact, more unequal and unone half of the constitutional number, taken as just than the inequality complained of in the a ratio or common divisor. That may not be House bill? "as near as may be." Descend to a represén- The committee refer, also, to the table C, to tative for a fourth or an eighth, and you may be show what would have been the operation of nearer still, and the committee see no limit to representing major fractions, if it had been the extention of the principle down to a unit, adopted at the several apportionments of repre except, indeed, the arbitrary discretion of Con- sentatives, and, also, what its operation now is gress; for the representative of a fourth frac- by the Senate's amendment. From which, tion bears the same relation to the representa-among others, this fact appears, that the State tive of a half fiction, that the latter does to the of North Carolina, at every former apportionrepresentative of a whole, and thus an inequality ment, would have been entitled to one addimay be really produced among the States, too tional representative, whilst the State of Masintolerable to be quietly submitted to. sachusetts would never, until now, have been There is one plain view of this question, entitled to such additional representative. By which may be presented in very few words, the amendment of the Senate, however, North which ought to be conclusive. According to Carolina is now excluded from a representative the amendment, eleven States out of twenty-for a fraction, and Massachusetts is now entitled four are to have a representative, each, for a- to a representative for a fraction. Not is it the bout twenty five thousand persons, and each o least of the objections to the plan assumed by the other thirteen States have to produce twice the Senate, that it demonstrates, if the princithat number, or very near it, for each represen-ple be correct, the injustice which many of the tative apportioned to them. The plan, there- States have suffered at the hands of their own fore, is partial, unequal, and unknown to the representatives at all former apportionments. constitution, and the constructions put upon it nor can the committee adopt, at the presen for forty years and upwards. day, a principle, which if true, would be : The views thus presented, it would seem, reproach to all the preceding functionaries o ought to be entirely conclusive upon this sub-the Government, both legislative and executive, ject; but the equality supposed to be attained who have heretofore acted upon the subject. by the amendment, as the committee have al There is still another light in which this subready remarked, is more specious than solid.ject may be presented, to show whether we Eleven members are to be given for fractions. are not, in fact, further from equality if wa Of these, the State of Delaware is to have one. adopt the amendment, than we shall be if we Her whole populatiou is 75,432. If she, then, adhere to the bill sent from this House to the is to have two representatives for that number, Senate. Let us compare a few of the States and equality is the object, every other State with each other under the original bill, ani ought to have in the same proportion. Apply under the amendment. By the original bill, the this rule to the population of the other States, inequality between the unrepresemed fractions and we will find that New York, which has on- of Maryland and Virginia was 2,440; by the ly forty by the amendment, ought to have fifty-amendment, Maryland is over represented one; that Pennsylvania, which has twenty-eight, 23,592, an additional member being assigned. ought to have thirty-six. To see the propor. to that State for a fraction, and Virginia, by the tionate number to which, according to the rule amendment, (that State having no representaassumed by the amendment, each of the States tive assigned to her for a fraction,) is under rewould be entitled, the committee beg leave to presented 21,488; so that to ascertain the inrefer to the table annexed to this report, mark- equality between those two States, the number ed A. They beg leave, also, to refer to the over represented in the one, and the number table B, to show the unequal operation of the under represented in the other, must be added plan of the Senate by a comparison between together, which will produce the number different States; from which it appears, that 45,080, which denotes the exact inequality the seven States of New Hampshire, New Jer-between them. Now the inequality complainsey, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Lou-ed of in the bill, is not so great as this between isiana, and Alabama, have an aggregate popu ary two States. By the bill, Vermont has the lation of 1,959,960. The State of New York largest, and Georgia the smallest, unrepresenthas a population of 1,918,552. These sevened fraction; and the difference between them States having but 41,407 of representative po- is 41,636. In like manner, the inequality bepulation more than New York, have, neverthetween the unrepresented fractions of the States less, forty-four representatives assigned to them of North Carolina and South Carolina was, by by the Senate's amendment, whilst New York the bill, 6,078. By the amendment, the inhas only forty representatives. With a differ- equality between those two States is 41,577.ence of population of only 41,407, these seven By the bill, the inequality between the unStates have four more representatives than New represented fractions of the States of Maine and

Delaware, was 9,899. By "the amendment, Now, work out the various proportions thus: as the inequality between those two States is the whole number of people of the United 37,713. States is to 250, so is the whole number of

whether the number of which the House shall consist is first fixed in the mind, and then the proportion of each State, by a simple process in common arithmetic, is ascertained. In both cases, the due proportion between the States, each losing its own fraction, is equally preserved, and must therefore be an apportionment according to the precepts of the Constitution.

By the bill, the inequality between the un- people in each State to the number of reprerepresented fractions of the States of Pennsyl-sentatives to which each State is entitled-and vania and Alabama, was 11,536. By the amend-it will be seen that the number thus found to ment, the inequality between those two States belong to each State, is exactly the number. is 35,834. The committee will not extend the assigned to each by the bill, and that, besides comparison between States further, but refer the number of members assigned to each State, the House to table D, from which it will be the amount of which is equal to 240, there will easy to calculate the relative inequality between also be found in each of the 24 answers, 24 the unrepresented fractions of any two States fractions of 24 different values, the aggregate accorng to the bill, and also according to the of all which fractions will be exactly equal to amendment proposed by the Senate. And it 10, and each of which being remainders, less may well be questioned whether the amend than integers, must be lost. So that the result ment attains, in any degree, the object which is precise y the same, whether a ratio be taken it professes, of making an apportionment among and applied to the States respectively, or the respective States, "as near as may be, according so their respective numbers. Indeed the committee are of opinion that, if the constitutional objection, which they believe to be well founded, against the principle assumed by the amendment was removed, that still, so far from being a nearer approach to equality, it is, in fact, as between many of the States, more unequal and unjust than the bill itself as it passed this House, the inequalities of which it To the Senate's plan no such rule of prois its professed purpose to remedy. The table portion can be applied. No process or proD exhibits, also, the relative effects of the two portion based upon the population of the States, plans as compared with each other, upon the respectively, of the United States; and the States respectively. It gives the relative rate number 251 assumed by the amendment as the per cent. of the representative population of number of the House, will give to eleven of the each State, compared with that of the whole States the number assigned to them respecUnited States; the rate per cent. of the repre- tively by the amendment. The amendment, sentation of each State, compared with the therefore, does not apportion representatives whole representation according to the amend-among the States according to any rule of proment of the Senate, the rate per cent. which portion, and is inconsistent, therefore, with the each State is over or under represented by the requirement of the Constitution. scheme of the Senate's amendment, and the For a more ready reference to the history of increase per cent of population of each State the legislation of Congress on this subject, the from 1820 to 1830. committee have appended to this report extracts from the Journals of the two Houses, from which it will be seen that every attempt to procure a representation of fractions has been resisted and defeated.

The committee, in conclusion, beg leave to present one other view of this subject, for the purpose of showing that the bill of the House apportions representatives to the States, respectively, according to the rules of proportion, and that the amendment of the Senate does

not.

The committee recommend to the House to adhere to the practical construction given to the clause of the Constitution in question, by the enlightened patriots and statesman who have so solemnly and repeatedly adjudged it.

They recommend to the House the following resolution:

Resolved, That this House do disagree to the amendment of the Senate to the said bill.

CONGRESSIONAL.

The ratio 47,700 assumed by the bill, and applied as a common divisor to the population of the States respectively, produces a House of 240 members; and the number assigned to each State, is its due proportion of the whole, as may be easily ascertained by working out 24 sums in the rule of three. Thus the census has given us the population of each State, and the population of the whole United States; the bill gives a House of 240 members; but in making the apportionment of them among the States, in each of the twenty-four States there are found fractions, which, when added together, are found to be equal, at the ratio fixed by the bill, to 10 members; add the 10, thus lost by The House then, in pursuance of the order fractions, to 240, the number of the House, and of the preceding day, proceeded with the trial you have 250, which would be the number of of General Houston, and Mr. BURGES, in a the House if the ratio of 47,700 was applied to long and eloquent argument, urged the propri. the consolidated population of the Union, in-ety and necessity of vindicating the violated stead of to that of the States respecavely.-rights of the representatives of the people.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
FRIDAY, MAY 11.

THE TRIAL OF SAMUEL HOUSTON. [CONCLUDED.]