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perfect, by reason of the fractional parts or
remainder over in each county, and it became
necessary to, adopt some rule, by which those
parts might be adjusted ; and the committee
were of opinion, that it was most agreeable to
the spirit of the constitution, that when any
senatorial district or any county had a remain-
der or surplus of electors, exceeding one half
the given ratio, (the ratio was 817 for the Se.
mate, and 554 for the Assembly,) such county
or such district should be entitled to an addi.
tional member ; and when such remainder was
less than half, it should be rejected.”
And this rule was followed in the appor-
tionment. -
But the principle of the amendment of the
Senate is objected to on the ground that it is a
representation of fractions. -
To this objection, it is a sufficient reply, that
the amendment can only be made to appear as
a representation of fractions, by assuming an
arbitrary ratio in the first instance. "It has al.
ready been observed, that the Constitution no-
where prescribes this; but that, on the contra-
ry, it must always be impossible, by assuming
such a ratio, to carry into effect the constitu.
tional rule of apportioning representatives
among the several states according to their re-
spective numbers. , - .
It may faither be replied, that the present
apportionment bill as it passed the House, and
every other apportionment bill that ever pass-
ed, is liable to precisely the same objection.
That bill provides for apportioning a House of
240 members. That number of members ap-
Portioned among the several States, according
to their respective numbers, would give the
following result:

Maine, 8.036
New Hampshire, 5.118 .
Massachusetts, 12 281 .
Rhode Island, 1.955–H
Vermont, - 5.647
Connecticut, 5.998+ .
New York, 38.5994---
New Jersey, 6,434
Pennsylvania, 27.122--
Delaware, 1.517
Maryland, 8.165
Virginia, 20.3924-
North Carolina, 12.8+
South Carolina, 9.15
Georgia, 89+
Alabama, 5.2
Mississippi, o 2.21,
Louisiana, 3.4
Kentucky, 12 3--
Tennessee, 12.5+
Ohio, 18.7+
Indiana, 69+
lllinois, 3.1
Missouri, 2.6

To these the bill adds twelve more members, assigned to the States marked thus +

It is thus demonstrated by figures, that if 240 members be apportioned, by the only true

ratio, viz. that obtained by dividing the whole population by the whole House, it will be found that fractions are represented : and if 240 be assumed as the number of the House, the only objection to the bill is, that it distributes the fractional members without regard, in all cases, to the size of the fractions. A moment's inspection of the table will show that the apportionment would be much more nearly according to the numbers of the several States, if one member were taken from New York, and given to Vermont; one from Pennsylvania, and given to Delaware; and one from Kentucky, and given to Missouri. In the table here with submitted, marked B, it will be seen that every apportionment bill hitherto passed has been obnoxious to the same objection of representing fractions, to a still greater degree than the amendment proposed by the Senate. In fact, in the admitted impossibility of constituting a House in such a way as that each State shall possess its exact mathematical proportion of the entire House, it is unavoidable that a remainder or a fraction should be left, if the numbers to be represented in different States be divided by any one ratio. But it is also mathematically demonstrable, that on the principles of the Senate’s amendment applied to the population of the States, these remainders are much less than they would be according to the bill as passed. In a House of 256, these remainders would, in the aggregate, amount to less than 140,000; by the bill they amount to 643,000, making a difference of more than half a million in favor of the principles of the amendment. But granting that the amendment represents fractions, and that this is an objection, it is a still stronger objection to the bill that it leaves fractions unrepresented. These fractions are composed of the people of the United States entitled to representation. The objection supposes that each member represents a portion of the population amounting to 47,000, or whatever else be the ratio, and that the amendment gives to some number less than 47,000 a member, who consequently represents a less number than are entitled to be represented by one member. On the principle of this objection, the bill leaves these fractions unrepresented, which is, to say the least, as great an evil. Perhaps it might be safely argued that, under our system, it is a greater evil to deprive a part of the people of their representation, than to give a part of them greater weight in the representation than they are entitled to. But, allowing these evils to be equal in themselves, their magnitude

|must depend on the numbers who suffer them.

It is, therefore, a greater objection to the bill
that it leaves 643,483 of the people unrepre-
sented, than it is to the amendment that it gives
an over representation of 137,000. Or, in other
words, as all the people are equally entitled to
be represented, is is a greater evil to leave the
larger fractions, unrepresented than to give
them a representation. -
In addition to this, it is to be borne in mind,




that there is no constitutional authority for as-
suming a ratio which, by dividing the State
numbers, creates these fractions. The consti-
tution prescribes an apportionment according to
numbers. This apportionment not only does
not require the assumption of a ratio—it cannot
possibly be reached by such a ratio. After the
apportionment is made by the rules indicated
above, the representatives assigned to each of
the States are the representatives of all the
people of that State. The constitution pre-
scribes that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of members chosen every second
year by the people of the several States. In se-
veral of the States they are chosen in one tick-
et, without any division into districts. In this
case, there can be no suggestion of fractions;
and it is the principle of the amendment to ef
fect such apportionment as will give to the peo.
ple of each State that number of representa-
tives which comes nearest its exact mathema-
tical share. It is the fault of the bill that it does
not thus apportion them—that it gives to some
States less, and to others more than their share.
The State of New York is entitled to 38.59 hun.
dredths in a House of 240. The principle of
the amendment will give her one additional
member for the 59.100ths. The bill gives her
two additional members, and yet it is objected
to the amendment that it represents fractions.
It is further objected to the amendment that it
tends to consolidation. ‘This objection is sup-
posed to rest on the circumstance that the po-
pulation is taken in the aggregate, in order to
ascertain what part of each State bears to the
whole. But with this arithmetical addition of
numbers the process of consolidation stops—
there is no political consolidation, no aggrega-
tion of votes. It is not proposed, in any way,
to change the mode in which the representa-
tives are chosen. There is no diminution of the
control exercised by the State Governments
over the election of representatives. If the pro.
posed amendment have any bearing upon con:
solidation, it has rather the opposite tendency.
It is essentially preservative of the weight of
the smaller States : the opposite principle to

first Congress was made.

order to understand whether this objection is,
well founded, it is necessary to inquire into the
principles on which the apportionment of the
That apportionment
forms a part of the text of the constitution; and
it is reasónable to suppose that it was made on
principles as nearly analagous as circumstances
permitted, to those prescribed in the same in-
strument as the permanent rule of, apportion.
The following is the statement of the popu-
lation on which this first apportionment was
made, as preserved in an address of General
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a member of
the federal convention, to the Legislature of S.
Carolina : . . "
New Hampshire, 102,000
Massachusetts, 360,000

Rhode Island, , 58,000

Connecticut, . 202,000

New York, 238,000, o

New Jersey, 138,000' ' ~ *

Pennsylvania, S60,000

Delaware, • 37,000

Maryland, 218,000 including 3-5ths of

. . . 80,000 slaves.

Virginia, 420,000 280,000 “

North Carolina, 200,000 60,000 “

South Carolina, 150,000 80,000 “

Georgia, 90,000 20,000 “ so --


Several of these sums are evidently estimates only, and for this reason probably, and the convenience of round numbers, the convention appear to have taken the aggregate population of the States at 2,600,000, an amount exceed. ing the estimate of 27,000 only. The number of the House was previously fixed at 65. It being found that this gave a ratio of about 40,000, that number was adopted by the convention. We are informed in the debates of the New York convention for adopting the consti. tution, that it was only at the very close of their labors that the lower ratio ef one for every thirty thousand was substituted, at the re

consolidation. As the large States increase in
relative size, the small States lose more and
more of their due representative proportion, by
the use of an arbitrary ratio applied to the po-
pulation of the States severally. By the princi.
ple of the bill the large States are made strong-
er and the small States weaker. By the con.
stitution the House of Representatives was, in
some degree, founded on the principle of cons
solidation, and the Senate on that of State sove-
reignty. The principle of the bill increases the
consolidating tendency of the House by strength-
ening the large states at the expense of the
small ; the principle of the amendment resists
that tendency, and though it does not unduly
increase, it preserves to the small States their
just proportion of strength.
It is, in the next place, objected to the a-
mendment, that it adopts a principle rejected
by President Washington in 1792, and not since
introduced into any apportionment bill. In

quest of General Washington. The convention had been guided to the number of 65, for the sake of making the Senate and House of Representatives consist, together of 91, which was the greatest number of delegates that could be sent to the old Congress by the 13 States, each being allowed to send seven. Deducting 26 Senators from 91, there remained 65 as the number of the House. But, in apportioning a House of 65 to the states, a regard for the smaller States was exercised, in harmony with the spirit of accommodation wiłich presided in the entire compact. Not merely were several of them allowed an additional representative for large fractions, but from two of the three large States, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, a member was taken away, and to one of the smaller ones, South Carolina, two members beyond her proportion were assigned. The following table will enable the House, by comparing the actual apportionment with that

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which a rigid adherence to the ratio would have required, to judge of the extent to which this regard for the interest of the smaller States

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and that the numbers in this section are artfully

lessened for the larger States, while the small-
er States have their full proportion, in ordet
to prevent the undue influence which the larg-
er States will have in the government from
being too apparent, and I think that this objec-
tion is well founded.” The minority of the
$ommittee by no means agree with Mr. Martin
in ascribing this arrangement to artifice. . With
* exact numerical estimate before them, it
was not possible that the convention should be
onorant of what they were doing, nor is it re-
*ciful to their memory to ascribe to inadver-
*} on the part of Virginia, Pennsylvania,and
Massachusetts, and to overreaching on the part
of New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina,
* Georgia, what was evidently granted by
:*: to the latter in the spirit of concilia-
*h, was the adjustment of this question,
*of the most delicate that presented itself to
* convention, by the framers of the constitu-
* That instrument provided for an enume,
* of the inhabitants within three years;
** soon as it could be effected, a new ap-
*onment was undertaken agreeably to its re.
silt, Cvagress contained at that time many
*ions of great eminence, who had been mem-
* of the federal convention, and less than
*Years had elapsed since the constitution

*framed. It was very soon perceived that *hardship was done to several States by *š an arbitrary ratio; and as the constitu*d not prescribed the process by which

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the apportionment of representatives was to be made, after ineffectual attempts to fix on a divisor, which would remedy the injustice complained of, resort was had to a propostion be. tween the aggregate population and the share to which each State was entitled. Both proGesses, in a spirit of accommodation, had been pursued in the convention. The question unfortunately assumed a sectional and party character in Congress, but the journals of the two Houses exhibit names in favor of the allotment of representatives by proportion, to which no suspicion can attach, and which must be considered as a high sanction of any interpretation of the constitution. Of those who voted in its favor in the Senate, were Messrs. Langdon, Cabot, Strong, King, Read, Bassett, and Ells. | worth, all members of the federal convention, and the last subsequently Chief Justice of the United States. In the House of Representa tives, the bill was supported by many of the most distinguished individuals of both the political parties which had begun, even then, to divide the country. The minority of the committee find it difficult to believe that any unconstitutional principle of apportionment could have received, the sanction of these eminent, patriotic, and sagacious men in both Houses of Congress, many of whom had been the most active and influential members of the federal convention. The bill which passed the two Houses, was expressed in the following terms: “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That from and after the 3d day of March, 1793, the House of Representatives shall be composed of one hundred and twenty members, elected within the several States according to the following apportionment, that is to say: within the State of New Hampshire, five; within the State of Massachu. setts, sixteen; within the State of Vermont, three; within the State of Rhode Island, two, within the State of Connecticut, eight; within the State of New York, eleven; within the State of New Jersey, six; within the State of Pennsylvania, fourteen; within the State of Delaware, two; within the State of Maryland, nine, within the State of Virginia, twenty-one; with. in the State of Kentucky, two; within the State of North Carolina, twelve; within the State of South Carolina, seven; within the State of Georgia, two.” This bill was rejected by President Washing. ton; and the weight of his authority requires that the grounds of his rejection of it should be carefully examined; the rather, as it is believed by the minority of the committee that his precise views of the subject have been disclosed but recently, and that through a private chan. nel; and that for want of this intormation, mistaken inferences have been drawn from his public message. . In order to throw full light on the subject, the following extract is made from the private memoirs of Mr. Jefferson,then Secretary of State: “April 6th, [5th.] The President called on


tenth day. I had before given him my opinion|t

me before breakfast, and first introduced someled no principle on which the allotment was so

other matter, then fell on the representation made. It wore the appearance of an arbitrary * bill, which he had now in his possession for the apportionment. The circumstance, also, uhat o here are two steps in the process of propot- or " in writing, that the method of apportionment|tion by which the result was obtained, may o was contrary to the constitution. He agreed|have been considered objectionable. The con: ... that it was contrary to the common understand-stitution, however, is silent on this head, and . ing of that instrument, and to what was under-|requires only that the apportionment should be o *ing,

stood at the time by the makers of it; that, yet, according to numbers.

it would bear the construction which the bill pit;

and he observed that the vote for and againstli
the bill was perfectly geographical, a northern to several States more than one member for

against a southern vote, and he feared he
should be thought to be taking side with a sou-
ern party. I admitted the motive of delicacy,
but that it should not induce him to do wrong;
urged the dangers to which the scramble for
fractionary members would always lead. • * *
* He went home, sent for Randolph, the At.
torney General, desired him to get Mr. Madi.
son immediately, and come to me; and if we
three concurred in opinion, that he should ne-
gative the bill. He desired to hear nothing
more about it, but that we would draw the in-
strument for him to sign. They came. Our
minds had been before made up. We drew the
instrument. Randolph carried it to him, and
told him we all concurred in it. He walked
with him to the door; and, as if he still wished
to get off, he said, “And you say you approve
of this yourself?’ ‘Yes, sir,” says Randolph, “I
do, upon my honor.” He sent it to the House
of Representatives instantly.” " " ' ". . .
It appears, from this passage, that General
Washington thought that the constitution ad-
mitted both constructions put upon it; and this
important fact enables us to comprehend more

clearly the purport of the message conveying|

his negative, a message not drafted by himself, as it appears from Mr. Jefferson's account, and sent to the House of Representatives at the last moment, and with evident reluctance. It is in the following terms:

“ Gentlemen of the House of Representatives: I have maturely considered the act pass. ed by the two Houses, entitled ‘An act for the apportionment of representatives among theseseveral States according to the first enumera. tion,” and I return it to your House where it originated, with the following objections;

First. The constitution has prescribed that representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, and there is no one proportion or divisor, which, applied to the respective numbers of the States, will yield the namber and allotment of representatives proposed by the bill.

Second. The constitution has also provided that the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand; which restriction is, by the context, and fair and obvious construction, to be applied to the separate and respective numbers of the States; and the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than one for every thirty thousand.


The first objection of General Washington

The second was probably the main objection in General Washington s mind, viz. that it gave

every thirty thousand. This objection has no
application to the present bill, which gives to
no State a member for less than thirty thousand
On the whole, therefore, it appears- ..
1st. That, in the first apportionment, which
forms a part of the text of the constitution, the
convention proceeded, by fixing the number of
the House, and that, from a compatison of that
number with the entire estimated population, a
ratio was reduced. * -
2d. That in applying that ratio, a great lo-
dulgence was exercised towards the smallet
States, in allowing them additional members
beyond their exact proportion. "

adopted in the present amendment, was sup-
ported by several of the most eminent members
of the federal convention.
4th. And that, though the bill of 1792 wo
rejected by General Washington, it was belie:
ed by him that the constitution would admit
the construction which the bill placed upon ti
and that he was induced with reluctance to in-
terpose his negative.
These considerations, it is believed, are sus.
ficient to show that no inference can be drawn
from the fate of the bill of 1792, adverse to
the constitutionality of the present amendment.
The subsequent acquiescence in a diffet."
mode of apportionment, cannot affect the right"
of those States on whom it operates injuriously,
The evil is constantly increasing with the grow"
ing inequality of population in different Stato.
It is greater now than ever before, and is of *

constitution has provided a new apportionment ficient reason for rectifying, on the occasion

process. It is a very insufficient reason for cQuiescence in a manifest injustice, that it has been borne forty years; it ought to be suff

. It has been already urged that the constitu.
tion provides that representatives and direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers
It is an obvious inference from this rule,that the
same process should be observed in each ap'
portionment. The objection to the amend-
ment, that it proceeds on principles of consoli-
dation, because it institutes a proportion be.
tween the aggregate of the population and the

was so far founded in fact, that the bill express

3d. That the principle of apportionment .

a new apportionment, any error in the former

cient to point it out, to have the remedy conce

numbers of the House, applies with equal forces,

nature to go on increasing indefinitely. The \!.

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that no one arbitrary ratio, previously fixed and

to the process by which direct taxes always have been, and always will be, apportioned. It has been argued, indeed, that no State, in a case where it has received a member beyond its exact proportion, would consent to pay tax. es in proportion to its members beyond its arith metical share of the tax; but it is still more im, portant to observe, that no State would be excused from any part of the tax on account of her unrepresented fractions. Although deprived of a part of the privilege of her representation, she would be relieved from no part of the burden of taxation. And if, as the objection truly assumes, no State would consent to be taxed for an extra member, it applies with double force to the bill. In a House of 240, the exact proportion of Mew York is 38.59—the amendment gives her 39 members. It is object. td to this, that out of a tax of $240, New York would not fairly be taxed $39. But the bill gives her 40 members; and in the same degree —and in which it would be more unjust to tax her $40 rather than $39, her true share being $38.59-in that degree, the bill is more obnoxo than the amendment to the objection urg

It is even contended that the bill apportions representatives to the States respectively, and that the amendment does not; and this unexpected result is thought to be attained because the numbers given by the bill, and amounting, altogether, to 240, are the quotients, onitting the remainders, obtained by dividing the whole population of the Union by the ratio which gives, in the aggregate, a House of 250. The fallacy of this statement is too apparent to require exposition. The objection of the proportion is to ascertain what part of a House of a given size is to be apportioned to each State. The first term of the proportion is the aggregate population of the Union—the second is the whole House—the third is the population of each State—and the fourth, the representation of each State. Now, as all the third terms, added logether, must make the first, so all the fourth terms, added together, must make the second. But this result cannot be attained without including the fractions. These the bill rejects, and makes the sum of the fourth terms equal to 240, instead of 250; and yet, it is said, “the due proportion between the States, each losing its own fractions, is to be presumed.”—

It has also been said that the approach to an exact proportion made by the amendment is imaginary; and tables have been constructed to show the inequalities which would result from taking, as the ratio of a portionment, the po- | pulation of some one of the States which receives an additional member. But the amendment proceeds on the incontestible principle,

applied to each State, would give an equitable result in practice, it is, therefore, illogical, to take the case of a State having an additional member for a large fraction, and make use of to population as a ratio to apply to all the other States. Still, however, this objection is capable of the most complete answer. It is admit‘ed that the same principle which, in the

amendment, gives Delaware two members, (or in the foregoing statement. House of 250, the result is a House of 251; and if 251 be, the number assumed, the aggregate result will be 252. Although, in practice,there

one for 37,716 inhabitants,) would greatly enlance the representation of New York, Penn. "lvania, &c. beyond what the amendment as:

*gns to them. But, on the other hand, it is i

number 251.
tion of the number 256; that it is the exact
mathematical result of the rule of proportion,
applied according to the principles maintained

This cannot be done without presuming that

any given number of representatives is the same

proportionate part of 250 and 240; that is, that

240 and 250 are the same number.

But, while the minority of the committee are

decidedly of opinion that the laws of equity,
and the fair interpretation of the constitution,
require an apportionment on the principles of
the amendment of the Senate, they recommend
to the House to adopt a different number, viz.
taining to each State its present representation

This number has the advantage of re

n Congress—an advantage not possessed by the It is an additional recommenda

In apportioning a

sno inconvenience in this result, and the prin

most too obvious to need statement, that the ciple of the nearest possible approach to an exMinciple of the bill which gives Delaware but act mathematical proportion remains unimpair* for 75,432, would greatly reduce the repre-led, the number 256 has the advantage of being

* beyond what the bill assigns to those tes.

By a table marked A, and subjoined to the *Port of the committee, it appears that if eveState were represented on a ratio that gives

free from this real or supposed objection. The minority of the committee accordingly recommend an amendment to the amendment of the Senate, in virtue of which the House will consist of 256 members, distributed in such a man

Delaware two members, the House would be ner that each State will have that number as

*tied to 306. But if every State were repre*ned on a ratio that gives Delaware but one *mber,the entire House would be sunk to 148. * excess, on the first supposition,is 66. The oriency,on the second, is 92. The inequality of the bill over that of the amendment is, ac. ‘ordingly, as 92 is to 66. (See table C.) In * manner, it can be proved, by mathemati* calculation, that every other kind of inequa. *y ascribed to the amendment, operates

signed it which comes the nearest possible to the exact proportion which the population of the State bears to the Union.

Table marked D presents, at one view, the apportionment of the present House—the apportionment proposed by the bill—the apportionment proposed by the Senate's amendment —and the apportionment, proposed in the amendment here with submitted to the amendment. ED WARD EVERETT,

*inst the bill to a much greater degree.


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