Sec. 12. And be it further enacted, That it regarding each representative apportioned to a shall be the duty of the master and owner of ev State as the representative of the number of ery steamboat running in the night to suspend inhabitants included in that ratio, leaves a retwo lights, (at least three feet above the deck mainder in each State, and in the aggregate, a of his boat,) the one at the bow and the other at the stern, under the penalty of two hundred dollars.

APPORTIONMENT.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
MONDAY, MAY 7.

very large population, unrepresented. The only reason urged in defence of this course, is, that each of the said remainders is less than the assumed ratio, and therefore not entitled to a representative. Now, if a ratio were assumed larger than the population of Delaware, and Delaware were, on that ground, deprived of a member, the Constitution would be exprressly violated: but if a number of representatives be REPORT OF THE MINORITY. assigned to a State less than its due proportion, The minority of the committee to which the entitle it to another member, the spirit of the on the ground that the assumed ratio does not bill for the apportionment of the House of Constitution is violated in the same way. It is Representatives under the fifth census was the result of a process, not only not prescribed referred, dissenting from the views express- by the Constitution, but actually rendering it ed in the report of the majority, beg leave impossible fully to execute the rule of the Conto submit to the House the following state-stitution, which is, that representatives as well ments and considerations: as taxes, shall be apportioned among the States

The majority of the committee recommend a according to their respective numbers. disagreement with the amendment of the The process of proportionment is not preSenate. The minority are of opinion that scribed by the Consti ution. Could a result the amendment of the Senate is founded mathematically exact be attained, all processes on correct principles, and that the bill, as it would be indifferent, because they would all passed the House, is liable to objections on come to the same thing. But an exact propor the score of constitutionality and justice. The tion cannot be had. The nearest possible ap grounds of this opinion will be briefly stated. proach to it must, therefore, be made, and that The object of the bill is to carry into effect process must be adopted which gives the the provision of the Constitution, which directs nearest possible approach. an apportionment of representatives every ten But though the Constitution does not exyears, according to each successive enumera-pressly direct a process, it is believed that it tion of the inhabitants. suggests, by obvious inference,, the process That provision is expressed in the following which is followed in the Senate's amendment. terms, viz. "Representatives and direct taxes It prescribes that "representatives and direct shall be apportioned among the several Sta es taxes shall be apportioned among the several which may be included in this Union, according States, according to their respective numbers." to their respective numbers. Now, when a tax is to be apportioned, the sum The number of representave shall not exceed to be raised is fixed, and each State is assessed one for every thirty thousand, but each State its just share of that sum. The analagous proshall have at least one representative." cess, in apportioning representatives, is to fix This clause requires three things, in which is the whole number of the House to be chosen, comprehended the whole of the constitutional and give to each State its nearest proportionate provision touching the number of represen-number.

tatives.

If this principle is departed from, and an 1st. That the representatives shall be appor-arbitrary ratio assumed, some States will have tioned among the several States according to less than their nearest proportionate number, their respective numbers. and others more, and both in violation of the

2d. That the number of representatives shall Constitution. not exceed one for every thirty thousand.

The present bill, in the opinion of the 3d. That each State shall have at least one minority of the committee, from the necessary member. imperfection of the process, violates the ConThese provisions are all equally obligatory, stitution in both of these ways. It apportions and there is no more constitutional authority to 240 members among the several States, not depart from one than from another. It would according to their respective numbers, but be as unconstitutional to assign representatives giving to some States more, and some less than to the States in any other proportion than that this proportion.

of their respective numbers, as it would be to Thus the five States of New York, Pennsyl fix on a ratio less than thirty thousand, or, fix-vania, Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky, contain ing on a ratio higher than the population of the 5,847,844 inhabitants, and their proportion of smallest State, to deprive that State entirely of 240 representatives if 118. The other nineits representation. And the undersigned con- teen States contain 6,080,787 inhabitants, and ceive that the bill violates the first principle in their proportion is 122 representatives, being the same way as the third principle would be violated in the last supposed case.

The bill, by assuming an arbitrary ratio, and

an excess of four members, on the part of the nineteen States, over the five enumerated.But the bill gives the five large States 121

members, and the nineteen 119 members, an These statements demonstrate that represenexcess of two in favor of the five large States; tatives are not apportioned by the bill among being, in the whole, a difference of six between the several States according to their respective the numbers assigned by the bill, and a due numbers.

proportion.

It has been already conceded that it is not Pennsylvania receives by the bill just as possible that a proportion mathematically exmany members as Vermont, New Hampshire, act should ever be attained. So long as a cerMassachusetts, and New Jersey; but the aggre- tain number of representatives is to be chosen gate of their population exceeds hers by one within and for each of the several States, it is hundred and thirty thousand, nearly enough for conceded that it is impossible to allot them in a three additional members, the ratio assumed by proportion mathematically exact. As the Conthe bill. stitution did not intend to prescribe that a thing The bill gives to New York forty members, should be done every ten years, which it is and to Vermont five, or eight times as many to impossible ever to do at all, it follows that the New York as to Vermont, but New York wants practical rule of the Constitution is, to come as more than three hundred thousand inhabitants near the true apportionment as possible. This of being eight times as large as Vermont, a dif- the minority believe not to be done in the bill, ference greater than the entire population of but to be done on the principle of the amend. Vermont. Representatives are, therefore, cer- ment. The principle of the amendment is this, tainly not apportioned to these States accord- that the whole number of the proposed House shall ing to their respective numbers.

be apportioned among the several States accordThe same rule of proportion, which gives ing to their respective numbers, giving to each Vermont five members, would give New York State that number of members which comes nearbut thirty-four instead of forty, a difference ex- est to her exact mathematical part or proportion. ceeding the entire representation of Vermont. This result will be attained by the following The representatives of the two States are so far rule of proportion. As the aggregate of the from being apportioned according to their re-federal numbers to be represented is the entire spective numbers, that New York has an ex- House, so is the population of each State to its cess of six members over what such a propor-number of members. This may be illustrated tion would give her. She has a like excess of by an example in the following manner : Supfour members over what she ought to have, posing the federal population to be 11,928,731, were her representatives assigned to her in the the whole House to be 256, and the population same proportion as those of Alabama. of Vermont to be 280,657, the process will be,

The Constitution, as has been observed, as 11,928.731 is to 256, so is 280,65, to 6, with unites representatives and direct taxes in one a remainder of 1,081, giving to Vermont 6 clause, in providing that they shall be appor- members.-See table A. tioned among the several States according to But it is obvious that, in consequence of the their respective numbers. The bill proposes existence of such a remainder, which in some to apportion 240 members among the several cases may be very large, the whole numbers to States. The Constitution requires that each be represented will not be absorbed by this di State should have the same portion of 240 mem vision, and the whole number of members of bers as it would pay of $240 tax. Of a tax which the House is to consist will not be ap of 240 dollars, New York would pay precisely portioned. If the number at which the House $38 59. Her proportion of representatives, is fixed be 256, the number apportioned by therefore, expressed in figures, would be 38.59 the first step of the process will be 244, leaving But, as the nature of the case requires that the 12 members still to be apportioned; and this it number of representatives should be a whole is proposed on the principle of the amendment number, it is evident that, instead of 38.59, to do, by giving to each State an additianal we must take either 38 or 39, the number next member, wherever such additional member below or next above the exact number. The will bring its whole number nearer to the exact principle of the amendment, under considera- proportion.

tion, in this and all other similar cases, takes The minority of the committee believe that that whole number which comes nearest the the principle of the amendment of the Senate true number; and, in this instance, adopts 39 is well known to the legislation of the States, rather than 38, because 39 comes nearer to in their senatorial and other apportionments. 38.59. But the bill gives New York 40 mem- The journals of the House of Assembly in New bers, which is neither her exact proportionate York present a case exactly parallel. The number, nor the number nearest to the exact former constitution of that State directed that number. The provision of the Constitution is, the Senators, being twenty-four in number, therefore, violated in its letter and in its spirit. should be apportioned among the four great This is not an accidental result. It is the districts as near as may be. The Assembly alnecessary effect of the process pursued by the so was to be justly apportioned to the number bill, which is that of a previously assumed ar- of electors in each county, on the return of each bitrary ratio-a process not prescribed by the enumeration. A report upon the journals for Constitution. the year 1791, after stating the number of elec

Neither is it a temporary evil; but one which tors for the Senate and the Assembly, and that will increase in magnitude, in proportion as the the Senate was to consist of 24, and the Aslarge States grow still larger, and the ratio assembly of 70, adds, that "the quota was imsumed is higher.

:

perfect, by reason of the fractional parts or ratio, viz, that obtained by dividing the whole remainder over in each county, and it became population by the whole House, it will be found necessary to adopt some rule, by which those that fractions are represented and if 240 be parts might be adjusted; and the committee assumed as the number of the House, the only were of opinion, that it was most agreeable to objection to the bill is, that it distributes the the spirit of the constitution, that when any fractional members without regard, in all cases, senatorial district or any county had a remain-to the size of the fractions. A moment's inder or surplus of electors, exceeding one half spection of the table will show that the apporthe given ratio, (the ratio was 817 for the Se- tionment would be much more nearly according nate, and 554 for the Assembly,) such county to the numbers of the several States, if one memor such district should be entitled to an addi-ber were taken from New York, and given to tional member; and when such remainder was Vermont; one from Pennsylvania, and given to less than half, it should be rejected." Delaware; and one from Kentucky, and given

In the table herewith submitted, marked B,

And this rule was followed in the appor- to Missouri. tionment. But the principle of the amendment of the it will be seen that every apportionment bill Senate is objected to on the ground that it is a representation of fractions.

hitherto passed has been obnoxious to the same objection of representing fractions, to a still To this objection, it is a sufficient reply, that greater degree than the amendment proposed the amendment can only be made to appear as by the Senate. In fact, in the admitted imposa representation of fractions, by assuming an sibility of constituting a House in such a way as arbitrary ratio in the first instance. It has al that each State shall possess its exact mathemaready been observed, that the Constitution notical proportion of the entire House, it is unawhere prescribes this; but that, on the contra- voidable that a remainder or a fraction should ry, it must always be impossible, by assuming be left, if the numbers to be represented in difsuch a ratio, to carry into effect the constitu.ferent States be divided by any one ratio. But tional rule of apportioning representatives it is also mathematically demonstrable, that on among the several States according to their re-the principles of the Senate's amendment apspective numbers. plied to the population of the States, these re

It may farther be replied, that the present mainders are much less than they would be ac apportionment bill as it passed the House, and cording to the bill as passed. In a House of every other apportionment bill that ever pass-256, these remainders would, in the aggregate, ed, is liable to precisely the same objection. amount to less than 140,000; by the bill they That bill provides for apportioning a House of amount to 643,000, making a difference of more 240 members. That number of members ap- than half a million in favor of the principles of portioned among the several States, according the amendment. to their respective numbers, would give following result:

Maine,

8.036

To these the bill adds twelve more members, assigned to the States marked thus +

It is thus demonstrated by figures, that if 240 members be apportioned, by the only true

But granting that the amendment represents fractions, and that this is an objection, it is a still stronger objection to the bill that it leaves fractions unrepresented. These fractions are composed of the people of the United States entitled to representation.

The objection supposes that each member represents a portion of the population amounting to 47,000, or whatever else be the ratio, and that the amendment gives to some number less than 47,000 a member, who consequently represents a less number than are entitled to be represented by one member.

On the principle of this objection, the bill leaves these fractions unrepresented, which is, to say the least, as great an evil. Perhaps it might be safely argued that, under our system, it is a greater evil to deprive a part of the people of their representation, than to give a part of them greater weight in the representation than they are entitled to. But, allowing these evils to be equal in themselves, their magnitude must depend on the numbers who suffer them. It is, therefore, a greater objection to the bill that it leaves 643,483 of the people unrepresented, than it is to the amendment that it gives an over representation of 137,000. Or, in other words, as all the people are equally entitled to be represented, is is a greater evil to leave the larger fractions unrepresented than to give them a representation.

In addition to this, it is to be borne in mind,

that there is no constitutional authority for as- order to understand whether this objection is. suming a ratio which, by dividing the State well founded, it is necessary to inquire into the numbers, creates these fractions. The consti- principles on which the apportionment of the tution prescribes an apportionment according to first Congress was made. That apportionment numbers. This apportionment not only does forms a part of the text of the constitution; and not require the assumption of a ratio-it cannot it is reasonable to suppose that it was made on possibly be reached by such a ratio. After the principles as nearly analagous as circumstances apportionment is made by the rules indicated permitted, to those prescribed in the same inabove, the representatives assigned to each of strument as the permanent rule of, apportionthe States are the representatives of all the ment.

people of that State. The constitution pre- The following is the statement of the popuscribes that the House of Representatives shall lation on which this first apportionment was be composed of members chosen every second made, as preserved in an address of General year by the people of the several States. In se- Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a member of veral of the States they are chosen in one tick- the federal convention, to the Legislature of S. et, without any division into districts. In this Carolina:

North Carolina,
South Carolina,
Georgia,

102,000 360,000

58,000

202,000

238,000

138,000

$60,000

37,000

218,000 including 3-5ths of

80,000 slaves.

420,000

280,000 66

200,000

60,000 66

150,000

80,000 66

90,000

20,000 66

2,573,000

case there can be no suggestion of fractions; New Hampshire, and it is the principle of the amendment to ef Massachusetts, fect such apportionment as will give to the peo Rhode Island, ple of each State that number of representa- Connecticut, tives which comes nearest its exact mathema- New York, tical share. It is the fault of the bill that it does New Jersey, not thus apportion them-that it gives to some Pennsylvania, States less, and to others more than their share. Delaware, The State of New York is entitled to 38.59 hun Maryland, dredths in a House of 240. The principle of the amendment will give her one additional Virginia, member for the 59.100ths. The bill gives her two additional members, and yet it is objecte to the amendment that it represents fractions. It is further objected to the amendment that it tends to consolidation. This objection is supposed to rest on the circumstance that the population is taken in the aggregate, in order to Several of these sums are evidently estimates ascertain what part of each State bears to the only, and for this reason probably, and the whole. But with this arithmetical addition of convenience of round numbers, the convention numbers the process of consolidation stops- appear to have taken the aggregate population there is no political consolidation, no aggrega- of the States at 2,600,000, an amount exceed. tion of votes. It is not proposed, in any way, ing the estimate of 27,000 only. The number to change the mode in which the representa- of the House was previously fixed at 65. It tives are chosen. There is no diminution of the being found that this gave a ratio of about 40,control exercised by the State Governments 000, that number was adopted by the convenover the election of representatives. If the pro- tion. We are informed in the debates of the posed amendment have any bearing upon con- New York convention for adopting the constisolidation, it has rather the opposite tendency. tution, that it was only at the very close of It is essentially preservative of the weight of their labors that the lower ratio of one for eve the smaller States: the opposite principle to ry thirty thousand was substituted, at the reconsolidation. As the large States increase in quest of General Washington. The convenrelative size, the small States lose more and tion had been guided to the number of 65, for more of their due representative proportion, by the sake of making the Senate and House of the use of an arbitrary ratio applied to the po- Representatives consist, together of 91, which pulation of the States severally. By the princi- was the greatest number of delegates that could ple of the bill the large States are made strong- be sent to the old Congress by the 13 States, er and the small States weaker. By the con- each being allowed to send seven. Deducting stitution the House of Representatives was, in 26 Senators from 91, there remained 65 as the some degree, founded on the principle of con- number of the House. But, in apportioning a solidation, and the Senate on that of State sove House of 65 to the States, a regard for the reignty. The principle of the bill increases the smaller States was exercised, in harmony with consolidating tendency of the House by strength- the spirit of accommodation which presided in ening the large States at the expense of the the entire compact. Not merely were several small; the principle of the amendment resists of them allowed an additional representative that tendency, and though it does not unduly for large fractions, but from two of the three increase, it preserves to the small States their large States, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, just proportion of strength. a member was taken away, and to one of the

It is, in the next place, objected to the a- smaller ones, South Carolina, two members bemendment, that it' adopts a principle rejected yond her proportion were assigned. The folby President Washington in 1792, and not since lowing table will enable the House, by comintroduced into any apportionment bill. In paring the actual apportionment with that

which a rigid adherence to the ratio would the apportionment of representatives was to be have required, to judge of the extent to which this regard for the interest of the smaller States was carried:

made, after ineffectual attempts to fix on a divisor, which would remedy the injustice complained of, resort was had to a propostion be. tween the aggregate population and the share to which each State was entitled. Both proGesses, in a spirit of accommodation, had been pursued in the convention. The question unfortunately assumed a sectional and party character in Congress, but the journals of the two Houses exhibit names in favor of the allotment of representatives by proportion, to which no suspicion can attach, and which must be considered as a high sanction of any interpretation of the constitution. Of those who voted in its favor in the Senate, were Messrs. Langdon, Cabot, Strong, King, Read, Bassett, and Ells. worth, all members of the federal convention, and the last subsequently Chief Justice of the United States. In the House of Representa

This apportionment was not inadvertently tives, the bill was supported by many of the made. Other apportionments were recom- most distinguished individuals of both the polimended, and it was known at the time that, tical parties which had begun, even then, to by that which was adopted, the smaller States divide the country. The minority of the comreceived a share of the representative power of mittee find it difficult to believe that any unthe House, beyond their mathematical propor-constitutional principle of apportionment could tion.

Luther Martin, in speaking on this subject, makes the following remark:

have received the sanction of these eminent, patriotic, and sagacious men in both Houses of Congress, many of whom had been the most active and influential members, of the federal convention.

The bill which passed the two Houses, was expressed in the following terms:

"It was also objected that the numbers of representatives appointed by this section to be sent by the particular States to compose the first legislature, were not precisely agreeable to the rule of representation adopted by this system, "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of and that the numbers in this section are artfully Representatives of the United States of America, lessened for the larger States, while the small-in Congress assembled, That from and after the er States have their full proportion, in order 3d day of March, 1793, the House of Repreto prevent the undue influence which the larg sentatives shall be composed of one hundred er States will have in the government from and twenty members, elected within the sevebeing too apparent, and I think that this objec- ral States according to the following apportiontion is well founded." The minority of the ment, that is to say: within the State of New committee by no means agree with Mr. Martin Hampshire, five; within the State of Massachuin ascribing this arrangement to artifice. With setts, sixteen; within the State of Vermont, an exact numerical estimate before them, it three; within the State of Rhode Island, two, was not possible that the convention should be within the State of Connecticut, eight; within ignorant of what they were doing; nor is it re- the State of New York, eleven; within the spectful to their memory to ascribe to inadver- State of New Jersey, six, within the State of tency on the part of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania, fourteen; within the State of DeMassachusetts, and to overreaching on the part laware, two; within the State of Maryland, nine, of New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, within the State of Virginia, twenty-one; withand Georgia, what was evidently granted by in the State of Kentucky, two; within the State the former to the latter in the spirit of concilia- of North Carolina, twelve; within the State of South Carolina, seven; within the State of Such was the adjustment of this question, Georgia, two." one of the most delicate that presented itself to This bill was rejected by President Washingthe convention, by the framers of the constitu-ton; and the weight of his authority requires tion. That instrument provided for an enume that the grounds of his rejection of it should be ration of the inhabitants within three years; carefully examined; the rather, as it is believed and, as soon as it could be effected, a new ap by the minority of the committee that his preportionment was undertaken agreeably to its re- cise views of the subject have been disclosed sult. Congress contained at that time many but recently, and that through a private chan. persons of great eminence, who had been mem-nel; and that for want of this information, misbers of the federal convention, and less than taken inferences have been drawn from his four years had elapsed since the constitution public message. In order to throw full light was framed. It was very soon perceived that on the subject, the following extract is made great hardship was done to several States by from the private memoirs of Mr. Jefferson, then assuming an arbitrary ratio; and as the constitu- Secretary of State:

tion.

tion had not prescribed the process by which "April 6th, [5th.] The President called on